Hegel on the Soul: A Speculative Anthropology

183 Pages·1972·14.44 MB·English

by  Murray Greene (auth.)

HEGEL ON THE SOUL
A SPECULATIVE ANTHROPOLOGY
HEGEL ON THE SOUL
A SPECULATIVE ANTHROPOLOGY
by
MURRAY GREENE
•
MARTINUS NIJHOFF/THE HAGUE/1972
@ 1972 by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague. Netherlands
All rights reserved. including the right to translate or
to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
ISBN-13: 978-90-247-1325-7 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2828-8
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-010-2828-8
Truth, aware of what it is, is Spirit.
(PhM 178)
PREFACE
The present study seeks to treat in depth a relatively restricted portion
of Hegel's thought but one that has not yet received intensive treatment
by Hegel scholars in English. In the Hegelian system of philosophical
sciences, the Anthropology directly follows the Philosophy of Nature
and forms the first of the three sciences of Subjective Spirit: Anthropo
1
logy, Phenomenology, and Psychology. The section on Subjective Spirit
is then followed by sections on Objective Spirit and Absolute Spirit.
The three sections together comprise the Philosophy of Spirit (Philosophie
des Geistes 2), which constitutes the third and concluding main division
of Hegel's total system as presented in the Encyclopedia of Philosophic
Sciences in Outline. a Hegel intended to write a separate full-scale work
on the philosophy of Subjective Spirit as he had done on Objective
Spirit (the Philosophy of Right), but died before he could do so.·
Thus the focus of our study is quite concentrated. Its relatively narrow
scope within the vast compass of the Hegelian system may be justified,
Iring Fetscher (HegeUt Lehre vom Menschen, Stuttgart, 1970, p. 11) notes the
1
lack of a modem commentary to Hegel's Encyclopedia, and in particular to the
section on Subjective Spirit. Brief accounts of this section in English may be found
in: Hugh A. Reyburn, The Ethical Theory of Hegel (Oxford, 1921), Chapter V; and
O. R. O. Mure, A Study of Hegers Logic (Oxford, 1950), pp. 2-22.
• Translated as Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, hereafter referred to as PhM (see list
of abbreviations, below, p. XVll).
• See Table of Contents in Enzyklopiidie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im
Grundrisse (1830), ed. FriedheIm Nicolin and Otto Poggeler (Felix Meiner, Hamburg,
1959).
• For an account of Hegel's plans, see F. Nicolin, "Ein Hegelsches Fragment zur
Philosophie des Geistes," Hegel-Studien, bd. I, 1961, pp. 9-15; also F. Nicolin,
"Hegels Arbeiten zur Theorie des subjektiven Oeistes," in J. Derbolav and F. Nicolin,
eds., Erkenntnis und Verantwortung. Festschrift fur Theodor Lilt (DUsseldorf, 1960),
pp. 356-374.
VIII PREFACE
I believe, by the proverbial complexity of Hegel's thought in general
and the difficulty of the task to which the philosopher addresses himself
in the Anthropology. This task is to show speculatively a necessary
development of Spirit as pre-objective sUbjectivity or soul (Seele) to the
ego of objective consciousness. The present study first of all seeks to
elucidate the nature of this task within the wider Hegelian problematic,
and secondly to follow step by step the course of the philosopher's
demonstration in the Anthropology. In a concluding chapter that has
the nature of an appendix, an effort is made to show the connection
between the doctrine of the soul and that of consciousness, and to provide
a transition from the science of Anthropology to the science of Pheno
menology.
The Anthropology is important to Hegel's general position for several
reasons. The human spirit, says Hegel, "stands between the natural and
the eternal world" and connects them both as extremes; its "origin" lies
in the former, its "destination" in the latter./) As shown by its place
among the philosophical sciences, the Anthropology deals with a transition
stage of Spirit. In the Anthropology we see Spirit's recovery from its
self-externality in nature and its rise through successive phases as "natural
soul" to its actualization as the ego of consciousness. The Anthropology
contains Hegel's main treatment of such questions as the mind-body
problem and the nature of sentience. But these topics of perennial
philosophic interest are discussed within the particular notion of the
selfhood as totality, which Hegel calls the "feeling soul." The treatment,
unlike that of most philosophers up to his time, includes aspects of
normal and abnormal psychical life, the phenomena of "animal mag
netism" and trance states, and the nature and forms of mental illness.
Hegel's discussions of these topics in the context of his speculative notion
of Spirit are of interest in themselves and are also presupposed in his
later treatments of cognition and volition in the sciences of Phenome
nology and Psychology. But in addition, Hegel's Anthropology forms an
important part of his doctrine of Subjective Spirit, which is one avenue
on which Hegel claimed to go beyond what he called the subjective
idealism of Kant.
Though Hegel's notion of the soul in some ways surprisingly anticipates
later depth psychology, he was not entirely an innovator among modem
thinkers in dealing with this realm. Kant, for example, had dealt with
aspects of the psychical life in his Anthropology. But Kant hardly treats
• FPhG 17,48.
PREFACE IX
of the psyche as a selfhood, much less as Spirit.6 Hegel's speculative
treatment of the soul differs in content and method from that of Kant,
and part of our study is to see the why and wherefore of this difference.
The Kantian Anthropology "from the pragmatic point of view" seeks
to know man in regard to "what can be made out of him." The work
7
is expressly termed by its author as outside the science of the a priori
principles of knowledge.8 In Hegel the Anthropology presents the first
moment of the notion of Subjective Spirit and is thereby one of the
necessary sciences of cognition. The Kantian work brings together a
number of connected topics discussed on the order of empirical generali
zations. There is no claim of necessary sequence, let alone deduction.
For Kant, as we shall see, there can be no such claim in this area.
Though not rigorously systematic, the Kantian Anthropology is rich in
aper~us into human nature. But Hegel seeks something more. The
Hegelian speculative Anthropology puts itself forward as a demonstration
according to the "logical Idea," and without this character of necessity
the Anthropology loses its meaning as a science of Subjective Spirit.
If the Kantian Anthropology had been lost or never written, the Kantian
metaphysic of knowledge would remain essentially unimpaired.9 If
Hegel's Anthropology had been lost, the foundation would be missing
in the logical structure of Subjective Spirit, which is an important
part of Hegel's metaphysic of knowledge.
The difference in treatment of the two works derives from an
important difference in principle. Unlike Kant, Hegel attempts .to de
monstrate an "emergence" of consciousness. What is the nature and
meaning of this attempt, and what are its implications for the Hegelian
position generally and the problem of knowledge in particular? What
• "For were I to enquire whether the soul in itself is of spiritual nature, the
question would have no meaning." (CPR A684 = B7~2) The notion of the soul as
spirit, according to Kant, can only be employed "regulatively," not "constitutively"
(see below, p. 10 n. 35). This applies to our theoretical knowledge, not to our know
ledge of the soul under the moral law.
APH 246.
T
APH 119, 134 n., 141-143. See also The Methaphysical Principles 01 Virtue
8
(Part n of The Metaphysic 01 Morals), trans. James Ellington (Bobbs-Merrill, New
York, 1964), pp. 16,43, 65.
• Feeling, for example, an important topic of Anthropology for each thinker, is
for Kant "not a faculty whereby we represent things, but lies outside our whole
faculty of knowledge." (CPR A801 = B829 In.) But for Hegel, as we shall see, in
order to understand how we are able to "represent things" we must follow the
development of the "feeling soul" to the ego of consciousness.
x PREFACE
role does this demonstration play in Hegel's purported overcoming of the
Critical Philosophy? This relation to Kant, as well as the need to
view Hegel's treatment as part of his overall "speculative method,"
has required a somewhat long introductory section where we have had
to draw upon the Phenomenology of 1807, the science of logic, and other
works.
The discussion of the problem of self-knowledge in our introductory
section turns largely on Kant's formulation of this problem as one of
"access," and to Hegel's transformation of the Kantian formulation.
For Kant, we cannot in an anthropology or psychology go beyond empir
ical generalization. In these sciences we cannot proceed from first prin
ciples for we can have no knowledge of the soul or ego or self as it is
"in itself." The Critical Philosophy's limiting of self-knowledge to an
empirical study of "appearances" is part of that philosophy's endeavor
to establish a certain knowledge of physical nature generally as a
knowledge of appearances. This outcome of the Critical Philosophy, both
as regards self-knowledge and knowledge generally, is seen by Hegel
as tantamount to a surrender of the philosophic quest.
The problem of knowledge of first principles is resolved by Hegel
partly in the manner of the ancients, namely, by a dialectical critique
of opinions.tO But the "opinions" for Hegel are prescientific stages of
consciousness which, by its own self-criticisni, raises its unverified "cer
tainty" to philosophic science. In this way, consciousness's internal move
ment, demonstrated phenomenologically, provides the initial access to
first principles.
But in what, we may ask, lies the nature and possibility of conscious
ness to be such a successful self-critic? Any alleged demonstration of
consciousness's movement must presuppose a certain concept of con
sciousness as such. For this reason the phenomenological "pathway" to
knowledge remains in an important sense ungrounded. The demonstration
in the Phenomenology of 1807 begins with the "natural consciousness,"
whose notion, we may therefore say, is presupposed in the conception
of the enterprise itself.n By the nature of the enterprise, the presuppo
sition cannot be overcome until after consciousness itself has become
philosophic.
As Fichte demanded that each particular science be demonstrated
See, for example, Aristotle's Topics lOla39ff., and Socrates' deuteros pious in
10
Phaedo 99D.
See below, p. 29.
11
PREFACE XI
from a first principle which cannot be demonstrated within the science
itself,12 so the first principle of the Hegelian science of Phenomenology,
namely, that of consciousness, needs to be demonstrated in a science other
than that of Phenomenology. In the Hegelian encyclopedic system of
philosophical sciences, consciousness derives its "logical Idea" from
the science of logic's doctrine of essence.13 But consciousness in its
"concrete notion" derives from the science of Anthropology, which
demonstrates the nature of consciousness as arising from a development
of the soul. We thus see briefly the place of the Anthropology as
providing the first principle of the science of Phenomenology, whereby
Hegel means to overcome the Kantian limitation of knowledge to
appearances. But what about the first principle of the Anthropology,
namely, soul? Here too, as we shall see in our introductory chapters
and thereafter, the logical Idea derives from the science of logic and
the concrete notion of the soul from the preceding sciences of nature.
Another consideration that has required our going outside the compass
of the Anthropology itself is the nature of demonstration in that science
and the meaning of demonstration for Hegel generally. This necessitates
a discussion of Hegel's "speculative method," whose importance for
any understanding of Hegel cannot be overstated. One mayor may not
accept Hegel's demonstration of the soul's development to the ego of
consciousness. But unless one knows beforehand what Hegel is about
in showing a movement "according to the logical Idea," the sequence
of stages in the Anthropology, like all "unfolding" in Hegel, cannot
but strike the reader as arbitrary if not utterly incomprehensible
With certain exceptions, which Hegel explicitly notes, the demonstra
tion of the soul's development to ego does not show a process in time.14
In the Hegelian sciences of nature and Spirit, "development" is all
important, but its meaning is essentially logical. For Hegel, genuine
demonstration is a movement of the subject matter itself (Sache selbst)
that is at the same time an unfolding of its "notion" (Begriff). This is
possible, Hegel contends, because the Notion as logical Idea is itself
a self-moving life, the heart and soul of every Sache selbst. Here perhaps
lies a main source of difficulty for the student of Hegel. Everything
See Fichte's essay Uber den Begriff der Wissenscha/tslehre (1794), inspired by
12
the Kantian transcendental philosophy.
See below, p. 162 .
:Ill
.. When Hegel deals with habit, for example, the three moments of habit are the
moments of its notion, not phases in habit formation. (See below, p. 136)
XII PREFACE
in Hegel is "proven," everything "demonstrated"-but .the whole mean
ing of demonstration in Hegel is sui generis. It can only be understood
in terms of the speculative method, which Hegel claims to be the only
method wherein the ordo rerum atque idearum idem est.
For .this reason I cannot agree with some writers, often friendly to
Hegel, who would separate "what is living" in Hegel from the omni
present form of demonstration according to the Notion. To be sure,
hardly anyone will maintain that Hegel's demonstrations are in all cases
felicitous. It remains a question in my own mind whether the purported
demonstration of the emergence of consciousness is to be regarded as
"successful." Yet I have sought .to show this aspect of the Anthropology
in its strongest possible light, for without it the Anthropology would be
quite bereft of its meaning in the doctrine of Subjective Spirit.
Hegel's claim to demonstration brings in a number of problems that
we shall only touch on peripherally in .the course of our study. In the
sciences of nature and Spirit, as Hegel tells us, we are no longer dealing
with pure logical categories but a concrete content that must arise for
the philosopher empirically.111 In the philosophical treatment, however,
the succession of shapes cannot remain "externally juxtaposed," but
must be known as "the corresponding expression of a necessary series
of specific notions." But how can we be sure that we grasp the particular
empirical shape according to its proper notion? And how far into the
empirical material does the philosopher mean to push his claims for
demonstration? In his treatment of the concrete sciences, Hegel sometimes
tells us at certain points that we are now entering a realm where contin
gency prevails over the Notion. Are we to say at these times then that
the discussion is mainly illustrative and possesses philosophic interest
marginally? But we shall find that the text is not always clear as to
whether a particular discussion intends to carry demonstrative force.
Perhaps Hegel means here .to suggest guidelines for a philosophic over
view of the empirical material? In the Naturphilosophie Hegel says,
we cannot demonstrate everything but must have faith in the Notion.16
But if this is the case, ought we not also to regard some of the demonstra
tions "proper" as tentative and subject to revision in the light of further
empirical knowledge? 17
'" PhM 26.
PhN 359.
1ft
With regard to questions similar to those raised in the preceding paragraph, see
17
Mure, op. cit., chapters xx-xxii.