The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St Thomas

191 Pages·1971·6.06 MB·English

by  Ralph M. McInerny (auth.)

THE LOGIC OF ANALOGY
THE LOGIC OF ANALOGY
AN INTERPRETATION OF ST THOMAS
by
RALPH M. MCINERNY
University of Notre Dame
I I
THE HAGUE
MARTINUS NI]HOFF
Photomechanical reprint 1971
© 1971 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 15t edition 1971
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any fonn
ISBN-13: 978-90-247-0104-9 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2960-5
001: 10.1007/978-94-0 I 0-2960-5
PREFACE
The need for another study on the doctrine of analogy in the writings
ofSt Thomas may not be obvious, since a complete bibliography in this
area would doubtless assume depressing proportions. The present work
is felt to be justified because it attempts a full-fledged alternative to the
interpretation given in Cajetan's De nominum analogia, an interpretation
which has provided the framework for subsequent discussions of the
question. Recently, it is true, there has been growing dissatisfaction with
Cajetan's approach; indeed there have been wholesale attacks on the
great commentator who is alleged to have missed the clef de voute of the
metaphysics of his master. Applied to our problem, this criticism leads
to the view that Cajetan was not metaphysical enough, or that he was
metaphysical in the wrong way, in his discussion of the analogy ofn ames.
As its title indicates, the present study is not in agreement with Cajetan's
contention that the analogy of names is a metaphysical doctrine. It is
precisely a logical doctrine in the sense that "logical" has for St Thomas.
We have no desire to be associated with attacks on Cajetan, the meta
physician, attacks we feel are quite wrongheaded. If Cajetan must be
criticized for his interpretation of the analogy of names, it is imperative
that he be criticized for the right reasons. Moreover, criticism ofCajetan
in the present study is limited to his views on the analogy of names.
Some readers may be surprised to find the writings of St Thomas
treated as a whole in which a consistent doctrine is sought, particularly
when some of the knottiest textual problems seemingly could be, if not
solved, at least dispelled by chronological considerations. For example,
the commentary on the Sentences and the Quaestio disputata de veritate,
early works, contain remarks on the analogy of names difficult to recon
cile with the Summa theologiae. Given this, one might wish to opt for an
evolution of thought and the need for reconciliation would thereby
vanish. But the problem calmbt be handled in this way. Late writings
of St Thomas present essentially the same problems as those found in
earlier works. Furthermore, these problems can be solved and the con
sistency of St Thomas' thought on the analogy of names is not so much
an assumption as a conclusion of the research whose fruits are set forth
VI PREFACE
in this study. It should be added that the author has learned not to be
surprised by such a conclusion. As has been pointed out by others, the
genetic approach lends itself all to easily to the dismissal of difficul
ties and the avoidance of the philosophical task. St Thomas did change
his mind on several points and thought this important enough to bring
to his reader's attention. In the matter of the analogy of names, there
is no such warning nor is there any evidence that his thought underwent
any significant change.
No attempt is made in the chapters which follow to take into account
the vast literature on analogy in St Thomas, although a good portion of
it has been consulted over the years. As is pointed out at the end of the
first chapter, that literature is fundamentally defined by the interpre
tation of Cajetan; consequently, a questioning of the very source of
that literature enables us to postpone the assessment of later modifi
cations, additions and nuances. This is by no means to suggest that
the author has come away from his reading ofpost-Cajetanian writings
on analogy unenlightened; far from it. But it seemed preferable, after
an initial statement of dissatisfaction with Cajetan on analogy, to make
the sequel as pure a textual analysis as possible, with periodic applica
tions of the results to the schema of Cajetan.
One of the more serious contentions of the present work is that St
Thomas used the Latin analogia in a decidedly different way than Aris
totle did the Greek avaAoyLa. Cajetan's failure to take this into account
had much to do with his view on what is truly an analogous name.
Let it be noted, however, that the difference between St Thomas and
Aristotle is a verbal one. The present study is not intended as an indirect
contribution to the belief that the philosophy of St Thomas is radically
different from that of Aristotle. The observation that St Thomas wrote
Latin and Aristotle Greek does not lead to the conclusion that they
taught different things, even on the signification of words. But, as we
shall see, the attempt to hold Latin authors to the proprieties of Greek
usage leads to grave misunderstanding.
The present interpretation was first suggested by M. l'abbe Maurice
Dionne, now doyen of the Faculte de philosoph ie, Laval University. In
developing that suggestion, the author does not wish to share the de
ficiencies of his efforts with that learned priest, but to indicate one in
many ways responsible for whatever merits this book may have. Thanks
must also be expressed to Professor Charles DeKoninck, who has a
special knack for making students disciples, not of himself, but of St
Thomas; to Professors John Oesterle and Joseph Bobik of the University
PREFACE VII
of Notre Dame. To my other colleagues, both at Creighton University
and at Notre Dame, and to those students who have endured my en
thusiasm for the subject of this book over several years, my sincere
gratitude; though they are too many to be named here, I wish them
entry in the Book of Life, a somewhat more important volume. This
study was completed on a Fulbright Research Fellowship for the year
1959-1960. I dedicate the book to my wife, Constance, who has always
lived up to her name both with respect to its id a quo and id ad quod.
Louvain
March, 1960
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface . .... . v
I. THE PROBLEM OF ANALOGY 1
l. Cajetan on Analogy . 3
(a) De nominum analogia . 3
(1) Analogy ofInequality 4
(2) Analogy of Attribution. 6
(3) Analogy of Proportionality . 11
(b) The Commentary on Summa theologiae 13
2. Sylvester of Ferrara. 23
II. LOGIC AND ANALOGY. • 32
III. THE NATURE OF LOGIC •• 37
1. Beings of Reason and the Subject of Logic 39
2. The Logical and Real Orders 45
IV. THE SIGNIFICATION OF NAMES 49
1. Logic and Naming. . . 49
2. Sign and Signification . 51
3. The Imposition of Names 54
4. Modus signicandi; res significata 57
5. Ratio quam significat nomen . . 61
6. Signification and Supposition 64
V. THE ANALOGY OF NAMES ••• 67
1. Things Named Equivocally 67
2. Things Named Univocally. 70
3. Things Named Analogically 71
VI. THE DIVISION OF ANALOGY • • 80
1. Multorum ad unum, Unius ad alterum. 80
2. Proportion and Proportionality. . 83
X TABLE OF CONTENTS
3. Extrinsic Denomination and Analogous Names 90
4. Aliquid dicitur secundum analogiam tripliciter . 96
(a) Secundum intentionem, non secundum esse . 97
(b) Secundum esse, non secundum intentionem . 98
(1) Genus logice loquendo 100
(2) Genus physice loquendo . 106
(3) Univocal or analogous? 114
(4) Who is the logicus? 118
(c ) Secundum intentionem, secundum esse 122
5. Summary. 124
VII. THE ANALOGICAL CAUSE 126
1. Diuersus modus existendi impedit uniuocationem 127
2. Predication and Causality . 130
3. Primum in ali quo genere . 133
VIII. KNOWLEDGE AND ANALOGY 136
1. Justice and Analogy 136
2. Proportion and Quantity 139
3. Our Knowledge of Prime Matter . 141
4. Proportionality, Metaphor, Analogous Names 144
IX. THE DIVINE NAMES. 153
1. Can God be Named by Us? 153
2. Why Many Divine Names? 155
3. Omne nomen cum defectu est 156
4. Ordo nominis, ordo rerum 161
X. CONCLUDING • • • • • 166
Appendix: Table of texts cited. 171
Index rerum et nominum . . . 180
CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM OF ANALOGY
"Let us start with a review of the theories of other thinkers;
for the proofs of a theory are difficulties for the contrary
theory. Besides, those who have first heard the pleas of our
adversaries will be more likely to credit the assertions we
are going to make."!
One does not have to be a student of the writings of St Thomas for very
long before being struck by the importance that analogy seems to have
for his thought. In the commentaries on Aristotle, in the two Summae,
in the disputed questions, the matter of analogy comes up soon and in
an obviously important way. Analogy is appealed to to explain our know
ledge of prime matter, the unity of the subject of metaphysics and the
way in which names are common to God and creature. But despite
the fact that it seems to pervade his thought, one does not find any
work of St Thomas devoted to analogy. It does not provide the sub
ject of a question, a lectio or a distinctio. Indeed, one becomes increasing
ly aware of the fact that when analogy is mentioned, it is most often
the case that knowledge of what it is is assumed, that we are being
presented with an example of it rather than an ex proJesso treatment
of analogy itself.
The thought occurs that, by amassing the texts where analogy is
mentioned and by separating the doctrine on analogy from the example
of analogy under consideration, an intricate and perhaps consistent
treatise could be constructed. It is at this point that thomists for centu
ries have breathed a sigh ofr elief. The painstaking work has already been
done, the treatise has been written. One of the most influential works
by a follower of St Thomas is the De nominum analogia by Thomas De
Vio Cardinal Cajetan (1468-1534). This treatise, completed on the
first day of September, 1498, when its author was thirty years of age,
is not a long one. In eleven brief chapters, Cajetan, drawn by the diffi
culty of, as well as by the superficiality of current writings on, the
subject, attempts to give the basic points necessary for an understanding
of the analogy of names. Father Alverez-Menendez, in his preface to
a recent Latin edition of the work, gives some indication of the approval
1 Aristotle, On the Heavens, trans. J. L. Stocks, I, 10. 279b5-9.
2 THE PROBLEM OF ANALOGY
with which the opusculum of Cajetan has been met in the thomistic
school down to our own times.2 This is not to say, of course, that no
dissenting voices have been heard. In a moment we will see that Syl
vester of Ferrara opens the way to disagreement with Cajetan on several
points. But it is still true that the majority of dissenters adopts the basic
point d'appui ofCajetan's work. Suarezians and Scotists have contributed
important and illuminating criticisms of the work ofCajetan, question
ing that it faithfully reflects the thought of Aristotle and St Thomas.
In recent times, there has been a remarkable revival of interest in St
Thomas' doctrine on analogy. This revival has involved a fairly general
agreement with Cajetan, although some have expanded the criticisms
implicit in Sylvester of Ferrara. Presently, Cajetan's opusculum is being
treated quite critically. In function of a new and influential interpreta
tion of the metaphysics of St Thomas, Cajetan's authority in general
is being questioned. At first proposed as an hypothesis,3 but now assumed
as somehow evident, it is said that Cajetan failed to grasp the very key
to thomistic metaphysics. And, although it was Cajetan who insisted
that analogy is metaphysical, the Cardinal's inadequate understanding
of the metaphysics of rus master is said to weaken if not vitiate his
interpretation of analogy.
Nevertheless, agreeing or disagreeing, discussions of analogy forever
go back to the De nominum analogia. One who has studied Cajetan and
found him wanting cannot abstract from his opusculum in presenting
another interpretation of the texts of St Thomas. And, of course, disa
greement with such a one as Cajetan is always accompanied by some
measure of agreement. Any interpretation of St Thomas on analogy
must profit from Cajetan's work. This is not to say that our own depar
ture from the great commentator is a minor one; indeed, we feel it is
most fundamental. One does not take on the drudgery of writing a book
to list minor disagreements, or relatively unimportant emendations to a
substantially helpful existent work.
What we want to do is outline the basic doctrine of the De nominum
analogia, considered as a resume of the thought of St Thomas, and then
observe what happens when Cajetan, as commentator, encounters texts
of St Thomas which do not seem to coincide with the doctrine of his
opusculum. The result of this, we feel, will indicate a serious problem
for the student who wants to accept the De nominum analogia as a faithful
2 Cajetan, Scripta Philosophica: De Analogia Nominum; De Conceptu Entis, ed. P. N. Zammit,
O.P., (revised, P. M. Hering, O.P.; Romae, 1952), pp. xv-xvi.
• Cf. Etienne Gilson, "Cajetan et l'existence," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, (June, 1953).