In Defense of the Human Being In Defense of the Human Being Foundational Questions of an Embodied Anthropology Thomas Fuchs 1 1 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Suhrkamp Verlag 2021 The moral rights of the author have been asserted First Edition published in 2021 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2021935956 ISBN 978– 0– 19– 289819– 7 DOI: 10.1093/ oso/ 9780192898197.001.0001 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Oxford University Press makes no representation, express or implied, that the drug dosages in this book are correct. Readers must therefore always check the product information and clinical procedures with the most up- to- date published product information and data sheets provided by the manufacturers and the most recent codes of conduct and safety regulations. The authors and the publishers do not accept responsibility or legal liability for any errors in the text or for the misuse or misapplication of material in this work. Except where otherwise stated, drug dosages and recommendations are for the non- pregnant adult who is not breast- feeding © Suhrkamp Verlag Berlin 2020 All rights reserved by and controlled through Suhrkamp Verlag Berlin Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work. With the progress of artificial intelligence, the digitalization of the life-w orld, and the reduction of the mind to neuronal processes, the human being appears more and more as a product of data and algorithms. We understand ourselves in the image of our machines, while conversely, we elevate our machines and our brains to new subjects. Against this self-r eification of the human being, the philosopher and psychiatrist Thomas Fuchs defends a humanism of embodi- ment: our corporeality, vitality, and embodied freedom are the foundations of a self- determined existence that uses the new technologies as means instead of submitting to them. Thomas Fuchs, psychiatrist and philosopher, is Karl Jaspers Professor for Philosophical Foundations of Psychiatry at Heidelberg University and chairs the research section “Phenomenological Psychopathology and Psychotherapy” at the Psychiatric University Hospital Heidelberg. Contents Abbreviations xi Introduction: A Humanism of Embodiment 1 Acknowledgments 8 References 8 A Artificial Intelligence, Transhumanism, Virtuality 1 Human and Artificial Intelligence: A Clarification 13 Introduction: The World of Data 13 The Digitization of the World 16 Subjectivity and Its Simulation 20 Persons are Not Programs 24 Programs are Not Persons 28 Robots, Androids, and Artificial Life (AL) 35 Conclusion: Simulation and Original 41 References 45 2 Beyond the Human? A Critique of Transhumanism 49 Introduction: Between Naturalism and Culturalism 49 The Idea of Perfectibility 54 Can Human Nature be Improved? 59 Cognitive Skills 59 Happiness and Morality 61 Aging and Death 64 The Contradictions of Posthumanism 67 Mind Uploading or Transfer of Consciousness 69 Critique of Functionalism 71 Critique of Neuro- Reductionism 74 Transhumanism as Neo- Gnosticism 75 Conclusion 76 References 79 3 The Virtual Other: Empathy in the Age of Virtuality 83 Introduction 83 Empathy and Virtual Reality 86 viii ConTenTs Primary, Implicit, or Intercorporeal Empathy 86 Extended, Explicit or Imaginative Empathy 87 Fictional Empathy 88 Interim Summary 92 Virtualization in the Present 94 Phantomization 94 Disembodied Communication 96 Summary and Conclusion 98 References 101 B Brain, Person, and Reality 4 Person and Brain: Against Cerebrocentrism 107 Introduction 107 Critique of the Cerebral Subject 109 Subjectivity and Intentionality 109 Embodiment 110 Interpersonality 112 Critique of Localizationism 113 Critique of Neuroimaging 114 Holism of Consciousness 115 Personhood as Embodied Subjectivity 116 Brain, Body, and Environment 116 Brain Transplantation 119 Conclusion 120 References 121 5 Embodied Freedom: A Libertarian Position 124 Introduction 124 Can Brains make Decisions? 126 Freedom as a Personal Ability 128 Embodied Freedom 131 Counter Positions 133 External Objections 133 The Compatibilist Counter Position 136 Immanent Objections 138 Conclusion 141 References 142 ConTenTs ix 6 Brain World or Life World? Critique of Neuroconstructivism 144 Introduction 144 Bodily Being- in- the- World: The Coextension of Lived Body and Physical Body 147 The Locus of Pain 151 Conclusion: Life-W orld and Neuroscience 153 References 155 7 Perception and Reality: Sketch of an Interactive Realism 157 Introduction 157 Perception as Interaction 159 The Objectifying Power of Perception 162 The Implicit Intersubjectivity of Perception 164 Genesis of Intersubjective Perception 167 Subjectivation of Perception in Schizophrenia 169 Summary 171 References 174 C Psychiatry and Society 8 Psychiatry between Psyche and Brain 181 Introduction 181 Reductionist Assumptions and their Verification 184 Psychiatry as Relational Medicine: An Integrative Concept 188 Conclusion 190 References 192 9 Embodiment and Personal Identity in Dementia 196 Introduction 196 Personal Identity 197 Body Memory 200 Dementia and Personal Identity 203 Dementia as a Loss of Reflexivity and Meta- Perspective 203 Body Memory in Dementia 205 Relational versus Embodied View of the Person in Dementia 209 Conclusion 212 References 213