Strategic air BalliStic MiSSile DefenSe - US Army Center Of Military

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Executive Summary
A. Introduction
This is the second of two draft volumes on the history of strategic air and ballistic missile defense from
1945 to 1972. It covers the 1955–1972 portion of the larger period, and is organized into five interrelated
and progressively more detailed chapters. Chapter I provides a comparison of U.S. and Soviet strategies,
Chapters II and III deal with U.S. strategy and Soviet strategy, while Chapters IV and V cover U.S. systems
and Soviet systems.
This Executive Summary is drawn directly from, and highlights critical judgments of, these five chap-
ters. As such, it outlines the substance of the much larger body of primary evidence contained in the sepa-
rate books in this draft volume which was gathered to address the reasons underlying policy formulation
and decision making for strategic defense and the relationship between the superpowers within that highly
complex security policy arena. Results of research concerning factors influencing attitudes of policy/deci-
sion makers at critical times appear in Chapters II and III.
This Executive Summary has three major groupings: one, to reflect the contextual setting of deci-
sion-making, circa 1955; the second, to highlight strategic air defense policy comparisons and contrasts,
1955–1972; and a third, to present judgments and conclusions about the results of the play of factors and
perceptions which molded air defense decisions during these years. These three sections derive from and
are firmly tied to an evidential base; however, time and documentation constraints have limited the effort to
develop that base. Conse quently, important elements of the story may appear to be slighted. The essential
and significant, however, are here.
Central questions faced the U.S. and Soviet defense planners. Fundamentally they asked: “How to
defend the country?” and “How may we be attacked?”
B. The Setting
1. Influential Factors
During this period, U.S. and Soviet perceptions of strategic air and missile defense requirements were
strongly influenced by (1) science and technology, (2) uncertainties in the future environment as to the
continuity of the other’s policies and nuclear strategies, and (3) the growing wish to move toward some
limitations on arms.
2. Context in 1955
a. U.S. Strategy and Policy
U.S. national policy called for a strong and effective secur ity posture with emphasis on strategic retal-
iatory forces and an integrated continental defense system. U.S. continental defense policy called for
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History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense, 1956–1972: Volume II
intensification and acceleration of programs in order to be prepared against a Soviet threat anticipated to be
grievous by 1957. Disarmament arrangements, if practicable, would be sought.
b. Soviet Strategy and Policy
Soviet strategy in the Spring of 1955 built on a fundamentally changed doctrine of preemption designed
to frustrate an enemy attack. This provided the basis for having strategic forces not only for offensive
employment but also to disrupt a Western surprise attack. In addition, the Soviets had an active defense
system to help secure a growing strategic deterrent force and to defend the homeland. A missile develop-
ment program was being pushed.
3. General Overview
a. Factors Influencing Deterrence
Concern over a perceived vulnerability to a surprise nuclear attack led both nations to develop powerful
deterrent forces and supporting postures. Technology was the predominant factor influencing the character
of the strategic choice made during this extended period for national defense. Deterrent strength was basic
to national security.
The United States and the Soviet Union shared the basic choice that was made. Both looked to an inte-
grated national air defense system as one element of deterrence. The weighted emphasis of the U.S. choice
went to the strategic offensive element of the deterrent; the Soviet deterrent inclined to a more balanced
posture between offensive and defensive comp onents.
As the deterrent force of the two nations evolved, threat perceptions influenced their character.
Based upon a perspective of the mid-1950’s, the United States decided that the deterrent strategy
required the high priority development of long-range missiles. The equivalent level of priority did not
attend programs for strategic air and missile defense although the threat projected distinctive needs
for active defense.
A reversed set of priorities guided the Soviet effort; response to the threat of U.S. strategic offen-
sive power emphasized the need for an active defense throughout this period while building up strategic
forces.
b. Factors Influencing Air and Missile Defense Decisions
In the context of the existing basic national security policy, U.S. strategic air and missile defense
contributed to the U.S. deterrent posture while the threat changed and new technological developments
appeared to challenge various aspects of the established strategy. Prime factors bearing on the U.S. strategic
decisions concerning air and missile defense during this period included the threat, technology, and budget-
ary constraints.
Soviet strategic concepts and planning for a continuing, up graded air defense structure and ABM
deployment were influenced by the same factors and this accounts for obvious similarities in the pattern of
basic trends. The nature and rationale of Soviet decisions, however, involves speculation although the avail-
able evidence clearly shows that the political leadership set priorities for strategic defense and regularly
allocated a substantial resource commitment to that effort.
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Executive Summary
C. Strategic Actions
1. Parallel Decisions During the Period
Actions of consequence to the U.S. and Soviet strategic air and missile systems are detailed in Chapters
II and III. Among those actions, certain decisions stand out. Noteworthy for their relative significance,
these decisions have added dimension because the U.S. and Soviet Union each chose parallel routes in their
approaches to security.
a. Mid-1950’s Build-Up
The United States and the Soviet Union each decided early in the period to build up the strategic
air defense structure existing at the time based upon perspectives of the current and anticipated manned
bomber threat. In effect, these decisions extended and reinforced earlier decisions to establish the national
air defense systems. Given added impetus in the mid-1950’s by decisions for build-up, each of the national
systems generated a momentum for a continuation of the established pattern of action with respect to air
defense. Each acquired a self- sustaining dimension.
In the Soviet Union this influenced subsequent decisions involved in the revamping of the National
Air Defense Forces which took place as part of Khrushchev’s general reorganization of the armed forces
(Section C, Chapter III, “Major Decisions”). Reductions in fighter aircraft and the virtual elimination of
antiaircraft artillery were noteworthy elements of this restructuring. These actions coincided with the avail-
ability of a new surface-to-air missile system, the SA-2, and the advanced development of the SA-3.
1) Factors Related to Soviet Decision
The availability of these missile systems and new fighters and improved early warning and communi-
cations links, it is presumed, enabled Khrushchev to accomplish resource savings within the strategic air
defense force in keeping with his larger, basic reorganization of the armed forces. Thus, it can be inferred
that the availability of the products of technology—the new SAMs, fighter aircraft, radars and communica-
tion links—resulting from decisions and action taken earlier facilitated this Soviet decision. The economic
situation remained generally poor despite a rise in military budgets about the time. Soviet threat perceptions
had to take into account about 1,500 U.S. strategic aircraft, including the recently introduced B-52. U.S.
naval aircraft, the RAF and an embryonic ballistic missile threat were added problems. Confidence among
the Soviet leadership, however, was high as a direct result of the stunning achievement of the Sputniks;
Khrush chev’s authority was accepted; he was respected as the principal leader and he had already made the
larger strategic decisions on offensive missiles. To upgrade the national air defense structure was therefore,
a natural progression.
2) Factors Related to U.S. Decision
a) Threat Perceptions
Threat perceptions and decision processes appear to be the prime factors in this decision. An updated
special intelligence estimate current at the start of this period held that by 1957 the U.S.S.R. could develop
the capability of launching approximately 1,000 aircraft in an initial air operation against the United States.
While it considered it more likely that the U.S.S.R. would elect to commit substantially fewer, this estimate
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History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense, 1956–1972: Volume II
believed that 550 mission aircraft would constitute the maximum initial effort (Chapter I and Annex V,
Chapter II).
Essentially limited progress had been made in the air defense programs already directed by President
Eisenhower. There was concern because of revised intelligence estimates concerning the Soviet nuclear
stockpile and fear aroused by the prospects of the fallout hazard. (Annex V, Chapter II deals with estimates,
assessments and key decisions at the time.) There also was growing Canadian concern. The Killian report,
“Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack,” pointed up Soviet capa bilities in early 1955, and indicated critical
U.S. targets were relatively few saying that “200 nuclear bombs . . . would decisively defeat us and . . . a
first attack could be fatal if we were surprised and unprepared.” The Killian report specified a number of
deficiencies of the U.S. air defense system. WSEG Report No. 15, “Continental Defense,” which circulated
during the summer of 1955, contained a variety of recommendations on the subject. Many separate groups
were urging high level U.S. Government action for improved air defense.
b) Decision Process
In the highly structured U.S. national security organization, the policy process was institutionalized,
but dependent on various ad hoc groups for technical assessments and evaluations. Decisions resulted
from the evidence such groups developed concerning the need for action on strategic programs. In 1953,
President Eisenhower’s Reorganization Plan No. 6 had revised the functions of the U.S. Armed Forces and
the chain of command, abolished the Munitions Board and Research and Developm ent Board, established
seven Assistant Secretaries of Defense, and, in the National Security Council, major policy questions and
security issues had become the purview of the Planning Board, made up of represen tatives drawn from the
Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury; the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization; and the Bureau
of the Budget.
This Board, which included advisors from the JCS and CIA, had members personally appointed by the
President upon nomination of the designated departments and agencies and the approval of the President’s
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Robert Cutler, a promi nent Boston banker. The Planning
Board, while only a small part of the NSC system under President Eisenhower, constituted the heart of
the U.S. security structure since it had the central task of formulating policy for the consideration of the
Council and the approval of the President. Board consideration of an issue began with the preparation of a
prelimin ary study and discussion. Following this a draft would be prepared, modified, and cleared through
inter-agency coordination. Special studies of air defense problems abounded.
b. Long-Range Missile Development—Deployment—Mid-1950’s
The Soviet Union and the United States each decided early in the period to pursue accelerated develop-
ment and deployment of long-range offensive missile systems. These decisions were significant because of
their direct consequences with respect to the choice of basic strategy and because of the added dimension
they gave to the evolution of threat perspectives.
1) Factors Related to Soviet Decision
The promise of technology appears to have been a primary factor in this decision. The Soviets needed a
deterrent to neutralize U.S. strategic air and missile bases in Europe, to hold Europe hostage against a U.S.
threat of action, and to support strategic concepts for the operations the combined arms against Europe.
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Executive Summary
A strong Soviet security position was needed; a deterrent force contributed directly to the defense of the
homeland. Technology offered the prospect of an impressive solution to the threat. Khrushchev would boast
that the strategic attack aircraft was obsolete. He had decided not to produce a large bomber force. Rockets
and missiles were manifestations of a growing Soviet emphasis on these new means for wielding nuclear
power.
Nuclear power had already proven useful for Soviet strategic purposes. The United States had shown
interest in detente during 1955 and, despite its commitment to “massive retaliation,” events in Suez and
Hungary the following year indicated that the pattern of power in world politics was changing. Events in the
fall of 1956 showed that efforts to impose political change by force at the expense of another major power
could induce great risk in the nuclear era. Soviet nuclear threats, however, were blatant at the time; their
diplomatic success now seems incredible.
2) Factors Affecting the U.S. Decision
Concern over the Soviet bomber program and the ICBM threat combined to make threat perception a
principal factor relating to this U.S. decision. Technology also was of great significance, and related to this
decision was an intense, bitter wrangle over roles and missions and bureaucratic politics. The Soviet ICBM
test and later successful launch of Sputnik, however, acted as a catalyst which fused several separate factors
and impelled the decision. U.S. decision making also felt the pull of other influences. Disarmament propos-
als provided one of these.
2. Contrasts in Choice
a. U.S. Choice
U.S. strategic thinking gave primary emphasis to the employment of offensive forces to defend U.S.
interests as part of a desired strong security posture. That concept was reaffirmed by the strategic decis ions
made early in this period. Effectively, air defense was secondary. In keeping with the strategic concept that
it was desirable to destroy an attacker as far from the target as possible, the United States, over this period,
emphasized massive strategic offensive forces—both aircraft and missiles—to meet the perceived threat.
U.S. strategy, however, included an integrated continental air defense system. That system grew in keep-
ing with the scale of the anticipated Soviet bomber capabilities and contracted as the Soviet missile threat
intensified. From the beginning of this period, U.S. policy and strategy sought to explore the possibility
of reaching practicable arrangements for arms limitations with the Soviet Union. To maintain a credible
retaliatory deterrent in the face of the growing Soviet missile threat the U.S. strategy looked to adequate
warning and a declared concept of sufficient strategic strike capacity to be able to absorb a massive Soviet
attack and to have surviving residual capabilities adequate enough to permit penetration of Soviet defenses
to deliver unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union.
From an initial objective of improved active defense as part of its deterrent strategy, the U.S. subse-
quently shifted to concepts of assured destruction and later, to sufficiency. By the mid-1960’s, with the shift
to assured destruction, U.S. continental air defense had effectively run its course. Decisions made in the
twilight years of the Eisenhower Administration, however, were significant to the outcome. Earlier deci-
sions, moreover, appear to demonstrate that the basic U.S. strategic choice involved a technological race.
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History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense, 1956–1972: Volume II
b. Soviet Choice
The Soviet strategy sought to provide a secure deterrent through active air defense in order to lessen the
extreme vulnerability of deterrent forces. Concurrently, however, the Soviets also pursued the development
and deployment of improved strategic capabilities, including missile systems, for offensive and defensive
employment, and a coordinated civil defense program. Contrary to the general belief that the Soviets rou-
tinely adhered to a predilection for defense, Chapter III shows a substantial and sustained Soviet commit-
ment to the strategic offensive component, greater than the priority given to defense of the homeland. (Table
19 contains comparative budget data.) Complementing and extending the strategy, Soviet bombers were
widely displayed and advertised. Nuclear blackmail was also used to support fundamental Soviet objec-
tives; threats were carefully timed against action on disarmament goals.
It is difficult to extrapolate Soviet strategic plans from the operational force deployments and related evi-
dence of resource commitments for defense. No official presentation of decisions is available. After the fact
judgment concerning Soviet strategic decisions, based upon the appearance and deployment of weapon sys-
tems, permits inferences to be made about the Soviet approach to strategic planning. Relevant intelligence and
the growing volume of Soviet literature dealing with questions of doctrine and strategy, also enable specialists
in Soviet affairs to demonstrate that Soviet strategic doctrine reflected a “classic” war strategy focusing on the
relative outcome and the need to come out best rather than to achieve specified levels of destruction. Active
air and missile defense could help to survive a nuclear attack. The Soviet position from the mid-1950’s how-
ever, also openly stressed the utility of nuclear strike forces as a deterrent to Western attack. From that time,
increased emphasis was given to the importance of Soviet nuclear forces as a major factor restraining aggres-
sion against the U.S.S.R. Continuing concern for their security, however, is demonstrated by the extended
commitment to active air defense. The evidence is mixed with respect to the actual goal in the development of
Soviet strategic forces; whether “superiority” was the goal, air defense was prominent.
3. Tactics—U.S.-Soviet Air and Missile Defense Strategy
a. From the Beginning to Sputnik (1955–1957)
Impelled by technology and the prospect that effective defense against the perceived bomber threat was
practicable, both the United States and the Soviet Union augmented their existing strategic air defense struc-
tures in the mid-1950’s. Specific objectives for the U.S. included an increased “kill” potential for air-to-air and
surface-to-air missiles. Operational concepts recognized the desirability of destroying an attacker as far from
the target as possible; however, attrition of the attacking force remained the basic U.S. concept. Each side had
already begun surface-to-air missile deployments; these would accelerate during the following period.
b. The Early Missile Era (1958–1961)
The Soviet Union and the U.S. proceeded with the deployment of first generation long-range, surface-
to-surface missile systems during this period although the Soviets held back on substantial deployment
of the ICBM system which had launched Sputnik. However, each side now had missile strike capabilities
as part of a growing deterrent strength. Vulnerabilities of first generation systems caused changes in the
charact eristic of the missile force.
By the end of this period the Soviets transferred responsibility for civil defense to the Ministry of
Defense and emphasized this function. Accelerating Soviet ABM development provided for extensive test-
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Executive Summary
ing and, in the air defense field, a nationwide deployment of SAM missile defenses gave added evidence
of the growth of PVO capabilities. Soviet decision makers also approved a new generation of all-weather
fighters. The Soviet programs for air and missile defense provide a sharp contrast to the U.S. effort.
As President Eisenhower’s second term approached its end, a number of U.S. air defense programs felt
the effects of decisions for their cancellation. Thus, in the period of this relatively short span of years, the
NORAD system was first augmented during 1958 with the deployment of new, longer range Nike-Hercules
missile units and the DEW line and SAGE system commenced operating; however, between the summer of
1959 and 1960, the F108 program was cancelled; the SAGE Super Combat Center was cancelled; DEW line
radar improvements were cancelled; programmed Bomarc sites were cut to 10; U.S. Navy ships were with-
drawn from operating a sea barrier; a number of programmed, radars, prime and gap-filler were reduced;
and the requirement for a new aircraft early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft was cancelled.
Coincident with this pattern of cancellations and reductions NORAD strategy appeared to shift when,
in January 1959, the North American Air Defense Objectives Plan (59–69) included the statement:
Attrition of the enemy’s forces no longer constitutes defense. . . . The air defense must be capable of virtu-
ally destroying the enemy’s total offensive force on its first missions. . . . Complete and absolute protection
of the entire North American continent will not be possible within the resources of Canada and the United
States. Therefore defense forces must be deployed to defend the vital elements which animate our national
structure.
c. 1961–1968, McNamara Years
As this period began, the Soviet threat to the United States increasingly reflected ICBM developments;
U.S. air defense planning, therefore, required consideration of possible attack by a mixed Soviet nuclear
force, probably to consist of initial missile strikes followed by manned bomber attacks. That planning was
measured against the develo ping doctrines of flexible and controlled response.
Controlled response closely involved damage limitation; air and missile defense were as natural
complements to the basic doctrine. With the shift from damage limitation to assured destruction by the
mid-1960’s, however, the U.S. air defense structure underwent significant reductions. From 1965 to 1968
fighter-interceptor strength went down 50 percent. The Navy first reduced and then ceased all operations
on the DEW line extensions. In May 1965, the mid-Canada line ceased operations. By late 1965, Nike-
Hercules defenses at SAC bases were being eliminated. By 1967, a reexamination of the role that Nike-
Hercules would play in a mixed missile/bomber threat environment led to further eliminations. The Sentinel
program foundered in the face of a concert of varied opposit ion.
Soviet air defense emphasized a continued program of moderniz ation to meet the threat posed by
increased speed, higher altitude, and electronic countermeasures capabilities of manned aircraft and cruise
missiles. The transition to improved organization and operation of PVO Strany included action to begin
deployment of the SA-5 missile system, probably designed to counter a high-velocity, medium- to high-
altitude aerodynamic threat. A Soviet ABM defense was operationally deployed at Moscow.
d. 1968–1972
The sharp contrast already evidenced between the U.S. and Soviet air defense systems received
increased emphasis during this period. CINCNORAD’s reduced mission in covering critical areas would
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History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense, 1956–1972: Volume II
be “partially” satisfied with forces available. A threat assessment by the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
built on a new and greatly reduced threat, believed NORAD’s reduced forces had the “capability to defend
against a small attack (about 10 bombers) after one day of warning….” (Section E, Chapter IV details
this.)
Soviet air and missile defense developments in this period underscored the growing coherence of that
system, and its impressive strengths, which now included integration of the system with the Warsaw Pact
countries. As the period closed, the Soviet anticipation appeared to be pointed to active defense consisting
mainly of antimissile defenses.
D. Conclusions
1. Summary Judgments
Technological changes were the predominant factor affecting air and missile defense strategy during
the period primarily as they related to the developing offensive threat. Their scope and pace intro duced
considerable uncertainty and greatly strained the stability of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. By their pace and
the nature of the changes projected, technological innovations raised fundamental challenges to previous
concepts of how to defend the United States.
U.S. strategy, in turn, built on the variety of new weapon system developments; Soviet strategic air
and missile defense trends, dating from the mid-1950’s, demonstrated Soviet anticipation, awareness and
response to developments in U.S. strategic offensive forces. The scale and character of the threat varied
over the period from bombers to missiles which complicated the choice of strategies.
Basic functions remained unchanged; the defense had to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy the
attacker. Science and technology helped greatly but, as the period progressed, the time available for reaction
grew less. This became of increasing consequence from the be ginning of the nuclear era. To be instantly
ready, the defense had to have a high order of competence, dedication, and vigilance. No longer could plan-
ners depend on a long mobilization period.
2. Conclusion
The basic patterns of action were set by initial, and early, strategic choices. Thereafter, the strategic
problem centered on technol ogical development. Threat perceptions increasingly involved possible appli-
cation by the Soviets of new technologies in order to define or delimit future threats. Perceptions of future
threats were influenced by the view of available technologies, whether or not the Soviets had demonstrated
the capacity to apply them. Available or known technologies were extrapolated to assess future threats. It is
difficult from this research to conclude whether “worst case” assessments, built on mirror-i maging, influ-
enced U.S. strategic choices.
Interaction was inherent in the premises; however, a direct action-reaction cycle was not a factor in the
development of U.S. and Soviet strategic air and missile defense systems, although tactical and operational
considerations necessarily influenced developments and deployments.
8
Chapter I
U.S. and Soviet Strategies Strategic Air and Missile Defense
1955–1972
A Comparison
A. Introduction
During this period, U.S. and Soviet perceptions of strategic air and missile defense requirements were
strongly influenced by (1) science and technology, (2) uncertainties in the future environment as to the
continuity of the other’s policies and nuclear strategies, and (3) the growing wish to move toward some
limitations on arms.
Technological changes were the predominant factor affecting air and missile defense strategy during
the period primarily as they related to the developing offensive threat. Their scope and pace introduced
considerable uncertainty and greatly strained the stability of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. By their pace and
the nature of the changes projected, technological innovations raised fundamental challenges to previous
concepts of how to defend the United States.
U.S. strategy, in turn, built on the variety of new weapon system developments; Soviet strategic air and
missile defense trends, dating from the mid-1950’s, demonstrated Soviet awareness and response to devel-
opments in U.S. strategic offensive forces. The scale and character of the threat varied over the period from
bombers to missiles which complicated the choice of strategies.
Basic functions remained unchanged; the defense had to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy the attacker.
Science and technology helped greatly but, as the period progressed, the time available for reaction grew less.
This became of increasing consequence from the beginning of the nuclear era. To be instantly ready, the
defense had to have a high order of competence, dedication, and vigilance. No longer could planners depend
on a long mobilization period. Warning grew in importance, soon it would be measured in minutes.
B. What Was Different from the First Decade?
1. 1955 Environment
a. Strategic Interaction in the General Situation
By 1955 Soviet nuclear capabilities and the potentials of science and technology directly challenged the
chosen U.S. security policy instrument, massive retaliation. Hard realities and uncertainty confronted the
basic U.S. policy of deterrence and affected its continuity.
As it originated earlier and later buttressed U.S. national security, deterrence was set in the context of
U.S. global responsibilities projected into the indefinite future. While the two super-powers could engage in
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