GURPS WWII: Their Finest Hour

67 Pages·2006·1.777 MB·English

by  Michele Armellini

Their Finest Hour
The Battle of Britain
Written by Michele Armellini • Edited by Scott Haring
A N E 2 3 S O U R C E B O O K F O R G U R P S® T H I R D E D I T I O N
F R O M S T E V E J A C K S O N G A M E S
F O R 3 T O 6 P L A Y E R S
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C
ONTENTS Air-to-Air Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57 Dogleg and Aspirin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64
Business as Usual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58 Special Jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64
CAMPAIGNUNITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 THECONTINUINGCAMPAIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
The Newcomers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 New Theaters Await . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
The Backbone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60 Battle of Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66
1. THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN . .3 Night Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60
The Best of the Best . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62
THESTAGEISSET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Radio Codes and Slang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67
Doomsday Weapons? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
The Fall of France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
THEEAGLESSTRIKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Sea Lion Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
About GURPS
Friendly Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Provocations on the Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Chivalry is Gone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Steve Jackson Games is committed to full support of GURPS
Day of the Eagles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
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Mistaken Escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
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What If . . . ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 include:
MAPOFBRITAINANDFRANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
THEBATTLEOFBRITAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Pyramid(www.sjgames.com/pyramid/). Our online magazine includes
new GURPSrules and articles. It also covers the d20system, Ars Magica,
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DEFIANTDEFENDERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 son Games releases like Illuminati, Car Wars, Transhuman Space, and
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Ground Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 books!
Taking the Flak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 New supplements and adventures. GURPScontinues to grow, and we’ll
Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
ASSUREDATTACKERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 be happy to let you know what’s new. For a current catalog, send us a legal-
The Luftwaffe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 sized or 9”¥12” SASE or just visit www.warehouse23.com.
German Aircraft Markings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
e23. Our e-publishing division offers GURPS adventures,
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German Ground Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
e23.sjgames.com.
Errata.Everyone makes mistakes, including us – but we do our best to
3. CHARACTERS . . . . . . . . . . . .36
fix our errors. Up-to-date errata sheets for all GURPSreleases, including
BRITISHCHARACTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 this book, are available on our website – see below.
Roleplaying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36
Civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Internet.Visit us on the World Wide Web at www.sjgames.comfor erra-
Female Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 ta, updates, and much more.
GERMANCHARACTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 GURPSnet. This e-mail list hosts much of the online discussion of
Roleplaying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
Aces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 GURPS. To join, point your web browser to www.sjgames.com/mail-
ADVANTAGES, DISADVANTAGES, man/listinfo/gurpsnet-l/.
ANDSKILLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
Rules and statistics in this book are specifically for the GURPS Basic
Aces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 Set,Third Edition.Page references to other books are as follows: B is
Skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 GURPS Basic Set, Third Edition, Revised; CI is GURPS Com-
Combat Stress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
CHARACTERTEMPLATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 pendium I; CII is GURPS Compendium II; VE is GURPS Vehicles;
Help from Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 W is GURPS World War II: W:AKM is GURPS World War II: All
Customization Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42
Ground Crewman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 the King’s Men; W:D is GURPS World War II: Dogfaces; W:DWE is
Home Guard Volunteer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 GURPS World War II: Doomed White Eagle; W:IC is GURPS
Warden/Observer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44
World War II: Iron Cross; W:GL is GURPS World War II: Grim
Auxiliary Servicewoman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
Auxiliary Fireman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 Legions; and W:MP is GURPS World War II: Motor Pool.
4. THE ARMOURY . . . . . . . . . . .46 A A
BOUT THE UTHOR
PERSONALGEAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
AIRMEN’SWEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47
Fireworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 Michele Armellini makes a living from foreign languages, and
THEMOTORPOOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 he’s probably more useful if manning a dictionary than a mortar. Nev-
British Fighters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47
Bristol Beaufighter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48 ertheless, he is fascinated with military history, wargames, and role-
De Havilland Tiger Moth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 playing, in whatever order. He may spend inordinate amounts of time
Other British Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50
Collimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 studying the social forces at work behind obscure historical events –
Dornier Do 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50
and trying to convert them into game mechanics! Michele lives in
Heinkel He 59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51
Heinkel He 111 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 Udine, Italy, with his understanding wife Silvia, and although a native
Other German Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54
Italian, he has never eyed any other woman. No, seriously. Apart from
5. CAMPAIGNS AND things he published in Italian, he has written for Pyramid, contributed
ADVENTURES . . . . . . . . . . .55 to many GURPS WWII books, and is the author of GURPS WWII:
Grim Legions. He is the author or co-author (with Hans-Christian Vor-
CAMPAIGNSTYLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55
Tally Ho! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 tisch) of several other products distributed by e23, including GURPS
Weary Heroes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55
The Grueling Grinder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56 WWII: Doomed White Eagleand GURPS WWII: Michael’s Army.
British Humor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56
Campaign Themes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56
CONTENTS 2
1. THE
BATTLE OF
BRITAIN
In 1940, after a dazzling series of victories, the later, and the sooner the better because the Red Army
seemingly unstoppable Nazis were soundly defeated was rearming. The British had repeatedly demonstrated
over England. they feared the Communists more than the Nazis (see p.
W:DWE8), so it all seemed ready to come nicely
Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this together: close the meaningless squabble with Great
Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Britain, and turn East against the real enemy. Hitler’s
Europe may be free and the life of the world may move admiration for the British Empire and the Royal Navy
forward into broad,sunlit uplands. But if we fail,then strengthened his resolve for such a course.
the whole world,including the United States,including The British, however, had declared war with good
all that we have known and cared for,will sink into the reason. Dying for Danzig might have seemed foolish,
abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister,and per- but preventing any one European country from becom-
haps more protracted, by the lights of perverted sci- ing a lone continental superpower was an established
ence. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties,and policy for the insular nation. Hitler’s behavior before
so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its the war (see p. W11) had already shown he was bent on
Commonwealth last for a thousand years,men will still a major shift in the balance of power.
say,“This was their finest hour.” Nevertheless, there were politicians as well as
– Winston Churchill other influential people in London who favored peace.
The Führer would have probably managed to strike a
THE STAGE deal with them in June, 1940, as they were decent, rea-
sonable and ordinary – and for this very reason, they
found it difficult to see that Hitler and his regime were
nothing of that. However, it wasn’t an ordinary politi-
IS SET
cian the new Prime Minister who had promised the
Commons “blood, toil, sweat and tears” on May 13,
1940. In his own party, he had a reputation as a war-
mongering maverick: he was Winston Churchill.
On June 21, 1940, the French accepted Adolf
Thus the stage was set for the next German offen-
Hitler’s heavy-handed armistice. In the previous ten
sive. Since the Channel served as a very wide anti-tank
months, Germany had also attacked, defeated and occu-
moat, and the Royal Navy very much mastered the
pied Poland, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Den-
seas, Germany needed to take control of the air.
mark and Norway. Most other European countries were
either Germany’s outright allies, or at least nervously D
OOMSDAY
friendly neutrals. The United Kingdom was the only
remaining enemy.
W ?
Hitler was well aware that in terms of geo-political EAPONS
interests, Germany had no reason to wage war on Great
Britain, which was a colonial empire and had no claims In the 1930s, some believed the bomber aircraft
on the European continent. Nazi Germany’s long-term would decide the next war’s outcome. Dropping incen-
plan was to secure Lebensraum (living space) in the diary bombs and possibly poison gases over cities, they
East. This meant war with the Soviet Union, sooner or would lay waste the industrial districts and break the
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN 3
enemy country’s will to wage war. This was the idea of unwieldy, highly unreliable sound locators, and even
Giulio Douhet, an Italian general. Others, including with infrared devices. In 1935, however, an Air Min-
British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin in 1932, at istry scientific commission explored the possibilities
least expected the bomber to “always get through,” as offered by high-frequency radio waves. AScottish sci-
intercepting it was a daunting task in daylight, an entist, Robert Watson Watt, came up with a proposed
impossible one at night. Billy Mitchell in the USA experiment that was carried out in February of that year.
thought along these lines, too. A transmitter loaned from the BBC sent out a short-
Douhet was a theorist, however, and Mitchell wave signal. The test target reflected it back, and a
something of an outsider. On the other hand, Hermann receiver displayed it on a cathode ray tube screen. Thus
Göring headed Germany’s Reichsluftministerium (Air Radio Direction Finding, or RDF, was born.
Ministry), and Sir Hugh Trenchard was the British It was indeed good for finding the direction of a
Chief of Air Staff until 1929. They both wanted the air target; evaluating the distance on the basis of the sig-
force to be independent from the other arms; the con- nal’s delay was difficult. However, using two signals,
cept of the bombers as key strategic assets, or even war- from two different stations, would make a triangulation
winning weapons, suited them very well, and they had possible, and a position could be pinpointed. If several
the power to make policy of this theory. Both Great airplanes flew in a close formation, counting them was
Britain and Germany embarked in a costly bomber pro- next to impossible, but experienced operators could
duction drive; the Germans were the latecomers, but make fair estimations. Height was the toughest deter-
they spent more. Also, in the 1930s an aircraft would be mination to make, and mistakes would later be made
obsolete in five years, thus having the most recent mod- throughout the battle; savvy Squadron Leaders would
els carried a disproportionate advantage. add a couple of Angels(see p. 63) to the directions they
The ideas about the bombers’supremacy did not received, just to err on the safe side.
remain on paper only. In the restless inter-war period, In those four years leading to 1939, the British set
they had been enthusiastically field-tested at the up their Chain Home and Chain Home Low radar sta-
expense of Iraqis, Abyssinians, Chinese and Spaniards tions, effectively putting a chain to their skies’door (see
(by British, Italian, Japanese and German-Italian air- p. 28). The stations’ranges overlapped, making the sys-
craft, respectively). It all seemed to work, but the tem less vulnerable as well as allowing triangulations.
bombers’ accuracy, and therefore their effectiveness, Even if one station was knocked out by enemy action,
remained a function of the quality of the defense. a small mobile unit could partially replace it. The radar
Even when the latter wasn’t totally absent as in the stations still had weaknesses, and the Germans should
Iraqi or Abyssinian skies, it seemed to be at a distinct have known their purpose; nevertheless, the bombers
disadvantage. Post-WWI fighters still were biplanes, had lost their first advantage, surprise.
because agility, not speed, was what made them win-
Be Prepared
ners in the WWI-style dogfight. On the contrary,
bombers did not need to maneuver, so they could be
The Chain Home radars were revolutionary and
powerful monoplanes; for a few years in the 1930s, it
unique, but they were but one part of the system.
was possible for a new bomber to be faster than the
Behind this early-warning line, traditional methods
fighters. They were sturdier, too, and the average fight-
were put to good use by the Observer Corps (see pp. 28,
er’s firepower was quickly becoming too little. Finally,
44). Both these elements provided the initial data, but
the sky is a wide place and in order to engage the
these wouldn’t be very useful without a processing sys-
attackers, the defenders would have needed to find
tem. This was the brainchild of the man who had
them first.
become the first Commander in Chief of the British
Thus, in order to beat back these seemingly invin-
fighters in 1936, Hugh Dowding. Coincidentally (or
cible doomsday weapons, a defender would need
not), before 1936 he had been member of the Air Coun-
recent, fast, well-armed fighters, and a way to locate the
cil and he had pushed hard for both the modern mono-
bombers.
plane fighters and for Watson Watt’s RDF experiments
(see p. 4). Dowding was a difficult man whose nick-
A Chain to the Door
name was “Stuffy,” and he had been given Fighter
If we can produce such apparatus it would become Command because his well-placed rivals in the RAF
the “eyes”of our defense system,and the greatest inno- top ranks thought that it was less important than the
vation we could dream of. bombers; but he really turned out to be the right man in
– Air Vice Marshal Hugh Dowding in 1935 the right place (see p. W:AKM55).
The air defense system he created in 1937 and
Just four years before the war, enemy aircraft was still improving in 1940 started with the raw data
would mainly be located by sight; bad visibility pre- from the radars and the observers. These forwarded
vented that. Experiments were being carried out with everything to the Filter Room at Fighter Command’s
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN 4
HQ in Bentley Priory. The information was sent both (see p. 4); developing them would take time, building
to the Operations Room of the HQ and down along them would cost too much. Göring decided he would
the chain of command, to the Groups and Sectors (see make do with a larger number of smaller bombers,
p. 24), who had their own Operations Rooms. delivered as soon as possible. Milch could and did prod
Observers Corps stations got feedback from the Sec- manufacturers; indeed, he mercilessly persecuted his
tors. Anti-Aircraft Command was also kept in the former employer, Hugo Junkers, who was not pliable
loop. enough. Unfortunately, the development of new
Tactical decisions were taken by the Group Com- designs was in the less competent hands of Udet, and
manders, who decided when and where to commit their this caused delays. Additionally, Hitler did desire to
forces, and managed by the Sectors, which guided the have his cake and eat it; i.e., he needed a strong military
interceptions and gave orders to the squadrons. but did not want to disappoint his people by putting the
The system provided everybody with all the data German industry on a total-war footing. Thus, by 1940,
they needed (while Dowding was the only one to get aircraft production was not what it could have been.
the complete picture). It was resilient and redundant, as The same could be said of pilot training. The Luftwaffe
it worked on telephone lines and teleprinter networks. was a sizable standing force, but had not invested
Its main vulnerability was that most of its command enough in long-term planning.
centers were not contained in well-protected, under- Another peculiar feature of the Luftwaffe in the
ground shelters. However, those parts that could be late 1930s was its fixation on dive-bombing. While
damaged by the enemy could be easily replaced by Göring wanted to believe an air force could win a war
neighboring elements and then quickly repaired. on its own, most of his officers came from the army,
Apart from dispersing most of the fog of war, the and did not buy that. On the contrary, a bomber force
air defense system also dispensed with the need of fly- that could deliver timely close support to fast-moving
ing tiresome, wasteful patrol missions, keeping fighters armored units tied in well with the German new land
in the air, ready to intercept the enemy. Finally, it was a warfare theories, making the panzers independent from
kind of preparedness the enemy had not the slightest slow artillery pieces. However, close air support needs
idea of. to be accurate: it has to be delivered on small targets,
and in the proximity of friendly ground troops. The
Flying Artillery
Germans lacked a bomb sighting device, and Udet had
fallen in love with a Curtiss Hawk dive bomber in
Born in the shadows of the Versailles prohibition,
1933. The end result was the famous Stuka (see p.
having grown too fast in the four years before the war,
W114). Ideally suited to serve as the panzer divisions’
the Luftwaffe was a very different organization from
flying artillery, this dive bomber couldn’t be used with-
the RAF. If the latter had staff rivalries, the German arm
out air superiority. Additionally, Udet insisted that the
was riven with the typically Nazi feuds, intrigues, per-
Ju 88 should be capable of diving, too. This delayed
sonal enmities and resorting to higher patronage. Its
production, added weight and reduced performance
commander was Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, a
(see p. W:IC87).
vainglorious man of robust appetites, a morphine
Finally, very little effort had been spent on naval
addict, a Nazi politician and a decorated WWI fighter
and anti-shipping resources. Torpedo bombers were
pilot (see p. W:IC52); the latter qualification could
just one step out of the experimental stage, cooperation
hardly balance the rest. All of the real work was done
with the Kriegsmarine was bad, and there were no
by his deputy, General Erhard Milch, a ruthless
bombs capable of piercing the top armor of a battleship
schemer and sharp administrator who, as the Lufthansa
before exploding.
chairman, had supported the Nazis in their campaigns.
All of this made the Luftwaffe of 1940 ready for
Göring had to replace three chiefs of staff between
accurate but short-ranged and relatively light bombing,
1936 and 1939, two of them because they couldn’t
in a violent but brief campaign against tactical land tar-
work together with Milch. Additionally, Der Eiserner
gets.
(the Iron Man, Göring’s WWI nickname) appointed
Oberst Ernst Udet as Inspector of Fighters and Dive- T F F
HE ALL OF RANCE
Bombers, and Chief of the Technical Department –
both tasks for which the popular WWI pilot was
After the winter of the “Phony War,” the Germans
unqualified for. Most of the previous war’s veterans did
finally moved to settle the score in the West. GURPS
not realize how fast the technology was evolving.
WWII: Blitzkriegdescribes this campaign in detail, and
Meanwhile, great expectations were being placed
further information can be found in GURPS WWII:
on the Luftwaffe. Hitler wanted a big air arm, and he
Return to Honor. The offensive began on May 10,
wanted it soon. This automatically ruled out building
1940, the same day Winston Churchill accepted the
the kind of heavy, four-engine bombers that could
King’s appointment to form a new government. The
really become the city destroyers of Douhet’s theory
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN 5
Nazis ruthlessly attacked neutral Belgium and Holland, the Luftwaffe’s task. Göring eagerly promised a victo-
luring the French and British troops in those countries; ry, and sent his bombers against the ever-decreasing
meanwhile, they moved through the Ardennes and beachhead. The German aircrews put on another
forced a crossing of the Meuse. By May 20, the Ger- impressive series of attacks, relentlessly pounding the
mans’“sickle stroke” had reached the sea, cutting off in pocket. The RAF fighters did stop many of them, but
Belgium the best Allied units. often out of sight of the ground troops, who would
The Allies reacted by counterattacking the exposed come home with a bitter resentment against the flyboys
flanks of this deep German penetration, but their who had not protected them against the Stukas.
moves, though worrisome for the Germans, were unco- That feeling was only partially unwarranted. While
ordinated and untimely. Hitler was more concerned the British squadrons that were committed to the Battle
with the bulk of the French army trying to rebuild a line of France and to cover Dunkirk during the evacuation
to the South, and ordered his main force to attack in that fought hard, Fighter Command as a whole was not
direction. In the pocket, the hard-pressed Belgians doing everything it might have done. This was because
finally gave up at the end of the month, thus making the Dowding was always acutely aware of his task: defend-
Anglo-French position unsustainable. The British had ing Great Britain. He stubbornly opposed plans to
already made plans for an evacuation by sea, and had deploy more fighters in France, and he fiercely hus-
begun withdrawal moves. On May 25, that became a banded his resources. Just as every soldier who left
general withdrawal, and it was high time; in the previ- Dunkirk could fight another day, every Hurricane not
ous days, the Germans had taken all the Channel sea- lost in Belgium would be precious over the Home
ports but one, Dunkirk, and they had arrived within 15 Counties.
miles of it. Operation Dynamo was over on June 4, 1940. The
On May 26, Operation Dynamo began; the British British forces, including the RAF, withdrew to defend
Expeditionary Force and many French soldiers were their own island. The Luftwaffe had lost some 290 air-
leaving the continent (see pp. W15, W:AKM10). Abold craft in Poland, 250 in Norway, and a whopping 1,450
dash by German armored troops might have caught in France. Repair crews were backlogged with similar
them between a rock and a hard place. numbers of heavily damaged machines, and production
wasn’t keeping up with this rate. The Battle of France
Save Them for Later
had cost Fighter Command 300 airplanes, but many of
their pilots had come back, and the core of the force had
As in previous campaigns, the air component had
not been dented. Dowding had saved his strength for
played a major role in this Blitzkrieg, though mostly in
the battle to come.
the close support task. The Stukas had once again deliv-
ered their pinpoint attacks, as well as their morale-shat-
The Last Appeal
tering effects. On the other hand, fighters had had a
secondary role. They could not rely on a centralized On the basis of political considerations that cer-
control, nor on timely intelligence, nor on a solid net- tainly looked sound from his point of view, Hitler
work of technical assistance. Additionally, the Allied air made overtures to the British. By the end of June the
forces had had to fight under the threat of losing their French were out of the war, 35 German divisions were
forward airfields not because of air attacks but because either demobilized or dropped to a lower degree of
of the enemy ground forces, and redeploying from combat readiness, and peace feelers were sent out
those airfields had caused delays. through several neutral countries. Hitler began talks
At the end of May, however, both the Luftwaffe with his generals about the Soviet Union. At the same
and the RAF would move to center-stage, because time, he reluctantly ordered to carry on with prepara-
Hitler chose not to order that final panzer rush towards tions for continuing the war against the United King-
Dunkirk. The reasons for this decision are unclear. Pos- dom.
sibly, he thought that the campaign had been too good Even after the British had declared war on Sep-
to be true, and that the final shove towards Paris would tember 3, 1939, the Wehrmacht had never contemplat-
cost him more. The terrain around Dunkirk was not ed the possibility of attacking them. There wasn’t even
very suitable for tanks, and once they were on the coast a feasibility study. This was ordered on July 2, and only
itself, they’d be exposed to the heavy fire of the best on July 16, Directive #16 was issued by the Führer; a
naval gunnery in the world. Political considerations vague and tentatively phrased project. Its timing was
may have had their weight: Hitler wanted to make unrealistic, as it stated that in a month all preparations
peace with Great Britain, and he may have thought that had to be completed. The text was broadcast by Enig-
destroying its army on the beaches would have pre- ma-coded radio messages – and the British decrypted it
vented a settlement. (see Intelligence, p. 29), which put them on high alert
Nevertheless, Hitler gave orders to keep up the and made them even less willing to consider settlement
pressure on the British: he decided that this would be proposals.
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN 6
On July 19, Hitler appeared before the Nazi-filled tion. They basically agreed to leave the overzealous
Reichstag, and made a “final appeal to common sense,” Göring holding the baby. Ideally, the British would
advocating peace. Since he did not put forth a detailed change their minds once they realized the Luftwaffe
proposal, the British should have accepted the current controlled their skies; or at least, the latter would keep
situation, a triumphant Germany. English-language them at bay for an almost unopposed landing. In the
leaflets, titled “A Last Appeal to Reason,” were also worst case, if Göring did not make it, the blame would
dropped over London. They failed to sway the British. be upon him alone.
The Heer kept gathering its units and hastily train-
THE ing them for what they called a large-scale “river cross-
ing.” The Admirals knew better; they realized how the
Royal Navy outgunned them, and were aware that the
waves in a river can’t be compared to those of the Eng-
EAGLES
lish channel. Yet they marshalled their river barges, tug-
boats, other odds and ends. They all wanted to be ready,
just in case – ifthe Luftwaffe could deliver. Time was
STRIKE running out, however; the invasion couldn’t be carried
out in the autumn weather, which meant that the last
days of September were the final deadline.
Geography and the balance of naval forces dictat-
ed the shape of the battle. F F
RIENDLY IRE
S L P
EA ION LANS At the beginning of the war, the British air
defense system still had a major drawback: there
As England, despite the hopelessness of her mili- was no way of telling the sheep from the goats.
tary situation, has so far shown herself unwilling to On September 6, 1939, the so-called “Battle of
come to any compromise, I have therefore decided to Barking Creek” took place: because of one stray
begin preparations for,and if necessary to carry out,an Dutch airplane, Spitfires from Hornchurch
invasion of England. engaged Hurricanes from North Weald and
– Adolf Hitler,Directive #16 downed two of them. Radar operators still lacked
experience, observers and pilots were unused to
Hitler did not show he meant business until July the problems of snap-decision identification, and
13, 1940. On that date, Feldmarschall Walther von everybody was nervous.
Brauchitsch (see p. W:IC55), Commander in Chief of The friendly fire accident, however, led to the
the Heer, presented his plans. He intended to deploy adoption of the IFF (Identification Friend or
elements of three armies, two of them in the main thrust Foe) equipment; primitive, hand-made contrap-
between Dover and Brighton; a smaller thrust would go tions that nevertheless marked the friendly fight-
from Cherbourg to Lyme Bay. Von Brauchitsch wanted ers’ radar signature. Additionally, the aircraft
a first wave of 85,000 troops; the second wave would radios automatically emitted a signal that was
include armored and motorized units, which needed to tracked by their Sector HQ; this device was
land in ports. The operation would employ 39 divisions, known as the “beep-squeak.” Thus, the positions
over 500,000 men (see p. W:IC13). of the squadrons could be known and updated
Numerous enemy landings on such a wide front (see p. 14).
would have created serious problems for the under- All of this prevented ground control from vec-
equipped British Army. On the other hand, defending toring friendlies against friendlies; but in a huge
the convoys from the Royal Navy along the length of dogfight, there was nothing but the pilot’s reflex-
the Channel would have been impossible for the es, eyes and experience (in GURPSterms, Vision
Kriegsmarine; by the end of the month, Admiral Erich and the Aviation skill).
Raeder (see p. W:IC55) pleaded for a much narrower It is important to notice that different
landing operation, in front of Calais. What’s more, squadrons, unless flying as a whole wing, would
according to him the first wave would take ten days to not normally be working on the same radio fre-
land. The generals were furious; such constraints would quencies. Similarly, German bomber crews were
have meant a defeat on land. unable to speak with the fighters escorting them.
On July 31, von Brauchitsch and Raeder met Throughout the Battle of Britain, minor friend-
Hitler, without any Luftwaffe representative present. ly fire accidents continued to happen, on both
The army and the navy insisted that, taking into account sides.
all the limitations, total air superiority was a precondi-
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN 7
A Requisite Condition Poised to Strike
The British control of the sea was a formidable At the end of June, 1940, the bulk of the German
challenge for the invasion. The Kriegsmarine, smaller units began moving to take possession of the air sta-
than its opponent to start with, had suffered heavy tions in northern France. They did so leisurely; they
losses in the Norwegian campaign. They could use needed rest after the French campaign, and everybody
minefields and submarines to fence in the ferrying thought the war was almost over.
corridor across the Channel, but the enemy had mines Level-flight bombers could have the major airports,
and minesweepers too, and the grand total of available while the fighters and Stukas, constrained by their short-
U-Boote was a puny 27. Assuming the landing went er range, ended up in minor airfields and forward
relatively well, the German ground forces would then airstrips. Some of these had been prepared in all haste by
face a whole army. The British were under-equipped the personnel of the units themselves; the Desvres air-
and not every unit was well trained, but they’d have field had to be mowed and leveled in this way. The Luft-
numbers, supplies, tanks and heavy artillery, all things waffe was used to operating from improvised bases, but
the first German wave would sorely lack. bumpy landings would be especially tough for the thin,
Hitler and Göring, however, wanted to rely on weak undercarriage of the Bf 109s, especially in the
their trump card: air superiority. They hoped that, hands of newcomers; this meant frequent, dangerous
once the RAF was defeated, the Luftwaffe could keep accidents. On the other hand, the sea was close and an
the Royal Navy under check by attacking it in its ports airman could go to the beach in his free time.
and in the Channel. The Stukas would replace tradi- Since the British did not seem in a hurry to surren-
tional field artillery in supporting the infantrymen. der, the German began putting pressure on them. Hitler
Everything pivoted on air superiority, an area in had forbidden flights in British air space as a pointless
which the Luftwaffe leaders were experts. They had provocation, but targets in and over the Channel would
demonstrated its effectiveness over Poland. In that be fair game (see p. 6). On July 21, Hitler requested an
campaign, however, they had benefited from their air campaign against the stubborn enemy, and on July
superior aircraft and overwhelming numbers. 25, he decided that attacks on England would indeed be
In France, the Germans had also won the contest, necessary. Attacks on cities were still forbidden.
but they only had achieved local, temporary superior- The air generals finally managed to convene a staff
ity, by using the traditional advantages of the attacker: meeting in the Hague on August 1. Göring was there in
surprise, concentration of forces, and choice of the a new gala uniform, and was met by all of his top-rank-
battlefield. Without an efficient command network, ing officers. The men of Luftflotte 2 came from Brus-
the Allied fighters had been defeated, but they had not sels. They were led by Feldmarschall Albert Kesselring
been wiped out of the sky. The Germans thought that (see p. W:IC55). Der lächelnde Albert (“Smiling
obtaining similar results would be possible and suffi- Albert”) had excellent communication skills, but he
cient. was also an organizational powerhouse and a shrewd
Achieving air superiority, however, meant consis- planner. His only handicap was that he remained a land
tently high kill rates. The Germans, who would be soldier at heart, and while he could conceive an air
attacking, would need to down many enemy fighters, campaign in support of a Blitzkrieg, an air-superiority
day in, day out. And their fighters could not simply campaign was another matter. He was the most skepti-
hunt their opponents; they’d need to protect the cal of the officers about the whole affair, and during the
bombers. Fighter-only formations could not seriously meeting he reminded everybody that sizable assets had
damage ground targets, and might not be engaged by to be set aside for covering the invasion. His subordi-
the British, so the bombers would be needed for the nates made several eager and contradictory proposals,
unenviable role of bait. covering the full range of potential targets.
Also, the German aircraft couldn’t be lavishly Luftflotte3, whose HQ was in Paris, was headed by
expended in this task. Assuming that Fighter Com- Feldmarschall Hugo Sperrle. A huge man, difficult to
mand would indeed be beaten, then both fighters and deal with, who rivaled Göring in his tastes for good liv-
bombers would be necessary for covering the inva- ing, he was nevertheless a professional air commander.
sion. The Luftwaffe needed to kill a lot and lose very He thought that the enemy fighters would be forced to
little. take off and fight if the Luftwaffe bombed the right tar-
Finally, the German pilots had a very short time to gets.
win the battle. Even assuming that Göring was correct That was the plan Göring finally pushed through.
and that the RAF really only had 500 fighters, the Ger- The idea was to launch several bomber raids with fight-
mans would need 42 kills per week over a month and er escort, to force the enemy to take off. These would
a half, just to reduce the enemy by 50% -and this fig- be followed by a wave of fighters, to shoot the British
ure did not take replacements into account. out of the sky. In the days to come, variations would be
attempted on this same theme.
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN 8
The Germans, because of their poor intelligence (see After minor skirmishes, large actions were carried
Intelligence, p. 29), mistakenly thought they still had a out on July 10 and 11. Either the German radar or recon
technological edge (they did not), and overestimated flights spotted the convoys. Stukas and/or Dorniers
their advantage in numbers. Kesselring correctly deemed were sent in, with a close escort of Bf 110s, while JG 51
they had two advantages: ace pilots and superior tactics, sent free-ranging Bf 109 over them. The RAF had
both thanks to their greater combat experience. Reliance standing patrols, flights of 6 fighters or less, over many
on the qualities of the individual “knight of the air” had of those convoys.
been fostered by WWI veterans like Göring. But the Ger- The battle for the convoy code-named Bread, on
mans could not lay claim to a monopoly on those two July 10, was a huge dogfight. The first British unit on
elements. The British were already grooming their own the scene was a flight from #32 Squadron, which was
aces, too, and as to tactics, while the German ones were outnumbered, but the radar operator had spotted the
better indeed (see p. 57), it remained to be seen whether large enemy formation and #56, #111 and #74
the British wouldn’t simply learn. Squadrons joined the fray. #111, in particular, jumped
Finally, the Germans knew nothing about the in with the most effective type of attack, a slashing dive
British defense system, knew of the radar stations but pass that cut through the enemy formation and dis-
totally underestimated them, and had not calculated persed it. Many kills in the whole Battle of Britain
the kill ratio they needed to really achieve their aim. would be achieved in this way, though normally from
More than a plan, all of this was wishful thinking. behind; this time, the Hurricanes made the hair-raising
The Luftwaffe generals had a catchy name for it, head-on version. The bombers’ aim was spoiled, and
however: Adler (“Eagle”). It would follow the they sank one small ship; other convoys would not be
Kanalkampf(the “Battle of the Channel”), which had so lucky in the following days. The other Squadrons
already begun. were fed into the battle one by one, and chased away
the enemy; #64 arrived last, in time to pursue the
P
ROVOCATIONS ON retreating Bf 110s.
The Luftwaffe lost ten aircraft in combat and three
C
THE HANNEL in landing accidents, and had twelve damaged
machines. Fighter Command lost two fighters, one in
If the British air space was off-limits (see p. 8), an accident, and had eight aircraft damaged, one by
Göring had ordered his Geschwaderto attack targets of friendly fire. Bomber Command lost five Blenheims
opportunity, in order to familiarize themselves with the out of six employed in a reckless, unescorted, low-level
opponent and the environment; beginning to whittle attack on an airport.
down the RAF could also do no harm. The enemy was On July 11, the Luftwaffe did better. The British
still carrying out coastal traffic in small convoys; this fighters had been scrambled too late and with too long
made a battlefield of the Channel. intervals, and the Bf 109s were able to fight them from
Oberst Johannes Fink, a dedicated veteran com- an altitude advantage, downing three of them. Aradar
manding KG 2 (see p. 32 for an explanation of German operator underestimated a raid of Bf 110s, and a small
abbreviations), set up shop in a bus on Cap Blanc Nez; flight of British fighters was sent to intercept it. More
he had been appointed as Kanalkampfführer, “Com- fighters were scrambled only after the first flight saw
mander of the Channel battle.” Since Kanalalso means the size of the raid and reported in by radio.
“sewer,” he was nicknamed Kanalarbeiter: “sewer Valuable lessons were already being learned.
worker,” or “sewer rat.” His main tool was a mobile Standing patrols were easy to surprise and outnumber.
Freyaradar station, which he used to locate the convoys. The first pass was key to success (see Air-to-Air Tac-
While Fink commanded the bombers, General tics, p. 57). The British needed to scramble fast, and
Theo Osterkamp (Onkel Theo, “Uncle Theo”) com- radar information needed to be reliable to be useful; but
manded the fighters that would be most involved in this even when making mistakes Fighter Command was
stage of the battle. able to redress them quickly. Sending in squadrons in
Both made the best of a difficult job. Fink ruthless- waves was good tactics; it allowed flexibility, and it
ly hunted shipping with Stukas. Osterkamp quickly often ensured that the last one would find retreating
realized that fighters roaming on their own over the enemies, low on ammo and fuel. On the German side,
British coast were ignored. He also ordered his pilots to the vulnerability of the Stuka was expected and con-
only pursue sure kills. (Osterkamp may have been the firmed, but that of the Zerstörer was a disappointing
only member of the Luftwaffe top ranks to understand surprise. The Germans missed the most important
how favorable the kill ratios had to be. On the other truths: they did not realize how and why the British
hand, if the Bf 109s had attacked only when they had attacks were so timely, and, because of their pilots’
the advantage, the campaign would have had no chance inflated claims, they did not understand they were not
of success in less than two months.) downing enough fighters. These factors dogged them
for most of the campaign.
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN 9
C G
HIVALRY IS ONE
Some Luftwaffe pilots entered WWII with a lin- and Red Cross markings. The applicable interna-
gering, romantic self-image as knights of the air. As tional conventions provided for such vehicles for
to their British counterparts, they were conscious evacuating wounded and sick personnel, and men-
that they were officers and gentlemen. Both were in tioned rescuing shipwrecked servicemen, but the
for disappointments. In retrospect, the Battle of status of these seaplanes remained unclear. The
Britain doesn’t hold a candle to the slaughterhouse British found some of them in close proximity to
that would become the Eastern Front, but chivalry convoys, and suspected they were radioing back
was already long gone in 1940. reports. They decided the use of the Red Cross was
The most successful behavior in air combat was a violation of the conventions by the Luftwaffe,
nothing like chivalrous to start with (see Air-to-Air and treated the He 59s as any other enemy aircraft.
Tactics, p. 57). Pilots who wanted to improve their Some of the crews they captured did not include
score routinely sought out crippled enemies, such as medical personnel, but the Germans protested
the bombers who limped home out of formation, strongly, anyway. When the RAF set up a sea res-
leaving behind a trail of smoke. Others would keep cue service in 1941, the aircraft did not carry the
firing on goners just because a “probable” kill was- Red Cross symbol.
n’t enough for them, while the sky was full of other Afew unflattering episodes may also have taken
targets for their limited ammo. place on land. Home Guard members are reported as
Both sides reported individual cases of pilots playing out a barbarous parade with the head of a
being machine-gunned while dangling from their German airman. Thankfully, in all likelihood it had
parachutes. This is certainly unsportsmanlike, but it been severed in the crash of an enemy bomber, not
still is not a war crime, no more than firing at an by the militiamen themselves from a living prisoner.
infantryman who is running away. Both the foot sol- The Guard was also trigger-happy, as some pilots,
dier and the pilot would be back fighting in a short including British ones, would learn at their own
while. The exception to this was German aircrews expense.
parachuting over England; they would all become On the other hand, once surrender had been
POWs, and Fighter Command explicitly prohibited accepted, POWs were treated well on both sides.
harming them for this very reason. They were seen Intelligence officers made thorough attempts at
as intelligence sources. interrogation, but did not employ threats or force,
Amore contentious issue is that of the German and they only succeeded when the prisoners them-
sea rescue seaplanes. These had a white paint job selves felt talkative.
Removing the Signposts In the first days of July, the government kicked in
more robust anti-invasion measures. Wide tracts of
The British were still under the Blitzkrieg shock,
coastal regions were made restricted areas, and the pop-
and the Army sorely missed all the equipment lost in
ulation was even evacuated from the most exposed cen-
France, but they were recovering. Manpower was abun-
ters; Margate looked like a ghost town, with grass
dant, while training and armaments were insufficient.
sprouting from the pavements’cracks. Earthworks were
At the end of the Dunkirk evacuation, there were 24
being built on the beaches, and by August they’d be
complete divisions in Great Britain, half of them still in
supplied with no less than 80,000 light machine guns
training. Equipment included 790 artillery pieces, 167
(most of them of WWI vintage). The best defenses
anti-tank guns, and a grand total of 261 tanks, most of
however were reserved for the ports; the wharves were
which were too light and/or obsolete. However, every
prepared for demolition, and new bunkers covered the
day that went by was one more for drills, and one more
approaches. Crossroads were manned by the Home
for industrial output. The Germans were aware of this,
Guard with makeshift barricades and “fire mines”: hid-
and it was one of the reasons for pushing for an imme-
den barrels of petrol ready for ignition. That wasn’t the
diate, though risky, invasion.
least creative measure taken at crossroads: signposts
Indeed, the coastal regions, the Home Counties,
had been removed, in order to make things more diffi-
London, and the rest of Great Britain were getting
cult for the invaders, and in some cases fake indications
ready. The Home Guard had plenty of recruits (see p.
had been placed.
43). The most exposed beaches were being fortified,
Adress rehearsal of these preparations was invol-
though the available mines, barbed wire and obstacles
untarily held on September 7, 1940. The sheer
were still spread quite thin.
weight of the raids on London (see p. 15), coupled with
THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN 10