The ally of reason: Plato on the spirited part of the soul

221 Pages·2011·0.95 MB·English

by  Joshua Wilburn

THE ALLY OF REASON: PLATO ON THE SPIRITED PART OF THE SOUL

Joshua Wilburn

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY

OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE

BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

Advisers: John M. Cooper and Alexander Nehamas

January 2011
UMI Number: 3437767

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iii
Abstract

My dissertation aims to provide an explicit and detailed account of the role of thumos in
Plato’s moral philosophy and, in doing so, to defend Plato’s commitment (both in the Re-
public and beyond it) to including thumos in his moral psychological picture and to the
theory of tripartition as a whole. I argue that Plato’s primary motivation for introducing
the theory of tripartition was neither a rhetorical one nor (as has often been assumed) the
result of his thinking about akrasia, but rather that he saw a crucial role for thumos and
spirited desires to play in early moral education and the virtue of individuals. In Chapter
1 I examine the nature of spirited desire and offer an account of how the primitive spir-
ited desires that Plato attributes to non-human animals and infants evolve into the more
mature spirited desires that he attributes to adult human beings. I argue that for Plato,
what is essential to mature spirited desire is the desire to be kalos – admirable or beauti-
ful. In Chapter 2 I take a detailed look at the program of early education that Plato pro-
poses in Republic 2 and 3 and argue that musical education as Plato conceives it (in addi-
tion to gymnastic education) is primarily directed at the spirited part of the soul. I also
address important ways in which early education is directed at the reasoning part of the
soul and suggest why Plato does not seem to direct moral education at the appetitive part
of the soul. In Chapter 3 I provide an account of the amicable relationship between thu-
mos and reason that explains both how intra-psychic communication betweeen the two
takes place and why thumos responds to reason’s judgments, desires, and commands in
the special way that it does. Finally, in Chapter 4 I confront and reject the recent pro-
posal that Plato abandoned the theory of tripartition in his later dialogues, and I offer an
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interpretation of crucial passages from the Laws that suggest, on the contrary, that Plato
maintained his commitment to that theory in his later works.
v

For Rachel and Joey
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Contents

Acknowledgements..........................................................................................................viii

Chapter 1: The Nature of Spirited Desire............................................................................1

1. Primitive Spirited Desire......................................................................................7

2. Mature Spirited Desire.......................................................................................15

3. Thumos in Republic 4, 8, and 9..........................................................................26

Chapter 2: Early Education and the Tripartite Soul...........................................................42

1: Early Education and Thumos.............................................................................44

2: Early Education and the Reasoning Part of the Soul.........................................63

3: Early Education and the Appetitive Part of the Soul.........................................81

4: Conclusion: Motivating Tripartition..................................................................93

Chapter 3: The Relationship between Reason and Thumos...............................................98

1: The Responsiveness of Thumos to Reason......................................................100

2: Communication between Reason and Thumos................................................109

3: The Ally of Reason..........................................................................................121

Chapter 4: Laws 644d-645b: Plato’s Divine Puppet and the Tripartite Soul...................141

1: Responding to the Argument from Silence......................................................144

2: A New Interpretation of the Puppet Passage...................................................155

3: Advantages of the New Interpretation.............................................................170

4: Psychic Weakness............................................................................................179

5: The Principle of Opposites and Partitioning of the Soul.................................186

Appendix A......................................................................................................................195
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Appendix B......................................................................................................................198

Appendix C......................................................................................................................203

Bibliography....................................................................................................................209
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Acknowledgments

I first took a special interest in ancient philosophy as an undergraduate at the Uni-
versity of Texas. My work owes a great deal to the education that I was provided there,
and in particular to Paul Woodruff, who was a dedicated and always insightful adviser
during my thesis work on ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism, and who encouraged me to go
to graduate school for philosophy.
The Princeton University Department of Philosophy has provided me with excel-
lent resources and support that have been crucial to my research. I have also benefited
greatly from the Princeton University Center for Human Values, the support of which
allowed me to devote my attention to the writing of this dissertation during the 2009-
2010 academic year. The opportunity to present early drafts of the dissertation chapters
in the Philosophy Department’s Dissertation Seminar and in the Center for Human Val-
ues’ Graduate Prize Fellows Seminar, and the feedback I have received in those seminars,
have been especially beneficial to me.
My philosophical thinking and developing views about my topic have benefited
from the conversation and feedback of several individuals, including Samuel Baker, Lara
Buchak, Ryan Cook, Josh Gillon, Elizabeth Harman, Dan Herrick, Terence Irwin, Philipp
Koralus, Angela Mendelovici, Ben Morison, Jessica Moss, Philip Pettit, Gideon Rosen,
Whitney Schwab, Michael Smith, and Josh Vandiver. I also received very helpful written
feedback on an early draft of Chapter 3 from both Thomas Johansen and Mark Johnstone.
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Three faculty members at Princeton have served as mentors for me and have contributed
richly and immeasurably to my thinking about my topic and about ancient philosophy in
general. Hendrik Lorenz has shown me extraordinary generosity with his time by in-
dulging me with countless conversations about my topic, and many of the central ideas
contained in this dissertation were born directly out of my discussions with him. I have
never walked out of his office less clear in my thinking about a given topic than I was
when I walked in, and I am much indebted to him and to the sharpness and lucidity with
which he has always pressed me on my ideas. John Cooper has been a consistently
tough, incisive, devoted, and brilliant adviser who has given me detailed and penetrating
comments on numerous drafts of this dissertation. I first started thinking about thumos
during his seminar on Aristotle’s Politics in my first semester at Princeton, and since then
his always challenging feedback and insight have been invaluable to the development of
my views on my topic. My work owes a great deal to him, and I suspect that I will never
write philosophy without hearing his voice in my head, the voice of rigor and reason.
Alexander Nehamas has been an inspiring and always enlightening adviser, who through
his kindness, encouragement, and profound conversation has always pushed me to think
about things in new ways. He has taught me what it means to pursue philosophy as a la-
bor of love – how, as it were, to “give birth in beauty” – and he has greatly influenced the
way I think about ancient philosophy, as well as, in fact, the very way I think about living
life.
I would also like to thank my family and friends – especially my parents, Ruth
Brown and James Wilburn, who have given me endless love and support, and whose
pride in me has always both motivated and flattered me. I also owe a great deal to Char-