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PSIR · PALGRAVE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing Lionel P. Fatton Palgrave Studies in International Relations Series Editors Knud Erik Jørgensen, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark J. Marshall Beier, Political Science, McMaster University, Milton, ON, Canada Palgrave Studies in International Relations provides scholars with the best theoretically-informed scholarship on the global issues of our time. The series includes cutting-edge monographs and edited collections which bridge schools of thought and cross the boundaries of conventional fields of study. Knud Erik Jørgensen is Professor of International Relations at Aarhus University, Denmark, and at Yas¸ar University, Izmir, Turkey. Lionel P. Fatton Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing Lionel P. Fatton Department of International Relations Webster University Geneva Bellevue, Switzerland Palgrave Studies in International Relations ISBN 978-3-031-22052-4 ISBN 978-3-031-22053-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22053-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa- tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: abzee/getty images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland To Nozomi and Saya, may you learn from the past to build the future. Foreword Foreword to Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing by Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki, Professor of International Relations, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University. I remember the day Dr. Lionel Fatton asked the question that underlies this book, many years ago. “Why do states begin wars?” He went on to say: “All wars are madness, but especially puzzling is why Japan began the war against the United States.” Why, indeed? Japan’s decision to attack Pearl Harbor and start a war against an enemy much stronger than itself is a mystery. Scholars of International Relations have sought explanations in the irrationality of Japanese thinking at the time. Some saw the source of irrationality in the Japanese culture. Others found the source in the malfunction of the state being hijacked by a small number of groups. It was thus with great pleasure and excitement that I turned the pages of this book to find out Dr. Fatton’s answer. Dr. Fatton argues the cause was overbalancing—not madness. The process of the war began when Japan turned its back to a naval arms control regime in the 1930s. Japan was one of the victors of the First World War and enjoyed a seat among the major powers. And yet, it walked away from the international order and began its path to unilateralism. Japan overbalanced, which led to reactions from the other countries, resulting in a spiral. Security dilemma ensued. Japan seeking to achieve security, in the end, decreased its security by walking away from the naval treaty. vii viii FOREWORD Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of Overbal- ancing traces the process through which Japan shifted from adequate balancing to overbalancing. The book shows how certain domestic condi- tions and international crisis allowed the military and the navy to convince other groups in the foreign policy establishment and the nation of an inflated threat perception, hence the necessity to prepare for war against the United States. Overbalancing was rooted in the perceptual and policy biases of the military institution. The book begins the analysis in the 1910–1920s when Japan’s threat perception toward the United States was benign, even though the rela- tionship was sometimes tense. Japan correctly assessed the American intention not to be malign and sought cooperation with the major powers. This provided the Japanese government with the flexibility to reach a compromise on naval arms control at the Washington Conference of 1921–1922. The Manchurian crisis of 1931–1933 was the exogenous shock that changed Japan’s threat perception. With the extensive use of archival materials from both Japanese and English language sources, Dr. Fatton describes the thinking and assessments different groups within the Japanese and American foreign policy establishments had of the Manchurian crisis. While the institutional biases of military services to overbalance may not be unique to Japan, the book shows how the Japanese navy, helped by dysfunctions in the structure of Japanese civil– military relations, successfully disseminated its inflated threat perception to other members of the foreign policy establishment. The Manchurian crisis alarmed many Japanese policymakers as well as the public. The book also illustrates how the economic crisis and the discontent of the Japanese public toward the Japanese government and the distrust of the American government paved the way for the navy to promote its views. The United States was identified to have the capability and the intent to harm the national security of Japan. A strong naval force was the solution to deter and defeat American aggression. Japan overbalanced. The book should be of great interest to many but especially to three types of readers. First, readers interested in the causes and prevention of war will learn greatly from this book. The book shows how international conditions are combined with domestic conditions to produce a prefer- ence for overbalancing. Second, readers interested in threat perception will find a process through which certain versions of threat perception are propagated to become the national threat perception. Third, those inter- ested in the history of Japan leading up to the Pacific War will enjoy the FOREWORD ix detailed account of how the moderate and cooperative foreign policy of Japan changed to a unilateral and non-cooperative one. The question of why Japan moved away from international coopera- tion and began the path to the war, sadly, is more relevant today than it has been in decades. Will China choose to remain in the current inter- national system? Can the United States and Japan accommodate China? Are the United States, Japan and China balancing adequately? Or are they overbalancing? Do the countries have the necessary institutions to make the correct assessment of the situation? The readers of Japan’s Rush to the Pacific War: The Institutional Roots of Overbalancing will find insights into answering these questions. The hope is we will be wiser to make the right choices for the future. Tokyo, Japan Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki Preface As far as I remember, war has always intrigued me. Not because I grew up isolated from human violence, quite the contrary. It did not take me long to realize that human beings are aggressive, brutal and even cruel not because of their nature, but because violence is sometimes perceived as the only way to protect oneself and loved ones. The origin of human violence cannot be condemned. It is rooted in human weaknesses, and actually comes from a noble intention. In society, however, this intention may transform human beings into predators. Homo homini lupus est .And in the society of states, countries repeat the same behavioral pattern. Si vis pacem para bellum. Human history is a tragedy, and war is a fatality. This conclusion was, and still is, the bedrock of my fascination for armed conflicts. In investigating war, one question has particularly puzzled me: how and why the sum of choices made by apparently rational actors can lead to the formulation of irrational policies resulting in interstate conflict? My interest in Japan’s rush to the Pacific War through unfettered naval expansion emerged when I was attending Waseda University, working on Tokyo’s decision to attack the United States in December 1941. Although, after years of study, the reasons behind the decision appeared clearer, I was still unable to understand how the country reached that point where it had the choice between a desperate war and a slow death by suffocation. I felt the need to dig into the topic, and to go back to the origins of a road to ruin for Japan. The present book is the result of xi

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