Germany's New Conservatism: Its History and Dilemma in the Twentieth Century (Princeton Legacy Library, 1947)

276 Pages·1968·9.25 MB·English

by  Klemens Von Klemperer

GERMANY'S NEW CONSERVATISM
Its History and Dilemma
in the Twentieth Century

Germany's
New Conservatism
Its History and Dilemma in the
Twentieth Century
BY KLEMENS VON KLEMPERER
Foreword by Sigmund Neumann
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
W
W
Copyright © 1957, © 1968 by Princeton University Press
All Rights Reserved
L.C. 57-5462
Second Printing, 1968
KLEMENS VON KLEMFERER is Professor of History at
Smith College. He is a native of Berlin, studied at
the University of Vienna, and obtained his doc­
tor's degree from Harvard University.
The 1968 printing includes a Postscript by the
author.
This book is sold subject to the condition that it
shall not, by way of trade, be lent, resold, hired
out, or otherwise disposed of without the pub­
lisher's consent, in any form of binding or cover
other than that in which it is published.
Printed in the United States of America
By Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey
TO THE GOOD PEOPLE IN
PLANDOME, L.I.—NORFOLK, CONN.
CLAREMONT, N.H.
WHO SAW THIS BOOK GROW

CONTENTS
FOREWORD, by Sigmund Neumann vii
PREFACE xxiii
INTRODUCTION S
PART I. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
BACKGROUND
I. TOWARD A DEFINITION OF CONSERVATISM 17
No Orthodoxy 17
The Logic of Conservatism 21
II. THE GENESIS OF THE DILEMMA 33
Nineteenth Century German Conservatism
at a Dead End 33
Nietzsche, Conservative and Nihilist 36
Challenges to Conservatism: The Workers
and the Proletarianized Middle Classes 40
III. THE REVIVAL OF GERMAN CONSERVATISM IN THE
YOUTH MOVEMENT AND DURING THE FIRST
WORLD WAR 43
The Youth Movement 43
The Ideas of 1914 47
PART II. THE NEO-CONSERVATIVE
MOVEMENT 71
I. THE REVOLUTION OF 1918-1919 AND ITS CON­
SERVATIVE ASPECTS 76
The "Dreamland of the Armistice Period" 76
The End of the "Dreamland of the Armi­
stice Period": (a) The Failure of the New
Socialism 80
The End of the "Dreamland of the Armi­
stice Period": (b) Versailles 88
II. THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC 92
The "Elders" of the Republic 92
The Post-War Youth Movement 96
CONTENTS
Eugen Diederichs and the Tat 97
Wilhelm Stapel and the Deutsches Volks-
tum 100
The June Club 102
Neo-Conservatism at the Crossroads: The
"Eldersf " Rejection of the Neo-Conserv-
ative Movement 112
III. THE LATER YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC 117
The Crisis and the Neo-Conservatives 117
The Young Conservatives 120
The Conservatives of the Tat Circle 129
The Radical Conservatives 133
IV. NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM AND THE NEO-CONSERV-
ATIVES 139
PART III. THREE MAJOR EXPRESSIONS
OF NEO-CONSERVATISM
I. THE THIRD REICH OF MOELLER VAN DEN BRUCK 153
II. THE PESSIMISM OF OSWALD SPENGLER 170
III. THE NIHILISM OF THE EARLY ERNST JUNGER 180
PART IV. NEO-CONSERVATISM AND
NATIONAL SOCIALISM
I. THE FAILURE OF THE FINAL TEST: THE CON­
VERGING OF THE TWO MOVEMENTS 191
II. THE "GOD THAT FAILED" 202
CONCLUSION 220
POSTSCRIPT, 1968 227
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY 232
INDEX 249
FOREWORD
CONSERVATISM: NEW AND OLD
by Sigmund Neumann
CONSERVATISM is the fashion of the day. Only a generation
ago a derogatory design, if not the death nail for any po­
litically ambitious man of affairs, it seems to have become
suddenly a mark of distinction and the open-sesame to wise
statesmanship. While some lone stalwarts of way back may
rejoice in such belated recognition and renown of a much
maligned notion, this is truly the time to save it from its
own newly won enthusiasts in order to salvage its historical
entity.
Political concepts indeed have their ways and days. They
are most endangered when they catch the popular fancy.
Like coins, passed from hand to hand, their imprint gets
worn, their deeper meaning is blurred, their pre-conceptions
and consequences are cheapened and lost in mouth-to-mouth
transactions. Thus they may well lose their original value.
If one does not want to discard them altogether, one must
re-press, re-furbish, re-define them.
Such a task is doubly called for in a time of transition
(and what time is not in such a radical transformation?).
Historical reality often changes without having yet man­
aged to create its new language. In the clash of present-day,
fast-changing systems, a continuous conceptual house-clean­
ing becomes a necessity. In fact, one could well argue that
a time-lag usually exists between historical reality and its
conceptualization, especially in a revolutionary age when
the political vocabulary is quickly outdated and thus full
of misnomers. We are still living within an ideological
framework of a hundred years back and naturally cannot
master our present-day political conflicts with such obsolete
and often romantic stereotypes. This is a time when a mean­
ingful historical comparison is called for. More than that:
a theoretical clarification becomes a paramount preliminary
FOREWORD
for appropriate strategies of proper political action. All
fundamental concepts must therefore be re-defined in the
light of a new reality. On this basis alone can theory be­
come, as it should, a guide to proper political action, a
compass through chaos.
Conservatism and liberalism, the time-honored twins of
ideological confrontation, are a case in question. In the con­
fusion of their contemporary abuse, one may be inclined to
dismiss them despairingly as adequate tools of conceptual
clarification; yet one will still be left with the need for
proper yardsticks in the present-day political labyrinth.
True, an examination of their real meaning will reveal that
the accustomed classifications of political ideologies and
movements in terms of conservatism, liberalism, socialism,
communism, fascism, etc., are misleading, to say the least.
Not only have innumerable combinations (such as liberal
conservatism, conservative socialism, National Bolshevism,
the people's democracy) confused the political fronts, but
the fundamental concepts themselves have shifted their orig­
inal meaning under the impact of radical social changes.
One may even doubt the simple contrast between right- and
left-wing movements. Originally "radical" groups, such as
the Parti Radical Socialiste, have been pushed to the right
under the pressure of newly appearing leftist movements.
At the same time frequent attempts at bridging right- and
left-wing radical organizations, insignificant though the at­
tempts may be in view of long-range developments, point to
similar psychological attitudes even among deadly political
opponents.
The full recognition of these difficulties should not lead to
the easy dismissal of ideological concepts altogether, as is
frequently suggested by short-sighted "realists" in politics.
On the contrary, ideologies cannot be taken seriously
enough in the vacuum of a spiritual crisis when the under­
lying unity of Christian European traditions is challenged
by a counter-church, when uncompromising political con­
flicts along petrified political fronts are threatening, and
when the drives for fundamental reorientation are of pri-