The Asian Conference On Asian Studies (ACAS) Official Conference Proceedings 2011

239 Pages·2011·10.74 MB·English

by  The International Academic Forum (IAFOR)

The 1st Asian Conference on Asian Studies

Osaka, Japan, 2011

The Asian Conference on Asian Studies 
Conference proceedings 2011 

For the International Academic Forum & The IAFOR International Advisory Board 

Reverend Professor Stuart D. B. Picken, Chairman of the
Japan-Scotland Society, UK Professor Michiko Nakano, Waseda University, Tokyo,
Japan
Professor Tien-Hui Chiang, National University of Tainan,
Chinese Taipei Ms Karen Newby, Director, Par les mots solidaires, Paris,
France
Dr. Adith Cheosakul, Associate Professor, Sasin Graduate
Institute of Business Administration, Chulalongkorn Mr David Paul, President, David English House,
University, Thailand Hiroshima, Japan

Mr Marcus Chidgey, CEO, Captive Minds Professor Michael Pronko, Meiji Gakuin University,

Communications Group, London, UK Tokyo, Japan
Professor Steve Cornwell, Osaka Jogakuin University, Professor June Xianjun Qian, Planning and Quality
Osaka, Japan Assurance Director, School of Economics and
Management, Tsinghua University, China
Professor Marina Dabic, Zagreb University, Croatia
Mr Mohamed Salaheen, Country Director, UN World Food
Professor June Henton, Dean of the School of Human Programme, Japan & Republic of Korea
Sciences, Auburn University, USA
Professor Gary Swanson, University of Northern Colorado,

Professor Sue Jackson, Pro-Vice Master of Teaching and USA
Learning, Birkbeck, University of London, UK
Mr Lowell Sheppard, Director Asia-Pacific, HOPE
Principal Masayasu Kano, Tsukuba International School, International Development Agency
Tsukuba, Japan
Dr David Wilkinson, Associate Dean, International and
Vice-Consul Kathryn Kiser, United States State External Programs, La Trobe University, Australia
Department, Jordan
Mr Takayuki Yamada, Chairman, IAFOR Japan
Mrs Eri Kudo, Head Private Sector Fundraising, UN World
Food Programme Japan, Tokyo, Japan Professor Kensaku Yoshida, Sophia University, Tokyo,
Japan
Mrs Daniela Locreille, Director of Student Marketing,

Hobsons, USA Mrs Elly Zaniewicka, BBC Political Programmes, London,

UK
Mr Sakate Masao, President, Sakate Company Ltd, &
Advisor S.E.A. Judo Federation

©The International Academic Forum 2011
The International Academic Forum (IAFOR)
Aza Katahira 23-4 801, Ouaza Nagakute
Aichi-gun, Aichi-ken, Nagakute-cho

480-1131 Japan
ISSN: 2185-6176
iafor 

The Asian Conference on Asian Studies 2011 

Official Conference Proceedings 2011

Contents 

Alternative Futures for Governance in Burma: 2040
Wylma Samaranayake-Robinson p. 1

Finding the Path for the Deltaic Eco-city: Orchard Settlement in Bangkok and its Vicinity
Terdsak Tachakitkachorn p. 13

Understanding Institutional Change and Persistence to Anticipate Future Livelihoods
Tanya Jakimow p. 24

Survival of the Fittest: An Eclectic Approach to Exploring the Motif of Globality in Pankaj
Mishra's Selected Works
Mohsen Masoomi p. 35

Fabricating the Past through Folklore in Ming Cher’s Spider Boys
Angela Frattarola p. 47

Where Everyone was Other: Jews in the Yokohama Treaty Port, 1859-1899
Chester Proshan p. 60

The Whereabouts of Conducting Research in Malaysian Setting in Exploring Malay Mothers'
Experiences of Having a Child With Cancer: Learning the Cultural Variation from the Past for the
Practicality of the Future
Nurhafizah Mohd Sukor p. 76

Communal Political Paradigm after the 2008 Election in Malaysia
Noriyuki Segawa p. 83

Thailand's Responses to CEDAW: 26 years of Women's Human Rights
Kanyanattha Ittinitiwut p. 95

Between Original and Host Societies: the Reconstructed Past of Picture Brides
Enyu Lin p. 108

Future Korean Urban Transformation as the Result of Integration of Urban Administrative
District
Hyeongkyu Cho p. 116
Demographic Studies in Hong Kong: How Cross-border irth Influences Hong Kong's Fertility
and Demographic Structure
Nancy Ling Sze Leung p. 132

Perceptions and Measurement of Family Welfare In Indonesia: A Qualitative Systematic
Review
Rina Herartri p. 145

A Study of the Parallel Passages of Hanshi Waizhuan Found in Alfred Forke’s Translation of
Lunheng
Pak-ka Chan p. 162

Iran Studies: Lack of Comprehensive Approach
Mahdi Faraz
Raziyeh Keivan Ara p. 176

Effects of Cognitive Styles on a Virtual Learning Companion System as an Adjunct to Classroom
Instructions
Sheng-Wen Hsieh
Min-Ping Wu p. 182

The Development of Fisher-folk's Livelihood Strategies: A Case Study of the Makassarese of
Sulawesi in Indonesia
Go Iwata p. 192

“Imagined Innocence Lost: The Performance of Post-Indigeneity in Hosoe Eikoh and Hijikata
Tatsumi’s Kamaitachi”
Michael Sakamoto p. 205

Where is My Bamboo Shoot? A Silent Question from Native People in Northern Lao PDR
Werapong Mesathan p. 217
Welfare Effects of Access to Water Services in Cambodia
Theara Horn p. 221
The Asian Conference on Asian Studies 2011 Conference Proceedings
Alternative Futures for Governance in Burma: 2040
Wylma C. Samaranayake-Robinson, Ph.D.
University of Hawaii-Manoa
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The Asian Conference on Asian Studies 2011 Conference Proceedings
Alternative Futures for Governance in Burma: 2040
Wylma C. Samaranayake-Robinson, Ph.D.
University of Hawaii-Manoa
This paper explores my vision of some alternative futures for governance in Burma, specifically
what Burma could become by 2040. The scenarios envisioned could serve as a passage for
continued dialogue about Burma which could then encourage creative thinking about future
governance in Burma, creative insofar as being able to lay aside the insistence of some that a
Burma that does not turn into democracy is a Burma that is doomed.
J. N. Pieterse (2001) provides a smorgasbord when it comes to the term democracy, to include
participatory democracy, direct democracy, social democracy, associational democracy,
substantive democracy, and deliberative democracy (pp. 410-413). Aung San Su Kyi (1995)
projects her own ideal when she writes that “the people of Burma view democracy not merely as
a form of government, but as an integrated social and ideological system based on respect for the
individual,” adding that they just want to be able to go about their own business “freely and
peacefully, not doing anybody any harm, just earning a decent living without anxiety and fear”
and they just want “basic human rights which would guarantee a tranquil, dignified existence
free from want and fear” (p. 173). M. A. Aung Thwin (2002) contends that ideologies related to
democracy and human rights are laden with a consolidated western vision that do not always
take into account that the most destructive aspect of such democratization is that it invariably
means decentralization which, in a non-western context, could encourage social and political
anarchy. He reminds that, in Burma, anarchy is feared far more than tyranny, noting that any
genuine desire to promote freedom from fear must address issues relevant to Burmese society
before assuming the applicability of western value-laden concepts (p. 1). Thant Myint-U (2006),
referring to the fear of many in Burma of anarchy that could follow a political revolt by
disaffected students, says that anarchy would be the worst possible scenario for Burma’s future.
But, first, what is futures studies? Briefly, futures studies refers to the study of the future with
the use of the plural “futures” stressing the element of choice concerning what the future will be
like. The term “alternative futures” denotes that the future is not fixed and various possibilities
should be explored and one should seek to realize those that seem the most desirable. This
characterization by H. Didsbury (1979) about futures studies lends credence to Futurist J. A.
Dator’s (2002) emphasis that one’s values are central to and do become a clear consideration at
every stage of any futures studies research.
What follows is not an attempt to look into crystal balls, to predict, or to forecast what alternative
futures for governance in Burma by 2040 could occur. I primarily explore Dator’s “Four
Futures” (1993, 2002) to envision whether Burma, by 2040, will be a nation that (a) is in a state
of governance that has shown progress, measured perhaps by market principles, and shown
continued, usually “economic,” growth; (b) has folded or collapsed for one or more of a variety
of reasons; (c) is disciplined (maintained), in which a future society is seen as organized around
some set of overarching values, be it ancient or traditional, or (d) has transformed itself, usually
“high-tech” or “high spirit” (become completely different from what is expected or assumed).
Dator says all images in all cultures can be lumped into one of these four major generic images
of the futures. He discourages favoring one image over any of the others and assuming that one
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or more is good, or most likely, or best, or worst case scenario. He adds that the four futures are
“generic” and may not work fully for all situations or countries and may require some tweaking
or even fusing. I recognize that Burma’s futures cannot be known with absolute certainty and
that my engagement of futuristic analytical tools is merely an academic exercise. By 2040,
futures completely different from what I present could unfold, depending on what decisions
Burma’s stakeholders and outside actors make in the coming decades.
Continuation Scenario: Economic growth has been achieved and sustained.
The year is 2040 and Burma is in a state of governance that has shown continued economic
growth. A new generation of military elite afforded more education has emerged to govern
Burma. For these up-and-coming leaders, it was a no-brainer to position Burma to follow in the
wake of other Asian “tigers” that have progressed, such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and
Singapore. Burma’s military government, in the wake of its reelection in 2010, had begun
laying the groundwork for this to happen by adopting policies that enabled the nation to “take
off” economically. These leaders succeeded in doing this without having to relinquish political
control of their nation because of their willingness to permit some Burmese civilians (many of
whom had strong business and economic credentials since the early 2000s) to become extremely
wealthy and to consider themselves part of the “ruling class.” Their decision to pursue this path
to economic development also resulted in the rise of a very comfortable and contented Burmese
middle class. At this point, the government does not view as irresolvable the slow emergence of
a rich/poor gap in Burmese society. What it considers important is its continuing ties to
regional neighbors China and India and its overall better business and investment climates.
Today Burma has transitioned from being a leading rice-producing nation to being demonized
for being a large producer of illicit opium. But this scenario for Burma bears in mind that an
alternative future does not have to be an extension of the present, but can grow from present
possibilities, while illustrating a future that is substantially different from the present. Other
economically thriving Asian nations, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, were once
impoverished and abysmally conflict-ridden countries. A. Booth and P. Moseley (2003) write
that, all over Asia, “military-led governments, displaying scant regard for democratic niceties,
have achieved rapid rates of economic growth and structural transformation” (p. 14). So why
should not Burma? Why should not Burma too be able to experience an extreme economic
makeover in its own time and at its own pace?
The premises for this scenario to unfold are as follow: First, military governance in Burma has
remained in place through 2040. Second, Burma’s military government, since early 2000s,
began setting the stage for economic growth by consulting with other Asian nations, accepting
assistance from regional counterparts, and welcoming multinational corporations in to help
achieve a sustainable economic standing. Third, a new breed of military leaders, adamantly
committed to Burma attaining higher levels of economic prosperity, has emerged to hold the
reins of political and economic power.
In this scenario, by 2040, the military governance has learned lessons from the experiences of the
Asian tigers, opened up the market, and held onto its monopoly over power. This monopoly is
cushioned by up-and-coming tiers of wealthy and middle-class Burmese citizens and by Burma’s
longstanding “patrimonial system of patronage and support involving the military elite” (D.
Steinberg, 2006, p. 139). As Steinberg puts it, Burma’s expatriates’ calls for massive
demobilization of military are for naught; an unemployed ex-military could be a political danger;
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the military’s influence is profound; and the military is the nation’s economic base. In fact,
Steinberg points out that a military career is the number one choice for most families with
children (Kyaw Ying Hlaing, et al., 2005, p. 108).
What stance should external and internal actors uphold for this scenario to develop? Externally,
the western international community at-large continues to refuse to engage with Burma because
Burma fails to meet so-called “democratic” standards. However, what is in Burma’s favor is that
the world’s two most populous Asian giants, China and India, have taken up economic residence
in Burma. Once adversarial about a Burma with whom they both share long contiguous
boundaries, China and India, by 2040, would be collaborating to carve up Burma as a primary
client state. Additionally, ASEAN member nations continue to uphold the principle of non-
interference in other sovereign nations. This, coupled with the economic progress Burma has
made, make these neighbors more willing to increase levels of trade with Burma and have them
continuing to explore and expand business ventures related to the export of Burma’s jade and
gems and the development of offshore oil and gas.
Internally, while the military government still retains power in Burma, most of its old-school
leaders, once trapped in paranoia that outsiders were all out to divide and destroy their nation,
will no longer be around. Instead, this concern has been replaced by a military cadre with a
different mindset and whose leadership has undergone a metamorphosis that includes admitting
that no country can progress by shutting itself in. While these officers remain true to the legacy
passed on to them as it relates to upholding Burma’s sovereignty at any and at all costs, they are
now open to accepting that the time has come for Burma to undergo an economic evolution if
they are to catch up with their regional counterparts. Many officeholders have traveled overseas
and recognize that their military ambitions and governance staying power depend heavily on
their nation’s economic growth. They foresee that a growing economy will primarily line their
pockets, but will still have enough leftover to trickle down to benefit a core Burmese middle
class, whose support will be direly needed to sustain continued military governance and to help
keep the army politically powerful beyond 2040. This new Roadmap for The Economy that the
military governance has designed has taken into consideration Burma’s cultural practices so as to
“retain its attractive natural landscape free of the environmental pollution which has marred
other Southeast Asian economic and industrial development programs (H. James, 2005, p. 115).
Equally important, the 2040 cadre of military leaders is fully embracing the nexus between
education, health, and economic development in their quest to completely eradicate illiteracy.
Such strategies run the gamut from increasing the number of monastic primary schools to
sending more Burmese students overseas for higher education. James, writing about the
traditional importance accorded to education in Burmese culture and the high regard that
teachers have always had in Burmese society, states that “policy-makers are exerting every effort
to enhance quality education in Myanmar as a key plank in the country’s program to re-skill its
population, rebuild its economy, and take an active role in international affairs again” (p. 103).
Collapse Scenario: Economic and social disorder ensues.
The year is 2040 and Burma is in a state of governance that has folded or collapsed as a result
of the current world disorder. Following an “earth shattering” global economic and
environmental collapse over the past decade, Burma too rapidly sinks into economic and social
disorder. The military government has been overthrown and unpaid and hungry soldiers, barely
able to survive, have deserted their posts and returned to their villages. Without adequate
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