: THE PERSONAL LIVES OF STRONG EVALUATORS , , ' Identity

26 Pages·2007·0.22 MB·English

by  Joel Anderson

THE PERSONAL LIVES OF STRONG EVALUATORS:
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Identity, Pluralism, and Ontology in Charles Taylor's Value Theory
Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory 3 (1996): 17-38.
[Reprinted in The Problematic Reality of Values, ed. J. Bransen and M. Slors (Assen: Van Gorcem, 1996), 97-115].
Joel Anderson
Washington University in St. Louis
Both in political theory and in ethics, discussions of pluralism are haunted by an
opposition between subjectivity and objectivity. Claims of subjectivity -- of individual
identity, personal tastes, and diverse ways of life -- are construed as conflicting with claims
of objectivity -- of morality, impartiality, and the Good. Debates then center on which
should be given primacy, or how to manage a detente between the two, say, by setting
aside a "private" domain where subjectivity has free rein. But the underlying dichotomy
generally goes unquestioned.
What is thus particularly appealing about the work of Charles Taylor is his attempt to
resolve the opposition itself by arguing that subjectivity and objectivity are essentially
intertwined in the realm of value. On the one hand, the modern self can determine its
authentic identity only by engaging with subject-transcending sources of value. On the
other hand, one's access to such values is only possible through the ongoing attempt to
make sense of one's ineluctably subjective experience of the way in which things matter. The
modern self both relies on "sources" beyond itself and represents, in another sense, a
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source itself. Hence the double meaning of the title, Sources of the Self.
This entwinement of the subjective and the "subject-transcending" seems to provide
Taylor with a way of arguing for the objectivity of values while remaining a stauch defender
of political and ethical pluralism. Both are central commitments. He is firmly committed to
1In preparing this essay, I have benefitted greatly from discussing earlier drafts with Bert van den Brink,
Rainer Forst, Joseph Heath, Pauline Kleingeld, Thomas McCarthy, William Rehg, Marc Slors, and Carl Wellman.
2Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989) [hereafter cited
in the text as "Sources"]. Taylor's concern with resolving the tension between the subjective and the objective is
particularly explicit in his The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).
Joel Anderson, "The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators" - 1
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Herder's notion of a "measure" unique to each individual, and his political philosophy is
centered on the claim that a good society is one that ensures the availability of adequate
resources -- cultural and institutional, as well as material -- for a rich diversity of individual
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forms of meaningful self-realization. Furthermore, he consistently opposes monistic
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attempts to reduce the "diversity of goods" to a single, overarching principle. And yet he
has been also been a tireless critic of subjectivism with regard to value, a stand that has
been further underscored by his formulation of his anti-subjectivism in realist terms (most
prominently, in Sources).
But the balance here is delicate. Indeed, I shall be arguing that, despite his explicit
commitment to the diversity in personal commitments and ways of life, his appreciation of
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the importance of toleration for intercultural understanding, and his continued emphasis on
themes of authenticity, self-understanding, and identity, Taylor's endorsement of value
pluralism is in tension with the ontological character of his value theory.
This seems to be a fairly widespread worry, often formulated as a charge that Taylor
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has slipped into a Platonist metaphysics of the Good. Unfortunately, by mistakenly
charging Taylor with "Platonism," many discussions miss both the subtlety of Taylor's ethical
realism and precise character of his difficulties. The specific difficulty that concerns me here
has to do with the tension between Taylor's ontological account of value and what I shall
3"The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (rev. ed.), ed. A. Gutmann
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 30; see also Sources, 375.
4See especially, "Atomism," and "What's Wrong with Negative Liberty?" in Philosophy and Human Nature, 187-210,
211-29; "The Politics of Recognition"; and "Irreducibly Social Goods" and "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-
Communitarian Debate," in Philosophical Arguments, 127-145, 181-203, respectively.
5For a particularly adament statement of Taylor's opposition to value monism, see "Reply to Braybrooke and
de Sousa," 125. See also, "The Diversity of Goods," in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, 230-247.
6"Understanding and Ethnocentricity," in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, vol. 2 of Philosophical Papers (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 116-133.
7Numerous reviews of Sources of the Self raise this worry in variety of ways, often with rather caustic comments
on the possible role Taylor grants to God within this ontology. See Quentin Skinner, "Who Are 'We'?
Ambiguities of the Modern Self," Inquiry 34 (1991): 133-153; Judith Shklar, "Review of Sources of the Self," Political
Theory 19: (1991): 105-109; Ronald de Sousa, "Bashing the Enlightenment: A Discussion of Charles Taylor's
Sources of the Self," Dialogue 33 (1994): 121; and Russell Hittinger, "Critical Study: Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self,"
Review of Metaphysics 44 (Sept. 1990): 125. The argument is also made that Taylor is either not enough of a
Platonist or is, in fact, not a realist at all. See, respectively, Stephen R. L. Clarke, "Taylor's Waking Dream: No
One's Reply," Inquiry 34 (1991): 195-215; and Hartmut Rosa, "Goods and Life-Forms: Relativism in Charles
Taylor's Political Philosophy," Radical Philosophy no. 71 (May/June 1995): 22-26.
Joel Anderson, "The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators" - 1
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call the "individuating role of personal commitments." This is the idea, central to Taylor's
account, that the contingent fact that some projects, relationships, and ideals have greater
personal importance for me than for others is part of what individuates me as the unique
individual I am [e.g., Sources, 30]. And the question I wish to pose is this: How is this
crucial pluralistic notion of something having special value for me (and not for you) to be
squared with the general prescriptive and motivating character that Taylor attributes to
goods?
In what follows, I begin by sketching Taylor's basic approach to practices of
evaluation (specifically, to his concept of strong evaluation) and his non-Platonist but
ontological account of the objectivity of value. I then turn in the third section to the central
tension just mentioned, that between pluralism regarding what has personal significance,
on the one hand, and objectivity regarding standards of worth, on the other. In the
subsequent two sections, I consider Taylor's two central strategies for resolving this tension:
first, narrative justification as reasoning in transitions and, second, articulation of goods as a
matter of capturing their "personal resonances." I argue that each of these ultimately falls
short, and I conclude by tracing the sources of the difficulties with Taylor's approach and
considering some possible modifications.
Critical Reflection, Self-Interpretation, and Independent Standards of
Worth
Taylor's concept of strong evaluation incorporates three central aspects: (a) taking a
reflective attitude toward one's motivations for acting; (b) interpreting that attitude as well
as one's situation; and (c) employing an interpretive vocabulary that involves non-subjective
distinctions of worth. Each of these aspects warrants brief elaboration, especially the third.
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(a) Drawing on Harry Frankfurt's discussion of "second-order desires," Taylor
8To counter the voluntaristic connotations of the term "commitments," it should be emphasized that what is
meant here is a rather complex manner of being constituted so as to find certain projects, relationships, and
ideals deeply important. This has been developed well by Harry Frankfurt: see his "Autonomy, Necessity, and
Love," in Vernunftbegriffe in der Moderne: Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongress 1993, ed. H.F. Fulda and R.-P. Horstmann (Stuttgart:
Klett-Cotta, 1994), 433-47.
9"Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," in The Importance of What We Care About (New York: Cambridge
Joel Anderson, "The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators" - 1
presents strong evaluation as the defining capacity of persons to examine critically their
desires and to determine whether they want (at a "second-order" level) to have those
desires. In place of passive acquiescence to their desires, strong evaluators take an active
stance toward those desires -- either condemning them or endorsing them. To engage in
strong evaluation, then, is to grapple with the question of whether one wants to be the sort
of person who is moved in the way one finds oneself being moved.
(b) As is suggested by this talk of a struggle to get clear about one's motives, Taylor
conceives of practical reflection as an activity, specifically as an ongoing process of self-
interpretation. There are several reasons for taking such an approach. It not only avoids the
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errors of a Cartesian model of reflection, in which the ego relates transparently to itself; it
also captures the important sense in which one may deliberate not only about whether to
perform a certain action, but whether to engage in an action with a particular attendant
self-understanding, such as visiting a sick relative out of concern for his well-being (rather
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than out of concern for one's self-righteousness).
This move to an interpretive approach has an important consequence within Taylor's
account, for it opens up a transformative dimension of strong evaluation. Taylor argues that --
like much that is constitutively interpretive, such as novels or sculptures -- motivations are
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open to being reinterpreted in ways that transform them. A person may come to see, for
example, that her indignation is better understood as envy, or that her urge to leave her
University Press, 1988), 11-25. On the relationship between Frankfurt and Taylor, see my "Wünsche zweiter
Ordnung, Starke Wertungen und intersubjective Kritik: Zum Begriff ethischer Autonomie," Deutsche Zeitschrift für
Philosophie 42 (1994), 97-119.
10For a compelling formulation of the relevant arguments here, see Ernst Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-
Determination, trans. Paul Stern (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986), esp. lectures 3, 4, and 7.
11See "Self-Interpreting Animals" and "Theories of Meaning" in Human Agency and Language, vol. 1 of Philosophical
Papers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 45-76 and (esp.) 262, respectively; "Interpretation and
the Sciences of Man" and "Neutrality in Political Science," in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, 15-57, 58-90. See
also, Michael Stocker's Aristotelean discussion of acting "for the sake of a friend," in his "Values and Purposes:
The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship," Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 747-65.
12See, e.g., Sources, 34; "Theories of Meaning," 270-3; "Self-Interpreting Animals," 64-74; "What is Human
Agency?" in Human Agency and Language, 35-40; and "Charles Taylor Replies," in Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: The
Philosophy of Charles Taylor in Question, ed. J. Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 219-22. Due to
constraints of space, I will not be able to discuss Taylor's important and controversial claim that many of the
motivations and emotions that are the object of strong evaluation are partly constituted by the way in which
they are interpreted. For a critical discussion, see Richard Moran, "Making Up Your Mind: Self-Interpretation
and Self-Constitution," Ratio (New Series) 1 (1988): 135-151.
Joel Anderson, "The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators" - 1
present job for a new life in Nepal may be motivated less by an adventurous spirit than by a
lack of resolve and self-confidence in the face of a tenure evaluation. Since what one feels
here is bound up with how one understands the import of one's feelings, these re-
interpretations rarely leave the motivational state unchanged.
Significantly, Taylor goes on to make the further claim that, because this process of
self-interpretation and self-evaluation is in principle unending, the possibility of
transformative re-interpretation opens up a realm of individual "responsibility for self," a
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responsibility to continue to strive for a deeper and better understanding of oneself. Since
we can never close off the hermeneutic process arbitrarily without risking shallowness or
inauthenticity, it seems that what gives an individual's (constitutively interpretive) identity
any stability at all can only be that, as in the case of a poem or painting, the interpretations
involved stand up to scrutiny. But even then, there is no final stopping point, for every
interpretation is subject to further challenge.
(c) This constructivist emphasis might suggest that we can just invent ourselves. But
this is an idea that Taylor adamantly rejects as failing to acknowledge the third dimension of
strong evaluation, the way in which our strong evaluations are constrained by standards
that are not of our own choosing. In its weakest formulation, this is the claim that because
progress in self-interpretations is bound up with making value-laden discriminations, such as
that between envy and indignation, that are only available in language, our use of these
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terms is governed by rules of linguistic intelligibility.
But Taylor usually means the constraints of "intelligibility" to apply in a stronger
sense, as fixing the limits of what actions, choices, and patterns of valuation we can
possibly render intelligible. The point is that it is only by finding ourselves "always already"
within some "horizon of significance" that we can distinguish between what is significant
and insignificant. To deny the existence of such constraints -- to claim that "people could
13"What is Human Agency?" 39-42.
14On the importance of evaluative terms, see, e.g., "Theories of Meaning," 261-2; and "Understanding and
Ethnocentricity," 116-23. Cf. Iris Murdoch's discussion of "secondary moral concepts," in "The Idea of
Perfection," in The Sovereignty of Good (Boston: Routledge & Kegal Paul, 1970), 1-46; and Bernard Williams's dis-
cussion of "thick ethical concepts" in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1985), esp. ch. 8.
Joel Anderson, "The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators" - 1
determine what is significant, either by decision or perhaps unwittingly and unwillingly by
just feeling that way" -- would be, in Taylor's words, "crazy":
I couldn't just decide that the most significant action is wiggling my toes in
warm mud. Without a special explanation, this is not an intelligible claim....
What could someone mean who said this? But if it makes sense only with an
explanation (perhaps mud is the element of the world spirit which you contact
with your toes), it is open to criticism....Your feeling a certain way can never
be sufficient grounds for respecting your position, because your feeling can't
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determine what is significant...."
Strongly evaluative claims must be conceived of as arguable, as open to being disputed and
defended intersubjectively. And it is a short step from here to Taylor's stronger claim that
"strong evaluation...involve[s] discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse, higher or
lower, which are not rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather
stand independent of these and offer standards by which they can be judged" [Sources, 4].
It is at this point that we can grasp Taylor's distinction between "strong" and "weak"
evaluation. To a first approximation, what separates them is that while strong evaluation
involves a principled rejection or endorsement of a way of being moved to act ("principled" in
the sense that it is not reducible to a contingent conflict with another motive), weak evaluation
is generally a matter of expedience or degrees of desirability. For example, to introduce a
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variation on Frankfurt's well-known example, imagine a drug addict who has a (second-
order) desire to stop wanting another "fix" because her addiction happens to conflict with
other desires -- such as affording a comfortable apartment or composing great music.
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Although reflective, she is evaluating only weakly. The strongly evaluating addict, by
contrast, finds her cravings base and her inability to take hold of her life cowardly;
furthermore -- and herein lies the distinction -- the strongly evaluating addict would reject
15The Ethics of Authenticity, 36. Elizabeth Anderson puts this point concisely: "Our capacities for articulating our
attitudes depend on our understandings of our attitudes, which are informed by norms for valuation." (Value in
Ethics and Economics [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 5.
16Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will," 17.
17This is not to deny that weak evaluation has its place in the life of strong evaluators. Taylor does claim,
however, that the capacity for strong evaluation is a crucial feature of full human agency, though I shall not be
able to treat this claim here. See Martin Löw-Beer, "Living a Life and the Problem of Existential Impossibility,"
Inquiry 34 (1991): 217-236. In what follows, I shall assume that it would be very hard for most of us not to
be. Thus, references to "strong evaluators" will be very inclusive.
Joel Anderson, "The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators" - 1
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her desire even if she could feed her habit and still pay her rent or write her music.
In order to make judgments of this kind, Taylor argues, one needs to be able to
employ certain "qualitative distinctions" as to the worth of certain desires and goals. Only by
appealing to subject-transcending standards of what makes something "cowardly" or "base"
rather than "courageous" or "noble," does it become possible to understand our experi-
encing some desires and goals as deserving to be endorsed or rejected. But what is the status
of the subject-transcending standards in virtue of which they deserve this?
Taylor's Account of Objective Value: Ontological but not Platonist
At this point, further clarification is needed regarding the ontological terms in which
Taylor formulates his anti-subjectivistic account of value. This brings us back to the charge
that, in speaking of coming into "contact" with "transcendent" and "nonanthropocentric"
"moral sources" such as Nature or God, Taylor is committed to an outdated Platonic
conception of the Good. For purposes of examining whether Taylor's ontological approach
provides the basis for an adequate theory of value, the central worry seems to be that, in
opting for Platonism, Taylor has taken on board a notion of objectivity with dogmatic
implications, for it suggests a single, timeless set of moral truths to be discovered. This
dogmatic conception of objectivity, it is thought, is fundamentally at odds with the history of
shifting value-conceptions and the imperatives of cross-cultural toleration. Given that Taylor
himself is deeply committed to avoiding ahistorical dogmatism of this or any sort, this is a
serious charge.
But the dismissal of Taylor as a Platonist is off the mark, and it is important to
understand why if we are to understand the deeper difficulties with his theory of value and
his concept of strong evaluation. To begin with, it is worth noting that Taylor himself
explicitly and consistently criticizes Platonism. As a matter of historical contingency, he
argues, "We are now in an age in which a publicly accessible cosmic order of meaning is an
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impossibility" [Sources, 512], and in this sense at least, "Platonism is dead." But Taylor also
18"What is Human Agency?" 21.
19"Comments and Replies," Inquiry 34 (1991): 248; and "Reply to Commentators," Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 54 (1994): 210].
Joel Anderson, "The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators" - 1
views Platonism about value as fundamentally mistaken in its assumption -- which it shares,
oddly, with naturalism -- that something can be deemed real only if it can be shown to part
of the same world that is revealed by inquiry into a human-independent reality. In this way,
according to Taylor, "Platonism and the natural science model are...objectively allied in
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creating a false picture of the issue of moral goods."
Taylor's approach, by contrast, aims to steer a course between projectivism and
standard forms of realism by arguing that, at least for goods such as courage and dignity,
what is real is what is "inseparable from our best self-interpretation" [Sources, 342; see also
58-9, 68-74]. Once we reject the assumption shared by Platonism and naturalism, it
becomes possible to argue that such goods are objectively real even though they are bound
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up with how we experience the world and our situation in it. On a parallel with non-
foundationalist approaches in philosophy of science, Taylor's position is that what is real is
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what our best theories (or, as he says, "best accounts") tell us is real. More specifically,
and consistent with his general hermeneutic-phenomenological insistence on the
importance of understanding the human world from the perspective of lived experience, Taylor
argues that with regard to certain practices and experiences that are central to the fabric of
our lives, the only way to make sense of them is by making claims about what is real -- for
example, claims about redness or sunsets -- even if this does not fit into detached,
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naturalistic accounts of the world.
20Sources, 56. See also 69, 73f., 342, 372, 427f., and esp. "Comments and Replies," 245-9. Cf. S.L. Hurley,
Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 14f.
21In this sense -- though probably only in this sense -- Taylor might actually be understood to be advocating
a form of "response-dependent" realism about value, a term first introduced by Mark Johnston in his
"Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 63, 139-174. See also, inter
alia, Philip Pettit, "Realism and Response-Dependence," Mind 100 (1991): 587-626; Michael Smith, The Moral
Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); David Wiggins, "Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life," in Needs, Values,
Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 87-137; John McDowell, "Values and Secondary
Qualities," in Morality and Objectivity: A Tribute to J.L. Mackie, ed. T. Honderich (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1985), 110-129; and Crispin Wright, "Moral Values, Projection, and Secondary Qualities," Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 62, 1988. Cf. the discussion of "sensibility theories" by Stephen Darwall, Alan
Gibbard, and Peter Railton, in their "Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends," The Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 152-65.
22Sources, 57-9, 68. For an excellent overview, see Arthur Fine, "Unnatural Attitudes: Realist and
Instrumentalist Attachments to Science," Mind 95 (1986): 149-79.
23See "Overcoming Epistemology" and "The Validity of Transcendental Arguments," in Philosophical Arguments
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 8-13 and 20-33, respectively.
Joel Anderson, "The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators" - 1
In the context of Taylor's concept of strong evaluation, the experiences from which
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we must always start out are what I shall term our "affective-conative responses" to situations.
These include the full spectrum of ways in which we find ourselves moved in response to
situations -- from the sense of compassion evoked by the face of a child in pain to the
feeling of reverence felt toward unspoilt wilderness. And it is in the attempt to make sense
of these experiences and their import, on Taylor's view, that the ontological vocabulary of
goods emerges as crucially important: "Ontological accounts have the status of
articulations of our moral instincts. They articulate the claims implicit in our reactions"
[Sources, 8]. In part, this is a claim about, say, wilderness areas being the bearer of a real
property such as worthy-of-reverential-treatment [Sources, 68]. More central to Taylor's
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concerns, however, is the idea that goods -- both "life goods" and "constitutive goods" --
are something real that we appeal to and that inspires us.
Central to Taylor's ontological account of value, then, is the claim that in actively
seeking to make sense of their affective-conative responses to situations, strong evaluators
necessarily find themselves appealing to standards of value and treating them as having a
certain ontological status. Indeed, what defines Taylor's approach as ontological is the fact
that what supports our most basic evaluative intuitions is not an underlying principle of
reason or even an overarching value or set of values that trumps all others but rather an
understanding of how the world is. There are two distinctive features of this ontological
status within Taylor's account that are worth highlighting.
First, Taylor speaks of goods not just as part of our best accounts of our affective-
conative responses but also in a language that highlights the way in which (in his view)
goods are experienced as having a certain ontological independence: not only do values
24The term "affective-conative response" is meant to capture the broad range of subjective elements that are
the object of a person's self-interpretation.
25Taylor draws a distinction between the widely varying "life goods," in virtue of which a life is worthy or
valuable [Sources, 63], and "constitutive goods," which "stand behind" life goods [Sources, 93]. Since (a) this is
not a foundationalist distinction and thus (b) there is no standpoint from which to say that a particular good is
a constitutive good rather than a life good that only appears to be beyond further backing, and (c) both are
justified by appeal to what makes the most sense of our lived experience, I shall be speaking for the most part
simply of "goods," understood as a continuum between these two sorts (with "hypergoods" -- to which Taylor
no longer refers -- somewhere in the middle.)
Joel Anderson, "The Personal Lives of Strong Evaluators" - 1
move us and empower us to act; we try to get "access" to them or get "closer" to them [e.g.,
Sources, 91-98, 310, 338]. Of course, all of this is part of how we experience goods, and thus
the contrast with Platonism remains. But by characterizing goods in terms of these sorts of
relationships to judging agents, Taylor suggests a model within which someone who was not
moved by these goods gets conceived as failing to connect with something real and as blind
to something objective. More strongly, if articulating the point of my experience is central
to what it is to be a self-interpretive agent (and a strong evaluator), and if this articulation
is geared toward identifying the appropriateness of my affective-conative responses and
doing so in ontological terms, then in doing so I am implicitly articulating something that
others should feel too.
The generality of the constraints on appropriate responses (and thus on choices,
which are justified in light of these responses) is underscored, second, by the rather strong
stand Taylor takes against relativism. Taylor is right, I think, to reject as pragmatically
incoherent forms of relativism according to which judgments about goods are justified only
from my perspective, as a function of my being the person I am, such that unless you share my
form of life, you are in no position to challenge my perceptions of value. This includes even
those forms of "sophisticated naturalism" that view "our valuations as among the
perceptions of the world and our social existence which are inseparable from our living
through and participating in our form of life" [Sources, 67 (he mentions Bernard Williams)].
This emphasis on the ontological and thus shared basis for judgments about the good clearly
indicates that the way that the import of one's affective-conative responses (and the
resulting claims about what is significant) are general in character.
But one can also evaluate a choice as good for you though not for me in an objective
sense, such that you might be able to show me wrong. We can take a claim such as "living
close to nature has enormous value for me, as a component of my life," and we can argue
about the truth of that claim. This seems like a plausible position for a realist about value
to take. The question is, can Taylor take it?
In fact, it seems unclear that he can, in part because he conceives of evaluative
disagreements not as disputes about the validity of claims, but rather as something more akin