Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect

190 Pages·2014·3.68 MB·English

by  Reese Erlich

“Fascinating and full of insights…. A welcome antidote to the flood of ill-informed blather that has deformed our understanding of this
alarming crisis.”
—Stephen Kinzer, author of Overthrow and All the Shah's Men
“Journalist Reese Erlich guides the reader through the labyrinth of Middle East history and politics that led to the Syrian Civil War. Since
the fallout from that conflict has global ramifications, this well-written book is a must read.”
—Conn Hallinan, columnist for Foreign Policy in Focus
“Read this book and you will receive an in-depth, objective, and truly fair understanding of what is taking place in the Middle East at this
moment. We need Reese Erlich in the mass media.”
—Peter Coyote, actor, author of Sleeping Where I Fall
“Well before the US invasion of Iraq, Reese Erlich's firsthand reporting challenged the official justification for that effort—and the
mainstream media's failure to report on it accurately. Since then, Erlich has combined independent reporting with straightforward political
analysis and expert media criticism. Inside Syria continues that important work. It parses that region's conflicts, considers the historical
and geopolitical forces at work, and skips the usual forms of demonization and mystification. If the news from Syria doesn't make sense
to you, read this book.”
—Peter Richardson, San Francisco State University, author of A Bomb in Every Issue: How the Short, Unruly Life of Ramparts
Magazine Changed America
“Erlich's work is a reliable astrolabe and an essential guide in navigating the shifting political winds of the Syrian war and regional
conflict. Meticulously investigated.”
—Meghan Nuttall Sayres, editor of Love and Pomegranates: Artists and Wayfarers on Iran
“The strength of the work lies in the interviews and firsthand observations that other types of analyses may lack.”
—Dr. Amir Sharifi, Department of Linguistics, California State University, Long Beach

Published 2014 by Prometheus Books
Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect. Copyright © 2014 by Reese Erlich. All rights
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Unless otherwise specified, all images in the photo insert are by Reese Erlich
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The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows:
Erlich, Reese W., 1947–
Inside Syria : the backstory of their civil war and what the world can expect / Reese Erlich ; foreword by Noam Chomsky.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-61614-948-2 (hardback) — ISBN 978-1-61614-949-9 (ebook)
1. Syria—History—Civil War, 2011– 2. Syria—Politics and government—2000– 3. Protest movements—Syria—History—21st
century. 4. Political violence—Syria—History—21st century. I. Title.
DS98.6.E75 2014
956.9104'2—dc23
2014015840
Printed in the United States of America

Foreword
by Noam Chomsky
1. The Uprising That Wasn't Supposed to Be
2. Lawrence of Syria
3. Treaties, Rebellions, and Independence: 1919–1946
4. Wars and Coups—Then the Assads Arrive: 1947–2011
5. The Uprising Begins
6. Chemical Weapons, Military Offensives, and Stalemate
7. Who Supports Assad?
8. Why Iran Backs Syria
9. Will the Kurds Have Their Way?
10. Israel, Palestine, and Syria
11. United States, Russia, and Outside Powers
Acknowledgments
Appendix 1. A Quick Guide to Syrian Politics and Terms
Appendix 2. Syria Timeline: Key Dates since World War I
Notes
Bibliography
Index
The Arab Spring uprisings of early 2011 were highly exciting events of historic importance. Despite
setbacks, significant gains have been achieved, and I suspect they will be lasting—very likely a
prelude of more to come.
In Tunisia, France was the dominant imperial power and supported the dictator strongly in ways
that were a considerable embarrassment. A French cabinet minister was even vacationing in Tunisia
while the popular uprising was expelling Ben-Ali. In Egypt, the dominant influences were the United
States and the United Kingdom. Both supported the dictator, General Hosni Mubarak, until the very
end.
They then followed the standard script when a favored dictator faces internal problems: support
him as long as possible, and when it no longer is—particularly if the business classes and the army
turn against him—ship him off somewhere. Then be sure to issue ringing declarations about your
love of democracy, and try to restore the old system as fully as possible.
The United States supported the elected Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohammed Morsi,
which, crucially, left the military pretty much in charge. When the military overthrew the government
and took full control in July 2013, the United States supported it with the usual formulaic comments
about democracy.
I was also excited about the uprising in Syria, although the vicious reaction of the Assad regime
turned the early nonviolent demands for reform into a murderous civil war that is destroying the
society. In chapter 5, Reese Erlich shows that the conflict remains one between the Assad regime and
major sectors of the Syrian people. But the war has become much more complicated because of
intensified fighting between Sunni, Alawites, Shia, and other religious and ethnic groups, and the
intervention into the conflict of jihadi groups with their own varying agendas.
The Sunni-Shia split, of course, goes back to the founding days of Islam. The Alawites were an
early offshoot of Shia Islam. Ottoman Turks and French colonialists sought to exploit religious
differences to maintain their rule. When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, the occupation
exacerbated low-level religious tensions, which have since been tearing Iraq apart and spread to the
entire region—Syria in particular.
There is perhaps some hope for a negotiated, political settlement of the Geneva type. Russia and the
United States could bring pressure to bear to end the civil war. It is a very slim possibility, but it is
actually the only one that I can see that has any hope of saving Syria.
From the beginning, as Erlich shows in chapters 10–11, the United States and Israel have been wary
of the Syrian uprising. Assad had, in fact, been relatively cooperative with the United States in recent
years, sharing intelligence, absorbing huge numbers of people fleeing from the wreckage of the US
invasion of Iraq, and generally conforming to US demands.
Interestingly, the United States and Israel did not undertake one fairly straightforward action that
could have significantly helped the rebels. Israel could have mobilized its forces on the occupied
Golan, which would have compelled Assad to move forces to the south, relieving pressure on the
rebels. Israel is quite happy to see Arabs murdering each other, as Erlich documents in chapter 10 by
interviewing Israeli analysts.
The United States has been helping expedite some arms flow to the rebels from the Gulf states and
directly training selected rebels in Jordan, but otherwise not intervening extensively. The United
States offered lukewarm support for UN negotiator Lakhdar Brahimi's Geneva peace initiative, the
one (very thin) reed that might offer some hope of arresting Syria's plunge to catastrophe.
The US failure to bomb Syria after the chemical-weapons incident in August 2013 was highly
significant. The Obama administration was unable to obtain virtually any international support. Even
Britain wouldn't support it. Congress wasn't going to support the attack either, which would have left
Obama completely out on a limb. So the Russian plan to dismantle Syria's chemical weapons was a
godsend for Obama. It saved him from what would have been a very serious political defeat.
This would have been a perfect opportunity to ban chemical weapons in the entire Middle East. The
Chemical Weapons Convention, contrary to the Obama administration position, does not refer just to
use of chemical weapons; it refers to production, storage, or use of chemical weapons. Well, Israel
has chemical weapons and has refused even to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The appropriate response would be to call for imposing the Chemical Weapons Convention
throughout the Middle East, which would mean that any country that is in violation of that convention,
whether it has accepted it or not, would be compelled to eliminate its chemical-weapons stores. Just
maintaining those stores, producing chemical weapons—all of that is in violation of the convention.
Of course, that would require that a US ally, Israel, give up its chemical weapons and permit
international inspections. This should apply to nuclear weapons, as well.
The United States hasn't given up on possible future military action in Syria. In chapter 11, Erlich
describes the various justifications offered for “humanitarian intervention.” Advocates argue that the
Syrian Civil War is so horrific—with the possibility of hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths—that
the international community must intervene with bombs and troops, though there is every reason to
expect that as in other cases, the intervention would not be in the interest of the Syrians, but of those
intervening, and would make the tragedy even worse.
Syria is a terrible atrocity. But there are much worse ones in the world. The worst atrocities in the
past decade have been in eastern Congo, where maybe five million people have been killed. And the
United States is indirectly involved. The government of Rwanda, which is a US client, is intervening
massively, as is Uganda to an extent. It's almost an international war in Africa. How many people
know about this? It's barely in the media. No one is calling for US humanitarian intervention to save
people in the Congo.
The concept of “humanitarian intervention” is very old, and to find genuine cases is no easy task. In
the 1990s, the concept became very fashionable in the West. The jewel in the crown was Kosovo, but
the traditional victims were unimpressed. The summit of the Global South, usually ignored or
ridiculed in the West, condemned “the so-called ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention” as another face
for imperialism.
The outcomes of these grand enterprises and the reactions led to development of a new concept,
“Responsibility to Protect,” or R2P. There are two crucially different versions of this doctrine. One
was adopted by the United Nations in 2005. Apart from a shift of focus, it barely goes beyond well-
established international law and practices.
A radically different version was produced by the commission headed by Gareth Evans, former
Australian prime minister, who has since been hailed in the West as the guardian angel of R2P. The
Evans version departs from the UN version in authorizing military action by regional groupings in
the area of their jurisdiction, subject to subsequent acquiescence by the UN Security Council. The
main regional grouping that can act this way is NATO, and it officially takes its area of jurisdiction as
virtually the entire world.
It comes as no surprise that the traditional imperial powers adopt the Evans version and justify it on
the grounds that the United Nations adopted R2P, concealing the fact that it is a crucially different
version.
Finally, I would like to mention that Reese Erlich's reporting and investigative journalism around
the world have been highly enlightening and, speaking personally, have been of great value to me in
my own work on global issues and current affairs.
Noam Chomsky
May 27, 2014
Boston
About seven months into the Syrian uprising, I arranged to meet with opposition activists in
Damascus. It wasn't easy. We had made a rendezvous at a large traffic circle where cars careened
about, competing with motorcycles for space on the small streets. Many dozens of people were
hanging out. Some looked like secret intelligence officers, wearing leather jackets and aviator
sunglasses—even at night.
Finally I met my contact, and we made our way to Old Damascus. We walked through the narrow,
cobblestone streets where no cars would fit and anyone tailing us could be spotted.
I was meeting with leaders of the Local Coordinating Committees, the loose-knit group then
spearheading the uprising against the government of President Bashar al-Assad. The activists I met
represented one sector of the protestors: mostly young, secular, and middle-income.
Demonstrators wanted to establish a genuine parliamentary system and hold free elections. An
activist leader named Ahmad Bakdouness said that at first the demonstrators called for reforms when
they came out into the streets in March 2011. They wanted free elections, a parliamentary government,
release of political prisoners, and the right to organize peaceful protests. The government rejected
these demands and responded with violent attacks. Within weeks, protestors were demanding the
government's overthrow. “When they [the government] started killing people,” Bakdouness said,
“people increased their demands. No one accepted how they killed us and arrested us for nothing.”1
At the beginning of the Arab Spring, Assad bragged that his country would never see a popular
uprising because of his nationalist credentials. History has rarely delivered a more stunning and
immediate rebuttal. Over 150,000 Syrians have died in the civil war since the beginning of the
uprising, with thousands more dying every month. Several thousand army and police personnel have
been killed. Over nine million Syrians have fled the country or been internally displaced.
Another activist, who used the name “Leen,” said everyone is taking sides. She said her country had
become much more dangerous than Tunisia or Egypt at the height of their revolutions. “In Egypt and
Tunisia they can demonstrate showing their faces, take photos, and put them on Facebook,” she said.
“We can't do that.” Leen said demonstrators faced the possibility of death at each confrontation.
“When we ask someone to come to the streets, they say, ‘you are asking us to commit suicide.’”2
Gradually, the liberation movement shifted from demonstrations to armed attacks. But unlike
movements in Latin America or Africa in earlier decades, the Syrian uprising lacked cohesive
political or military leadership. Young men from the same village or town grouped together to form
ad hoc local militias. They armed themselves with homemade rifles or supplies captured from the
Syrian military.
By the beginning of 2012, foreign powers were arming the rebels, each seeking groups that would
carry out its political goals in post-Assad Syria. Adventurers, journalists, and spies prowled the
Syrian–Turkish border, seeking contact with militias. I visited one such hotbed of international
intrigue—Antakya, Turkey, close to the northwestern border with Syria.