The Concept of Argument: A Philosophical Foundation

499 Pages·2014·3.07 MB·English

by  Harald R. Wohlrapp (auth.)

Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 4
Harald R. Wohlrapp
The
Concept of
Argument
A Philosophical Foundation
Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning
Interdisciplinary Perspectives from the Humanities
and Social Sciences
Volume 4
Series Editor
Shahid Rahman
For further volumes:
http://www.springer.com/series/11547
Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning

The series is developed in partnership with the Maison Européenne des Sciences de l’Homme et de
la Société (MESHS) at Nord - Pas de Calais and the UMR-STL: 8163 (CNRS). Aims & Scope: The
scientifi c objectives of the series, where humanities and social sciences are conceived as building
interdisciplinary interfaces, are:
This series publishes volumes that link practices in the Humanities and Social Sciences, with
theories in Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning, such as: Decision theory and Action theory,
Argumentation Theories in: cognitive sciences, economy, sociology, law, logic, philosophy of
sciences. The series is open towards research from the Analytic and the Continental traditions, and
has four main focus areas: Pragmatic models and studies that develop a dynamic approach to
reasoning in which argumentation is structured as an interaction or as a game, in which two or
more participants’ play moves are defi ned by the type of argumentation in question, communication,
language and techniques of argumentation; studies between the practical and theoretical
dimensions of argumentation, as well as the relationships between argumentation and other modes
of communication, reception, persuasion and power; studies in which reasoning practice is
considered from the point of view of its capacity to produce conviction of persuasion, and focusing
on understanding what makes an argument performative; Diachronic transformations of reasoning
practices studies that emphasize the invention and renewal of reasoning forms, with respect to its
performance and its effectiveness.
General Editor
Shahid Rahman (Lille, UMR 8163)
Managing Editor
Laurent Keiff (Lille, UMR 8163)
Area Editors
Argumentation and Pragmatics Cognitives Sciences. Computer Sciences
Marcelo Dascal (Tel Aviv) Yann Coello (Lille)
Erik Krabbe (Groningen) Eric Gregoire (CRIL-Lens)
Frans H. van Eemeren (Amsterdam) Henry Prakken (Utrecht)
John Woods (British Columbia/King’s François Recanati (ENS, Paris)
College)
Epistemology and Philosophy of Science
Argumentation and Rhetoric André Fuhrmann (Frankfurt)
Fabienne Blaise (Lille, MESHS-Nord Pas Gerhard Heinzmann (Nancy)
de Calais) Göran Sundholm (Leyden)
Gabriel Galvez-Behar (Lille, MESHS-Nord
Pas de Calais) Logic
André Laks (Sorbonne, Paris IV) Michel Crubellier (Lille, UMR 8163)
Ruth Webb (Lille, UMR 8163) Dov Gabbay (King’s College)
Sven Ove Hansson (Stockholm)
Decision Theory, Mathematics, Economy Tero Tulenheimo (Lille, UMR 8163)
Jacques Dubucs (IHPST-Paris 1)
Fredéric Jouneau (Lille) Political Science and Sociology
Richard Sobel (Lille) Jean-Gabriel Contamin (Lille)
Franck Fischer (Rutgers)
Josh Ober (Stanford)
Marc Pichard (Lille, MESHS-Nord Pas
de Calais)
Harald R. Wohlrapp
The Concept of Argument
A Philosophical Foundation
Harald R. Wohlrapp
Professor emeritus of Philosophy
Universität Hamburg
Hamburg , Germany
The translation of this work was funded by Geisteswissenschaften International – Translation
Funding for Humanities and Social Sciences from Germany, a joint initiative of the Fritz
Thyssen Foundation, the German Federal Foreign Offi ce, the collecting society VG WORT,
and the Börsenverein des Deutschen Buchhandels (German Publishers and Booksellers
Association).
Translated by Tim Personn in cooperation with Michael Weh
ISSN 2214-9120 ISSN 2214-9139 (electronic)
ISBN 978-94-017-8761-1 ISBN 978-94-017-8762-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-8762-8
Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London
Library of Congress Control Number: 2014942850
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Preface to the English Edition
“ Once more from the beginning” (p alin ex archès) the Platonic Socrates says, whenever
a dialogue has become so contradictory and confusing that it is no longer possible
for anyone to get their bearings.1 Then the matter is traced back to its beginnings:
aims are ascertained anew, attempted answers examined once more, and ultimately
the participants try to determine whether it is possible to identify certain basic
concepts or thoughts for a new beginning.
E uropean thought about argumentation dates back to ancient Greece. Over the
past 50 years, this thought has taken the form of an academic discipline informed by
the theoretical means of the twentieth century and invigorated by a renewed effort
to address old questions. Today, we face a vast and heterogeneous fi eld that is host
to numerous, and sometimes, contradictory perspectives. It seems that scholars do
not even agree on the basic structures of argumentation. All that we have regarding
the aim of argumentation—let alone the conditions and possibilities for achieving
it—are merely different opinions. To be sure, these opinions are also supported
by arguments. Even arguments, however, do not seem to provide any clarity here;
at best they bring a certain structure to the diversity of opinions. Positions are
grouped according to specifi c approaches: product approach, process approach,
dialogue approach, etc. Is this an expression of “pluralism” or is it simple relativism?
Representatives of these positions take their views to be valid based on their own
justifi cations while being fully aware that others think differently. They even engage
in occasional discussions, but generally try not to get in each other’s way. To my mind,
this state of affairs demonstrates a certain intellectual richness, but also a weakness
with respect to how the matter at hand has been theoretically permeated.
Perhaps it is worthwhile to take a cue from the Platonic Socrates and at times make
a new beginning in our efforts to grasp this matter. At any rate, that is how we looked
at it in Hamburg in the early 1980s. Our pursuit of issues relating to the philosophy
of science (in particular resulting from the Popper-Kuhn controversy) led to the
insight that such issues need to be addressed in the medium of argumentation.
1 Cf. e.g. Plato: Laches 198a, Gorgias 506c, Meno 79e.
v
vi Preface to the English Edition
Nevertheless, there was hardly any appropriate theory for doing so. The little that was
available seemed to us limited by its ties to traditions (logic, rhetoric) that had
ostensibly been pushed aside but still operated beneath the surface.
Complete analyses of complex, sophisticated arguments that could have had a
paradigmatic function were simply not available. Consequently, we founded the
“Hamburg Group on Argumentation Theory” and attempted for several years to
think through arguments—in the attitude of what Buddhists call a “beginner’s mind”.
We took certain basic distinctions from philosophy (thesis, justifi cation, opinion,
knowledge, contradiction, truth) and tried to determine what really happens in
verbal practice when a thesis is posited based on reasons and/or criticized with
objections. Over time, we saw the emergence of certain basic structures; of course,
this was in part due to discussions with the incipient discipline of argumentation
theory. The group’s work resulted in several dissertations (as described in the
Introduction) and led me to believe that the theorization of argument proceeds along
tracks that are well worn and nevertheless of limited scope. It dawned on me that a
new attempt at a philosophical foundation was required. It was this conviction that
gave birth to the present book.
In order to manage expectations, I will outline in some broad strokes what is
presented on the following pages. Let me begin by saying that I do not claim to
offer an elaborate theory of argumentation. Rather, I will just lay down, as it were,
a few salient tracks on which our thinking may proceed. In the case of specifi c
questions, these tracks can form the basis for the development and justifi cation of
further theoretical structures.
W hat is new here can primarily be divided into two theoretical moves—introducing
the concept of orientation as the basic unit for the theorization of argument and
decoupling the quality of an argument from its persuasive force. Let me explain this very
briefl y. Basically, argumentation is aimed at gaining or establishing “orientations”.
Orientation is the pragmatic function of theories of all kinds. Anyone who wants to
move in uncharted territories, i.e. anyone living and acting, is in need of orientation—
and orientation is something we obtain from theories. According to the terminology
introduced here, theories are verbal formations that open up any domains of reality
at least to the extent that people are now able to act within them. Theories in this
sense do not only exist in the sciences but also in the humanities, in philosophy, and
in ordinary life. Since the world in which we live and act is constantly changing, so
too must our orientations. This means that our theories—i.e. our knowledge, but
also our more or less fi xed opinions—have to evolve in order for them to retain their
function as orientation. From a pragmatic point of view, then, we can distinguish
between old theory that has already been established and new theory that has yet to
demonstrate its value as orientation. Arguing is the activity by which we examine
new theories with regard to their function of providing orientation. A new theory or
a thesis may emerge as “valid” from a process of argumentation if it can be justifi ed
without a remainder of open objections. This notion of validity as applicable to theses—
rather than, as is commonly the case, to (logical) schemes only—will presumably
be a great challenge to most theorists’ habitual ways of thinking (I will develop it
in detail in Chap. 7 ) .
Preface to the English Edition vii
T he valid thesis is a “new orientation”. Material adduced to argumentatively
support a thesis makes use of old theory, i.e. theory which has already been cor-
roborated in its function as orientation. Accordingly, that theory by which we orient
ourselves in the practice of argumentation, i.e. argumentation theory, must make it
possible to grasp the dynamics of orientation formation. A static theory such as
logic cannot do so. In this respect, we see the emergence of a second fundamental
dimension of argumentation—behind the structural dimension, which is captured in
logic and in quasi-logical inferences.
A nother new dimension that comes into view when introducing the basic concept
of orientation is the subjective one. It is clear that there is always “somebody” (an
individual or a collective) that is oriented or looking for orientation. Considering
this subjective side of argumentation requires a willingness to recognize that all theses
bear a subjective imprint and that an argument transports this subjective character in
manifold ways. Of course, this cannot be the last word because subjectivity leads to
biases of all kinds and must therefore be worked off. But in order to do this, a theory
needs to make room for a subjective dimension in addition to the material one.
T his takes me to the second new move, the aforementioned act of decoupling
argumentative quality from persuasive force. It should be obvious that the degree to
which a thesis, which has been supported by arguments, can fulfi ll its function as
orientation depends on the quality of these arguments. This quality has priority over
any possible acceptance by an audience. However, this means that the fusion of
argumentative quality and acceptance already suggested by Aristotle is to be resolved
into a succession of two aspects. Anyone who presents an argument to an audience
faces two distinctly different questions: (1) Is my argument suffi cient for presenting
my thesis as valid? (2) Can my argument persuade the audience to accept my thesis?
Keeping these questions distinct seems to be a bewildering imposition. They are
connected, but in a special way: the second question is relevant for the fi rst one only
insofar as the audience might put forward objections to the argument. If that is the
case, the audience adopts the role of a critical opponent—a role, however, which is
already needed in answering the fi rst question. In general, the quality of an argument
(once we move beyond simple formal inferences) can only be assessed with respect
to possible objections—and raising objections always already requires the existence
of a second instance. It follows that arguing is to be regarded as intrinsically dialogi-
cal, even if it takes place as solitary reasoning with oneself. (The dialogue partner is
not an audience to be persuaded. What we expect of him or her is not acceptance,
but dialogical control.)
S o much for a brief overview of what is new. The German edition of the present
book was published in 2008 and has so far received eleven reviews (in publications
ranging from philosophical journals over the German Medical Association’s
offi cial journal to a weekly newspaper2 ) . Five German universities have held
semester-long courses on it. In 2010, it received the award of “Geisteswissenschaften
International.” This award came with the funding of an English translation, which
has now been completed.
2 There are two reviews in English: Kock (2009) and Hoppmann (2012).
viii Preface to the English Edition
O f course, this conception of a philosophy of argument does not exist in a vacuum.
Rather, I regard it as contributing to a discussion that has been going on for a long
time and in a particularly intensive way for the last half century. The present book
contains many references, not only to argumentation theory, but also to the philosophy
of science, history, and general philosophy. This should not be surprising. After
all, the concept of argument touches on the grand old themes of truth and reality,
freedom, and humanity. Nevertheless, my references are often brief and resolute,
which some people have held against me. I continue to think, however, that clear
statements serve our common cause more than a practice of constant attenuation
and self-relativization.
Finally, I would like to attend to the fi nest duty of a preface—the acknowledgments.
My fi rst word of thanks goes to the organisation “Geisteswissenschaften International”,
which paid for the translation, and immediately afterwards to my university in
Hamburg, which arranged for intermediate fi nancing.
I would then like to prominently thank my translator, Tim Personn, and his
supervising editor, Michael Weh. Over 1½ years of work, with devoted perseverance,
they allowed my book to go out, as it were, into the “big world”. Katharina von
Radziewsky also provided valuable research assistance.
N ext, I would like to express my gratitude to those North American colleagues
who patiently and unselfi shly read parts of the manuscript and provided valuable
comments and corrections: Mark Battersby, Tony Blair, Maurice Finocchiaro, Jean
Goodwin, Fred Kauffeld, Bob Pinto, Chris Tindale, Mark Weinstein, and especially
Tom Fisher, Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, and Ralph Johnson, who sent careful
and extensive comments on details of my concept and even discussed these with me
(in the case of David and Ralph over several years).
The German edition of the book featured a long list of people who had contrib-
uted in one way or another to its production. Three of them I would like to mention
again. These are my philosophizing friends, the jurist Ralph Christensen and the
musician Peter Mengel and then my wife Claudia Lühdorf. They know that the book
would not exist without them, and of course they are aware of my gratitude. My readers
should know of it, too.
Hamburg, Germany Harald R. Wohlrapp
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................. xiii
The Aristotelian Foundation of Argumentation Theory ........................ xix
Knowledge and Opinion ............................................................ xx
Theory and Praxis ...................................................................... xxi
Analytics and Dialectics ............................................................ xxii
Topics and Rhetoric ................................................................... xxiv
Types of Dialogue and Ways of Addressing .............................. xxv
The Formation and Deformation of Aristotelian Theory
in the Philosophical Tradition ............................................................... xxvii
On the Concepts of Knowledge and Truth ................................ xxvii
On the Concepts of Probability and Subjectivity ...................... xxviii
On Argumentation and Rhetoric ................................................ xxxi
Argumentation Theory Under Construction ......................................... xxxii
First New Constructions ............................................................ xxxii
Some Highlights of Contemporary Argumentation Theory ...... xliii
Sketch of the Revised Foundation of the Concept of Argument ........... lix
1 Knowledge ........................................................................................... 1
1.1 Sketch of the Pragmatic Concept of Theory .............................. 1
1.2 Action: Praxis ............................................................................. 11
1.3 Theory: The Pragmatic Concept of Theory ................................ 16
1.4 The “Substance” That Theories Are Made of ............................ 23
1.4.1 Concepts ......................................................................... 23
1.4.2 Propositions .................................................................... 28
1.4.3 Rules ............................................................................... 31
1.5 Theory Types .............................................................................. 32
1.5.1 Formal Theory ................................................................ 32
1.5.2 Technical Theory ............................................................ 33
1.5.3 Social (Cultural, Culture Forming) Theory .................... 34
ix