Technological 'spin-off' : strategic implications from U.S. experience

64 Pages·1991·1.7 MB·English

by  Chiang, Jong-Tsong

HD28
.M414
^/
MAR 20 1991
WORKING PAPER
ALFRED SLOAN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
P.
Technological "Spin-off":
Strategic Implications from U.S. Experience
Jong-Tsong Chiang
Fcbmary 1991 \VP 3242-91-BPS
MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
50 MEMORIAL DRIVE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139

Technological "Spin-off":
Strategic Implications from U.S. Experience
Jong-Tsong Chiang
February 1991 \VP 3242-91-BPS

Technological "Spin-off":
Strategic Implications from U.S. Experience
Abstract
This paper is to seek strategic implications of "spin-off" from
mission-oriented, in particular defense-related, technology programs.
Because the U.S. has worldly unmatched military technological
capabilities and "spin-off" achievements, this paper focuses on the
U.S. experience. By comparing a number of "big" cases, such as
semiconductors, computers, nuclear power, aircraft and systems
technology, this paper identifies three common mechanisms critical
to the success of "spin-off" as well as some unfavorable trends and
pitfalls. To synthesize, this paper uses several perspectives relating
to the basic characteristics of technology and the unique features of
mission-oriented programs. The main conclusion is that "spin-off" is
not so serendipitous. There are many rules to follow. However, it
would not be pragmatic for most other countries to expect significant
contribution from "spin-off."
Contents
Introduction
1.
2. Institutional Background and Policy Principles
Achievements and Impacts of "Spin-Off"
3.
4. Mechanisms and Patterns of "Spin-Off"
4.1. General Rules and "Big" Cases
4.2. Semiconductors
4.3. Computers
4.4. Nuclear Power
4.5. Aircraft
4.6. C3I and Systems Technology
4.7. Crucial Mechanisms
5. Skepticism about "Spin-Off" Rationale
5.1. Diverging Military and Civilian Requirements
5.2. Adverse Influence on Manufacturing Productivity
5.3. Little Incentive to Cost Containment
5.4. Misguidance of Commercial Technological Efforts
5.5. Diminishing Leverage of Mission-Oriented Programs
5.6. Institutionally Rooted Obstacles
6. Synthesis and Implications
6.1. Radical vs. Incremental Technological Change
6.2. General Direction, Functional Technology and Generic
Technology
6.3. Systems Technology and Nationally Based Efforts
6.4. Implications of U.S. Experience to Other Countries
6.5. Contrast with Centrally Planned Economies
7. Concluding Remarks