Guadalcanal 1942–43: America's first victory on the road to Tokyo

97 Pages·19.5 MB·English

by  Mark Stille, Peter Dennis(Illustrations)

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CAMPAIGN 284
GUADALCANAL 1942–43
America’s first victory on the road to Tokyo
MARK STILLE ILLUSTRATED BY PETER DENNIS 
Series editor Marcus Cowper
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CONTENTS
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN 4
Admiral King and the South Pacific
CHRONOLOGY 8
OPPOSING COMMANDERS 11
American commanders Imperial Japanese Army commanders
n
OPPOSING FORCES 17
US Forces The Imperial Japanese Army
n
OPPOSING PLANS 35
Terrain The American plan The Japanese plan
n n
THE BATTLE 39
The landings Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo The Japanese response Ichiki attacks The Japanese
n n n n
reaction The battle for Bloody Ridge The impact of Kawaguchi’s failure The Japanese build-up
n n n n
The October battle for Henderson Field The Japanese approach The battle opens The attack on
n n n
the ridge November skirmishing The Japanese November offensive December lull The Japanese
n n n n
evacuation decision The American January offensive The Japanese evacuation
n n
THE AFTERMATH 90
THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY 92
BIBLIOGRAPHY 94
INDEX 95
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ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
The first American offensive of the Pacific War came eight months to the day
after the war began on December 7, 1941 at Pearl Harbor. When American
Marines stormed ashore at several points in the southern Solomon Islands in
the South Pacific on August 7, 1942, it was the start of an epic struggle
between Japan and the United States, which would last over six months and
would feature an almost unrelenting succession of air, naval, and ground
battles. At the end of the campaign, Japanese air and naval forces had suffered
heavy attrition, which was clearly beyond their ability to withstand. Almost
forgotten in this titanic naval clash was the fact that the US had also dealt
the Imperial Japanese Army its first major defeat of the war. The brutal
ground battle on Guadalcanal created the template for future clashes on
islands throughout the Pacific.
After their successful operation at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese had little
trouble conducting what they called the First Operational Phase. This called
for the occupation of the Philippines, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Burma,
and Rabaul on the island of New Britain in the South Pacific. Rabaul was the
gateway for further Japanese expansion in the South Pacific with its large
harbor and several airfields. In January 1942, the Japanese occupied Rabaul
against minimal Australian resistance.
Except for the Philippines, which would not fall in their entirety until
May 1942, the Japanese quickly achieved all their First Operational Phase
objectives. The next step was to create strategic depth for their new
possession – this was the goal of the Second Operational Phase. This
presented the Japanese with a much more ambitious set of objectives and
quickly challenged available Japanese forces and shipping resources. While
the Aleutians and Midway Atoll were eyed for attack, most of the anticipated
future expansion was planned for the South Pacific. This included eastern
New Guinea, Fiji Samoa, and “strategic points in the Australian area.”
Unable to conduct simultaneous operations into the Central and South
Pacific, the Japanese had to decide how to sequence their operations.
Between the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, and within the IJN itself,
there were sharp differences of opinion about how to proceed. Within the
IJN, the commander of the Combined Fleet, Yamamoto Isoroku, wanted to
move first into the Central Pacific and use Midway as a means to draw out
the remaining units of the US Pacific Fleet into a major battle and complete
the defeat of American naval power. However, the Naval General Staff
advocated an immediate advance into the South Pacific to cut the sea lines
of communications between the United States and Australia. The IJA left the
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direction of Japanese strategy in the Pacific to the IJN, but it made clear that
it would support only operations that required minimal numbers of ground
forces. This precluded an attack on Australia, but smaller operations against
South Pacific islands were still possible with the limited numbers of
troops available.
Yamamoto used the threat of resignation, and his views prevailed.
However, as part of the compromise reached with the Naval General Staff,
the Combined Fleet would conduct a set of tightly sequenced operations
beginning in the South Pacific in early May, and then against Midway and
the Aleutians in early June. Elements of the Combined Fleet’s carrier force
would be allocated to support an invasion set for May to seize Port Moresby
on New Guinea and occupy Tulagi Island in the southern Solomons. This was
a major operation with some 60 ships and could not escape the notice of
American intelligence, which had the advantage of being able to break a
limited percentage of Japanese naval code traffic. When the scope of the
Japanese plan became clear, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief
Pacific Fleet, committed two carrier groups to defeat the invasion. The result
of the ensuing battle of the Coral Sea on May 7–8, 1942 was the first strategic
Japanese defeat of the war. The first carrier battle of the war resulted in all
three Japanese carriers present being placed out of action (one was sunk, one
damaged, and the third had its air group decimated), which eliminated air
cover for the invasion of Port Moresby forcing the cancellation of the entire
operation. Almost forgotten in this victory was that the first phase of the
Japanese operation went according to plan, resulting in the occupation of the
island of Tulagi on May 3. Tulagi was useful as a seaplane base and gave the
Japanese their first foothold in the southern Solomons. Tulagi was not big
enough for an airfield, but it was located some 20 miles (32km) north of a
virtually unknown island named Guadalcanal.
This view from August 8 shows
the uncompleted Henderson
Field. Bloody Ridge is the
elevated area in the center of
the photo surrounded by
jungle. The coconut groves on
the coast are clearly evident.
This airfield was to become the
center of the most prolonged
campaign in the Pacific War.
(Official Marine Corps photo
courtesy of Marine Corps
History Division)
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Following the battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese continued with their
much larger operation against Midway and the Aleutians. The importance of
the defeat at Coral Sea was felt in the Central Pacific, since it reduced the
Combined Fleet by three carriers, including two fleet carriers. For this reason,
but primarily because of faulty operational planning, the IJN suffered a
devastating defeat at Midway with four fleet carriers being sunk or disabled
on June 4. The loss of the bulk of its fleet carriers blunted Japan’s offensive
power in the Pacific. On June 11, the operation to occupy New Caledonia,
the islands of Fiji and Samoa was postponed. The next month it was canceled.
Offensive operations were now limited to mounting an overland attack on
Port Moresby by the IJA’s 17th Army.
The Japanese were not entirely passive. On June 13, they decided to build
an airfield on the northern coast of Guadalcanal. On July 6, a 12-ship convoy
arrived off Lunga Point on Guadalcanal with two IJN construction units to
start work on the airfield, which was expected to be completed in August.
With long-range aircraft based on Guadalcanal, the Japanese could threaten
Allied supply lines to Australia.
ADMIRAL KING AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC
While the Japanese struggled to maintain their offensive momentum in the
South Pacific, the Americas were also making plans to begin offensive operations
there. The driving force behind American strategy in the South Pacific was
Admiral Ernest King, Commander-in-Chief US Fleet. The high priority he
placed on the South Pacific was immediately impressed upon Nimitz after he
assumed his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on December
31, 1941. King’s priorities for Nimitz were to hold Hawaii and Midway in the
Central Pacific, followed closely by protecting the sea lanes between the United
States and Australia. This required the garrisoning of a series of islands in the
South Pacific as far west as Fiji Island and the New Hebrides. Just like the
Japanese, the Americans would be challenged to provide adequate force and
supporting shipping to secure all the points King thought necessary to safeguard
the sea lanes. Since the overarching imperative of American military strategy for
the conduct of the entire war was to give emphasis to defeating Germany in the
war in Europe, King and Nimitz were constantly battling with the Army for
more forces. This became easier after the Japanese advance into the South
Pacific in January 1942, with the seizure of Rabaul looking to be the first step
to further advances south against Fiji and New Caledonia. Not only did this
threat, which prompted renewed Australian concerns, make it easier to acquire
new forces for the South Pacific, but it further reinforced King’s thinking that
he could not be passive in the South Pacific.
As early as March 1942, King admitted that he had no intention of
remaining strictly defensive in the South Pacific, but envisioned an offensive
from the New Hebrides into the Solomon Islands and eventually the Bismarck
Archipelago to re-take Rabaul. Events in the Pacific served to drive forward
King’s ambitions to conduct offensive operations. In June, the Japanese defeat
at Midway meant that the Japanese threat in the Central Pacific was virtually
gone, and that additional resources could be devoted to the South Pacific.
While the Japanese seemed uncertain after their defeat at Midway about how
they would maintain the initiative they had held since the beginning of the war,
King was planning to shift to the offensive. On June 24, King directed Nimitz
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to come up with a plan to capture Tulagi and nearby islands. These efforts were
contingent upon rearranging the command jurisdictions in the South Pacific,
since the southern Solomons were actually in the Southwest Pacific Area
command under Army General Douglas MacArthur. There was never any
prospect in King’s mind that an operation conducted with Navy and Marines
forces would be commanded by an Army general. By July 2, a deal was made
between King and Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall to move the
command line to place the southern Solomons in the South Pacific Area under
Navy control. With this major detail taken care of, time was of the essence,
since King envisioned the offensive to begin on August 1 to exploit the victory
at Midway. After American intelligence provided an assessment that Japanese
construction troops were on Guadalcanal, the island was added as an objective
on July 5. The operation was given the codename Watchtower.
The principal ground unit earmarked for Operation Watchtower was the
1st Marine Division. This unit embarked from Norfolk, Virginia in May 1942,
and arrived in Wellington, New Zealand the following month. The unit’s best
regiment, the 7th Marines, had been sent to Samoa to bolster the garrison there
in March 1942. On June 26, shortly after arriving in New Zealand, the Marines
learned of their assignment to attack Guadalcanal. On July 18, Major General
Alexander Vandegrift assumed command of the South Pacific Marine
Provisional Corps while still maintaining command of the 1st Marine Division.
His command was spread out over a good chunk of the Pacific and it looked
impossible to get his force ready and organized for a landing in the Solomons
in just under three weeks. A short delay was granted, and, on July 22, the 1st
Marine Division departed Wellington. At the end of the month, elements of the
division conducted a rehearsal on Fiji. This was a shambolic affair, suggesting
that it was very fortunate for the Marines that their landing was unopposed.
On July 31, the Marines departed the peaceful waters of Fiji and headed for
the Solomons. The first American offensive of the war was under way.
The airfield shown later in
August by an aircraft from
carrier USS Saratoga with the
surrounding area pockmarked
by Japanese bomb explosions.
Marine aircraft are located to
the left. The Japanese were
never able to neutralize the
airfield fully. (Official Marine
Corps photo courtesy of Marine
Corps History Division)
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CHRONOLOGY
1942
May 3 Japanese seize Tulagi Island in southern Solomons. 
May 1st Marine Division embarks at Norfolk, Virginia for South Pacific. 
June 1st Marine Division arrives in Wellington, New Zealand. 
June 24 King directs Nimitz to plan for capture of Tulagi and adjacent islands. 
July 5 Guadalcanal added to American list of targets. 
July 6 Japanese begin work on airfield on Guadalcanal. 
July 22 1st Marine Division departs Wellington for invasion of southern Solomons. 
August 7 Americans land on Guadalcanal against no resistance, but encounter heavy resistance on Tulagi and
Gavutu-Tanambogo. 
August 8 Uncompleted airfield on Guadalcanal captured, and organized Japanese resistance on Tulagi and
Gavutu-Tanambogo ends. 
August 9 Battle of Savo Island results in a severe Allied naval defeat; transports forced to depart Guadalcanal
before unloading is finished. 
August 16 First Japanese destroyer arrives on Guadalcanal carrying reinforcements. 
August 18 Marines finish airfield. 
August 18–19 First battle of the Matanikau. 
August 20 First American aircraft from Marine Air Group 23 arrive at Henderson Field. 
August 20–21 Battle of the Tenaru River; first Japanese attempt to seize Henderson Field is repulsed and the Ichiki
Detachment destroyed. 
August 24–25 Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Japanese attempt to destroy American fleet and run a small
reinforcement convoy to Guadalcanal is defeated. 
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September 8 Marines conduct raid on Tasimboko. 
September 12–13 Battle of the Bloody Ridge (also known as Edson’s Ridge) begins; Japanese attacks on the first night
misfire. 
September 13–14 Japanese continue attacks on Bloody Ridge but are repulsed with some 800 killed or missing. 
September 18 7th Marines arrives on Guadalcanal. 
October 7–9 Second battle of the Matanikau. 
October 11–12 Battle of Cape Esperance. First major Japanese naval defeat in a night battle during the war, but
another Japanese reinforcement group delivers troops and equipment to Guadalcanal. Japanese
build-up for an October ground attack in full swing. 
October 13 164th Infantry Regiment arrives on Guadalcanal; these are the first US Army troops to enter the
campaign. 
October 13–14 Two Japanese battleships bombard and temporarily neutralize Henderson Field. 
October 15 Japanese “High-Speed” reinforcement convoy arrives on Guadalcanal; three of six transports sunk
by air attack but 4,500 troops land. 
October 18 Ghormley relieved by Halsey. 
October 18–20 Japanese begin demonstrations along Matanikau to draw American attention from main attack. 
October 21–23 Main attack south of Henderson Field delayed until October 24. 
October 23–26 Japanese attack across Matanikau. 
October 24–25 Initial Japanese ground assault on Henderson Field fails after only two battalions attack. 
October 25–26 Japanese resume attack against Bloody Ridge, but are repulsed with heavy losses. 
October 26 Battle of Santa Cruz. Japanese gain major victory and assess Americans will not be able to stop
future large-scale Japanese reinforcement of the island. 
November 1–4 Fourth battle of the Matanikau. 
November 4 8th Marines arrive on Guadalcanal. 
November 9–12 Americans eliminate last Japanese force located to the east of the American perimeter. 
November 10 Major operation to take Japanese supply area at Kokumbona aborted after Americans learn of
impending large-scale Japanese reinforcement operation. 
November 12 US Army 182nd Infantry Regiment arrives on the island. 
November 13 First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Americans suffer heavy losses but turn back Japanese attempt to
bombard Henderson Field with battleships. 
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November 14–15 American aircraft sink all but one of 11 Japanese transports in a convoy bound for Guadalcanal. 
November 14–15 Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. US Navy defeats another Japanese attempt to conduct a
battleship bombardment of Henderson Field. 
November 18–23 Fifth battle of the Matanikau. 
December 9 Vandegrift turns over ground campaign to Army Major General Patch. 
December 11 Last Japanese destroyer run to Guadalcanal in 1942; Japanese garrison reduced to starvation
rations. 
December 17 Battle for the Gifu near Mount Austen begins. 
December 26 IJA and IJN agree to withdraw from Guadalcanal. 
December 31 Emperor approves evacuation plans. 
1943
January 10–17 First phase of American offensive to clear Japanese from Guadalcanal. 
January 14–15 Fresh Japanese troops arrive to act as rearguard. 
January 21 American attack resumes. 
January 22–23 Japanese withdrawal begins. 
January 23 Kokumbona falls to the Americans. 
January 23 Gifu falls to the Americans. 
February 1 Americans cross Bonegi River. 
February 1 First Japanese evacuation run to Guadalcanal picks up 4,935 personnel. 
February 4 Second evacuation run picks up another 3,921 personnel. 
February 7 Americans cross Umasani River. 
February 7 Last evacuation run picks up final 1,972 personnel. 
February 9 Organized Japanese resistance on Guadalcanal ends. 
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