Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940–45 PDF
Preview Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940–45
SPIES AND SABOTEURS Spies and Saboteurs Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940-45 Jay Jakub, D.Phil Professional Staff House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence United States Congress Foreword by Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker palgrave macmillan First published in Great Britain 1999 by MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-1-349-40502-2 ISBN 978-0-230-37317-4 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9780230373174 First published in the United States of America 1999 by ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC., Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 978-0-312-21327-5 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jakub,Jay, 1963- Spies and saboteurs: Anglo-American collaboration and rivalry in human intelligence collection and special operations, 1940-45 /Jay Jakub ; foreword by Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 978-0-312-21327-5 (cloth) 1. World War, 1939-1945-Secret service. 2. World War, 1939-1945- -Military intelligence. I. Title. D810.S7J27 1998 940.54'86-DC21 97-51695 CIP © Jay Jakub 1999 Foreword © Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker 1999 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written pennission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London WIP 9HE. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 I 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 To my loving wife Eleni, without whose steadfast support this book would not have been possible. Also to my friends and colleagues at Oxford, the British Special Forces Club, the Central Intelligence Agency, and to those veterans of OSS, SOE, and the Secret Intelligence Service whose sacrifices and larger-than-life exploits inspired this work. Contents Foreword by Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker, Chief of British Special Operations in the Western and Central Mediterranean (1943-45) Xl Preface XVll Acknowledgments XXI Key Terms and Acronyms XXll1 1 Planting the Seeds: 'Wild Bill' Donovan's Two European Missions, 1940-41 1 Introduction 1 Roosevelt's 'Unofficial Representative,' July-August 1940 2 Background 2 The Visit 5 The Aftermath 7 The Navy Department's 'Observer,' December 1940-March 1941 10 Background 10 Bermuda and London 13 The Middle East 14 The Balkans 16 Back in London 18 The Aftermath 18 Conclusions 20 2 An Unequal Partnership: The Coordinator of Information and British Mentoring, 1941-42 22 Introduction 22 From Concept to Reality: The Birth of COl and the British Role 23 British Intervention 24 A Bureaucratic Breakthrough 27 From Birth to War 28 Together Through the Washington Minefield 28 cor Establishing s First Overseas Station 32 Bumps in the Road 33 Problems in London 33 cor Robert Solborg and s Special Operations Capability 38 cor Wallace Phillips, and s Secret Intelligence Capability 40 Looking to the Far East 42 Conclusions 45 Vll Vll1 Contents 3 Trial by Fire: London and the Proving Grounds of North Africa and Burma, 1942-43 48 Introduction 48 The Anglo-American Intelligence Protocols of June 1942 49 London, 1942 53 Background 53 SO London 55 SI London 60 North Africa, 1942--43 66 Background 66 Operation 'TORCH' 69 The French Dynamic 72 The MASSINGHAM Controversy 74 The SO-SOE Operational Revisions of January 1943 79 Burma and India: Success and Mistrust 83 Conclusions 90 4 Coming of Age: London, Norway, and the Jedburgh-Sussex Negotiations, 1943 93 Introduction 93 OSS-SOE, Norwegian Operations, and the Jedburgh Plan 94 OSS-SIS, Joint Chiefs Directives, and Operation SUSSEX 100 Conclusions 109 5 The Yugoslav Morass: A Case Study in Anglo-OSS Divergence, 1942-44 110 Introduction 110 Background 111 Early Maneuvering 113 Down the Slippery Slope in 1943 121 The Huot Affair and OSS Bari 133 SOE's Formal Break with Mihailovic 135 Deepening Divisions in 1944 139 Conclusions 143 6 The Liberation of France: A Case Study in Anglo-OSS Convergence, 1943-44 146 Introduction 146 Background, 1940-43 147 The Maquis and the Special Inter-Allied Missions 157 Semi -Integrated Organizational Collaboration 161 Contents IX The Jedburgh Plan 170 Operation SUSSEX 174 OSS Operational Groups and British Special Forces 180 Conclusions 182 7 Key Findings 185 Introduction: A Relationship of Four Themes 185 Indirect Mutual Dependence 185 Direct Mutual Dependence 188 Restricted Independence 191 Unrestricted Independence 194 Final Observations 196 Notes 198 War Chronology of Key Events 245 Bibliography 254 Index 262 Foreword by Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker Dr Jay J akub' s book on the origins of the Anglo-American' special relationship' in human intelligence and special operations during the Second World War is of sub stantial present value. His friendly and sustained industry has been rewarded as he picked his way through the minefields of the records and memories of nationalist, ideological, Service, political and personal events and prejudices, genuine if some times conflicting. His explicit conclusions are the more valuable with their free dom from bias. Future researchers will find this a reliable, unique source from which to judge these seminal years and efforts of Anglo-American association in secret services. Useful mention can also be made of the situations which preceded and influ enced the critical years of 1940 to 1945 covered in this survey, and of the differing positions and aims of the main protagonists: Britain with its Empire, and the United States of America. Broadly speaking, Britain believed in an Empire to create free-standing units as Empire became Commonwealth, as has occurred, the final stages being hastened by the events of the Second World War. Conversely, the United States advocated independence to be given without waiting for the administrative and economic structures which sustain true independence. This put the two sides at odds and complicated the relationship between the British and American secret services. I accepted with some diffidence Dr J akub' s flattering invitation to write this foreword. As a junior officer, I had first been concerned - by the chance of my employment since 1935 - in the need for Imperial organizations for action to withstand the hostile activities of dictatorships worldwide. My Sudan service in the late 1930s on the Ethiopian frontier and in the Public Security Department in Khartoum led me later to witness the first victory over fascism, with the res toration in 1941 of the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie. In Ethiopia the British secret services were involved throughout, from secret intelligence (SI), through clandestine action (SO), to paramilitary and regular forces, and military govern ment. On my return to the United Kingdom, I was charged with the supervision for the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in London of air and sea transport into and out of the Continent of Europe. Our map room showed by May 1941 only two parachute drops into France, both 'blind.' By May 1944, this number had increased to one thousand dropping points ready for action. It would have been difficult, and certainly undesired, to show to whom the credit for this achieve ment was due; such was the close cooperation of all three main allies - British, Xl Xll Foreword American, and French. Reading this book will give some idea of the success of their association, and the difficulties which had to be overcome in building the groups under the conditions of occupation. For the secret services herein recorded, the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) was long-term, professional, with a great record of past success. SOE was created from the 'D-Section' of SIS and the military research section of the War Office Intelligence section (MIR). This took place in July 1940, for the short term, as it turned out. It was designated 'Executive' not 'Service,' implying, as in the Civil Service, subordination to Higher Authority. Its members were recruited from employments in which they had shown aptitude and gained experience, to meet many challenges ahead. All were anxious to return to their normal employ ment once the survival of Britain and the Commonwealth was assured, and after helping - with our allies - in the liberation of the occupied countries from the Axis powers. Never was heard any suggestion that SOE should continue thereafter, or that they sought employment therein. SIS regarded SOE at the outset with some apprehension as being 'amateurish'. A similar view was held, together with SOE, of the newborn American organizations, Coordinator of Intelligence (COl) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), in 1941 and 1942 respectively. SIS thus had duties which stretched beyond the war's end, whereas SOE knew that their tasks would be short -Ii ved. On the other hand, the American Services were being created and led by General Bill Donovan, with his vast and varied experience, who foresaw the place of the United States in the future world order. He therefore urged the need for a permanent organization, combining intelligence and action, befitting its economic strength and political stature. In the years between the wars the world had been split into many authoritarian groups of Left and Right. The Left, Communists and various Socialists; the Right, Fascists, broadly representing the status quo, and capitalists. The Right had been strengthened on the Continent by the knowledge of the bloodstained Russian revolution, and episodes like Bela Kun in Hungary. The result was more anti Communists than anti-Fascists in Europe before and after 1939. Another factor was the weakness of the Democracies in the later 1930s. They had estimated that there could not be another European war without ten years warning. Then Germany had rearmed with unexpected swiftness, under an obvious aggressor. All others wished to avoid a repeat of the slaughter of 1914/1918. They admired President Teddy Roosevelt's dictum 'Speak softly, but carry a big stick.' They spoke softly - appeasement - but pursued disarmament, not a big stick. Yet again there had been a seismic change in conflict. Until 1918, wars had been fought between armies, leaving out the civilian populations. The 'Troubles' in Ire land and Russia after 1917, and later conflicts in China, Ethiopia, and Spain, had shown that there could well be resistance against outside occupation, in which the new facilities - air transport and wireless radio - could playa vital role. Against this background, it was difficult for us to understand the account of the American opposition to Donovan's first plans to help Britain. These resulted in protection
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