Freedom of Expression in Eighteenth Century Russia PDF
Preview Freedom of Expression in Eighteenth Century Russia
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY RUSSIA by K. A. PAPMEHL MARTINUS NUHOFF /THE HAGUE/1971 © 1971 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands Softcover reprint o/the hardcover 1st edition 1971 All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form ISBN 978-94-011-8397-0 ISBN 978-94-011-9101-2 (eBook) DOl 10.1007/978-94-011-9101-2 To the memory of my parents TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface IX Introduction XI Chapter I The First Half of the Century 1 Chapter II Erosion of Old Attitudes 13 Chapter III The Emergence of the Idea: The Legislative 47 Commission and its Significance Chapter IV The Period of Growth - Theory 71 Chapter V The Period of Growth - Practice 90 Chapter VI The "Reaction" of the "Nineties" 111 Chapter VII The Balance Sheet of Catherine's Reign 131 Freedom of Expression under Paul I Conclusion 147 Bibliography 152 Index 162 PREFACE This study is an expanded and revised version of a thesis accepted for the Ph. D. Degree by the University of London in 1965. My sincere thanks go to Dr. Bertha Malnick, formerly of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, for her valuable advice, criticism, and encourage ment. Some of the material used in Chapters Three and Four has been published earlier in The Slavonic & East European Review, and I am grateful to the Editors of that journal for their kind permission to draw on it for the present purpose. Most of my research was carried out in the libraries of the British Museum and of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, and I wish to thank the many members of the staff of both these institutions who facilitated my labours. My thanks also go to the ladies of York University Secretarial Services involved in preparing the manuscript for the press. Finally, I must acknowledge the immense debt of gratitude lowe to my wife, without whose co-operation the whole project could never have materialised. The responsibility for all opinions expressed in this book and for all its shortcomings is entirely my own. Toronto, Canada December 1970 INTRODUCTION The eighteenth century for Russia marks the transition from the medieval (i.e. religious) to the modern European (i.e. secular) culture, a process which in relation to most of the nations belonging to the Latin civilisation, was delayed by something like two centuries. In addition, this process in Russia was compressed into a much shorter period of time. The impact of the change was therefore that much greater and its magnitude more apparent, both to the contemporaries and to their descendants: it was, in a true sense, a cultural revolution. The old established concepts, values, and traditions, ranging from the theory of state and political power to manners and the style of attire, were being uprooted and replaced by their Western-European equivalents, generally without mucht thought being given to their suitability or applicability under the local conditions. Simultaneously, the vestiges of the old culture which proved extremely tenacious, in re asserting themselves often modified the imported values or attitudes and altered their character. Whether one sees the effective beginnings of this process in the after-effects of the Time of Troubles or in the reforms of Peter the Great, the fact is that its results did not become fully apparent until the second half of the eighteenth century. Freedom of expression - by which term I understand the liberty of the individual to utter thoughts, opinions, statements of fact, etc., whether or not they agree with the views of the accepted authorities - was one such modern concept which made its appearance in Russia during this remark able age. It is closely related to the concurrent development of the practical means of expression, such as literature, theatre, educational institutions, popular assemblies and, last but not least, the printing and publishing facilities. The aim of this study is to examine the circumstances in which the notion of freedom of expression as one of the civil freedoms. or liberties, first became discernible in Russia, the early stages of its XII INTRODUCTION development, and its practical application within the political and social system then existing. This task is fraught with some serious difficulties. Most of them arise from the fact that since the subject is largely a matter of degree and its value is relative, it tends to elude a precise definition. Another problem is its broad character, in the sense of encroaching upon, or overlapping, several academic disciplines. This is why, in setting the terms of reference, I decided to confine the topic to a relatively narrow perspective. Conse quently, this study is not, other than marginally, concerned with the philosophical aspect of the problem, it does not investigate the character and intensity of Western influences on Russian thought, and it is not a comparative analysis on an international or intercultural scale. At the same time, I have made no attempt to fit it into some conveniently labelled disciplinary niche, such as intellectual or political history. The main methodological problem in dealing with double-edged subjects, such as freedom (and, unavoidably, the restrictions upon it) is presented by the tendency to view the issues and events in dialectical terms: as a conflict between the two opposing trends or "camps", personified in "the state" and "the individual". Such dialectical presentation, with its con comitant pitfalls of oversimplification, has been employed in the body of this work for the sake of reasonable lucidity. One of its less desirable results is that, on the pages that follow, the terms "government" and "society" are occasionally employed in what may seem imprecise or ambiguous manner. They in effect mean, respectively, those who have the power to extend or to restrain freedom, and those who desire to use it for the purpose of uttering views or ideas not in accord with those of the controlling authority. One visible characteristic of the reign of Catherine II, the period on which I have concentrated my attention, is the often-noted ambivalence or discrepancy between the policy-making and policy-implementing process. I thought it advisable to employ another dialectical distinction, that between theory and practice, partly in order to show this particular phenomenon in its proper relief. Traditionally, there have always existed two basic schools of thought with respect to freedom of expression. The first of these can be traced back to Plato and to the early Fathers of the Christian Church. It holds that truth and virtue are absolute values, known to some people whose duty it is to protect them from error or misrepresentation (which, con versely, they are also qualified to identify). The second, a development of the Aristotelian view that each individual should be free in his quest for INTRODUCTION XIII truth, believes that no one has the right to limit this freedom of choice. Theoretically, both these schools aim at preserving freedom. 1 Both have found their zealous proponents and followers throughout recorded history. In the political context, the first is obviously compatible with an authori tarian, paternalistic structure, the second with a popular democracy. In transferring this theory onto the more practical plane of the degree, or extent, of freedom of expression obtainable under varying political conditions, we might consider the following three simplified stages, rang ing from complete "unfreedom" to the maximum possible freedom: (1) When there exists an officially proclaimed set of beliefs, applicable to all aspects of life, to which a society is totally committed. In an extreme form of this system not only is all dissent suppressed, but active support of the ruling creed is demanded from writers and other purveyors of articulate thought. (2) When there is an officially accepted ideology, but it is no longer single and all embracing. This permits a measure of freedom, within limits set by the guardians or interpreters of the prevailing values. These limits can range from extremely narrow to very broad, in the wide spectrum of systems coming under this category. (3) When there is no such officially accepted set of values, and ideas are allowed to compete freely. Freedom of expression here is still not absolute: is is circumscribed by the individual rights of the proponents of differing views. This is the total application of the "Aristotelian" principle whereas the "Platonic" one applies, entirely or predominantly, in stages (1) and (2). It will be evident that the problem of freedom of expression, in the sense of a conflict between the pressures for its extension and the limiting factors, will be most acute, or at least most prominent, in a system falling under category (2). This is precisely why it became discernible in Russia in the second half of the eighteenth century: the transition from (1) to (2) became apparent in that period. At this point a few words may be said on the important problem of the relationship between civil and political liberties. In modern times, freedom of expression is generally regarded as an aspect of civil, as distinct from political liberties. But this distinction, always somewhat artificial, dates back at the most to the American Bill of Rights. It was not made by such important eighteenth century thinkers as Rousseau or Montesquieu. The belief that these two fields are really inseparable is made clear in the latter's definition of political liberty as "that tranquility of mind which comes from every man's conviction of his own security, as such it is the 1 For a discussion of this point see w. GelIhom, Individual Freedom and Govern mental Restraints, Louisiana State U. P., Baton Rouge, 1956, pp.50ff.
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