The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy: Volume IV 2004 PDF
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The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy In cooperation with M. BRAINARD, Frankfurt • R. BRUZINA, Kentucky J. DRUMMOND, New York • A. MICKUNAS, Ohio T. SEEBOHM, Bonn • T. SHEEHAN, Stanford edited by BURT HOPKINS STEVEN CROWELL QQ IV - 2004 The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy General Editors Burt Hopkins, Seattle University Steven Crowell, Rice University Contributing Editors Marcus Brainard, Frankfurt/Main, Germany Ronald Bruzina, University of Kentucky John J. Drummond, Fordham University Algis Mickunas, Ohio University Thomas Seebohm, Bonn, Germany Thomas Sheehan, Stanford University Consulting Editors Pierre Adler, New York, New York Patrick Burke, Seattle University Damian Byers, Sydney, Australia Richard Cobb-Stevens, Boston College Natalie Depraz, University of Paris IV (Sorbonne) John Drabinski, Grand Valley State University R. O. Elveton, Carleton College Parvis Emad, La Crosse, Wisconsin Lester Embree, Florida Atlantic University Kathleen Haney, University of Houston, Downtown James G. Hart, Indiana University Patrick Heelan, S.J., Georgetown University Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann, University of Freiburg, Germany Nam-In Lee, Seoul National University, Korea Christian Lotz, University of Kansas James Mensch, St. Francis Xavier University, Canada Dermot Moran, University College, Dublin, Ireland Harry Reeder, University of Texas, Arlington James Risser, Seattle University Hans Ruin, Sodertorn University College, Sweden Karl Schuhmannt, University of Utrecht, Netherlands Marylou Sena, Seattle University Nicolas de Warren, Wellesley College Olav K.Wiegand, University of Mainz, Germany Edith Wyschogrod, Rice University Dan Zahavi, Copenhagen, Denmark Articles appearing in this journal are indexed in the Philosopher's Index. Copyright ®2004 by Taylor & Francis ISSN 1533-7472 ISBN 13: 978-0-9701679-4-1 (pbk) All rights reserved. No part of the material protected by this copyright may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, or by any infor mation storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the Publisher. Aim and Scope: The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy will provide an an nual international forum for phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy in the spirit of Edmund Husserl’s groundbreaking work and the extension thereof in the phenomenological tradition broadly con ceived. The editors welcome the submission of manuscripts containing original research in phenomenolo gy and phenomenological philosophy, contributions to contemporary issues and controversies, critical and interpretative studies of major phenomenological figures, investigations on the relation of phenomenolo gy and phenomenological philosophy to the natural and human sciences, and historical studies and docu ments pertaining to phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Translations of classic and contemporary phenomenological texts are also welcome, though translators should make arrangements with the editors in advance. First published 2004 by Noesis Press Published 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon 0X14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Groupy an informa business This page intentionally left blank Contents /. Essays RUDOLF BERNET HusserPs Transcendental Idealism Revisited 1 IAN ANGUS In Praise of Fire: Responsibility, Manifestation, Polemos, Circumspection 21 DIETER LOHMAR The Transition of the Principle of Excluded Middle from a Principle of Logic to an Axiom: HusserPs Hesitant Revisionism in Logic 53 TORSTEN PIETREK A Reconstruction of Phenomenological Method for Metaethics 69 RENAUD BARBARAS Sensing and Creating: Phenomenology and the Unity of Aesthetics 109 CHRISTIAN LOTZ Recollection, Mourning, and the Absolute Past: On Husserl, Freud, and Derrida 121 KARLHEINZ RUHSTORFER Adieu: Derrida's God and the Beginning of Thought 143 ROSEMARY R. P. LERNER Husserl versus Neo-Kantianism Revisited: On Skepticism, Foundationalism, and Intuition 173 SEBASTIAN LUFT A Hermeneutic Phenomenology of Subjective and Objective Spirit: Husserl, Natorp, and Cassirer 209 V HERIBERT BOEDER Truth in the First Epoch of Philosophy 249 MARCUS BRAINARD Epoché and Epoch in Logotectonic Thought 263 II. Texts and Documents EDMUND HUSSERL Tobacco-logisches / 274 Tobaccology 275 MARK VAN ATTEN AND KARL SCHUHMANN"** Introduction: Johannes Daubert's Transcript of Husserl's Mathematical- Philosophical Exercises (Summer Semester 1905) 284 JOHANNES DAUBERT Notizen zu Husserls Mathematisch-philosophischen Ubungen vom SS 1905/ 288 Notes from Husserl's Mathematical-Philosophical Exercises, Summer Semester 1905 289 LESTER EMBREE Introduction: Dorion Cairns's Review of Eugen Fink's "The Problem of Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology" 319 DORION CAIRNS Review of Eugen Fink's "The Problem of Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology" 323 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 341 vi Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism Revisited Rudolf Bernet Husserl-Archives, Leuven It is widely known that Ideas I,1appearing in 1913, was the first publica- tion in which Husserl explicitly argued in favor of a phenomenological ide- alism. It is also well known that this standpoint immediately incited dispute as well as astonishment, with the controversy surrounding it still alive today. The surprise of the students and first readers, as well as the fact that Ideas I never uses the term ‘idealism’ by name to characterize the nature of tran- scendental phenomenology, managed to make it seem as if it came about as a result of a sudden or at least hastily made about-face on Husserl’s part, and not through a decision that had been extensively reflected upon. Thanks to a recently published volume of Husserlianawhich compiles the principal texts by Husserl on transcendental idealism,2 we can take account of how the Husserlian position concerning phenomenological idealism had, for the most part, already been established by 1908. Likewise, the famous “Nachwort” to Ideas Iwritten in 19303clearly shows that Husserl maintained his idealism up until the end of his days—all the while insisting that Ideas Ihad gone astray in suggesting that such a form of idealism coincided with a solipsistic conception of transcendental subjectivity. —————— *Translated from the French by Basil Vassilicos. 1. Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie,ed. Karl Schuh- mann, Husserliana III/1 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976); English translation: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Intro- duction to a Pure Phenomenology,trans. F. Kersten (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1982); henceforth cited as Ideas I. 2.Edmund Husserl, Transzendentaler Idealismus. Texte aus dem Nachlaß (1908–1921), ed. Robin Rollinger and Rochus Sowa, Husserliana XXXVI (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003). Following the initial reference, all volumes from Husserliana are cited as Huawith volume and page references. 3.Edmund Husserl, “Epilogue,” in Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to aPhenomenological Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 405–30. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy IV (2004): 1–20 ISSN 1533–7472 •ISBN 0-9701679-4-6 2 RUDOLF BERNET The phenomenological idealism of Ideas I,such as it is set out in its “Fun- damental Phenomenological Consideration,” is the outcome of a phenomeno- logical investigation concerning the conditions of the possibility of authentic knowledge of objective reality. Because the establishment of these conditions of possibility is for Husserl a matter of an examination of the manner in which objective reality is intuitively given to consciousness, rather than any sort of in- quiry into the logical nature of reason, the analysis of “external” perception comes to play a predominant role therein. Already this perception (and not only the judgment based on it), involves a “positing” (Setzung)of the reality of things and the world. Moreover, it is incumbent on this form of perception— inasmuch as it is the experience of a givenness of the thing itself, “in the flesh” (leibhaft)—to justify belief in the existence of the world. However, such a legit- imization of objective reality by perceptual consciousness can only avoid the contradictions of psychologism on the express condition that this conscious- ness, serving as the epistemological foundation for the existence of objective re- ality, does not itself belong to that reality. This is why the task of a “phenome- nological reduction” is to purify perceptual consciousness of any apperception as an empirical reality before perceptual consciousness can be given the task of validating or “constituting” the existence of a transcendent empirical reality. For a phenomenology that, as a “critique of knowledge,” can only hold the positing of the existence of an objective reality to be legitimate to the ex- tent that, at the same time, this existence is testified to in “pure” consciousness in the form of an intuitive phenomenon, the meaning of the existence of the world necessarily depends on transcendental consciousness. For the most part, phenomenological idealism is nothing other than the solemn proclamation of such a dependence of the truth-value of the positing of the existence of the world vis-à-vis intentional, perceptual, and pure consciousness of that world. This form of idealism therefore does not have to make any claims as to what the reality of the world could be independent of the positing of a transcen- dental subject’s knowledge of it. That is to say, outside the subject’s pretension to having knowledge of a real object4 and the justification of this subjective —————— 4.By ‘real’ or ‘actually real’ we mean an actually existing object (wirklich)in contrast to a merely possible object or a fictive object. It is worth mentioning that this sense of ‘real’, meaning that which actually exists, is not synonymous with what Husserl himself calls ‘real’. First of all, ‘real’ in the Husserlian sense means anything concerning an empirical or sensuous thing (res)and is thus to be distinguished from anything relating to an idealobject. Afictive sensuous object is hence a “real” object for Husserl, even though it has no actual or “real” existence. ‘Real’ then refers to a possibilityof experience of an object insofar as it would be founded on an experience that has already been actually (wirklich)accomplished. Such a “real” possibility (reale Möglichkeit)of experience of an object is to be distinguished from an “ideal” possibility (ideale Möglichkeit), which is the product of pure phantasy rather than of any actual experience. This difference between real possibility and ideal possibility is just as applicable to the experience of empirical objects as to thatof ideal objects. How- ever, we shall see that there is a fundamental difference between ideal objects and empirical objects regarding their actual existence (Wirklichkeit): while a really or only ideally possible HUSSERL’S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM REVISITED 3 pretension by an actual act of perception had by a pure consciousness, this sort of idealism need not make any claims about the reality of the world. If Ideas Idoes not rest satisfied with merely stating this thesis—it being one that is fairly banal once one accepts its premises—this is especially because no external perception, nor any finite series of harmonious external perceptions, can definitively assure us of the actual reality of a transcendent thing. For lack of an adequate givenness of the thing, the assertion of the dependence of the thing’s actual reality vis-à-vis a pure perceptual consciousness is thus accompa- nied by a compunctious reservation that draws our attention to the fact that the testimony to the thing’s actual reality by such a consciousness is always only provisional. Likewise, though nothing in the preceding course of our experi- ence allows us to foresee it, in principle it is never out of the question that a sub- sequent perception may come to contradict the previous perceptions of the thing, to the point of annulling our faith in the thing’s existence. Must one con- clude, then, just as is done in Ideas I without a second thought, that the only thing about which the phenomenologist can be apodictically certain is the ex- istence of pure consciousness just as it is given, that is, adequately, in an “inter- nal” perception? From such a line of reasoning, is one justified in drawing the patently metaphysical conclusion that consciousness—in contrast to the actual reality of the world of transcendent things—is an enduring or substantial being that “nulla ‘re’ indiget ad existendum”?5Is that not to confuse the (presumptive) form of a particular thing’s existence with that of the world? Is it not to take away from consciousness its transcendental character, which is to say, its power to constitute transcendent reality? Is it not to close up the field of phenomeno- logical investigation by confining it to a consciousness that can only be given to me, where I am the sole person who may have an internal perception of it? In what follows, I wish to show how a text almost contemporaneous with Ideas Idevelops a version of phenomenological idealism that is not only more precise but that is also less problematic. It has the great advantage of no longer relying on the Cartesian opposition between the sphere of immanence of my own consciousness, of which I can be apodictically certain, and transcendent reality, the actual existence of which forever remains problematic. In this text, which came about in the context of his revision of the Sixth Logical Investi- gation,6Husserl is inspired (at least implicitly) more by Leibniz than by Des- —————— ideal object cannot but have an “actual existence” (or validity) in the world of essences, the experience of the ideal or even real possibility of an empirical object never suffices to assure us of its actual reality in the empirical world. In the present essay, we shall reserve the terms ‘reality’ or ‘actual reality’ (Wirklichkeit) to denote actually existing empirical objects and their world. 5.Husserl,Ideas I,§49. 6.Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Ergänzungsband. Erster Teil: Entwürfe zur Umarbeitung der VI. Untersuchung und zur Vorrede für die Neuauflage der Logischen Un- tersuchungen(Sommer 1913), ed. Ullrich Melle, Husserliana XX/1, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002).
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