religions

16 Pages·2017·0.22 MB·English

religions
Article
One Life/Many Lives: An Internal
Hindu-Christian Dialogue
JefferyD.Long
ReligiousStudiesFaculty,ElizabethtownCollege,OneAlphaDriveElizabethtown,PA17022-2298,USA;
[email protected]
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Received:25December2017;Accepted:27March2018;Published:31March2018
Abstract: Thisessayconsistsofphilosophicalandcomparativetheologicalreflectionsonthetopicof
rebirth,orreincarnation. InformedbytheworkofWilliamJames,JohnHick,andFrancisX.Clooney,
the essay first establishes the author’s stance that reincarnation is a plausible option for belief,
atleastasattractiveasitstwomainrivals. Theserivaloptionsarethebeliefinaneverlastinglifein
eitherheavenorhell,characteristicofreligionssuchasChristianityandIslam,andthematerialist
orphysicalistbeliefthatthereis noafterlife, exceptinahighlyattenuatedsense. Theessaythen
movesintoadialogical,comparativetheologicalmode. Itraisesthequestionofwhethertraditional
Christian rejection of rebirth, even if it is not something to which the author ultimately assents,
might nevertheless carry with it an important insight that is worthy of serious consideration by
thosewhoaccepttheideaofrebirth. Thisisseenasaninstanceofthe‘deeplearningacrossreligious
borders’thatisthemaingoalofcomparativetheology,asdefinedbyClooney.
Keywords:rebirth;reincarnation;Christianity;Hinduism;comparativetheology;RomanCatholicism;
Veda¯nta; theology; eschatology; afterlife; purgatory; past life memory; past lives; consciousness;
BhagavadG¯ıta¯
1. Introduction
Thisessayconsistsofphilosophicalandcomparativetheologicalreflectionsonthetopicofrebirth,
orreincarnation. InformedbytheworkofWilliamJames,JohnHick,andFrancisX.Clooney,theessay
first establishes the author’s stance that reincarnation is a plausible option for belief, at least as
attractiveasitstwomainrivals. Theserivaloptionsarethebeliefinaneverlastinglifeineitherheaven
orhell,characteristicofreligionssuchasChristianityandIslam,andthematerialistorphysicalistbelief
thatthereisnoafterlife,exceptinahighlyattenuatedsense. Theessaythenmovesintoadialogical,
comparative theological mode. It raises the question of whether traditional Christian rejection of
rebirth,evenifitisnotsomethingtowhichtheauthorultimatelyassents,mightneverthelesscarry
withitanimportantinsightthatisworthyofseriousconsiderationbythosewhoaccepttheideaof
rebirth. Thisisseenasaninstanceofthe‘deeplearningacrossreligiousborders’thatisthemaingoal
ofcomparativetheology,asdefinedbyClooney.
2. PhilosophicalMethodology: DrawingfromWilliamJamesandJohnHick
Inhisgroundbreakingwork,nowaclassicinthefieldofthestudyofreligion,TheVarietiesof
ReligiousExperience,WilliamJamessaysofphilosophythatit:
failstoproveitspretensiontobe‘objectively’convincing... Itdoesnotbanishdifferences;
itfoundsschoolsandsectsjustasfeelingdoes.Ibelieve,infact,thatthelogicalreasonofman
operatesinthisfieldofdivinityexactlyasithasalwaysoperatedinlove,orinpatriotism,
orinpolitics,orinanyotherofthewideraffairsoflife,inwhichourpassionsorourmystical
Religions2018,9,104;doi:10.3390/rel9040104 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions
Religions2018,9,104 2of16
intuitions fix our beliefs beforehand. It finds arguments for our convictions, for indeed
ithastofindthem. Itamplifiesanddefinesourfaith, anddignifiesitandlendsitwords
andplausibility. (James1982,p. 436)
Fewtopicsareasemotionallysensitiveorassusceptibletotheinfluenceofwishfulthinkingas
humanbeliefsaboutwhat,ifanything,happenstoourconsciousnessafterthedeathofthephysical
body. Ourbeliefsonthistopicaretiedtoourintensedesirenottobeforeverpartedfromourloved
ones,byoursenseofjustice(thatgoodshouldberewardedandevilpunished,especiallyifthisdid
not occur during the life of the deceased person), and by our views about the limits and scope of
thenaturalsciences. Inaddition, wishfulthinkingonthistopic, asphilosopherDavidRayGriffin
argues,canbe‘positive’and‘negative’(Griffin1997,pp. 26–33). Inotherwords,itisnotonlythat
peoplebelieveinsomekindofafterlifeoutofthehopeofapossiblereunionwiththeirdepartedloved
ones,oroutofdreadoftheirownmortality. Itisalsothecasethattherearepeoplewhodisbelieveona
similarlynon-rationalbasis: whoaredeeplyinvestedintheideathatthereisnoafterlife.
Giventhesensitivityofthistopic,thedepthofthefeelingsthatitevokes,andtheambiguityof
theavailableempiricaldata,suchasitis,itisnotatalllikelythatthesequestions—‘Whathappensto
ourconsciousnessonthedeathofthebody? Whathappenstousafterwedie?’—willberesolvedina
conclusiveanduniversallycompellingwayinthenearfuture.
Whatispossible,asJamesasserts,istodevelop“argumentsforourconvictions,”to“amplify
and define our faith,” whatever it may be, “and dignify it and lend it words and plausibility.”
Inshort,whateverone’sbeliefsaboutanafterlife(ortheabsencethereof–or,inthecaseofthisessay,
aboutafterlives),evenifitisnotpossibletodevelopanargumentthatwillbeuniversallypersuasive,
itispossibletoshowthatone’schoicetobelieveinaparticularmodeloftheafterlifecanbegivena
rationaldefense. Oneofthechiefaimsofthisessayistobegintheprocessofoutliningjustsucha
rationaldefense.
ThisessaythustakesaJamesianperspectiveonthereflectionsitpresents. Itaimsnottoconvince
anyandallreadersthatrebirthorreincarnationisarealphenomenon,butratherthatbeliefinthe
realityofrebirthisatleastasplausibleastheotheravailableanswerstothequestion,‘Whathappens
after we die?’ Believers in rebirth are thus not, simply by virtue of this belief, irrational ‘kooks,’
butrationalagentsrespondingintelligentlytotheuniversalhumanphenomenaofdeathandloss.
InanotherfamousessaytitledTheWilltoBelieve,Jamesarguesthatinthoseareasoflifeinwhich
scientificanswersarenotforthcoming,wearejustifiedinbelievingasourinclinationstakeus:
Sciencecantelluswhatexists;buttocomparetheworths,bothofwhatexistsandofwhat
doesnotexist,wemustconsultnotscience,butwhatPascalcallsourheart. Scienceherself
consultsherheartwhenshelaysitdownthattheinfiniteascertainmentoffactandcorrection
offalsebeliefarethesupremegoodsforman. Challengethestatement,andsciencecanonly
repeatitoracularly,orelseproveitbyshowingthatsuchascertainmentandcorrectionbring
manallsortsofothergoodswhichman’sheartinturndeclares. (James2017,p. 23)
PhilosopherofreligionJohnHickpointstothechiefdifficultyofJames’position,butthengoes
ontosuggestasolutiontoit,buildingfurtheruponJames’thought:
Theweaknessofhisposition... isthatitwouldauthorizeustobelieveanythingthatwehave
astrongenoughpropensitytobelieveprovidingtheevidenceconcerningitisinconclusive.
Ifwewouldlikesomeunprovablepropositiontobetrue,then,giventhattheoptionisforus
alive,momentousandforcedone,James’argumentwouldjustifyusinbelievingit. Butthis
virtuallyamountstoalicenseforwishfulthinking. (Hick1989,p. 227)
Hick’smodificationofJames’positiontocompensateforthispotentialweaknessisto“substitute
compelling religious experience for the mere desire to believe an unproved and undisproved
proposition.”AsHickelaborates:
Religions2018,9,104 3of16
James’basicargumentthenbecomesanargumentforourrighttotrustourownreligious
experienceandtobepromptedbyittotrustthatofthegreatreligiousfigures. Thusifinthe
existingsituationoftheoreticambiguityapersonexperienceslifereligiously,orparticipates
inacommunitywhoselifeisbaseduponthismodeofexperience,heorsheisrationally
entitledtotrustthatexperienceandtoproceedtobelieveandtoliveonthebasisofit.1
This attitude of trust is not incompatible with, but indeed invites critical self-reflection,
includingreflectiononthepossibilitythatone’sentireworldviewmayprovetobedeluded:
Thereis,then,ontheonehandan‘experienceofexistinginthepresenceofGod’[bywhich
Hickmeansanygivenreligiousexperienceofacompellingnature],whichmaybeapproved
asauthenticbythecriteriaoftheindividual’stradition. Suchexperienceconstitutesagood
prima facie ground for religious belief. But on the other hand there is the possibility that
thisentirerealmofexperiencemaybeintotoillusory. Isuggestthatinthesecircumstances
itiswhollyreasonableforthereligiouspersontotrusthisorherownexperienceandthe
largerstreamofreligiousexperienceofwhichitisapart. Suchapersonwill,ifaphilosopher,
beconsciousoftheever-presenttheoreticalpossibilitythatitisdelusory;butwill,Isuggest,
rightlyfeelthatitwouldbeirrationaltobaselifeuponthistheoreticpossibility. Whyshould
oneforegoentryintoalargeruniverseofmeaning,whichclaimsandseemstorepresentthe
actualstructureofreality,simplybecausethereisalwaysthegeneralpossibilityofdelusion?2
TheopennessHickdescribestothepossibilitythatone’sexperiencesmaybedeludedneednot
beincompatiblewithadeepreligiouscommitment. Indeed,worldreligioustraditionsthemselves
treatpersonalreligiousexperiencewithsomemeasureofskepticism,mindfulofthepossibilitythat
an individual might be deluded by such experience into rejecting the worldview of the tradition
inquestion.3 TraditionsevenincludethecriteriatowhichHickrefersfordifferentiatingauthentic
experiencesfromdelusoryones.4 Affirminganideaonthebasisofexperienceandtraditionneednot
implyanabdicationofresponsibilitytothetruth,andtonormsoflogicandcriticalthinkingaccepted
regardlessofreligiousaffiliation.
Thisessaythusproposestotreatrebirthseriouslyaspartofatotalworldviewinwhichtheauthor
andseveralconsiderablestreamsofreligioustraditionfindaplausibleaccountoftheirexperiences.
Itisanaccountthatisnotincompatiblewithscience, andthatcarrieswithitastrongcapacityfor
allowingitsadherents“entryintoalargeruniverseofmeaning”andanabilitytotransformthelives
oftheseadherentsinpositiveways.
3. ApproachingReincarnationfromaComparativeTheologicalPerspective
After outlining its argument for the plausibility of reincarnation, this essay will turn from
philosophytocomparativetheology,asdefinedbyFrancisX.Clooney: thatis,“deeplearningacross
religiousborders”(Clooney2010). AsClooneydefinesit,comparativetheologyisamodeofdiscourse
pursued by committed adherents to a religious tradition who engage in a close study of another
tradition. This study is pursued not with the aim either of converting or being converted, but for
thesakeoflearningfromtheotherandbringingbackinsighttothecomparativetheologian’sown
religioustradition.
Comparative theology–comparative and theological [from] beginning to end–marks acts of
faith seeking understanding which are rooted in a particular faith tradition but which,
1 Ibid,p.228.
2 Ibid.
3 AfamousexampleofamysticwhoquestionedtheveridicalityofherownexperiencesisSt. TheresaofAvila,fromthe
RomanCatholictraditionofChristianity.See(TheresaofAvila1979).
4 This topic and that of the epistemic status of religious experience in general are explored in depth in (Alston 1991).
Alstonargues,likeHick,fortherationalvalidityofusingreligiousexperienceasabasisforknowledgeclaims.
Religions2018,9,104 4of16
from that foundation, venture into learning from one or more other faith traditions.
This learning is sought for the sake of fresh theological insights that are indebted to the
newlyencounteredtradition/saswellasthehometradition... Comparativetheologythus
combinestradition-rootedtheologicalconcernswithactualstudyofanothertradition. Itis
notanexerciseinthestudyofreligionorreligionsforthesakeofclarifyingthephenomenon.
Itreducesneithertoatheologyaboutreligions,nortothepracticeofdialogue[although,
asClooneynoteselsewhere,a‘theologyaboutreligions’(ortheologyofreligions)andthe
practiceofinterreligiousdialoguecananddoinformthepracticeofcomparativetheology].5
4. ACatholicwhobecameHinduLooksBackatChristianity
Theparticularcomparativetheologicalprojectpursuedinthisessayhasasomewhatidiosyncratic
character. I am not a Christian studying Hinduism, nor am I a Hindu by birth who is studying
Christianity. Thetheologicaldialoguepresentedherehasthecharacterofaninternaldialoguepursued
by a person who started out as a Roman Catholic Christian, but who later became an adherent of
aHindutradition(specifically,theVeda¯ntatraditionofSriRamakrishnaandSwamiVivekananda),
andwhoisnowraisingthequestionwhetherChristianitymighthavesomethingvaluabletoofferto
Hindusonthesubjectofrebirth.
One of the major reasons for my transition from Christianity to Hinduism was my strong
preference for the idea of rebirth over traditional Christian ideas about the afterlife. As the essay
willshow,thisessentialpreferencehasnotchanged. Istillholdthatrebirthisthemostplausibleof
theavailableafterlifeoptions,andasalreadystated,Ihopetomake,oratleastoutline,acaseforits
rationaldefensibility.
AnotherHinduidealthatiscentraltomyworldview,though,isdharmasamanvaya,whichmeans
‘theharmonyofreligions,’orreligiouspluralism. Thisistheviewthatthereistruthinalltraditions.
ThechallengeIhaveposedformyselfinthisessayistoaddressthequestion: EvenifIdonotagree
withtheChristiandenialofrebirth,itbeingacentralreasonformybreakwithChristianity,istherean
importanttruththatthisdenialcaptures?
BradleyMalkovskyhassummarizedthisdenialwellintheabstractforhispaperforthisspecial
issueofReligions:
MainstreamChristianityhasalwaysrejectedreincarnationteachinginallitsvarieties... as
beingincompatiblewiththebiblicalunderstandingoftheuniqueness,dignity,andvalueof
thehumanperson,ateachingthatisultimatelyrootedintheradicalunderstandingofdivine
mercyandlovetowardeveryhumanbeingproclaimedbyJesushimself. (Malkovsky2017)
Myresponseisthat, althoughtherearestrongreasonsforfindingthedoctrineofrebirth
persuasive,Christianityalsomakesavalidpointinitsemphasisonthe“uniqueness,dignity,
and value” of each lifetime. A dialogue with Christians on this topic is an occasion for
highlightingdimensionsoftheideaofrebirththatmayotherwisereceivelittleattentionin
aconversationfocusedonlyonthecontrastsbetweenHinduandChristianvisionsofthe
afterlife. Theaimofthisdialogicalportionofmyessayisnottoshowthatonesideorthe
otherisrightandthattheotheriswrong. Myviewonthatissueshouldbeclear,ifforno
otherreasonthanmychosenreligiousaffiliation,aswellastheargumentofphilosophical
section. Theaimofthisdialogueisadeepenedunderstandingoftheideaofrebirthbyway
ofinterfaithengagement. And,ofcourse,faithseekingunderstandingisthedefinitionof
theology,datingtotheworkofSt. Anselm: fidesquaerensintellectum.6
5 Ibid,p.8.
6 See(Ward1973).
Religions2018,9,104 5of16
This essay will also include reflections on a series of interactions I have had with a student
whomIshallcallMatthew(nothisrealname)whoisinclinedtobelievehemaybethereincarnation
of a very well-known historical figure whose life and character are quite familiar to me. I am not
entirelypersuadedthatMatthewisthereincarnationofthisfigure–nor,forthatmatter,isMatthew.
We are both simply open to the possibility, based on a set of experiences that Matthew has had
and which he has discussed with me in depth. Frankly, I have hesitated to include this material.
Givenprivacyconsiderations,Iofferthebarestsketchoftheseinteractionshere. Ihavefound,though,
thatentertainingtheidea,asathoughtexperiment,thatMatthewmightindeedbethereincarnationof
thisparticularfamousperson,hasyieldedinsightintothetopicofthisspecialissueofReligionsthat
Iwouldliketoincludeinit. Thisportionoftheessaycouldperhapsbeseenasanaddendum,onlyto
bereadbythosewithanintenseinterestinthistopicandmyapproachtoit.
5. ReligiousStance: BeliefintheRealityofRebirthintheModernVeda¯ntaTradition
As a Hindu theologian in the tradition of Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Vivekananda, I am
operatingfromaperspectivewhichtakesrebirthtobearealphenomenon. BothSriRamakrishnaand
SwamiVivekananda,aswellasotherteachersintheVedantatraditiontheyestablished,makereference
torebirthintheirteachings,andtheidealispresupposedthroughoutthepremodernVedantatradition
aswell. ThetwomainprimarysourcesonthelifeandteachingsofRamakrishna—twoBengalitexts
calledS´r¯ıS´r¯ıRa¯makr.s.n.aKatha¯mr.taandS´r¯ıS´r¯ıRa¯makr.s.n.aL¯ıla¯prasan˙ga—containnumerousreferencesto
rebirth,asdotheCompleteWorksofSwamiVivekananda.
ThefactthatIamlocatedinatraditionthataffirmstherealityofrebirthisnot,ofcourse,sufficient
reason for anyone outside of that tradition to see the reality of rebirth as anything other than an
assertion,orastatementoffaith. Myintentinthissectionissimplytogiveasenseofhowtheidea
ofreincarnationisviewedinthetraditioninwhichIamlocated. Therearemanydifferentmodels
of rebirth, in both India and the West, as well as in other cultures, some of which are explored in
other essays in this volume. This section should give some idea of what I mean by ‘rebirth’ and
‘reincarnation’whenusingthesetermsandarguingfortheplausibilityofbeliefinthisphenomenon.
IntheKatha¯mr.ta,writtenbyMahendranathGupta,ahouseholderdevoteeofSriRamakrishna,
andtranslatedintoEnglishasTheGospelofSriRamakrishnabySwamiNikhilananda,Ramakrishna
makesacasualreferencetopeoplewhoareverydeartohim. “Ifeelasiftheyhadbeenmyfriendsin
aformerincarnation.”Atthis,someoneasks,“Sir,doyoubelieveinthereincarnationofthesoul?”
SriRamakrishnareplies,“Yes,theysaythereissomethinglikethat. Howcanweunderstandtheways
ofGodthroughoursmallintellects? Many[authoritative]peoplehavespokenaboutreincarnation;
therefore I cannot disbelieve it” (Nikhilananda 1942, p. 153). He then cites an example from the
Maha¯bha¯rata.
Thisisbasicallyanargumentonthebasisofreligioustradition. Theideaofrebirthisancientand
widespreadacrosstheentirevarietyofHindutraditions,andinotherIndictraditionssuchasJainism,
Buddhism,andSikhism. Withthisstatement,Ramakrishnaissimplylocatinghimselfinthislarger
culturalandreligiouscurrentofthought.
Later,inthesametext,SriRamakrishnaisasked,“Sir,whatisthenatureofthelifeafterdeath?”
Ramakrishnareplies,“Aslongasamanremainsignorant,thatistosay,aslongashehasnotrealized
God,solongwillhebeborn. ButafterattainingKnowledgehewillnothavetocomebacktothis
earthortoanyotherplaneofexistence.”7 ThisisareferencetotheclassicalVeda¯nticviewthatone
isreborn,eitherontheearthorinanotherplaneofexistence,untiloneattainstherealizationofthe
identityoftheself,ora¯tman,andbrahman,theinfinitebeing,consciousness,andblissthatformsthe
ground,source,andultimatedestinationofallentities. Withthisrealizationcomesfreedom—moks.a
ormukti—intheformofreleasefromsam. sa¯ra,thecycleofbirth,death,andrebirth. If,inhisearlier
7 Ibid,p.416.
Religions2018,9,104 6of16
statement,RamakrishnaislocatinghimselfintheHindutradition—orfamilyoftraditions—broadly
conceived,withthisstatementhelocateshimselfspecificallywithintheAdvaita,ornondual,Veda¯nta
tradition,whichtracesitselftotheUpanis.ads.
Finally,Ramakrishnapresentshisdistinctiveapproachtothistopic,whichmarksthemodern
Veda¯nta tradition that takes him as its chief inspiration. Specifically, he gives an answer which
emphasizes direct experience over the pronouncements of traditions and texts. He states that,
rather than speculate intellectually about such topics, it is far better to seek the direct experience
ofGod-realization. AdevoteeasksRamakrishna,“Sir,istheresuchathingasreincarnation? Shallwe
be born again?” Ramakrishna replies, “Ask God about it. Pray to Him sincerely. He will tell you
everything ... It is not right to try to know these things at the beginning. First of all realize God;
thenHeHimselfwillletyouknowwhateveryoudesire.”8ThisstatementofRamakrishna’sisevocative
ofMatthew6:33: “ButseekfirstthekingdomofGodandhisrighteousnessandalltheseotherthings
shallbegiventoyouaswell.”
In the other main source on the life of Ramakrishna, the L¯ıla¯prasan˙ga, written by one of
Ramakrishna’soriginalmonasticdevotees,SwamiSaradanandaandtranslatedintoEnglishbySwami
ChetananandaasSriRamakrishnaandHisDivinePlay,wefind,first,areferencetotheYogaSu¯trasof
Patañjali,“Throughtheperceptionofpastimpressionscomestheknowledgeofpastlives.”9Thisis
elaboratedasfollows:
Thescripturessaythataspirantsattainthememoryofpastlivesbeforetheybecomefully
establishedinpureconsciousnessbywayofthenondualattitude. Or,attheculmination
of that attitude, the aspirant’s memory reaches such an advanced state that the aspirant
remembershow,where,andhowmanytimeshewasborn,andalsoeverythinghedidin
everypreviousincarnation,whethergoodorbad. Consequently,theaspirantfullyrealizes
theimpermanenceofallworldlyobjectsandthefutilityofbeingbornagainandagainto
chasesenseobjectsforenjoyment. Anintensedetachmentthenarisesintheaspirant’smind,
whichmakesthatpersonfreefromalldesiresforever. (Chetanananda2003,pp. 316–17)
ThesametextalsoincludesanaccountofapredictionbySriRamakrishnathathewould,himself,
notattainliberationimmediately,butthathismissiontoaidintheliberationofotherswouldrequire
himtobereborn:
... [T]heMasterrealizedthathewouldnotattainliberationlikeotherbeings[j¯ıvas]. Itdoes
nottakelongtounderstandthisthroughordinaryreasoning: Hewhoisalwaysinseparable
from God and is indeed a part of God, who is by nature pure, awakened, and free at all
times, and who has no deficiency or any limitation—how can the question of liberation
arise for such a person? As long as God continues to redeem all human beings, He will
havetoaccomplishthisbybecomingincarnateineveryage. SohowcouldtheMasterhave
liberation? AstheMasterusedtosay,“Anofficerofthelandlordmustruntoanypartof
theestatewherethereistrouble.”Henotonlyknewthisabouthimselfthroughhisyogic
insight, but he also told us many times, pointing to the northwest, that the next time he
would reincarnate there. Some of us said that the Master even told them the time of his
advent,stating,“Ishallbeborninthatdirectionaftertwohundredyears. Thenmanywillbe
liberated,andthosewhofailatthattimewillhavetowaitalongtimeforliberation.”10
InadditiontothesefirsthandaccountsbydevoteesofSriRamakrishna,whichgiveanideaof
hisviewsonrebirth,therearealsoreferencestothisconceptintheCompleteWorksofhisbestknown
disciple,SwamiVivekananda.
8 YogaSu¯tras3:18.
9 YogaSu¯tras3:18.
10 Ibid,p.360.
Religions2018,9,104 7of16
Vivekanandapresentsamoralargumentforreincarnation,connectingthisideawiththeodicy—the
problem of evil. Rather than laying the responsibility for all our suffering at the feet of God,
reincarnation,accordingtoVivekananda,makesusresponsibleforourownsuffering. Thisisnotseen
asamessageofblameorofguilt,butofhope;forwhatwecando,wecanundo,giventhepotentially
infinitesecondchancesprovidedbytheconceptofrebirth:
Thisideaofreincarnationrunsparallelwiththeotherdoctrineoftheeternityofthehuman
soul. Nothingwhichendsatonepointcanbewithoutabeginningandnothingthatbegins
atonepointcanbewithoutanend. Wecannotbelieveinsuchamonstrousimpossibilityas
thebeginningofthehumansoul. Thedoctrineofreincarnationassertsthefreedomofthe
soul. Supposetherewasanabsolutebeginning. Thenthewholeburdenofthisimpurity
inmanfallsuponGod. Theall-mercifulFatherresponsibleforthesinsoftheworld! Ifsin
comesinthisway,whyshouldonesuffermorethananother? Whysuchpartiality,ifitcomes
fromanall-mercifulGod? Whyaremillionstrampledunderfoot? Whydopeoplestarve
whoneverdidanythingtocauseit? Whoisresponsible? Iftheyhadnohandinit,surely,
Godwouldberesponsible. Thereforethebetterexplanationisthatoneisresponsiblefor
themiseriesonesuffers. IfIsetthewheelinmotion,Iamresponsiblefortheresult. Andif
I can bring misery, I can also stop it. It necessarily follows that we are free. There is no
suchthingasfate. Thereisnothingtocompelus. Whatwehavedone,thatwecanundo.
(Vivekananda1979,p. 329)
Vivekananda also makes an argument for reincarnation on the basis of memory: that there
are certain tendencies (sam. ska¯ras) that can be found, particularly in children, which cannot easily
beaccountedforbytraining,or‘nurture.’ Theonlyexplanationsforthesetendenciesaregenetics,
or‘nature,’or,forthosewhobelieveinasoul,reincarnation:
Wegainallourknowledgethroughexperience;thatistheonlyway.Whatwecallexperiences
areontheplaneofconsciousness. Forillustration: Amanplaysatuneonapiano,heplaces
each finger on each key consciously. He repeats this process till the movement of the
fingersbecomesahabit. Hethenplaysatunewithouthavetopayspecialattentiontoeach
particularkey. Similarly,wefindinregardtoourselvesthatourtendenciesaretheresult
ofpastconsciousactions. Achildisbornwithcertaintendencies. Whencedotheycome?
No child is born with a tabula rasa—with a clean, blank page—of a mind. The page has
beenwrittenonpreviously. TheoldGreekandEgyptianphilosopherstaughtthatnochild
camewithavacantmind. Eachchildcomeswithahundredtendenciesgeneratedbypast
consciousactions. Itdidnotacquiretheseinthislife,andweareboundtoadmitthatitmust
havehadtheminpastlives... Nowifheredityaloneexplainsthis,thereisnonecessityof
believinginthesoulatall,because[the]bodyexplainseverything... Sofarthewayisclear
forthosewhobelieveinanindividualsoul. Weseethattocometoareasonableconclusion
wemustadmitthatwehavehadpastlives.”11
ItisinterestingtonotethatVivekananda’sstanceinthisregardisnotunlikethatwhichwould
laterbetakenbyJohnHickonreligiousexperience,asdiscussedearlier,inasmuchasVivekananda
allowsforthepossibilitythathisbeliefinrebirthmayturnouttobedelusory.Amaterialistexplanation
forthetendencieshedescribesisavailable,intheformofheredity. However,theideaofreincarnation
is available—and, according to Swami Vivekananda, inescapable—“for those who believe in an
individualsoul.”
What is this ‘individual soul,’ according to the Veda¯nta tradition? What is it that is reborn?
Punarjanma,orrebirth,inallthevarioussystemsofVeda¯nta,referstotheideathateachofusis,atour
11 Ibid,pp.329–30.
Religions2018,9,104 8of16
mostbasiclevel,abeingofpureconsciousness,orj¯ıva,thathasmanifestedonthematerialplanein,
oras,amaterialformwhichisconventionallyknownasabody(adehaors´ar¯ıra,inSanskrit). Thisj¯ıva,
asVivekanandaexplains,hasnobeginningandnoendintime. InthewordsoftheBhagavadG¯ıta¯:
ThereneverwasatimewhenIdidnotexist,noryou... Andthereneverwillbeatimewhen
wedonotexist. Justastheembodiedone[dehin]experienceschildhood,andyouth,andold
age,inthisbody,inthesamewayheentersotherbodies. Awisepersonisnotdisturbedby
this... Justasonediscardsworn-outclothesandgetsothersthatarenew,sotheembodied
onediscardsworn-outbodiesandentersothersthatarenew.12
In the Advaita, or nondualist, system of Veda¯nta, even the j¯ıva does not define our ultimate
identity. Allofusareultimately,accordingtoAdvaita,onewiththesingulara¯tman,thedivineSelfat
theheartofallexistence. FromanAdvaitaperspective,beliefinrebirthplaysasoteriologicalroleas
onestepinalongerprocessofdestabilizingourconventionalsenseofidentificationwiththephysical
body, and finally, our identification with anything other than consciousness itself.13 The a¯tman is
essentiallypureconsciousness;forBrahmanisconsciousness—prajña¯nam. brahma14—andthea¯tman
isBrahman—ayam. a¯tma¯ brahma.15 Wethereforemovefromidentifyingwithourphysicalbodyand
withthepersonalitywehavedevelopedinthislifetimetoidentifyingwiththesoul,orj¯ıva,whichhas
assumedmyriadformsthroughoutcosmictime,andthenmovefromidentifyingevenwiththesoulto
identifyingwiththepureandinfiniteconsciousnessthatmanifestsinandasallsouls.
HowdidI,personally,cometoholdthisreligiousstance? ToagainciteHick,what‘compelling
religious experience’ led me to adopt it? As I have recounted elsewhere, I first read the just-cited
wordsoftheBhagavadG¯ıta¯ attheageoffourteen,intheaftermathofmyfather’sverypublicsuicide,
whichwastheculminationofhislongstrugglewithphysicaldisability.16 ComingacrosstheG¯ıta¯,
seeminglybychance,inthemostunlikelyofplaces(afleamarketintheparkinglotoftheMethodist
ChurchofmysmallMissourihometown),wasaneventthatchangedmylife,resolvingahostofissues
thathadariseninmymindwhilecopingwiththetragediesandshocksthathadbefallenmyfamily.
Ifelt,inthatmoment,thatIhadbeengivenadivinerevelation.
From a perspective of scientific rigor, the fact that I find the doctrine of rebirth to be deeply
reassuring—and moreover, that I ascribe my adoption of this doctrine to a personal divine
revelation—probably disqualifies any further pronouncements from me on this topic from being
takenseriously. However,itis,ofcourse,alsotruethatthefactthatanideaisdeeplyreassuringdoes
notmeanitisnecessarilyfalse. Theargumentsfor(andagainst)thisideaneedtobetakenontheir
ownmerits.
Again,though,myaimhereisnottoproveconclusivelythatrebirth,asunderstoodintheVeda¯nta
tradition, isarealphenomenon. Itistoprovethatbeliefinthisphenomenonisnotunreasonable,
particularlyincontrastwiththeotherpossibleanswerstothequestion,‘Whathappensafterwedie?’
Sowhatisthecasefortheplausibilityofreincarnation?
6. WhyBelieveinRebirth? OutlineofanArgumentforthePlausibilityofReincarnation
Briefly,therearethreebasicargumentsforrebirth. Icallthefirstargumentmoral-theological.
Thesecondoneisempirical. ThethirdIcallpragmatic-soteriological. Noneoftheseargumentsis,
by itself, completely airtight. Each of them can be rejected, or at least questioned, by reasonable
persons. Cumulatively,however,theydemonstratethattheideaofrebirthisnotbeyondthepaleof
plausibilityforother,equallyreasonablepersons.
12 BhagavadG¯ıta¯,2:12–13,22.(Thompson2008),withminormodificationsonmypart.
13 FormoredetaileddiscussionofthedeconstructivesoteriologicalstrategiesofAdvaitaVeda¯nta,see(Davis2010).
14 AitareyaUpanis.ad3:1:3.
15 Man.d.ukyaUpanis.ad1:2.
16 See(Long2012,2015).
Religions2018,9,104 9of16
The arguments for rebirth function in a way that is akin to that in which arguments for the
existenceofGodfunction,accordingtophilosopherofreligionRichardSwinburne. Swinburnesees
thetraditionalargumentsfortheexistenceofGod–suchastheontologicalargument,thecosmological
argument, the teleological argument, and so on–not as airtight on an individual basis, but taken
together,tobecumulativelypersuasive. Usinganimageofasetofleakywaterbuckets,hearguesthat
eachbucket,individually,maybeunabletoholdwater,butthattheycanbestackedtogetherinsuch
awayastorenderthemcapableofservingthispurpose. AsSwinburneexplains,“... argumentsthat
arenotdeductivelyvalidareofteninductivelystrong;and,ifyouputthreeweakargumentstogether,
youmayoftengetastrongone,perhapsevenadeductivelyvalidone”(Swinburne2004,p. 13).
Themoral-theologicalargumentforrebirthoperatesontheassumption,sharedbymanyreligions,
thatthereisabenevolentandultimatelyjustcosmicorderwhichdefinesthewidercontextofhuman
existence. Thisorder—ordharma—canoperatewithorwithoutthepresenceofadivineguarantorof
thatorder,astheexistenceofboththeisticandnon-theisticDharmatraditionsattests.17
Fromthisperspective,giventhealternativesnormallypresentedinresponsetothequestionofthe
afterlife,rebirthisseentofulfillthecriteriaofbenevolenceandjusticeinamoresatisfactorywaythan
eitherthemodelofaneternalheavenorhellthatisupheldinthemainstreamChristianandIslamic
traditions, or the secular model in which there is no afterlife (except in the very attenuated sense
in which persons and the effects of their lives continue on in the memories of others, or through
the passing on of their genetic, cultural, or intellectual inheritance). What is the basis for this
assertion? Whatmakesreincarnationmoreconsistentwithajustandbenevolentcosmicorderthanthe
heaven-and-hellmodelorthematerialistmodel?
Putbriefly, theproblemwithheavenandhellisthatmostpeopleareneithergoodenoughto
spendaneternityinheavennorevilenoughtospendaneternityinhell. Evenifoneallowsthatafew
beingsinagivencosmicepochmight,asDharmatraditionsaffirm,attainperfection,onelifetimeisnot,
asthesetraditionsalsoaffirm,timeenoughtoachievethisultimategoal. Tosaythatasoulmightreach
apointofnoreturn,withoutanyabilitywhatsoevertoimprove,andthusspendeternityinhell,isa
highlyarbitraryandhorrifyingconclusion.Indeed,whencombinedwithtraditionaltheism,itsuggests
thatGod,knowingsomebeingswillendupsufferingforever,neverthelessgoesaheadandcreates
them,thusbecomingresponsiblefortheirtorment. Thisisarguablyasadisticandpsychopathicvision
ofdivinity: theveryonewhichwehaveseenstronglyrejectedbySwamiVivekanandaas‘monstrous.’
Inaddition,whileidealsofdivinemercyandunmeritedgracecertainlyhaveamajorroletoplayin
manyreligioustraditions,includingmanyHindutraditions,theideathatoneisreceivedintoeternal
blissafteronelifetime,evenoneriddledwithimperfections,offendsone’ssenseofjustice. Oneis
sympathetic,here,totheperspectiveofthebrotheroftheprodigalson,whoseeshisbrotherwelcomed
homewithopenarmsandacelebrationafterwastinghisfather’swealth,whilehehimself,whohas
beenfaithfullyobedient,receivesnosuchreward. Neitherheavennorhell,fromthispointofview,
seemsanappropriateorproportionaloutcomeofthetypicalhumanlife,withitsmixofperfectionand
imperfection. Benevolenceandjusticetogetherseembestfulfilledbyanafterlifethatcontainsamixof
happinessandsorrow,butalsoongoingopportunitiestoimproveoneself.
TheCatholicperspective,withwhichIwasraised,mitigatestheproblemsoftheheaven-and-hell
modelwiththeconceptofpurgatory,inwhichnot-yet-perfectedsoulswhoareneverthelessinastate
of grace, and so ultimately destined for salvation, continue to work out their imperfections in an
intermediatestate,betweenthetimeofthedeathofthephysicalbodyandtheattainmentofthebeatific
visioninitsfullness.
AsBradleyMalkovskypointsout,though,inhiscontributiontothisvolume,thisworkingoutof
imperfectionsinpurgatorydoesnot,astraditionallyconceived,involvethecooperationofthefreewill
17 BuddhismandJainismarethusnon-theistic,whereasSikhismandmostHindutraditionsaretheistic.See(Howard2017).
Religions2018,9,104 10of16
oftheindividualsoul. Thoughheultimatelyrejectstheideaofreincarnation,Malkovskyconcedesthat,
onthispoint,thedoctrineofreincarnationhasanadvantageoverthetraditionalconceptofpurgatory:
Thedoctrineofpurgatory,itistrue,alsoincludesthenotionofpost-mortemtransformation,
Rahnerpointsout,butnotonthebasisofacontinuedexerciseoffreedom. Itisperhapssurprising,
then,thatCatholicteachingrejectsthepossibilitythatfreewillcontinuesbeyondearthly
existenceintotheafterlife. Thisistheadvantageofreincarnationdoctrine;itoffersfurther
opportunityforself-determiningfreedom.18
Thereareotherissueswithpurgatoryaswell. Apartfromthefactthatitretainsthepossibilityof
eternaldamnationforsome—namely,thosewhodidnotdieinastateofgrace—anotherproblemwith
thepurgatorysolutionisthatitraisesthequestionofthepointofone’sphysicalincarnationonearth.
Ifthesoulstillhaswork,perhapsagreatdealmorework,todoatthetimeofthedeathofthebody,
andifthisworkistobedoneinpurgatory,whydidthesoulnotsimplybeginitsjourneyinpurgatory?
Whatwasthepurposeofbeingborninthephysicalworldatall? Theideaofrebirth,intheseterms,
ineffectamountstotheclaim,thatwearealreadyinpurgatory,doingthework—thekarma—thatwe
needtodoforthesakeofoureventualperfection. One’scurrentlife,ineffect,isthepurgatoryofthe
onewhichimmediatelyprecededthisone.
Regardingtheotheralternative—thatthereisnorebirthbecausethereisnosoulorafterlifein
anytraditionalsense—IampersuadedbyJohnHick’sargumentthatthisviewis“badnewsforthe
many”(Hick2004,pp. 19–24). Thisisofcoursenotanairtightargument. Thefactthataworldviewis
incrediblybleakandsuggeststhatthevastmajorityofhumanbeingshavelivedlivesthatare,toquote
ThomasHobbes,“nasty,brutish,andshort,”withnoultimateredemptionorsensethatthesepersons
haveanythingbettertolookforwardtoafterdeath,doesnotmeanitisnecessarilyfalse. Itmaysimply
bethecasethatweliveinahorriblyunjustandmonstrousuniverse,notunlikethatoftheheaven
andhellmodel,butwithoutthecomfortofaheavenforthechosenfew. Suchamaterialistviewdoes,
however,raisetroublingmoralquestions,suchasthequestion“Whybemoralatall?”Thesequestions
arenotincapableofbeinganswered,andthinkerssuchas‘newatheist’SamHarrishavebeenstriving
valiantlytoanswerthem. However,asHickhassaid:
Whyshouldoneforegoentryintoalargeruniverseofmeaning,whichclaimsandseemsto
representtheactualstructureofreality,simplybecausethereisalwaysthegeneralpossibility
ofdelusion?19
Inshort,althoughthematerialistrejectsreincarnationbecauseithasnotbeenscientificallyproven,
solongasithasalsonotbeenscientificallydisproven,itsatisfiesbothHick’sandJames’criteriaasa
validoptionforbelief.
As the next argument suggests, however, it may not actually be necessary, in light of recent
scientificdevelopments,eventocontemplatecastingasidethepossibilityofaspiritualrealminorder
toremainfaithfultoascientificvisionofreality.Itmayindeedbethat,inthenearfuture,thesurvivalof
consciousnessbeyondthedeathofthebodywillbecomeatopicofmainstreamscientificinvestigation.
The empirical argument for rebirth is based on the research into past life memory that was
famously pursued by the late Ian Stevenson and that continues to be pursued by his successor,
JimTucker,inthedepartmentofpsychiatryattheUniversityofVirginia.
To the possible objection that past life memory studies in the West are not relevant to Indic
modelsofreincarnation,suchastheVeda¯nticmodel,andthatpastlifememoryisarelativelyrecent
phenomenon,wehavealreadyseenmentionmadeinanancientIndictext—theYogaSu¯tra—topast
life memory. The idea of past life memory, indeed, undergirds an entire genre of early Buddhist
18 (Malkovsky2017).
19 Ibid.