Managing Britain’s Defence

284 Pages·1990·14.02 MB·English

by  Malcolm McIntosh (auth.)

MANAGING BRITAIN'S DEFENCE
Also by Malcolm Mcintosh
ARMS ACROSS THE PACIFIC
JAPAN RE-ARMED
Managing Britain's
Defence
Malcolm McIntosh
M
MACMILLAN
© Malcolm McIntosh 1990
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1990
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First published 1990
Published by
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
McIntosh, Malcolm, 1953-
Managing Britain's defence.
1. Great Britain. Defence. Policies of government, history
I. Title
355'.0335'41
ISBN 978-1-349-10537-3 ISBN 978-1-349-10535-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-10535-9
To Louise
Contents
Acknowledgements ix
Introduction xi
1 Setting the Scene 1945-79 1
Introduction 1
Setting the scene 2
1945-79: defence decisions 5
2 The Decision-making Process 33
Introduction 33
Democracy and the British Constitution 34
Secrecy 38
Secrecy and defence decision-making 49
The Public Accounts Committee, the National
Audit Office, and the Commons Defence
Select Committee 54
The Civil Service 62
Whitehall 78
Threat assessment 81
Public relations, propaganda and the media 93
3 Francis Pym, Secretary of State for
Defence, 1979-81 97
Introduction 97
Financial control and open Government 98
Rayner 100
Chevaline 102
TridentC4 108
Conclusion 110
4 John Nott, Secretary of State for
Defence, 1981-3 111
Introduction 111
Financial Control and a Defence Review 112
The Nott/Lewin Central Reorganisation 119
Trident C4 to DS 121
The Falklands War 124
Conclusion 136
vii
viii Contents
s Michael Heseltine, Secretary of State for
Defence, 1983-6 137
Introduction 137
Management and MINIS 138
Central reorganisation 150
The central components of the MOD after
January 1985 159
Heseltine the publicist: DS 19, Cruise and Montebello 177
Westland Helicopters pic 188
Conclusion 195
6 Thatcher's Defence: Command and Control? 197
7 Reforms 202
Introduction 202
Reforms 206
Freedom of information 207
Parliament 211
Specific Parliamentary Reforms 213
Ministerial Control 222
Conclusion 228
Summary of reforms 228
Appendices 231
Notes and References 240
Select Bibliography 262
Index 267
Acknowledgements
Writing this study has been a long process which began with a year
spent researching a television series for BBC television on the
Ministry of Defence. The five-part series was transmitted in spring
1986 under the title 'MOD'. My primary thanks, therefore, go to
David Taylor, reporter and producer on the series, and Charles
Bruce and Steve Anderson, assistant producers. Much of the material
quoted in this study comes from the many hours of recorded
interviews with members of the government, civil servants, politi
cians, former civil servants and politicians and other outside observ
ers. In the notes this is indicated with a reference to David Taylor in
each case.
A year after the series had been transmitted I again approached
the Ministry of Defence with the idea of writing a study of the
defence decision-making process. With a few exceptions, they were
very helpful, and I spent a further year in the main MOD building
just off Whitehall talking to officials about their work. I also
returned to many of those people interviewed for the television
series - to them also I extend my gratitude. Most civil servants and
serving officers in the MOD must remain anonymous but I must
thank Gloria Franklin, at the time head of Policy Studies, for her
time and patience in dealing with my many queries and requests to
see numerous personnel.
This study would not have been possible without the support of
the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. I would particularly like to
thank its secretary Stephen Burkeman for his help and guidance.
From September 1983 until December 1989 I was attached in
varying degrees to the School of Peace Studies at Bradford University
and to Malcolm Chalmers, Malcolm Dando, Paul Rogers and James
O'Connell I am grateful for academic guidance and support in this
project.
Personal thanks go to Nicholas Gillett for his initial enthusiasm
for this study, and for his support during the writing of it. My
interest in issues of peace and security stems from my father and
mother. Finally, my greatest thanks go to my wife Louise for her
love and support.
Bath, England MALCOLM MciNTOSH
ix
Introduction
The central defence organisation in Britain has been reformed many
times since 1945. The intention of the reforms has been to increase
ministerial control of defence planning by creating a more centralised
structure with a defence-wide, rather than single-service, perspective.
The central problem of post-1945 defence planning has been match
ing declining resources to Britain's continuing global commitments.
The situation has been exacerbated by the growing sophistication
and expense of modern military equipment and the intransigence of
the single services, particularly the Royal Navy, against participation
in long-term strategic planning on a defence-wide basis.
This study argues that both Ministerial control and Parliamentary
oversight need to be increased to improve defence decision-making
in Britain.
Very few of the post-war reforms have been concerned with
increasing Parliamentary access and accountability of defence deci
sion-making. Parliament has been largely excluded from both the
policy-making process and scrutinising the work of the Ministry of
Defence.
Since 1979 the Thatcher government has published more informa
tion relating to defence than any previous government with the
avowed aim of raising the level of defence debate in Britain. It is
certainly true that the quality of information relating to some
aspects of defence planning have shown marked improvement.
However, this study argues, this more open policy has been selective
in topic, partial in coverage and designed not so much to raise the
level of the defence debate as to convince the British public that the
government's defence policies, particularly where they relate to the
nuclear deterrent, are correct.
Of course, the government should be able to communicate its
intentions to the public where defence is concerned. But this study,
by looking specifically at the period 1979 to 1986, sets out to show
that while the intention was to increase ministerial control of
defence decision-making and raise the level of the defence debate
the government has not been totally successful.
There are specific problems which relate to all post-1945 defence
planning. First, there has been an imbalance between the long-term
process of defence planning and the short-term nature of ministerial
xi