Religion, Political Power and Human Capital Formation

14 Pages·2017·0.13 MB·English

Religion, Political Power and Human Capital Formation:
Evidence from Islamic History
Eric Chaney∗
March 2018
Abstract
This essay links the rise and subsequent decline of scientific output in the medieval Islamic
world to institutional changes. The rise of secular bureaucratic institutions stimulated scientific
output whereas the collapse of these bureaucratic structures —and the concomitant rise in the
politicalpowerofreligiousleaders—suppressedit. Theessayconcludesthatsecularstatecapacity
can help encourage scientific development by constraining rent-seeking religious elements within
civil society.
∗OxfordUniversity,[email protected]. IthankJaredRubinforhelpfulcomments. Anyremainingerrors
are mine.
1
The flowering of scientific production in the medieval Islamic world has received increased scholarly
attention in recent years (e.g. Saliba, 2007; Dallal, 2010). For some, this historical episode demonstrates
the compatibility of Islam and science. For others, it represents a temporary deviation from Islam’s
obscurantist pull. These conflicting views stem partly from the fact that the reasons behind the rise
and subsequent decline in scientific production remain poorly understood.
This essay draws on recent and ongoing research to locate the “Golden Age” of scientific advances in
the Islamic world’s institutional history. In particular, the rise of scientific production is linked to the
waxing of secular bureaucratic structures in the late eighth century CE whereas the decline is attributed
to the waning of these structures in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.
How did the rise of a secular bureaucracy encourage scientific development? The emergence of ratio-
nalized forms of administration increased the demand for secular knowledge and politically empowered
secular elites such as administrators, astrologers, doctors and secretaries (Crone, 2006, pp. 23-24).
These individuals joined rulers in their patronage of scientific works both for practical (Sabra, 1996, p.
662) as well as for ideological reasons (Gutas, 1998; David, 2008).
A period of institutional change in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, traditionally known as
the Sunni Revival, resulted in the decline of the secular bureaucracy. This empowered religious leaders
(e.g. Gibb, 1982a, p. 24) who molded the institutional environment to discourage scientific production
that undermined their societal influence.
I hypothesize that an increasingly militarized government undermined the secular bureaucracy and
allowed religious leaders to take control of civil society. This in turn contributed to the emergence of
educational institutions such as madrasas that decreased the relative payoff to producing science. As
the payoff structure shifted in favor of the production of religious knowledge, talent increasingly flowed
away from the study of scientific topics, leading to a decline in both the quality and quantity of scientific
works produced (Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 1991).
Conceptually, this historical account is related to the growing literature highlighting the relationship
between state capacity and economic outcomes (e.g. Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and
Papaioannou, 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2015; Dell et al., 2017). In particular, it suggests that secular
state structures can help constrain rent-seeking religious elites within civil society. In this sense, it
is consistent with Acemoglu and Robinson (2017) who argue that growth-promoting state structures
2
constrain (and in turn are constrained by) civil society.
The essay also complements the growing literature arguing that “religion matters” in understanding
differences in human capital formation rates across societies (e.g. Mokyr, 2002; Becker and Woessmann,
2009; Botticini and Eckstein, 2012; Benabou et al., 2013). Consistent with Cantoni and Yuchtman
(2013); Cantoni et al. (2017), I argue that where religious elites are more powerful they will favor
an institutional and educational framework that discourages human capital accumulation that could
detract from their control over the population (see Acemoglu and Autor, 2012, for a related discussion).
This view suggests that better understanding these political constraints may help clarify why some
religions historically encouraged human capital formation to a greater extent than others.
Finally, this essay is related to studies investigating the economic rise of the Western World. The
literature increasingly highlights the role of the technological and scientific dynamism of the West as
a key driver of the divergence both within the West and between the West and the rest of the world
(e.g. Mokyr, 2005; A’Hearn et al., 2009; Buringh and van Zanden, 2009; Squicciarini and Voigtlander,
2015). It is often forgotten, however, that the Islamic world outstripped the West technologically and
scientifically for much of the Middle Ages. The analysis in this paper suggests that future research
investigating how the political equilibrium in the West placed constraints on religious leaders may
provide insights into the greater scientific and technological development of the West in the run-up to
the Industrial Revolution.
The remainder of the essay proceeds as follows: section 1 provides a brief overview of scientific
development in the medieval Islamic world. Section 2 locates these advances within the Islamic world’s
institutional history and section 3 concludes.
1 Science in the Medieval Islamic World: a Brief Background
Scholars broadly agree that for much of the medieval period Islamic societies led the world in both
technology and science (e.g. Huff, 2003, p. 48). While the factors that led to this surge in intellectual
output remain a topic of debate, its timing is reasonably well known. From the rise of Islam in the
seventh century until the start of the Abbasid Caliphate in 750 CE, the nascent Islamic world produced
3
relatively little scientific output.1 Abbasid Caliphs over the following century sponsored a translation
movement aimed at rendering every available scientific text into Arabic (Gutas, 1998). This translation
movement coincided with and served as a catalyst for the explosion of scientific output that occurred in
the Islamic world over the following centuries. Scientists during this period made important advances
in fields as varied as astronomy, mathematics, medicine and optics (Kennedy, 1970, p. 337).2 Indeed,
many scientific works from the medieval Islamic world were eventually translated into Latin and are
believed to have played a central role in the scientific development of Western Europe during the late
medieval and early modern periods (e.g. Lindberg, 1978).
According to Brentjes (2009, p. 305) there were “two major periods for the patronage of scientific
knowledge,” the first spanning roughly the eighth to the twelfth centuries and the second running from
the twelfth to the nineteenth century. During the first period, rulers, bureaucrats and wealthy urban
groups funded scientific output and also established institutions such as libraries where scientific topics
were studied (e.g. Brentjes, 2009, p. 305). Rulers and other wealthy individuals patronized scientists
for both prestige (David, 2008) and for the “practical benefits promised by the practitioners of medicine
and astronomy and astrology and applied mathematics” (Sabra, 1996, p. 662).
In the second period, funding for intellectual pursuits shifted to religious institutions such as
madrasas. Unlike the direct patronage system of the first period, in the second period rulers and
wealthy individuals endowed religious institutions dedicated to knowledge production. Prospective
scholars who wished to be appointed to these posts generally had to specialize in the production of
religious knowledge (Makdisi, 1981, p. 285).
One line of scholarship implies that this shift in the patronage structures was the product of the
Sunni Revival which began sometime in the eleventh century. Traditionally, scholars have stressed
the ideological aspects of this shift arguing that the Revival marked the final triumph of traditionalist
religious leaders in their battle against rationalism (e.g. Makdisi, 1973, p. 168). As traditionalists
1In the century following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE, Arab-Islamic armies conquered a vast
territoryreachingfrommodern-dayFrancetoPakistan. TheimmediatesuccessorstoMuhammad(knownastheRashidun
Caliphs) were followed by the Umayyad Dynasty in 661 which was replaced, in turn, by the Abbasid Dynasty in 750.
Contrary to what is implied in many studies, this dynasty was relatively short-lived, at least in its ability to directly
controlterritory. Generallyspeaking,after945theAbbasidCaliphsnolongercontrolledterritoryandprimarilyprovided
their blessing upon the true holders of power across the Islamic world. In 1258, this state of affairs came to an end when
the last Abbasid Caliph was killed by the Mongols.
2The term scientist is, admittedly, anachronistic. Throughout, I use this term in place of others such as natural
philosopher for expositional ease.
4
gained societal influence, madrasas replaced institutions such as libraries focused on scientific research
(Makdisi, 1981, p. 10).3
Historical evidence suggests that traditionalist religious leaders worked to orchestrate these institu-
tional changes. These elites had long criticized rationalist interpretations of Islam, claiming that they
led to a loss of belief (e.g. Kraemer, 1986, p. 72). Madrasas are generally believed to have served the
traditionalist agenda by discouraging rationalist strains of Islam, unrestricted study of scientific topics
and innovation more broadly (e.g. Talbani, 1996).4
Other explanations for the medieval decline of scientific output compete with the Revival hypothesis
intheliterature. Forcenturies,scholarshavestressedtherolethattheMongolinvasionsofthethirteenth
century played in bringing about the medieval decline. Although the mechanisms through which these
shocks affected scientific output remain a topic of debate, the existing scholarship often stresses the
importanceofthedestructionofphysicalandhumancapitalaswellasinstitutionalandculturalchanges
(for one critical review of this hypothesis, see Saliba, 2007, p. 235).
In recent years, a new line of scholarship has emerged challenging the entire medieval decline narra-
tive. For example, Saliba (2007) provides overwhelming evidence that important advances continued to
be produced in the Islamic world long after the supposed decline of scientific production. He suggests
that the decline did not begin until the sixteenth century.
Chaney (2016) provides new empirical evidence suggesting that scientific output declined in the late
eleventh century. Such evidence casts doubt on both Mongol and revisionist narratives, suggesting the
importance of better understanding the mechanisms through which the Revival dampened scientific
production.
2 Scientific Development in Institutional Perspective
Existing studies of scientific development in the Islamic world tend to abstract from the region’s insti-
tutional and political history. In this section, I argue that this political history can explain both the
3While there are isolated examples of madrasas solely dedicated to funding scientific endeavors most available posts
were dedicated to the production of religious knowledge (e.g. Brentjes, 2009, p. 313).
4Rationalism, innovation and the unrestricted study of science were believed to lead individuals to a loss of belief.
Consistentwiththisview,Stroumsa(1999)providesexamplesofthedeist/atheistfiguresthatemergedduringtheGolden
Age. Also, see Glaeser and Sacerdote (2008) for evidence of a negative relationship between religious beliefs and human
capital formation.
5
rise and subsequent decline of scientific activity during the medieval period.
The basic premise underlying this hypothesis is consistent with recent evidence linking the rise of
scientific activity in the medieval Islamic world to institutional changes. For example, Gutas (1998)
recounts how the emergence of the Abbasid Caliphate led to a resurgence of pre-Islamic institutional
forms which led to the translation movement and subsequent scientific activity. In particular, his
analysis suggests that the rise of the secular bureaucracy during this period was “instrumental” in
stimulating scientific development and that state functionaries constituted “one of the most important
social groups” patronizing scientific activities (Gutas, 1998, p. 128).5
Scholars have long noted that the rise of the Abbasid Caliphate represented a break with previ-
ous institutional arrangements. Importantly, the Abbasid Revolution politically empowered non-Arab
(initially largely Persian) bureaucratic elites who aimed to remold institutions on pre-Islamic Iranian
patterns (Gibb, 1982b, p. 66). The increased political power of this group, in turn, stemmed from
the fact that both Persianized Arabs and Persians played a central role in bringing the Abbasids to
power (Gutas, 1998, p. 29). Thus, the Abbasid revolution led to a marked change in both the size and
political influence of the secular bureaucracy (e.g. Biddle, 1972, p. v) and by the start of the ninth
century this bureaucracy had become “a major political and cultural force” (Kennedy, 2004, p. 146).
How did the rise of a secular bureaucracy encourage scientific development? The emergence of ratio-
nalized forms of administration increased the demand for secular knowledge and politically empowered
secular elites such as administrators, astrologers, doctors and secretaries (Crone, 2006, pp. 23-24).
These individuals joined rulers in their patronage of scientific works both for practical (Sabra, 1996,
p. 662) as well as for ideological reasons (Gutas, 1998; David, 2008). Saliba (2007, pp. 58-64) argues
that competition between bureaucrats also worked to stimulate scientific output.6 As the bureaucracy
expanded and competition increased, incumbent bureaucrats “resorted to higher specialization through
thetranslationofthemoreadvancedsciences”tosecuretheirpositions(Saliba,2007, p. 65). Regardless
of the exact mechanisms at work, the educational needs of these bureaucrats are generally viewed as a
central impetus for scientific development (e.g. Gutas, 1998, p. 115). For example, algebra is believed
to have been developed, at least in part, to address engineering and irrigation problems bureaucrats
5The term secular bureaucracy has been used by Goitein (1957, p. 597) among others.
6It is worth noting that Saliba (2007) sees the rise of the translation movement in this competition, which in his view
is rooted in the bureaucratic reforms of the late Umayyad period.
6
faced at the time (Gutas, 1998, p. 113).
Although the rise of the secular bureaucracy had benign consequences for scientific development, it
also reflected an attempt to build autocratic state structures. Opposition to this project began early on
as disaffected groups began to organize opposition to government policy around religious ideals. These
groups are generally viewed as proto-ulama or the first of the religious elites that were to play a central
role throughout much of Islamic history (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 250).
As Arab elites in the Umayyad dynasty became increasingly autocratic, the distance between these
religious elites and the ruling class grew. This process continued under the Abbasids and played a
central role in the development of Islamic law (Hallaq, 2009, pp. 128-129). Some scholars have viewed
the development of this law —which largely developed outside state structures— as an attempt to
constrain increasingly autocratic caliphs (e.g. Crone and Hinds, 2003, pp. 108-109).
The process is believed to have come to a head during the Abbasid Caliphate during what is known
as the Mihna (833-848). During this period, the Abbasid Caliph attempted to undermine this growing
opposition by forcing religious leaders to adhere to rationalist interpretations of Islam. After this
attempt failed, Abbasid caliphs introduced the slave soldier system that characterized much of the
Islamic world over the following centuries (Crone, 1980).
The timing of the failure of the Mihna and the introduction of slave soldiers suggests that these two
events may have been related. In particular, it seems plausible that the introduction of slave soldiers
marked an attempt by caliphs to circumvent the growing constraints that the autonomous development
of Islamic law threatened to place on their rule (Crone and Hinds, 2003, pp. 108-109). Recent analyses
support this claim (Blaydes and Chaney, 2013; Chaney, 2013; Blaydes and Chaney, 2016).7
2.1 Slave Soldiers, Militarization of Government Structures and Scientific
Decline
The introduction of armies staffed by slaves marked a “major innovation in Middle Eastern history”
(Lapidus, 2014, p. 86). Although the use of military slaves began in the ninth century, this institution
did not fully develop until the tenth century (Kennedy, 2004, p. 204).8 Although the introduction of
7Morebroadly,theideathatslavesoldierswereintroducedtoreduceconstraintsonthecaliphsisconsistentwithboth
Fukuyama (2011, p. 192) and Lapidus (1982, p. 717).
8See Blaydes and Chaney (2013) for an in depth overview of this institution.
7
slave soldiers is often viewed as an attempt to create a loyal military, these slaves “had a disconcerting
tendency to take over the state and tear it apart from within” (Tor, 2008, p. 223).
The historian Miskawayh (who died in 1030 CE) records how the introduction of slave soldiers
undermined bureaucratic structures. After the introduction of slave soldiers he notes how “the bureau-
cracy was shut down and the bureaucratic secretaries and tax collectors disappeared [... instead the
land was managed by] slave soldiers and agents who did not take care of what was in their power or
manage the land in a fruitful manner” (Miskawayh, 1915 [1030], pp. 97-98). Lapidus (2014, p. 179)
sums up such evidence, noting how these soldiers “destroyed established elites.”
ThisprocessculminatedintheinstitutionalchangesknownastheSunni Revival inthesecondhalfof
the twelfth century. During this period, the secular bureaucracy contracted in what has been described
as the militarization of final governmental power (Hodgson, 1974b, p. 64). As the secular bureaucracy
contracted, religious leaders filled the void, emerging as social and political elites in addition to religious
ones (Gilliot et al., 2012). Thus, during the Revival, civil society “came under the purview of Islam”
as religious scholars “took charge of judicial administration, local police, irrigation, public works and
taxation” (Lapidus, 1996, pp. 13-14).
During this period the madrasa spread across much of the Islamic world, in what is widely viewed
as a sign of the increased political influence of religious elites. As religious leaders gained political
power, they could have continued to support scientific research in madrasas or other waqf institutions
had they desired. The available evidence, however, suggests that while some scholars employed in
madrasas continued to work on scientific topics, the sciences were “banished from the regular course of
institutionalized education” under the law of waqf (Makdisi, 1981, p. 283).
The evidence suggests that religious elites used their increased influence to limit the study of science
because they believed that the unrestricted study of science led to religious skepticism which under-
mined, in turn, their control over the population. Such skepticism had been widespread among the
secular bureaucrats who were “often disinclined to defer to religious scholars” (Crone, 2006, pp. 23-24).
To prevent such skepticism, religious elites advocated restricting the study of science to individuals who
could be trusted to not go astray (in practice, primarily religious leaders themselves).9 This desire to
9For example, al-Ghazālī notes that those who study sciences (in this case geometry and arithmetic often) “have gone
beyond their study into innovations (i.e. non-orthodox beliefs) and thus the weak (in faith) should be barred from their
study like the boy is barred from the bank of the river so that he does not fall in” (al-Ghazālī, 1111 [2005], p. 31). Sabra
(1987, p. 237) notes that after the Revival, scientists “were imbued with Muslim learning and tradition.”
8
eradicate skepticism appears to have guided the crafting of the post-Revival education system. Thus,
in addition to limiting the study of science, this system is believed to have discouraged “questioning,
verifying, criticizing, evaluating and making judgements” while encouraging “the uncritical acceptance
of authority” (Halstead, 2004, p. 526).
As madrasa-employed religious leaders worked with military elites to prevent “unfettered private
inquiry by persons not trained to come to the right answers” the “liberty of opinion” that had char-
acterized the previous centuries came to a close (Hodgson, 1974b, p. 192). Chaney (2016) provides
empirical evidence consistent with this historical narrative, showing that scientific production experi-
enced a significant drop during the Revival.
3 Conclusion
This essay has argued that the Islamic world’s Golden Age of scientific production was closely linked to
theregion’ssecularbureaucraticstructures. Ihaveprovidedevidencethattheseinstitutionsencouraged
scientific production by both increasing demand for scientific output and by constraining religious
leaders opposed to the study of scientific topics. The introduction of slave soldiers and the eventual
militarization of government led to the collapse of this bureaucracy and the empowerment of religious
leaders. These religious elites worked to restrict scientific production that undermined their societal
position.
The evidence presented in this paper weighs against claims that Islam is uniquely inimical to sci-
entific development. Instead, and consistent with Rubin (2017), it argues that secular state structures
can play a fundamental role in constraining rent-seeking religious elites aiming to restrict scientific
research. In this sense, it suggests strengthening secular institutions across the Islamic world may
encourage scientific production today.
9
References
Acemoglu, D. and D. Autor, “What Does Human Capital Do? A Review of Goldin and Katz’s The
Race between Education and Technology,” Journal of Economic Literature, 2012, 50 (2), 426–463.
and J. Robinson, “The Emergence of Weak, Despotic and Inclusive States,” NBER Working Paper
23657, 2017.
, C. Garcia-Jimeno, and J. Robinson, “State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network
Approach,” American Economic Review, 2015, 105 (8), 2364–2409.
A’Hearn, B., J. Baten, and D. Crayen, “Quantifying Quantitative Literacy: Age Heaping and the
History of Human Capital,” Journal of Economic History, 2009, 69 (3), 783–808.
al-Ghazālī, A., Iḥyā’ ’ulūm ad-dīn, Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 1111 [2005].
Baumol, W., “Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive,” The Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 1990, 98 (5), 893–921.
Becker, S. and L. Woessmann, “Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of Protestant
Economic History,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009, 124 (2), 531–596.
Benabou, R., D. Ticchi, and A. Vindigni, “Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy of Science,
Religion, and Growth,” Mimeo, 2013.
Biddle, D., “The Development of the Bureaucracy of the Islamic Empire during the Late Umayyad
and Early Abbasid Period.” PhD dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin 1972.
Blaydes, L. and E. Chaney, “The Feudal Revolution and Europe’s Rise: Political Divergence of the
Christian West and the Muslim World before 1500 CE,” American Political Science Review, 2013,
107 (1), 16–34.
and , “The Political Economy Legacy of Institutions from the Classical Period of Islam,” in
S. Durlauf and L. Blume, eds., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Palgrave Macmillan,
2016.
10