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Managing Britain’s Defence PDF

284 Pages·1990·14.02 MB·English
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MANAGING BRITAIN'S DEFENCE Also by Malcolm Mcintosh ARMS ACROSS THE PACIFIC JAPAN RE-ARMED Managing Britain's Defence Malcolm McIntosh M MACMILLAN © Malcolm McIntosh 1990 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1990 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 33-4 Alfred Place, London WC1E 7DP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. First published 1990 Published by MACMILLAN ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world Filmset by Wearside Tradespools, Fulwell, Sunderland British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data McIntosh, Malcolm, 1953- Managing Britain's defence. 1. Great Britain. Defence. Policies of government, history I. Title 355'.0335'41 ISBN 978-1-349-10537-3 ISBN 978-1-349-10535-9 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-10535-9 To Louise Contents Acknowledgements ix Introduction xi 1 Setting the Scene 1945-79 1 Introduction 1 Setting the scene 2 1945-79: defence decisions 5 2 The Decision-making Process 33 Introduction 33 Democracy and the British Constitution 34 Secrecy 38 Secrecy and defence decision-making 49 The Public Accounts Committee, the National Audit Office, and the Commons Defence Select Committee 54 The Civil Service 62 Whitehall 78 Threat assessment 81 Public relations, propaganda and the media 93 3 Francis Pym, Secretary of State for Defence, 1979-81 97 Introduction 97 Financial control and open Government 98 Rayner 100 Chevaline 102 TridentC4 108 Conclusion 110 4 John Nott, Secretary of State for Defence, 1981-3 111 Introduction 111 Financial Control and a Defence Review 112 The Nott/Lewin Central Reorganisation 119 Trident C4 to DS 121 The Falklands War 124 Conclusion 136 vii viii Contents s Michael Heseltine, Secretary of State for Defence, 1983-6 137 Introduction 137 Management and MINIS 138 Central reorganisation 150 The central components of the MOD after January 1985 159 Heseltine the publicist: DS 19, Cruise and Montebello 177 Westland Helicopters pic 188 Conclusion 195 6 Thatcher's Defence: Command and Control? 197 7 Reforms 202 Introduction 202 Reforms 206 Freedom of information 207 Parliament 211 Specific Parliamentary Reforms 213 Ministerial Control 222 Conclusion 228 Summary of reforms 228 Appendices 231 Notes and References 240 Select Bibliography 262 Index 267 Acknowledgements Writing this study has been a long process which began with a year spent researching a television series for BBC television on the Ministry of Defence. The five-part series was transmitted in spring 1986 under the title 'MOD'. My primary thanks, therefore, go to David Taylor, reporter and producer on the series, and Charles Bruce and Steve Anderson, assistant producers. Much of the material quoted in this study comes from the many hours of recorded interviews with members of the government, civil servants, politi cians, former civil servants and politicians and other outside observ ers. In the notes this is indicated with a reference to David Taylor in each case. A year after the series had been transmitted I again approached the Ministry of Defence with the idea of writing a study of the defence decision-making process. With a few exceptions, they were very helpful, and I spent a further year in the main MOD building just off Whitehall talking to officials about their work. I also returned to many of those people interviewed for the television series - to them also I extend my gratitude. Most civil servants and serving officers in the MOD must remain anonymous but I must thank Gloria Franklin, at the time head of Policy Studies, for her time and patience in dealing with my many queries and requests to see numerous personnel. This study would not have been possible without the support of the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. I would particularly like to thank its secretary Stephen Burkeman for his help and guidance. From September 1983 until December 1989 I was attached in varying degrees to the School of Peace Studies at Bradford University and to Malcolm Chalmers, Malcolm Dando, Paul Rogers and James O'Connell I am grateful for academic guidance and support in this project. Personal thanks go to Nicholas Gillett for his initial enthusiasm for this study, and for his support during the writing of it. My interest in issues of peace and security stems from my father and mother. Finally, my greatest thanks go to my wife Louise for her love and support. Bath, England MALCOLM MciNTOSH ix Introduction The central defence organisation in Britain has been reformed many times since 1945. The intention of the reforms has been to increase ministerial control of defence planning by creating a more centralised structure with a defence-wide, rather than single-service, perspective. The central problem of post-1945 defence planning has been match ing declining resources to Britain's continuing global commitments. The situation has been exacerbated by the growing sophistication and expense of modern military equipment and the intransigence of the single services, particularly the Royal Navy, against participation in long-term strategic planning on a defence-wide basis. This study argues that both Ministerial control and Parliamentary oversight need to be increased to improve defence decision-making in Britain. Very few of the post-war reforms have been concerned with increasing Parliamentary access and accountability of defence deci sion-making. Parliament has been largely excluded from both the policy-making process and scrutinising the work of the Ministry of Defence. Since 1979 the Thatcher government has published more informa tion relating to defence than any previous government with the avowed aim of raising the level of defence debate in Britain. It is certainly true that the quality of information relating to some aspects of defence planning have shown marked improvement. However, this study argues, this more open policy has been selective in topic, partial in coverage and designed not so much to raise the level of the defence debate as to convince the British public that the government's defence policies, particularly where they relate to the nuclear deterrent, are correct. Of course, the government should be able to communicate its intentions to the public where defence is concerned. But this study, by looking specifically at the period 1979 to 1986, sets out to show that while the intention was to increase ministerial control of defence decision-making and raise the level of the defence debate the government has not been totally successful. There are specific problems which relate to all post-1945 defence planning. First, there has been an imbalance between the long-term process of defence planning and the short-term nature of ministerial xi

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