Reason and Conduct in Hume and his Predecessors

189 Pages·1974·5.307 MB·English

by  Stanley Tweyman (auth.)

REASON AND CONDUCT IN HUME
AND HIS PREDECESSORS
REASON AND CONDUCT IN HUME
AND HIS PREDECESSORS
by
STANLEY TWEYMAN
I I
MARTINUS NIJHOFF I THE HAGUE 11974
To my daughter Justine Susan
ISBN-13: 978-90-247-1582-4 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-011-6432-0
001: 10.1007/978-94-011-6432-0
© 1974 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or
to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE. VII
INTRODUCTION 1
Chapter One: MORAL PmLOSOPHY AND ITS METHOD . 4
I. Aim of Moral Philosophy 4
II. Method 6
III. Justification of the Method 10
Chapter Two: IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS 18
I. Impressions and Ideas Differ in Kind 18
II. Distinctions in Kind . 20
III. The Criterion of Force and Vivacity 26
IV. The Criterion of Substantial Existence. 28
V. Impressions are Paradigmatic; Ideas are Derivative 29
VI. The Role of Force and Vivacity 35
VII. Further Confirmation Provided by the Missing Shade of Blue 37
Chapter Three: HUME'S ANALYSIS OF REASON. 40
I. Three Senses of Reason 40
II. Causal Reasoning 41
III. Distinctions of Reason 42
IV. Reason as the Comparison of Ideas 46
(A) Not all relations yield knowledge in the strict sense 46
(B) Three conflicting views on those relations yielding know-
ledge . 48
(C) Steps toward resolving the conflict 50
(0) Resolving the conflict . 60
VI TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Four: REASON AND CONDUCT IN HUME'S PREDECESSORS 71
I. Ralph Cudworth . 71
II. Samuel Clarke 73
(A) Fitting and unfittbg actions 73
(B) Fitness and obligation . 81
(C) Mathematical and moral reasoning 86
III. William Wollaston 87
(A) Actions, propositions, and truth values 87
(B) Truth and happiness. 92
(C) Truth, happiness, and obligation . 98
Chapter Five : HUME CONTRA THE RATIONALISTS 100
I. Introduction . 100
II. Critique of Wollaston 103
III. Critique of Clarke. III
Chapter Six: REASON AND THE WILL 121
I. Introduction . 121
II. The Alleged Combat Between Reason and Passion 122
(A) Demonstrative reasoning and the will 123
(B) Causal reasoning and the will . 132
(C) Only passions can oppose passions 137
Chapter Seven : REASON AND MORAL CONDUCT 139
I. How Moral Rules are Obtained: The Three Stages in Hume's
Argument 139
II. The First Stage : The "Is-Ought" Passage 139
(A) Hume's meaning 139
(B) Hume's own program outlined 145
III. The Second Stage : Examining the Impressions which Give
Rise to Moral Distinctions. 147
(A) Identifying these impressions . 147
(B) The origin of moral impressions 150
(C) How a disinterested standpoint is achieved 163
IV. The Third Stage : Proving that Moral Rules Can only be
Obtained from the Moral Impressions Identified in the
Second Stage. 168
CONCLUSION 172
BIBLIOGRAPHY 175
INDEX 178
PREFACE
Can reason play a significant role in making moral distinctions and in
generating moral precepts? In this book I attempt to provide Hume's
answers to these questions in the light of his employment of the 'Experimen
tal Method', his doctrine of perceptions, and his analysis of reason. In
addition to this, attention is paid to some of Hume's rationalist predeces
sors - most notably, Samuel Clarke and William Wollaston - in order to
assess Hume's critique of the rationalists.
Regarding the preparation of this book I wish to thank Professor Ronald
J. Butler who introduced me to Hume's writings. Professors W. J. Huggett,
R. F. McRae, and F. E. Sparshott each read the original draft of this book
and provided me with extremely valuable comments and criticisms. My wife
Barbara Tweyman and my mother Fay Tweyman provided me with constant
support throughout the time I was preparing this book, and for this, as well
as for many other things, I will always be grateful. My father-in-law, the late
Joseph Millstone, a man I dearly loved and respected, also provided me
with support during the time I was working on this book. His death is for
me an incalculable loss, and his memory is something I will always cherish.
Because there is considerable shifting of the textual references in the
case of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature and the two Enquiries, for the
convenience of the reader I should like to point out that all such references
are to the Selby-Bigge editions, and that within these editions the following
main divisions in terms of the pages they occupy are: Treatise, Book I,
p. 1-274; Treatise, Book II, p. 275-454; Treatise, Book III, p. 455-621;
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p. 5-165; Enquiry Concerning
the Principles of Morals, p. 169-323.
INTRODUCTION
Hume's Treatise of Human Nature and his Enquiry Concerning the
Principles of Morals both show that he holds that his views on morality
are to be understood through the application of his Experimental Method,
his theory of perceptions, and his analysis of reason to the positions held
by his rationalist predecessors. In this way Hume held that the untenability
of the rationalists' positions would be exposed, and this in turn would
1
pave the way for the acceptance of his own ethical theory which has its
foundation in feeling, this being the only alternative Hume considers to
rationalism in ethics.
My aim in this book is to follow Hume through this task he has set for
himself, a task noted by some but not yet carried through.2 Accordingly,
in the first four chapters attention is paid to those ingredients the interaction
of which Hume believes will be able to establish the truth of his own
ethical views. Chapter one examines Hume as an 'anatomist' of human
nature, and attempts to provide a rationale for adopting the Experimental
Method as the only method of inquiry. Any question which Hume raises
and any answer he provides are couched in terms of his theory of per
ceptions. To fully understand both his questions and answers, therefore,
an adequate understanding of his doctrine of impressions and ideas is
required. In the second chapter, an attempt is made to show what Hume
regards as the distinguishing features of these two kinds of perceptions,
and what he means when he employs these terms. This analysis will perme
ate most of what follows in the succeeding chapters. The third chapter, for
example, will avail itself of the findings in the second in examining Hume's
1 I say 'positions' since we shall find that there is much diversity in the views held
by the rationalists.
2 See, for example, Henry D. Aiken, Hume's Moral and Political (Hafner Publish
ing Company, New York, 1948). Reprinted: Hafner Publishing Company, New York
1966, p. xxvii.
2 INTRODUCTION
concept of reason. In addition, the third chapter will disclose that Hume
actually has three senses of reason - demonstrative, causal, and distinctions
of reason - rather than two (demonstrative and causal). Our study in this
chapter will help us both in making clear the manner in which Hume
employs the term 'reason' and in trying to make clear the roles which Hume
assigns to reason in morality. Significantly, all three senses of reason will
be seen to playa vital role.
The fourth chapter will be concerned with those aspects of the moral
theories of Hume's rationalist predecessors which are relevant to our
study in this work. In this regard I have confined myself primarily to
Samuel Clarke and William Wollaston inasmuch as it is usually supposed
that Hume is attacking their ethical theories.3
Chapter five is devoted entirely to Book III, Part I, Section i of the
Treatise in which Hume raises the opening question of his inquiry into
morality, namely, 'Whether 'tis by means of our ideas or impressions we
distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable
or praise-worthy?' and where he seeks to refute his rationalist predecessors.
In the light of my discussion in the first three chapters the meaning of
Hume's question is provided. And by means of my discussion in the first
four chapters I will attempt to show that Hume is unable to refute the
moral theories of Clarke and Wollaston: Hume has failed to see that
much of what he accepts Wollaston and/or Clarke also regard as true;
that certain parts of his attack on Walloston and Clarke are based on a
misunderstanding of their views; and that some central areas of disagreement
between Hume on the one hand and Wollaston and Clarke on the other
are not attended to by Hume at all.
In addition to his attack on the rationalists in the first section of the
third book of the Treatise, Hume also attacks rationalism in the second
book of the Treatise (Book II, Part III, Section ii, 'Of the Influencing
Motives of the Will') by attempting to establish that reason cannot yield
rules of action in opposition to the dictates of passion. In my sixth chapter
each of Hume's arguments will be examined especially as they apply to
Samuel Clarke's view of the opposition of reason and passion, and I will
argue that here again Hume's attack on rationalism in ethics fails: Hume
is not able to show that reason cannot dictate actions. The section in the
Treatise under examination in this chapter also gives us some insight into
Hume's views on the relationship between conduct and demonstrative and
8 See for example, John Laird, Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature (Methuen:
London, 1932). Reprinted: Archon Books, 1967, p. 214.
INTRODUCTION 3
causal reasoning. This will also be examined, and certain confusions
regarding the relationship between causal reasoning and conduct will be
cleared up.
Since Hume holds that reason is incapable of yielding practical judgments
alone he concludes that the practical judgments of morality cannot be
derived from reason. The aim of my seventh chapter is to determine exactly
how Hume argues such judgments are obtained and to establish the various
roles which Hume assigns to reason with regard to moral conduct.
My concluding chapter will offer a critical appraisal of Hume's approach
to morality with particular emphasis on his use of the Experimental Method
in an effort to establish the untenability of the moral theories of Wollaston
and Clarke.
CHAPTER I
MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND ITS METHOD
I. AIM OF MORAL PIDLOSOPHY
In his Treatise of Human Nature 1 and in the two later Enquiries2, Hume's
concern is with moral philosophy, an area he also labels the science of
human nature.3 This realm of enquiry he distinguishes from natural phi
losophy which had made remarkable advances under Newton. Moral
philosophy itself is divided by Hume into the "easy and obvious philosophy"
and the "accurate and abstruse".4 People engaged in the latter are referred
to as 'anatomists',s while those in the former are spoken of as 'painters'6.
The easy and obvious philosophy treats men as being born chiefly for
action and as being influenced by taste and sentiment. As such, what is
7
thought to be most desirable is painted in the most complimentary fashion,
employing poetry and eloquence wherever necessary, and in general
"treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such as is
best fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections".8 The
accurate and abstruse philosophy considers man as a reasonable rather
1 All references to the Treatise of Human Nature are taken from the Selby-Bigge
edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1888), heieafter cited as T. followed by the page num
ber.
a All references to the Enquiries are taken from the Selby-Bigge edition, Oxford:
Clarendon Press (1902), hereafter cited as E. followed by the page number.
3 E. 5.
4 E. 6.
I See for example E. 10, T. 621.
8 See for example E. 5, T. 621.
7 E. 6.
8 E. 5. The effectiveness of this type of philosophy is also noted by Hume. For example,
in one passage he writes: "Tis difficult for us to withhold our assent from what is pointed
out to us in all the colours of eloquence ... We are hurried away by the lively imagina
tion of our author or companion; and even he himself is often a victim of his own fire
and genius." (T. 123) See also E. 6-7.