ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: TO DICTATE THE PEACE: POWER, STRATEGY AND SUCCESS IN MILITARY OCCUPATIONS Anthony S. Marcum, Doctor of Philosophy, 2015 Dissertation directed by: Professor Paul Huth Department of Government and Politics The dissertation addresses the following question: why do some states win a war only to lose the occupation whereas other states can successfully impose their preferred outcome via the control of foreign territory? For example, compare the United States’ failure in Iraq (2003-2008) to the Allied Powers’ success in France (1815-1818). To explain this variation, I develop and test a principal-agent model in which I incorporate the occupied elite’s costs of compliance and the occupier’s strategies of control. As agents, the occupied elites expect to incur significant domestic and international costs if they consent to the occupier’s demands, and thus have strong incentives to not comply. The occupying state can overcome this hostility through a costly exercise of power to shape the choices and manipulate the incentives of elites to influence their decision-making. Occupying states that engage in dictating as a strategy of control are compelling the elites to make a costly choice. By constraining the choice set to compliance or non-compliance with its terms, the occupying power can effectively separate strongly adverse elites from moderately or weakly adverse ones, and thereby gain a commitment to its objectives. Although previous work on occupations recognizes the difficulties in achieving success, the costs of compliance to the elite and the occupiers’ strategy of control are largely overlooked in previous scholarship. To evaluate the theoretical argument, I employ two research methods in the project. First, I built an original dataset to test the effects of the costs of compliance and the strategies of control on the outcomes of 137 military occupations that result from interstate wars between 1815 and 2003. The statistical analyses are paired with two plausibility probes: the Chilean Occupation of Peru (1881-1883) and the Soviet Occupation of North Korea (1945-1948). Second, I examine in-depth the American Occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952. The case study investigates how the costs of compliance – across regime change, economic stabilization, and rearmament – generated resistance among Japanese politicians, and how the Americans exercised their power to dictate that the former comply with the latter’s costly terms during the course of the occupation. TO DICTATE THE PEACE: POWER, STRATEGY AND SUCCESS IN MILITARY OCCUPATIONS by Anthony S. Marcum Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2015 Advisory Committee: Professor Paul Huth, Chair Professor Sarah Croco Professor I. M. Destler, Dean’s Representative Professor Scott Kastner Professor George Quester © Copyright by Anthony S. Marcum 2015 For Katie Acknowledgements Writing a dissertation can be dark and lonely business. It is best done with good mentorship and excellent companions. Paul Huth has served as a model dissertation adviser over the years. He let me roam the field searching for the next case, and provided the right insights at a number of critical phases in the project. Scott Kastner, George Quester, and Sarah Croco have greatly contributed to the improvement of the project, lending their skills and advice throughout its development. Prof. I. M. Destler agreed to serve as my Dean’s Representative during the final phases of the project. I want to thank for his interest in the project, especially his knowledge on the case of Japan. Next, I would like to thank a number of institutions that helped in the gathering of evidence for the dataset. At McKeldin Library, I earned a reputation as a ‘heavy borrower’ who ordered any and all obscure manuscripts by the dozens over the years. The librarians and staff were exemplary in their efforts to meet my numerous requests. At the British Public Archives, a number of staff members freely gave their time and advice in assisting with my search. My efforts would not have been nearly as successful without their guidance. The library staff at Tufts University provided some much needed assistance in acquiring a particular manuscript. Their generosity allowed my wife to acquire a copy of a crucial dissertation, and for that I am grateful. At the University of Cologne, the librarians accepted my unsteady German and frequent requests with peaked interest. I want to thank a number of individuals who have helped and inspired me along the way. First, at the department, Ann Marie and Cissy have always made me feel right at home. Their support and friendship throughout graduate school were essential to my ii success. I was especially fortunate during my time at Maryland to work with James M. Glass and the College Park Scholars International Studies Program. Jim let me work with the program for several years. His experience and advice were invaluable for an aspiring teaching scholar. Next, Prof. Morhad Eghbal has been quite generous with his time and energy over the last few years. His wisdom and enthusiasm always came at the crucial moments, whether during the car rides to and from the airport, or enjoying a dinner with his wonderful family. From Purdue University, I want to thank Ann Marie Clark and James McCann for their encouragement and kindness. I owe a special thanks to Melissa Buehler. Mel knew I could do it, even when I was not sure of that myself. From my days as an undergraduate, Prof. Donna Schlagheck and Prof. Laura Luehrmann provided the necessary encouragement for me to become a professor. I only hope that I can be as successful a mentor to my students as they were to me. I especially want to thank Prof. Kathleen Myers. The hours spent discussing the finer points of diplomatic and military history of Southeast Asia remain some of my fondest memories from Wright State. I hope chapter five meets your expectations. My friends have been especially important in completing this project. Jon Brown has been especially vital. We met in August 2005 for our first teaching assignment, and then soon discovered that we shared similar intellectual interests in realism and history. His willingness to entertain my ideas and to provide the right amount of encouragement to pursue them made the whole process that much better. I also want to thank Alex, Andy, Christina, Dave, Katherine, Kevin, Jim, Josh, and Steve. Over the years, each of you has contributed in one way or another to the project, even if you did not realize it. iii My family has provided their enduring support over the years. My parents have been encouraging, in more ways than they will probably ever know. My interest in military and diplomatic history stems from a conversation with father in December 1990, during the build up to the initial Gulf War. Even after twenty-five years, I am still trying to understand why states fight. That persistence and patience comes from my mother, who reminded me to go as far as I needed to find what I was looking for. My brother Luke instinctively understood the process, and made sure we talked about anything else. My sister Abby always asked the pertinent question: is it done yet. Finally, I have saved the most important thank for last: Katherine M. Simpson. Katie, you are an inspiration. You are my best friend, my greatest competitor, and my perfect partner. Thank you for being here with me. The dissertation is as much yours as it is mine. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... ii List of Tables ................................................................................................................... vii List of Figures ................................................................................................................. viii Chapter 1: Introduction ..................................................................................................1 Between War and Peace: Military Occupations in the Modern International System ... 4 A Central Dilemma for Peace: Occupied Elites and the Costs of Compliance ............ 10 Power Politics and the Establishment of the Victor’s Peace ........................................ 15 Exercising Power as Control ......................................................................................... 17 Organization of the Dissertation ................................................................................... 22 Chapter 2: Purgatory in International Politics: the Military Occupations Dataset, 1815 – 2003 .........................................................................................................26 Conceptualizing Military Occupations ......................................................................... 26 Military Occupations and the Distribution of Sovereign Rights .................................. 36 Identifying the Universe of Cases ................................................................................. 44 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 54 Chapter 3: Power, Strategy, and Success in Military Occupations ..........................61 Clarifying the Vocabulary............................................................................................. 63 Enforcement in World Politics: Assumptions of the Model ......................................... 64 Selection, Costly Compliance, and the Principal-Agent Model in Military Occupations............................................................................................................... 69 Power, Risk-taking, and the Strategic Nature of Costly Control .............................. 77 Autonomy & Influence: Strategies of Control as Power .......................................... 88 Strategies, Costs, and the likelihood of the Victor’s Peace ...................................... 93 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 101 Chapter 4 Testing the Theory ...................................................................................103 The Unit of Analysis: Occupying Powers in Military Occupations ........................... 104 The Dependent Variable and the Statistical Model .................................................... 105 Identifying Success ................................................................................................. 106 Recognizing Failure ................................................................................................ 109 Primary Independent Variables ................................................................................... 112 Controlling for The Occupied Population ............................................................... 118 Control Variables ........................................................................................................ 122 The Empirical Results ................................................................................................. 128 v Costly Delays and Popular Leaders: the Chilean Occupation of Peru (1881-1883) and the Soviet Occupation of North Korea (1945-1948) ................................................... 132 Interpreting the Independent and Control Variables ................................................... 137 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 147 Chapter 5: Revisiting the American Occupation of Japan, 1945 to 1952 ..............148 Research Design and Methodology ............................................................................ 149 Retention of an Emperor and Constitution Reform .................................................... 153 Revealed Designs and the American Response ...................................................... 159 Adversity to Demands and Enforcing the Draft Constitution ................................. 163 Analysis: A Concession to Accommodate or the Power to Enforce ...................... 174 Aid, Economics, and Reviving the Workshop of Asia ............................................... 178 The Dodge Line and the Emerging Political Consequences ................................... 190 Analysis: Economic Recovery with High Compliance Costs ................................. 204 Peace, Security and Rearmament ................................................................................ 208 Negotiations among “Equals” ................................................................................. 216 Analysis: Dictating Rearmament over Recovery .................................................... 229 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 238 Chapter 6: Conclusion ................................................................................................239 Summary of Theoretical and Empirical Discoveries .................................................. 240 Implications for Scholarship and Policymaking ......................................................... 245 Directions for Future Research ................................................................................... 250 Appendix A: Interstate Wars under Investigation for Military Occupations ..........254 Appendix B: Auxiliary Analysis for Identity and Democracy ...................................259 Appendix C: Military Occupations Dataset & Case Sources ....................................263 References ...................................................................................................................... 308 vi
Description: