The Foundations of Cognitive Archaeology

296 Pages·2012·3.385 MB·English

by  Marc A. Abramiuk

Contents
Introduction vii
1 Toward a Study of the Mind in the Past and Its Relation to
Developments in Archaeological Theory 1
2 Archaeological Perspectives on the Mind and Associated Approaches
for Studying the Mind in the Past 21
3 Concepts and Their Reconstruction in Cognitive Archaeology 49
4 Percepts and Their Reconstruction in Cognitive Archaeology 95
5 Reasoning and Its Role in Reconstructing Conceptual Products and
Inferring Cognitive Capabilities in Cognitive Archaeology 125
6 An Introduction to the Evolution of the Mind 157
7 An Introduction to the Emergence of the Modern Human Mind 215
8 A Vision for an Ongoing Discipline 255
Glossary 263
Notes 267
References 277
Index 313

Introduction
Broadly framed, the purpose of this book is to familiarize readers with the
aims and foundations for studying the mind in the past. I expect that the
interested reader will likely come from a background primarily in archaeol-
ogy and secondarily in cognitive science. To write a book targeting essen-
tially two audiences, I assume that the reader has at least a passing
knowledge in both areas. For the archaeologist, this passing knowledge
may include a familiarity with certain cognitive scientifi c and other associ-
ated extra-disciplinary research that might explain key archaeological
observations. Whereas for the cognitive scientist, this passing knowledge
may concern areas of application and a general understanding of how
cognitive science and archaeology relate to one another. (To guide the
reader toward these ends, a glossary and citations to the original source
studies are provided, and the reader is encouraged to take full advantage
of them.)
Just as important as the reader’ s background is the reader’ s desire to
make sense of fi ndings in mind-related archaeological research. This
amounts to an intense interest in analyzing the epistemological issues
underlying such research. Understanding these issues is essential because
they form the foundations upon which future mind-related archaeological
research can be based.
Ultimately, the objective of this book is to show (1) that most mind-
related archaeological research is built upon empirically and logically sub-
stantiated principles derived from relevant disciplines, and (2) that much
of the published mind-related archaeological research is complementary
and therefore most adequately treated under the rubric of a single
discipline.
viii Introduction
With respect to the fi rst objective, I explore relevant topics from phi-
losophy, biological anthropology, cognitive psychology, cognitive anthro-
pology, and of course, archaeology, and draw from them the support
required to establish foundations for studying the mind in the past. Estab-
lishing these “ multidisciplinary” foundations will facilitate the moving of
mind-related archaeological research in a productive direction by promot-
ing fruitful dialogue between archaeology and the other disciplines upon
which much of this research is founded. By generating a forum in which
students and researchers of archaeology and the cognitive sciences can
become acquainted with topics outside of their immediate disciplines, this
book may serve to encourage cross-disciplinary research. The question of
what archaeology and the cognitive sciences can offer one another is one
that I propose should be continually addressed and readdressed in future
studies.
Regarding the second objective, mind-related archaeological research
traditionally has been envisaged as falling into two distinct theoretical
schools of thought (Renfrew 1994). The fi rst is the cognitive-processual
school (e.g., Renfrew 2007), and its proponents argue that the main objec-
tive of mind-related archaeological research is to explain how people in the
past thought. The second is the post-processual school (e.g., Hodder 1986),
and its adherents argue that the goal is to study, through the interpretation
of cultural remains, what people in the past thought about. This tendency
to segregate one school of thought from the other has prevented these
researchers from working together in a productive way. Archaeologists on
both sides of the processual/post-processual debate have been inclined to
avoid research characterized by the other ’ s viewpoint, thereby preventing
them from forming a well-rounded perspective in which researchers from
each school see the other ’ s research as complementary to their own.
Another way of looking at mind-related archaeological research, and
one to which I am largely sympathetic, is to regard processual and post-
processual prone research as being related. This view, which has been
advocated by David Whitley (1982) and others (e.g., Lewis-Williams 1980,
1981, 1982; Huffman 1981), is not bound by the restrictions that the two
schools of thought have imposed on the objectives for mind-related
archaeological research. Whitley (1992) suggests that research can be b oth
explanatory in the manner that processualists deem it, as well as interpre-
tive as post-processualists see it. Here, the distinction made between how
Introduction ix
and what people thought in the past is obviated by advocating a theoretical
middle ground for researchers (Whitley 1998: xi).
In line with this view, I suggest that much of the archaeological research
concerning the mind is better suited to being presented as a series of fi ne-
grained practical approaches , rather than as streams of research delineated
by divergent theoretical concerns (cf. Renfrew 1994). Although these
approaches in some cases have come to be implemented by researchers
allying themselves with a particular school of thought — and have even
come to be identifi ed with a particular school of thought— the approaches
themselves, as we will come to learn, are not contingent on a particular
theoretical stance. Indeed, as will become evident, these practical
approaches— of which I will discuss six— can be treated independently and
in a complementary manner.
Each practical approach is used with an aim in mind and a set of empiri-
cal constraints imposed on the approach for achieving the researcher’ s aim.
The constraints are determined by the available data appropriate to the
researcher’ s aim. It is not a question of what approach s hould be utilized
but rather what approach can be utilized. In recognizing the constraints of
each of these approaches, one will come to realize that, rather than stand-
ing in stark contrast to one another, the approaches can be used together.
It is through reconciling and, hence, synthesizing the various cognitive
archaeological approaches that I feel a student can most adequately become
acquainted with the subject.
In pursuit of this objective, the material in this book will be presented
as follows:
Chapter 1 (“ Toward a Study of the Mind in the Past and Its Relation to
Developments in Archaeological Theory ” ) constitutes a brief introduction
addressing when and why archaeologists turned their attention to studying
the mind in the past. The purpose of this chapter is to fi rst contextualize
mind-related archaeological studies in relation to developments in archae-
ological theory and then to propose the means by which I will present
mind-related archaeological research.
Chapter 2 ( “ Archaeological Perspectives on the Mind and Associated
Approaches for Studying the Mind in the Past ” ) discusses two ways that
the human mind has traditionally been viewed by archaeologists: namely,
as either a universal or relative interface with the environment. These
perspectives on the mind, which archaeologists have maintained over the
x Introduction
past half-century, are by no means unique, having been deliberated by
philosophers for centuries and, indeed, millennia in certain cases. I further
introduce the reader to the approaches — inspired by these two perspec-
tives — archaeologists have taken to studying the mind in the past. Assess-
ing these perspectives of the mind in more detail, and determining the
foundations for the associated approaches individually, is carried out in
chapters 3, 4, and 5.
Chapter 3 ( “ Concepts and Their Reconstruction in Cognitive Archaeol-
ogy ” ) surveys the cognitive psychological and cognitive anthropological
literature for an understanding of how memory functions in humans. New
light is shed on the universal and relative perspectives of the human mind
presented in the preceding chapter, but here those perspectives are ana-
lyzed particularly with regard to memory. The knowledge gained from this
chapter will show how certain approaches can be used for elucidating
concepts maintained in the past.
Chapter 4 (“ Percepts and Their Reconstruction in Cognitive Archaeol-
ogy ” ) examines the cognitive psychological and cognitive anthropological
literature to understand how humans perceive the material world. The
universal and relative perspectives of the human mind presented in chapter
2 are analyzed in more detail with respect to perception. The reader will
learn how the approaches researchers use for elucidating percepts of people
in the past can be substantiated.
Chapter 5 (“ Reasoning and Its Role in Reconstructing Conceptual Prod-
ucts and Inferring Cognitive Capabilities in Cognitive Archaeology ” ), as in
the previous two chapters, looks at the cognitive psychological and cogni-
tive anthropological literature for an understanding of how the mind
functions in humans, but with special attention paid to reasoning. The
different kinds of reasoning are examined and used to provide context for
the fi nal approaches to be discussed; the purposes of these approaches are
to enable the archaeologist to reconstruct the conceptual products of rea-
soning and to infer the existence of basic cognitive capabilities in the past.
Chapter 6 (“ An Introduction to the Evolution of the Mind” ) uses a
technique called the conditional approach, which is discussed in chapter
5, to investigate how the mind evolved from our early australopithecine
forbears onward. In recent years, much research has been dedicated to the
evolution of the mind, and we review and synthesize this literature.
Archaeological research has contributed signifi cantly to this area of study;
Introduction xi
it is through the study of the culture of humans and their predecessors
that many aspects of the mind responsible for producing this culture can
be elucidated. The evolution of the brain and the evolution of the mind
are discussed in tandem so as to provide a fuller account of the evolution
of the mind not only from an archaeological perspective but also from a
neurophysiological perspective.
Chapter 7 (“ An Introduction to the Emergence of the Modern Human
Mind ” ) picks up where chapter 6 left off, which is right before the rise of
Homo sapiens and the associated changes that took place in life ways. Gen-
erally known as the Upper Paleolithic, this is a time period in which the
variability or diversity of cultural forms increased signifi cantly. The goal of
this chapter is to understand when it was that the early human mind
became functionally comparable to the modern human mind; to accom-
plish this, archeological and genetic evidence is extensively relied on. This
information is essential if we are to make use of the approaches we inves-
tigated and substantiated in chapters 3, 4, and 5 for studying the mind in
the past.
Finally, in chapter 8 ( “ A Vision for an Ongoing Discipline ” ), I integrate
the various practical approaches discussed earlier through an epistemologi-
cal look at the issues involved with using them. Epistemology can bring
together approaches that were artifi cially forced apart by the great theoreti-
cal debates between the processualists and post-processualists in the 1980s.
I provide a model for how a well-established discipline dealing with the
study of the mind in the past can be realized by incorporating all of the
approaches discussed.

1 Toward a Study of the Mind in the Past and Its Relation
to Developments in Archaeological Theory
Interest in the human mind of the past has been around, at least implicitly,
since the fi rst antiquarians began collecting ancient relics, many of which
were presumed to have carried esoteric meanings that were lost to time.
Therefore, cogitation about past human mind frames , such as ancient reli-
gious beliefs, is by no means new. Archaeologists, and antiquarians before
them, have for centuries speculated about ancient peoples ’ beliefs, percep-
tions, and experiences. In 1840, the famous explorer and naturalist John
Lloyd Stephens expressed the urge to view the world from the perspective
of someone who lived in the past as he prosaically described the House of
the Dwarf at the Classic Maya site of Uxmal:
Beyond a doubt this lofty building was a great Teocalis, “ El grande de los Kues,” the
great temple of idols worshipped by the people of Uxmal, consecrated by their most
mysterious rites, the holiest of their holy places.   .   .   . In all the long catalogue of
superstitious rites that darkens the page of man’ s history, I cannot imagine a picture
more horribly exciting than that of the Indian priest, with his white dress and long
hair clotted with gore, performing his murderous sacrifi ces at this lofty height,
in full view of the people throughout the whole extent of the city. (Stephens
1963: 193)
Since the time of Stephens, archaeology has become increasingly more
systematic in its attempts to understand how people who lived before us
thought and what they thought about. However, it would not be until over
a century later that a legitimate effort to study the mind in the past would
actually emerge. The emergence of cognitive archaeology by the early
1980s was a direct product of changes in how archaeologists viewed the
archaeological record. The paradigmatic shifts over the course of a century
in how the archaeological record was viewed marked a series of theoretical
breakthroughs in archaeology that initiated associated changes in archaeo-
2 Chapter 1
logical practice. These advances to both theory and practice, which will be
discussed below in chronological fashion, would eventually spawn an
archaeology of the mind with two seemingly diverse objectives. A way of
dealing with this schism is proposed at the end of this chapter and will
form an overarching theme throughout the remaining chapters of this
book.
1.1 The Rise of Explanation in Archaeology
Before the 1950s, the fi eld of archaeology, as it was conceived of in the
Americas, was mostly concerned with reconstructing “ culture history,” and
this resulted in archaeology being more closely aligned with history than
with social science. What set archaeology apart from history, however, was
its focus on the study of prehistory — time frames or culture areas in which
writing was not practiced and from which we have no documentary
accounts. To compensate for the lack of written documents to scrutinize,
prehistoric archaeologists of the culture history ilk, such as Nels Christian
Nelson (1875– 1964) and Alfred Vincent Kidder (1885– 1963), rose to the
task of reconstructing the past by observing and recording the cultural
contents of the various strata of earth through which they dug in the
course of their excavations. Through stratigraphic analysis, these archae-
ologists were able to assign relative dates to strata along with their contents
and thereby generate a timeline or “ cultural history” of the remains. The
emphasis on simply describing and chronologically ordering data in the
archaeological record is exemplifi ed in the following excerpt taken from
Nelson ’ s (1910) concluding assessment of his excavations of a Middle Cali-
fornian shellmound:
In concluding it may be well to point out that the same general types of implements
prevail from the bottom of the refuse heap to the top. Certain notable additions were
made in later times, and the progress towards perfection of manufacture is generally
marked; but aside from these normal changes there are no important breaks in the culture
represented. This means that if more than one people have lived on the mound,
whether these were friendly migrants or disputing enemies, they were all essentially
of the same type of culture, and the last occupants of the shellmound at Ellis
Landing were probably Indians similar to those that have lived in Middle California
within historic times. (402: italics mine)
Although differences identifi ed in the cultural remains of disparate
strata were attributed to changes through time, very little was said about