Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing

324 Pages·2023·5.163 MB·English

by  Lionel P. Fatton

PSIR · PALGRAVE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Japan’s Rush to
the Pacific War
The Institutional Roots
of Overbalancing
Lionel P. Fatton
Palgrave Studies in International Relations
Series Editors
Knud Erik Jørgensen, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
J. Marshall Beier, Political Science, McMaster University, Milton, ON,
Canada
Palgrave Studies in International Relations provides scholars with the best
theoretically-informed scholarship on the global issues of our time. The
series includes cutting-edge monographs and edited collections which
bridge schools of thought and cross the boundaries of conventional fields
of study.
Knud Erik Jørgensen is Professor of International Relations at Aarhus
University, Denmark, and at Yas¸ar University, Izmir, Turkey.
Lionel P. Fatton
Japan’s Rush
to the Pacific War
The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing
Lionel P. Fatton
Department of International Relations
Webster University Geneva
Bellevue, Switzerland
Palgrave Studies in International Relations
ISBN 978-3-031-22052-4 ISBN 978-3-031-22053-1 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22053-1
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
Cover illustration: abzee/getty images
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
To Nozomi and Saya, may you learn from the past to build the future.
Foreword
Foreword to Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of
Overbalancing by Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki, Professor of International
Relations, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University.
I remember the day Dr. Lionel Fatton asked the question that underlies
this book, many years ago. “Why do states begin wars?” He went on to
say: “All wars are madness, but especially puzzling is why Japan began the
war against the United States.” Why, indeed? Japan’s decision to attack
Pearl Harbor and start a war against an enemy much stronger than itself
is a mystery. Scholars of International Relations have sought explanations
in the irrationality of Japanese thinking at the time. Some saw the source
of irrationality in the Japanese culture. Others found the source in the
malfunction of the state being hijacked by a small number of groups.
It was thus with great pleasure and excitement that I turned the pages
of this book to find out Dr. Fatton’s answer.
Dr. Fatton argues the cause was overbalancing—not madness. The
process of the war began when Japan turned its back to a naval arms
control regime in the 1930s. Japan was one of the victors of the First
World War and enjoyed a seat among the major powers. And yet, it walked
away from the international order and began its path to unilateralism.
Japan overbalanced, which led to reactions from the other countries,
resulting in a spiral. Security dilemma ensued. Japan seeking to achieve
security, in the end, decreased its security by walking away from the naval
treaty.
vii
viii FOREWORD
Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of Overbal-
ancing traces the process through which Japan shifted from adequate
balancing to overbalancing. The book shows how certain domestic condi-
tions and international crisis allowed the military and the navy to convince
other groups in the foreign policy establishment and the nation of an
inflated threat perception, hence the necessity to prepare for war against
the United States. Overbalancing was rooted in the perceptual and policy
biases of the military institution.
The book begins the analysis in the 1910–1920s when Japan’s threat
perception toward the United States was benign, even though the rela-
tionship was sometimes tense. Japan correctly assessed the American
intention not to be malign and sought cooperation with the major
powers. This provided the Japanese government with the flexibility to
reach a compromise on naval arms control at the Washington Conference
of 1921–1922. The Manchurian crisis of 1931–1933 was the exogenous
shock that changed Japan’s threat perception. With the extensive use of
archival materials from both Japanese and English language sources, Dr.
Fatton describes the thinking and assessments different groups within
the Japanese and American foreign policy establishments had of the
Manchurian crisis. While the institutional biases of military services to
overbalance may not be unique to Japan, the book shows how the
Japanese navy, helped by dysfunctions in the structure of Japanese civil–
military relations, successfully disseminated its inflated threat perception
to other members of the foreign policy establishment. The Manchurian
crisis alarmed many Japanese policymakers as well as the public. The book
also illustrates how the economic crisis and the discontent of the Japanese
public toward the Japanese government and the distrust of the American
government paved the way for the navy to promote its views. The United
States was identified to have the capability and the intent to harm the
national security of Japan. A strong naval force was the solution to deter
and defeat American aggression. Japan overbalanced.
The book should be of great interest to many but especially to three
types of readers. First, readers interested in the causes and prevention of
war will learn greatly from this book. The book shows how international
conditions are combined with domestic conditions to produce a prefer-
ence for overbalancing. Second, readers interested in threat perception
will find a process through which certain versions of threat perception are
propagated to become the national threat perception. Third, those inter-
ested in the history of Japan leading up to the Pacific War will enjoy the
FOREWORD ix
detailed account of how the moderate and cooperative foreign policy of
Japan changed to a unilateral and non-cooperative one.
The question of why Japan moved away from international coopera-
tion and began the path to the war, sadly, is more relevant today than it
has been in decades. Will China choose to remain in the current inter-
national system? Can the United States and Japan accommodate China?
Are the United States, Japan and China balancing adequately? Or are they
overbalancing? Do the countries have the necessary institutions to make
the correct assessment of the situation? The readers of Japan’s Rush to the
Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing will find insights
into answering these questions. The hope is we will be wiser to make the
right choices for the future.
Tokyo, Japan Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki
Preface
As far as I remember, war has always intrigued me. Not because I grew
up isolated from human violence, quite the contrary. It did not take me
long to realize that human beings are aggressive, brutal and even cruel
not because of their nature, but because violence is sometimes perceived
as the only way to protect oneself and loved ones. The origin of human
violence cannot be condemned. It is rooted in human weaknesses, and
actually comes from a noble intention. In society, however, this intention
may transform human beings into predators. Homo homini lupus est .And
in the society of states, countries repeat the same behavioral pattern. Si
vis pacem para bellum. Human history is a tragedy, and war is a fatality.
This conclusion was, and still is, the bedrock of my fascination for armed
conflicts.
In investigating war, one question has particularly puzzled me: how
and why the sum of choices made by apparently rational actors can lead
to the formulation of irrational policies resulting in interstate conflict?
My interest in Japan’s rush to the Pacific War through unfettered naval
expansion emerged when I was attending Waseda University, working
on Tokyo’s decision to attack the United States in December 1941.
Although, after years of study, the reasons behind the decision appeared
clearer, I was still unable to understand how the country reached that
point where it had the choice between a desperate war and a slow death
by suffocation. I felt the need to dig into the topic, and to go back to
the origins of a road to ruin for Japan. The present book is the result of
xi