Gervais Willard Norenzayan Henrich 2011 RELIGION

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Religion
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THE CULTURAL TRANSMISSION OF FAITH
Why innate intuitions are necessary,
but insufficient, to explain religious
belief
Will M. Gervais, Aiyana K. Willard, Ara Norenzayan & Joseph
Henrich
a University of British Columbia, Department of Psychology,
Department of Economics, Canadian Institute for Advanced
Research
Available online: 08 Nov 2011
To cite this article: Will M. Gervais, Aiyana K. Willard, Ara Norenzayan & Joseph Henrich (2011):
THE CULTURAL TRANSMISSION OF FAITH Why innate intuitions are necessary, but insufficient, to
explain religious belief, Religion, 41:3, 389-410
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0048721X.2011.604510
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Religion
Vol. 41, No. 3, September 2011,389–410
THE CULTURAL TRANSMISSION OF FAITH
fi
Why innate intuitions are necessary, but insuf cient, to
explain religious belief
WillM.Gervais*, Aiyana K.Willard, Ara Norenzayan and Joseph Henrich
1 UniversityofBritishColumbia,DepartmentofPsychology,DepartmentofEconomics,Canadian
1
0 InstituteforAdvancedResearch
2
r
e
b
m ABSTRACT The cognitive science of religion integrates insights from diverse
ce scientific disciplines to explain how people acquire, represent and transmit
e
D religious concepts. This perspective has led to a fruitful research program on
0 thenaturalisticoriginsofreligion.However,ithasthusfarnotdirectlyaddressed
2
7 a key component of religion: faith or committed belief. The present review
4
6: proposesaframeworkthatintegratesstandardapproachesfromthecognitive
1
at science of religion with established models of cultural evolution and cultural
] learning.Accordingtothissyntheticapproach,innatecognitivecontentbiases
s
ai explainhowpeoplementallyrepresentgods,andculturalevolutionarymodels
v
r explainwhypeoplecometobelieveandcommittotheparticularsupernatural
e
G
beliefs that they do. This synthesis offers a more complete picture of the
Will originsandculturalpersistenceofreligiousbelief.
[
y KEYWORDS religion;culturalevolution;cognitivescienceofreligion;atheism;
b
d dualinheritancetheory
e
d
a
o
nl Thecultural transmission offaith
w
o Inrecentyears,researchersfromavarietyofdisciplineshavebeguntomakesignifi-
D
cantprogressinunderstandingtheevolutionaryandcognitiveorigins ofreligion.
One school of evolutionary thought sees religion as a naturally selected genetic
adaptation for cooperative group living (e.g., Sosis and Alcorta [2003]; Wade
[2009]; Wilson [2003]), while an alternative perspective argues that religion is a
natural by-product of normal, everyday psychological processes that evolved for
other purposes (e.g., Atran [2002]; Atran and Norenzayan [2004]; Barrett [2004];
Bloom [2007]; Boyer [2001]; Foster and Kokko [2009]; Guthrie [1993]; McCauley
[2000]; Pyysiäinen [2001]). In this ‘cognitive byproduct’ view, we do not have a
mindforreligion;rather,religion hasevolvedculturallytofitthemindswehave.
Despite the growing influence of the cognitive byproduct perspective, there is
considerable room for debate about the role of cultural processes in the evolution
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], henrich@
psych.ubc.ca
ISSN0048-721Xprint/ISSN1096-1151online/11/030389–22©2011Taylor&Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0048721X.2011.604510
390 W.M.Gervais etal.
ofreligion(see,e.g.,Barrett[inpress];GeertzandMarkússon[2010]).Inparticular,
one commonargument (e.g.,Barrett [2004]; Pyysiäinen andHauser [2010])is that
religious beliefs arise naturally and effortlessly from the biases and tendencies of
the human mind, with minimal or no need for extensive cultural scaffolding.
Thisworkhasledtoimportantinsightsintothecognitivetendenciesandintuitions
that bias the human mind towards religiosityand constrain the range of possible
religious intuitions across cultures (e.g., Atran and Norenzayan [2004]; Barrett
[2000]; Henrich [2009]; Kirkpatrick [1999]; Pyysiäinen and Antonnen [2002]).
Inthepresentpaper,wealsostartfromthecentralargumentthatreligiousrep-
resentations can best be explained as cognitive byproducts of ordinary human
thinking. We build on this insight and propose an updated theoretical model
that allows for a much greater role than previouslyassumed for cultural learning
processesinshapingandsustainingreligiousbeliefs.Wethussituatethecognitive
science of religion more firmly within existing frameworks of cultural evolution
which emphasize that human thinking and behavior are powerfully shaped both
1
1 bygeneticandculturalinheritance(seee.g.,BoydandRicherson[1985];Richerson
0
2 andBoyd[2005];forrelatedperspectives,seeBulbulia[2008];Schalleretal.[2010];
r
be Sperber [1996]; Norenzayan and Gervais [in press]). In doing so we invite debate
m
e and further research on this relatively neglected topic in the evolutionary study
c
e ofreligion.
D
0 Thecornerstoneofthisupdatedmodelistwofold:(1)theculturaltransmissionof
7 2 concepts–includingsupernaturalreligiousconcepts–aredependentonthecogni-
4
6: tive biases that constrain and canalize their content; and (2) these concepts also
1
at depend on cultural learning biases that push individuals to selectively attend to
] and acquire both concepts and degrees of commitment or belief from those
s
ai around them. We propose that a combination of these two processes has led to
v
r
e the proliferation of certain kinds of religious beliefs, rituals and devotions in the
G
Will wpoowrledr.oWfethsehcoowgnhitoivwetbhyisprpoedruspctecpteivrsepreecttaivines,bthuetibnaasidcdiintisoignh,tasdadnredssexpprelavnioautosrlyy
[
y unanswered questions about the key distinction between mentally representing
b
d supernatural concepts as opposed to believing in them. Take, for example the
de Mickey Mouse problem, which illustrates that many fictional characters like
a
o
nl Mickey Mouse have similar cognitive content as gods, yet are not believed to be
w realnorcommittedtothewayagodwouldbe(Atran2002;AtranandNorenzayan
o
D 2004). McCauley and Cohen (2010) recently approached this problem by arguing
that there is no natural partition between religious and other cultural represen-
tations and therefore it may not be clear on what grounds we differentiate them
scientifically. We couldn’t agree more. Religion is a family-resemblance category,
andthereforethereisnonaturalpartitionbetweenreligiousandotherculturalrep-
resentations.However,wearguethatasignificantpuzzleremains:scientistsneed
toexplainthepsychologicaldifferencebetweensupernaturalbeliefsthataremen-
tallyrepresentedbuttreatedasfictional(fairiesinfolktales,thegodsofotherreli-
gions), and those that are mentally represented and evoke deep worship and
commitment (the gods of one’s own group). We submit that theories of cultural
evolution can explain why some counterintuitive representations galvanize pro-
found commitment, while others are treated merely as entertaining curiosities,
despite their transmission advantage. The distinction between mental represen-
tation and belief-commitment is crucial to explain cultural differences in the
degree of religious commitment around the world, the existence of disbelief, and
Religion 391
howcertaingods,likeZeus–despitehavingsimilarcognitivecontentthroughout
theages–canmovefromaworshipeddeitytothefictionalcharacterofmythsand
stories.Wethusexplainwhyasupernaturalagentwithidenticalcontentandsup-
ported byexactly the same cognitivebiases can in one place or time be an idol of
immensedevotion,whileinadifferenttimeorplacecanbemerelymythorfanciful
tale: this is the so-called ‘Zeus Problem’ (Gervais and Henrich 2010).
Theevolution ofcultural learning
Imagine that tomorrow morning you wake in a strange and novel environment,
surrounded by strange people, flora and fauna. Your stomach rumbles hungrily,
and you decide to rustle up some breakfast. How would you decide what is safe
to eat? You may notice that a lot of people are gathering small brown nuts from
a local bush. That is a good sign: if lots of people are interested in these nuts,
there’s a good chance that they are good to eat. On the other hand, you notice
1
1 somepeoplegatheringmushroomsinstead.However,manyofthepeoplegather-
0
2 ingnutsareobviouslysuccessful,whilethemushroomgathererslooktobestrug-
r
be gling.Thenutgatherersarehealthy,strong andothers looktothemforguidance.
em Finally,younoticethatthesefitindividualsareactuallyeatingthebrownnuts.In
c
e this rather speculative example, you (a naïve cultural learner) are faced with the
D
0 question of what to believe about a new environment. Should you believe that
2
7 nuts are delicious and nutritious, should you believe that mushrooms are prefer-
4
6: able, or should you instead set out on your own and begin trying various foods
1
at for yourself?
] Thisanecdoteillustratesafundamentalpointabouthowhumanscometocommit
s
ai to certain beliefs. Although social learning can be found in many animal species
v
r
e (e.g.,Whiten[2005]),humansrelyuponeachotherforadaptiveinformationtoan
G
Will fuonrpagarearlsle–lecadndneogtrseuervinivtehewaitnhiomuatltakpinpgidngomth.eUvnalsitkreesoethrveersaonfimacaclusm,huulamteadnscu–lteuvreanl
y [ knowledgeaboutfindingfood,makingshelters,cookingandproducingtools.Asa
b
d consequence, our species is addicted to culture, and the vast bulk of preferences,
de motivations, attitudes and beliefs are – or can be – influenced by transmission
a
o
nl from other members of their social group (Henrich and McElreath 2003). We
w argue that a scientific understanding of the origins of religious faith would be
o
D incomplete without considering this critical dependence on others as sources of
information.Belowwediscussculturallearningbiasesandempiricalevidencefor
theminmoredetail.Wethenexplainhowtheseculturallearningbiasesshedimpor-
tantlightontheculturalspreadandstabilityofreligiousbeliefsandpractices.
Becausehumansdependonothersforinformation,theymustbesensitivetothe
qualityoftheinformationtheyacquirefromdifferentsources.Someculturalevol-
utionarytheories(e.g.,HenrichandMcElreath[2003];RichersonandBoyd[2005])
recognizetwobroadtypesofpsychologicalmechanismsthataidintheprocessing
of such information, termed representational content biases and context biases (or
model-basedlearningbiases),respectively.Whenusingcontentbiases,humansselec-
tivelyretainsomeinformationbecauseofdifferencesintheactualcontentofinfor-
mation. Some types of information are easier to remember, more emotionally
evocative (fitness relevant), or allow more potent inferences to be made about
the surrounding world. Concepts supported by these content biases would hold
privileged status in cultural transmission. Content biases have been the primary
392 W.M.Gervais etal.
focusofmuchofthepreviousworkintheunderstandingofthecognitiveoriginsof
religion,whilecontextbiaseshavereceivedlittleattention(Henrich2009).Though
thereareseveralotherrelevantperspectivesontheprocessesofculturalevolution
(see,e.g.,Donald[2001];Sperber[1996];Tomasello[1999]),andimportantnuances
and distinctions, a complete overview and detailed comparisons is beyond the
scope of this paper. Instead we focus on these cultural learning biases within the
frameworkofcultural evolution toexplain thetransmission of religious belief.
The adaptive value of context learning biases is evident in the above food
example. One strategy is for cultural learners to weight how common various
beliefs appear tobe intheir immediate cultural context. Ifanaïve cultural learner
places weight on the prevalence of a certain belief (say, by noticing that most
people gather nuts rather than mushrooms), that learner is utilizing a conformist
learningbias(BoydandRicherson1985;HenrichandBoyd1998;Kendal,Giraldaeu
andLaland2009).Asecondstrategyistopreferentiallyimitateculturalmodelswho
are older, skilled, prestigious and successful (e.g., Gil-White and Henrich [2001]),
1
1 oftenreferredtoasaprestige-basedlearningbias.
0
2 A third context bias springs from the need for cultural learners to avoid decep-
r
be tion. An unscrupulous model might knowingly transmit false information to
m
e others, perhaps to maintain a competitive advantage. In this case, it is important
c
e for learners to ensure that their models actually hold the beliefs they espouse
D
0 before adopting the belief themselves. Actions speak louder than words: theyare
7 2 great cues of another’s underlying beliefs. For example, if a model who praises
4
6: mushrooms actually eats the mushrooms, a learner can be more certain that the
at 1 model holds the belief ‘mushrooms are delicious and nutritious’ rather than the
] belief ‘mushrooms are toxic.’ Alternatively, if a model praises mushrooms but
s
ai refuses to eat them, the learner would be wise to treat this claim as dubious. In
v
r
e this example, eating the mushrooms constitutes a credibility-enhancing display
G
Will I(Cf mREoDde)losfenthgeagmeoidnebl’eshuanvdioerrslytihnagtbweoliuelfds rbeegcaordstilnygifmoupsphorsoionmgsbe(Hlieefnsrwicehre20h0e9ld).
[
y (that is, if they engage in credibility-enhancing displays of their beliefs) learners
d b can be more confident that the model actually holds the belief, and as a result
e
d theywouldbemorereceptivetothesebeliefs(Henrich2009).Inallthreestrategies
a
o
nl (conformist, prestige-based and CREDs) people rely not only on the content of
w information (in the above example, what a learner already knows about nuts or
o
D mushrooms), but also on the context in which learning occurs, that is, various
factorsrelatingtoapotentialculturalmodelormodelsthataffectthetransmittabil-
ityof abelief.
In this view, learners are expected to utilize a variety of cues to assess which
potential information sources are more reliable, and come to preferentially
believeinformationfromthesesources.Thecapacitiesforcontext-dependentlearn-
ingemergeearlyindevelopment.Three-andfour-year-oldchildrenaremorelikely
to believe information that comes from sources who have proven to be reliable;
they prefer sources with a track record of accuracy (e.g., Koenig and Harris
[2005]; Koenig, Clément and Harris [2004]; Pasquini et al. [2007]). Children are
abletomonitorandtrackthereliabilityofdifferentsources,usingthisinformation
to preferentially learn from previously accurate sources of information (Birch,
Vauthier and Bloom 2008). Children as young as four preferentially believe infor-
mation from sources who claim certainty (Sabbagh and Baldwin 2001), or who
appear more confident in their information (Birch, Akmal and Frampton in
Religion 393
press).Childrenalsoappeartovalueexperiencedsources.Whenchoosingwhether
to imitate a previously reliable adult source or a previously reliable child source,
kidsfollowtheadult(JaswalandNeely2007).Recentworkshowsthatyoungchil-
dren readily track the visual attention of others (a ‘prestige cue’) and selectively
learn from those who were previously preferentially attended to, even under
novelcircumstances and inthe absenceof observers(Chudeket al. 2010).
We next argue that content and context biases interact to affect the spread of
certain kinds of religious beliefs. They influence the transmission of religion in
different, but complementary, ways. We expect, as has been argued before, that
content biases make some concepts inherently more interesting, memorable and
transmittable.However,peopleshouldalsobe endowedwithcapacities forfilter-
ing concepts that havedubious credibility,and therefore context biases should be
instrumentalinexplainingpatternsofbeliefinvariousconcepts.Morespecifically,
wearguethatcontentbiasesaffectthepotentialofaconcepttobecomememorable
andcontagious, butpeoplewill onlycome tobelieve inthosesalient concepts that
1
1 aresupportedbyappropriatecontextbiasesthatallowpeopletoselectivelyacquire
0
2 cultural information.
r
be Content biases: counterintuition and the cognitivescience ofreligion
m
e Evolutionaryapproachestoculturaltransmissionprovidearichsetofcognitively
ec informedhypothesesregardinghowthecontentofrepresentationsinfluencestheir
D
0 transmission(BoydandRicherson1985:5;Sperber1996).Specifically,culturallear-
2
7 ners should be more likely to payattention to, store and transmit representations
6:4 when these are judged more: (1) potentially actionable; (2) fitness relevant and
1
at thusemotionallyevocative;and(3)plausibleorcompatible:
ais] (1) ‘Potentially actionable’ means that the content of a representation leads to
rv inferencesthatcanreadilyinfluencesubsequentactions,includingadditional
e
G inferences (Inferential Potential: Boyer 2001). Representations, for example,
Will in which the causes of unpleasant circumstances (e.g., storms or illnesses)
[ are random with respect to the actions of those afflicted do not lead to
y
b useful or helpful inferences or actions, and thus are not easy to maintain.
d
e Evolutionarily non-actionable representations need not be stored because
d
oa theycannotbeofhelpevenifoneremembersthem.Instead,representations
nl thatinvolvebelievingthatillnessesarecausedbythejealouslyofothers(e.g.,
w
o the‘evileye’)canleadtoinferencesaboutwhomightbecausingaparticular
D
illness and howone can avoidsuch illnesses in the future.
(2) ‘Fitnessrelevant’:naturalselectionshouldfavormoreattentionandrecallfor
representational content of greater relevance to fitness, at least in ancestral
environments.Oftensuchcontentsparksmorepositiveornegativeemotion-
al responses, thus adaptively biasing memory storage and recall. People
shouldtendtodevotemorecognitiveresourcestostimulithatevokeaffective
reactions such as disgust, fear, etc., potentially leading to biases in cultural
evolution (e.g., Boyerand Lienard [2006]).
(3) ‘PlausibleorCompatible’representationsinvolveavarietyofexpectationsthat
alearnermighthaveabouthowtheworldworksand,consequently,whatis
moreandlesslikelytobetrue.Someexpectationsrelyheavilyonourreliably
developing intuitions, including core cognitive processes related to such
domains as mechanics and biology (Spelke and Kinzler 2007). For example,
representations from modern physics, which involve objects (e.g., electrons)
394 W.M.Gervais etal.
thatexistonlyprobabilisticallyatanypointinspace,radicallyviolateourintui-
tiveexpectationsfromfolkmechanicsandthusdonotreadilytransmit.Such
plausible or compatible content biases can also be culturally acquired, such
that the possession of one mental representation biases the acquisition of
others.Thatis,havingacquiredaparticularideaviaculturaltransmission,a
learner may be more likely to acquire another idea, because the two ‘fit
together’ in some cognitive or psychological sense. For example, believing
thatperformingacertainritualinthespringwillincreasethecropharvestin
the summer might favor the acquisition of a belief that a similar ritual will
increaseawoman’soddsofconception,ahealthypregnancyandthesuccessful
deliveryofarobustinfant.
Researchersworkinginthecognitivescienceofreligionhavelargelyfocusedon
thesetypesofcontentbiasestoexplainthecognitivestructureandculturalspread
ofreligiousbeliefs.Thisviewisalreadywellelaboratedandhasledtofruitfulthe-
1 orizing and empirical research (e.g., Barrett [2004]; Boyer [2003]; Pyysiäinen and
01 Antonnen [2002]). Here we discuss one influential hypothesis: that the presence
2
r of mildly counter-intuitive content in concepts or narratives can bias memory in
e
b
m amanner that would favor such concepts or narrativesin cultural evolution (e.g.,
e
c BarrettandNyhof[2001]).Counter-intuitiveconceptsviolateourcoreassumption
e
D aboutthenatureofthingsintheworld;usuallytheseassumptionsfocusoninten-
0
2 tional beings, animals, inanimate objects or events (expectations often associated
7
4 with the cognition domains of folkphysics, folkpsychology and folkbiology). By
16: departing systematically, but mildly, from established cognitive rules we use to
at understand and organize information in our environment, they achieve greater
ais] memorability. Examples of counter-intuitive concepts from this literature are ‘a
rv person who can be in twoplaces at once’ (Boyer and Ramble 2001) and a ‘thirsty
Ge door’ (Norenzayan et al. 2006). Furthermore, the presence of a few counter-
Will intuitiveconceptsinanarrative,evenwithinalistofotherwiseordinaryconcepts,
[ improves memory for the entire narrative or list, increasing the transmission
y
b advantage of the entire narrative (Norenzayan et al. 2006).
d
e From the perspective just presented, many counter-intuitive concepts probably
d
a createcomplexmixturesofplausibility,applicabilityandemotionalevocativeness.
o
nl Many religious beliefs, for example, would appear to be more applicable, more
w
o emotionally evocative, but less plausible than alternative non-religious concepts
D
or explanations. If counter-intuitive concepts, by their very nature, make stories
orbeingsseemlessplausible(lessbelievable),theoptimalnumberofsuchviolations
shouldbesmall.Inananalysiscomparingasamplingofsuccessfulandunsuccessful
Grimm’s fairy tales, successful (widely known) fairly tales had only two or three
counter-intuitive violations (Norenzayan et al. 2006). Successful counter-intuitive
representationsarealsolikelytogenerateemotionalresponses,likefearorinterest,
aswellasactionableoptionsandadditionalinferences.
Researchershavelongrecognizedthatrepresentationalcontentbiasesmayplay
animportantroleinreligiousbelief.Thesupernaturalagentsendemictoreligions
appear to possess a particularly evocative set of abilities (flight, omniscience or
transubstantiation) and characteristics (being invisible or wholly incorporeal) not
shared by more mundane agents. People find this minimal counterintuitiveness
memorable, giving these concepts a strategic advantage in cultural transmission:
they should be more likely to spread and persist. To be culturally successful,
Religion 395
thesedeviationsmustbesystematicbutnotradicaldeparturesfromcommonsense
astorupture meaningcompletely.AsSperber (1996:73)hasput it,these minimal
counterintuitions are ‘relevant mysteries,’ in the sense that they are closely con-
nected to background knowledge, but do not admit to a final interpretation. As
aresulttheyareattentionarrestingandinferentiallyrich,andthereforeencourage
further cognitive processing and multiple interpretations over time that facilitate
transmission.
The picture we have painted so far explains why religious concepts the world
over tend to have the peculiar cognitive structure that they do (e.g., containing a
few minimally counterintuitive elements), and why such structure is memorable
andcontagious.However,itisafarstepfrommemorabilityandmentalrepresen-
tationtosincerebeliefinandpassionatecommitmenttoreligiousconcepts.People
believe in only a small subset of the minimally counterintuitive agents that are
worshipped around the world, which are themselves but a small subset of all
minimallycounterintuitiveconcepts.Furthermore,ifthesecognitivebiasesoperat-
11 ingonrepresentationalcontentaresufficienttoexplainthepersistenceofreligious
0
2 beliefs,whydopeoplecometobelieveinonlyasmallsubsetofsupernaturalagent
r
be concepts, when so many concepts share the same or similar content conducive to
m
e cultural success?
c
e
D
0
2 Can content biases alone explainfaith?
7
6:4 While content biases appear to influence the mental representation,memorability
at 1 andsocialcontagionofsupernaturalconcepts,theymayhavedifficultyexplaining
] whypeoplecometodevoutlycommittotheparticularsupernaturalconceptsthat
s
ai areprevalentintheirownculture.WhydoChristianspassionatelybelieveinJesus
v
r
e butnotinShiva(orviceversaforHindus)?AndwhyisitthatZeus,whohasallthe
G
Will cloonggneitrivaeweolersmheipnptsednedceeistsya?rIyntoothbeerawsourdccse,scsafnulcognotde,nhtabsialsoesst(hiniscluspdeinllgatnhdemisnneo-
[
y monicadvantageofcounterintuitiveconcepts)aloneexplainpatternsofbeliefand
b
d disbelief in supernatural agents?
de In a humorous piece titled ‘Why Santa Claus Is Not a God,’ Barrett (2008)
a
nlo recentlyattemptedasolutiontothispuzzleofbelief,relyingonfurtherrefinements
w ofcontentbiases.However,weareskepticalthatcontentbiasesalonecansolvethe
o
D aforementionedpuzzles.(Foradetailedcritique,seeGervaisandHenrich[2010]).
Cultural learners are not mere passive receptacles who believe in and commit to
any concept that is memorable and widespread. (See Bergstrom, Mehlmann and
Boyer[2006]forasimilarpoint).Indeed,therearegoodreasonstosuspectskepti-
cismorepistemicvigilance(Sperberetal.2010)onbehalfofculturallearners,even
inchildren.Givenboththeimperfectionofculturaltransmissionandthethreatof
manipulationfromunscrupuloussources(Henrich2009),adegreeofincredulityis
warranted when evaluating new sources and types of cultural information.
Consistentwiththis,childrenshowasophisticatedunderstandingofthedifference
betweenrealityandfictionalconcepts,andperhapsevensomeinherentresistance
to belief in counterintuitive concepts (see, e.g., Bergstrom et al. [2006]; Harris and
Koenig [2006]).
Decades of developmental research in psychology support the notion that chil-
dren appreciate the difference between real entities and fictional entities (e.g.,
Sharon and Wooley [2004]). They can reliably tell which types of things actually
396 W.M.Gervais etal.
exist from those that only exist in pretense (e.g., DiLalla and Watson [1988];
Golomb and Galasso [1995]; Harris et al. [1991]; Morison and Gardner [1978];
Samuels and Taylor [1994]). They can even reason about how fictional agents in
one fantasy context might view fictional agents in another fantasy context; they
report, for example, that Batman would think that Spongebob is fictional, even
though both are fictional characters (Skolnick and Bloom [2006]). Children
readily engage in pretend play, without confusing pretense and reality (e.g.,
Golumb and Kuersten [1996]; Woolleyand Wellman [1990]). Many children even
entertain imaginary friends, but they still appreciate that these companions are
not, in fact, real (Taylor [1999]).
Children are also sensitive to the different types of information they could
acquire, even from a reliable source. Older children (eight to nine years old) dis-
tinguish between facts and opinions, showing a greater degree of conformity to
others’ views of factual matters than to others’opinions (Banerjee et al. 2007). As
children age, they become increasingly aware that others may systematically
1
1 distortinformation.Ten-and11-yearoldsareskepticalofself-reportsasaccurate
0
2 informationaboutvaluedpersonalitycharacteristicssuchasintelligence(Heyman
r
be and Legare 2005). Children recognize that others might misrepresent the world.
em The development of children’s abilities to think critically about sources of infor-
c
e mationandthetypesofinformationforwhichtheymightbereliabledemonstrates
D
0 thatculturallearnersmightrelymoreorlessheavilyondifferentcontextbiasesfor
2
7 different types of information. (See Heyman [2008].)
4
6: Childrenareabletobotheasilyreasonaboutthedifferencebetweenrealityand
at 1 fictionandalso tomentallyrepresent fictional counterintuitiveagents.Tocompli-
] cate matters even further, there is some evidence that children are actually quite
s
ai skeptical of concepts that violate their intuitive expectations about the world.
v
er Mead’s (1932) classic study of animism on the island of Manus in New Guinea
G
Will rceovnecaelpetdstthhaetychheialdrreexnpdreossneodtbreyaaddiluyltcso.mRamthitetro,tahnedchbielldierevnewinetrheescoomuenwtehrianttrueistiisvte-
y [ ant to adopting such concepts. Although controversy surrounds Mead’s work,
b
d similarpatternsemergefromlaboratoryexperimentsthatgenerallyshowthatchil-
e
d drenaremoreinclinedtobelieveinintuitiveconceptsovercounterintuitiveconcepts
a
o
nl (Harris and Koenig 2006; Harris et al. 2006). In one study, Harris and colleagues
w (2006) asked children whether they thought a variety of different entities exist.
o
D Thechildrenreportedthatavarietyofempiricallynon-verifiablescientificentities
suchasgermsexist,andassertedtheexistenceofendorsedbeingslikeSantaClaus.
Althoughthisappearstoindicatethatthechildrencametobelieveincounterintui-
tive agents like Santa Claus, children were more confident that scientific entities
exist than that endorsed beings exist. These authors argue that children might in
part be more skeptical of the endorsed beings simply because these beings
violate intuitive expectations, leading the children to ‘conclude that the existence
ofspecialbeingssuchasGodorSantaClausismoredubiousthanthatofscientific
entities’(Harriset al. 2006: 92).
This resistance to belief in counterintuitive concepts persists into adulthood.
Although university students rate minimally counterintuitive concepts as more
supernatural(AtranandNorenzayan2004),theyalsoratethemtobelessbelievable
than intuitive concepts (Willard et al. 2010). Furthermore, Bloom and Weisberg
(2007)arguethatadultscientificilliteracystemsinpartfromaresistancetobelieving
things that contradict domain-specific intuitions. For example, in one experiment
Religion 397
(McKloskey,CaramazzaandGreen1980)JohnsHopkinsundergraduates–manyof
whomhadtakencollegephysics–wereaskedtopredictthetrajectoriesofobjects
leaving curved tubes. Consistent with folk physics, and inconsistent with actual
physics, most participants guessed that the balls would have curved trajectories.
In a variety of domains, children and adults alike have a hard time believing in
conceptsthatviolateintuitiveexpectationsabouttheworld.
In sum, content biases make some counterintuitive concepts memorable and,
therefore, widespread. However, cultural learners are easily able to remember,
represent and reason about concepts without necessarily believing in them. Fur-
thermore, some evidence suggests that people actually resist belief in concepts
that routinely violate intuitive expectations. This skepticism of counterintuitive
conceptsposesaseriouschallengeforanymodelofreligionthatreliesexclusively
uponrepresentationalcontentbiases,astheverysamefeature(minimalcounterin-
tuitiveness)thathasbeenarguedtocausereligiousconceptstospreadandpersist
in cultures may also make the concepts less believable. Content biases therefore
11 appear better abletoexplainwhyfolktalesandmyths–that is,storiescontaining
0
2 somecounterintuitiveelementsthatpeopledonotactuallybelievetobetrue–are
r
be widespreadandmemorablethan theyareable toexplain thefact that around the
m
e world most people who have ever lived sincerely believe in and commit to only
c
e the small subset of counterintuitive supernatural agents popularly endorsed
D
0 within their own cultural context.
2
7
4
6:
1 Religious faith in cultural context
at
] If content biases are insufficient to explain which sorts of religious beliefs people
s
ai commit to, how might context biases shed further light on religious beliefs?
v
r
e Contentbiasesmakesupernaturalconceptsinteresting,memorableandcontagious,
G
Will bsuuptecronnatteuxrtabliacsoensceexpptslationwwhhyicpheoppeolepcleomareetoexbpeoliseevdei(nAatrpaanrtaicnudlaHrseunbriscehto2f0t1h0e;
[
y Gervais and Henrich 2010). Most people adopt the religious beliefs of their
b
d parentsandsurroundingcommunities,ratherthancomingtobelieveineverymem-
e
d orableorattention-grabbingsupernaturalagenttowhichtheyareexposed.Ifmost
a
nlo of the people in a learner’s environment – and especially if the most successful
w people in the area – say that Zeus throws lightning bolts, or that Yahweh will
o
D judgepeoplefortheirsins,itislikelythatthelearnerwillcometobelievetheseprop-
ositions, just as the learner will come to adopt the styles of dress or cuisine also
demonstrated by the rest of the community. Furthermore, most religions give
believers ample opportunity to exhibit credibility-enhancing displays of their
fealty to a given god – public prayer, painful rites of passage, martyrdom – that
willfurtherratchetupbeliefinculturallearners.(SeeHenrich[2009]foracompre-
hensive treatment). Although the content of many supernatural agent concepts
makethemlikelygodcandidates,peopletendtoactuallybelieveinonlythesuper-
naturalconceptssupportedbycontextbiases.
Contextbiasesmakeobviousmanyfeaturesofreligionthatareunexplainableby
content biases alone. Context biases can help explain patterns in people’s beliefs
abouttheoriginsofspecies,beliefsaboutdeathandpatternsofbeliefanddisbelief
in various supernatural agents (across societies and within individual lifespans).
Importantly, some noted researchers (e.g., Barrett [in press]) have made strong
claims that supernatural beliefs in each of these domains emerge naturally, with