Peace in motion : John Dewey and the aesthetics of well-being

272 Pages·2016·4.53 MB·English

by  Yoram Lubling

Lubing & Evans_cover_AUS dd.qxd 1/5/2016 6:13 AM Page 1
In this book Yoram Lubling and Eric Evans offer a Deweyan reconstruction of our philosophical L A M E R I C A N U N I V E R S I T Y S T U D I E S
u
understanding of well-being. They begin with Dewey’s critique of the “philosophical fallacy” b
to examine the legitimacy and value of theories of well-being offered by traditional philoso- lin
phy. However, such theories fail to provide an authentic account of well-being due to a false g
understanding of experienceas either epistemic or cognitive. Next, using Dewey’s theory of expe- &
rience, they reconstruct “happiness” as the target for evaluation of well-being. This leads them E
to reject the traditional view of a private encapsulated self, and to offer in its place a transac- v
a
tionally situated selfwhich is an embodied, enculturated agent. Through their emphasis on the n
s
importance of the qualitative aspects of Dewey’s understanding of a situation, the pervasive
quality of the situationemerges as the most plausible criterion for the evaluation of well-being.
The authors use Dewey’s theories of inquiry, ethics, value and art to establish the naturalis-
tic conditions under which such pervasive qualityenters into a situation as either settled or unset-
tled, in other words, as peace in motion. Consequently, a problematic situationbecomes the P
primary condition under which all inquiry initiates whether it is in the context of science, ethics, e
a
values, art or ordinary living. Lubling and Evans conclude that a Deweyan account of well-
c
being involves embodied knowinginstead of the traditional view of cognitive knowledge. By using e
such an account, it is possible to explain the conditions and mechanisms under which well- i
being contributes to the enlargement and enrichment of individual and collective human n
experience. M
o
“The assumption of ‘intellectualism’ goes contrary to the facts of what is primarily experienced.
t
For things are objects to be treated, used, acted upon and with, enjoyed and endured, even more i
o
than things to be known. They are things had before they are things cognized…If we start from
n
primary experience, occurring as it does chiefly in modes of action and undergoing, it is easy
to see what knowledge contributes—namely, the possibility of intelligent administration of the
elements of doing and suffering.”—John Dewey, Experience & Nature
“We cannot seek or attain health, wealth, learning, justice or kindness in general. Action is
always specific, concrete, individualized and unique. And consequently judgments as to acts
to be performed must be similarly specific. To say that a man seeks health or justice is only to
say that he seeks to live healthy or justly. These things, like truth, are adverbial.”—John Dewey,
Reconstruction in Philosophy
YORAM LUBLINGis Professor of Philosophy at Elon University. He is the author of Twice
Dead: Moshe Y. Lubling, the Ethics of Memory, and the Treblinka Revolt(Lang, 2007) and The
Person Vanishes: John Dewey’s Philosophy of Experience and the Self(Lang, 2011), as well as numer-
ous book chapters and journal articles on classical American philosophy, John Dewey, Martin
Buber, active pedagogy, aesthetics, Holocaust studies, Jewish philosophy and the history of
Modern Zionism.
v
ERIC EVANSteaches undergraduate and graduate level courses in educational foundations, • 2 Peace in Motion
ethics and education, philosophy of education and history of education in the College of 1
2
Education and Human Sciences at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. He is CEO at Disability
Rights Nebraska, the federal protection and advocacy system for
Nebraska, and a former president of the ACLU Nebraska. He has John Dewey and the Aesthetics of Well-Being
authored book chapters and journal articles on disability-related
issues and serves on the Editorial Review Board for the American
P
E
Journal of Orthopsychiatry. T
E
R
A M E R I C A N LA
N
G
U N I V E R S I T Y
YORAM LUBLING ERIC EVANS
www.peterlang.com S T U D I E S AND
Lubing & Evans_cover_AUS dd.qxd 1/5/2016 6:13 AM Page 1
In this book Yoram Lubling and Eric Evans offer a Deweyan reconstruction of our philosophical L A M E R I C A N U N I V E R S I T Y S T U D I E S
u
understanding of well-being. They begin with Dewey’s critique of the “philosophical fallacy” b
to examine the legitimacy and value of theories of well-being offered by traditional philoso- lin
phy. However, such theories fail to provide an authentic account of well-being due to a false g
understanding of experienceas either epistemic or cognitive. Next, using Dewey’s theory of expe- &
rience, they reconstruct “happiness” as the target for evaluation of well-being. This leads them E
to reject the traditional view of a private encapsulated self, and to offer in its place a transac- v
a
tionally situated selfwhich is an embodied, enculturated agent. Through their emphasis on the n
s
importance of the qualitative aspects of Dewey’s understanding of a situation, the pervasive
quality of the situationemerges as the most plausible criterion for the evaluation of well-being.
The authors use Dewey’s theories of inquiry, ethics, value and art to establish the naturalis-
tic conditions under which such pervasive qualityenters into a situation as either settled or unset-
tled, in other words, as peace in motion. Consequently, a problematic situationbecomes the P
primary condition under which all inquiry initiates whether it is in the context of science, ethics, e
a
values, art or ordinary living. Lubling and Evans conclude that a Deweyan account of well-
c
being involves embodied knowinginstead of the traditional view of cognitive knowledge. By using e
such an account, it is possible to explain the conditions and mechanisms under which well- i
being contributes to the enlargement and enrichment of individual and collective human n
experience. M
o
“The assumption of ‘intellectualism’ goes contrary to the facts of what is primarily experienced.
t
For things are objects to be treated, used, acted upon and with, enjoyed and endured, even more i
o
than things to be known. They are things had before they are things cognized…If we start from
n
primary experience, occurring as it does chiefly in modes of action and undergoing, it is easy
to see what knowledge contributes—namely, the possibility of intelligent administration of the
elements of doing and suffering.”—John Dewey, Experience & Nature
“We cannot seek or attain health, wealth, learning, justice or kindness in general. Action is
always specific, concrete, individualized and unique. And consequently judgments as to acts
to be performed must be similarly specific. To say that a man seeks health or justice is only to
say that he seeks to live healthy or justly. These things, like truth, are adverbial.”—John Dewey,
Reconstruction in Philosophy
YORAM LUBLINGis Professor of Philosophy at Elon University. He is the author of Twice
Dead: Moshe Y. Lubling, the Ethics of Memory, and the Treblinka Revolt(Lang, 2007) and The
Person Vanishes: John Dewey’s Philosophy of Experience and the Self(Lang, 2011), as well as numer-
ous book chapters and journal articles on classical American philosophy, John Dewey, Martin
Buber, active pedagogy, aesthetics, Holocaust studies, Jewish philosophy and the history of
Modern Zionism.
v
ERIC EVANSteaches undergraduate and graduate level courses in educational foundations, • 2 Peace in Motion
ethics and education, philosophy of education and history of education in the College of 1
2
Education and Human Sciences at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. He is CEO at Disability
Rights Nebraska, the federal protection and advocacy system for
Nebraska, and a former president of the ACLU Nebraska. He has John Dewey and the Aesthetics of Well-Being
authored book chapters and journal articles on disability-related
issues and serves on the Editorial Review Board for the American
P
E
Journal of Orthopsychiatry. T
E
R
A M E R I C A N LA
N
G
U N I V E R S I T Y
YORAM LUBLING ERIC EVANS
www.peterlang.com S T U D I E S AND
Peace in Motion
S E R I E S V
P H I L O S O P H Y
V O L. 2 1 2

This book is a volume in a Peter Lang monograph series.
Every volume is peer reviewed and meets
the highest quality standards for content and production .

PETER LANG

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Brussels Vienna OxfordWarsaw
Yoram Lubling and Eric Evans

Peace in Motion

John Dewey and the
Aesthetics of Well-Being

PETER LANG
New York  Bern  Frankfurt  Berlin
Brussels  Vienna  Oxford  Warsaw
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Lubling, Yoram, author.
Title: Peace in motion: John Dewey and the aesthetics of well-being /
Yoram Lubling, Eric Evans.
Description: New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2016. | Series: American
University studies. V, Philosophy, ISSN 0739-6392; Vol. 212 |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2015038042 | ISBN 9781433121234 (hardcover: alk. paper) |
ISBN 9781453917787 (e-book)
Subjects: LCSH: Well-being. | Dewey, John, 1859–1952. | Aesthetics.
Classification: LCC BD431.L797 2016 | DDC 191—dc23
LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015038042
Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek.
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the “Deutsche
Nationalbibliografie”; detailed bibliographic data are available
on the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de/.
Cover image by Yoram Lubling
© 2016 Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., New York
29 Broadway, 18th floor, New York, NY 10006
www.peterlang.com
All rights reserved.
Reprint or reproduction, even partially, in all forms such as microfilm,
xerography, microfiche, microcard, and offset strictly prohibited.
To friendship—the most genuine of all modalities of love

Table of Contents
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xvii
Frontispiece John Dewey xix
Introduction 1
1 Seeing Further than Dewey 9
Method of Our Inquiry 14
The Philosophical Fallacy 16
Experience as Ecology 18
2 The Falsification of Well-Being 23
Happiness and Formalism 25
The Fixation of Happiness 28
The Modern Trajectory of Happiness 31
Preference Fulfillment and Authenticity 35
Well-Being Is Not an Aesthetic Value 38
A Subjective-Relative Theory of Welfare 40
The Tradition as the Philosophical Fallacy 42
viii | Contents
3 Experience and the Situated Self 51
The Intelligibility of Nature 53
Continuity, Interaction and Situation 58
Experience as Geography 63
Habit: The Organized Response in Experience 66
The Unification of Habit 69
The Limits of Cognitive Experience 73
4 Inquiry and Creative Intelligence 79
Inference as Existential Activity 84
The Reflex Arc 87
Creative Intelligence and Well-Being 93
To Be Is To Be Relational 95
Dramatic Rehearsal in Imagination 99
Imagination, Education and Well-Being 102
5 Ethics and Value 109
Meliorism and Well-Being 110
Deliberation and the Future of Philosophy 116
Valuation and Well-Being 121
The Existential Context of Desire 123
The Existential Nature of Qualitative Thought 128
Instrumental Well-Being 130
The Nature of Judgment 132
6 The Live Creature and the Aesthetic Mode 137
The Aesthetic in Ordinary Experience 140
Life and the Live Creature 143
The Meaning of Peace in Motion 145
The Naturalization of Aesthetic Sense 147
Emotion and Expression in Aesthetics 150
The Imaginational Aesthetics of Self-Activity 152
Aesthetics and Vulnerability 159