DTIC ADA530285: Handmaid of the Army? The American Perception of German Bombardment Doctrine prior to the Battle of Britain

13 Pages·1.5 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

“HANDMAID” OF THE ARMY?

The American Perception of German

Bombardment Doctrine

prior to the Battle of Britain*

CAPT ALEXUS G. GRYNKEWICH, USAF
*I would like to offer my thanks to Prof. John H. Morrow for his guidance and support in writing this paper and to Prof.
William M. Leary Jr. for his comments and suggestions. Additionally, I would like to thank the United States Air Force for affording
me the opportunity to complete this study.
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’Handmaid’ of the Army? The American Perception of German
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Bombardment Doctrine prior to the Battle of Britain
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Air and Space Power Journal,155 N. Twining St,Maxwell REPORT NUMBER
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Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Strate gy, the use of engagem ents for the object of war.
—Carl von Clausewitz
The object ive sought—an effect on the war as a whole—determ ines if a
targ et or attack is strateg ic. Similarly, the enemy react ion determ ines
whether an attack has strateg ic results.
Air Force Manual (AFM)1–1,
Bas ic Aerospace Doctrine
of the United States Air Force,
(1992)
IN THE YEARS since the end War II doctrine. Fewer still have allowed that
of World War II, American cont emp or ary USAAC offic ers apprec ia ted
airm en have justif ied their this doctrine. Instead, most postwar histor i­
ind ep ende nce largely by em­ ans noted the conspicuo us absence of a
phas izi ng the mission of heavy bomber fleet in the Luftwaff e’s inven­
strat eg ic bombardm ent. They tory and concluded that it had been
arg ued that only the re- equipped primari ly for use in a tactic al and
sources and flexibili ty inhere nt in an inde­ close air support role.1 In a similar vein,
pende nt service could mass the requis ite independence-m inded American airmen
force to defeat an enemy without recourse pointed to their own successes with aerial
to ground troops. Unfort un ately, this zeal­ bomb ardm ent and condemned Luftwaffe of­
ous advoc at ion of Douhet-style airpower has fic ers for their lack of vision.
caused a misund ers tandi ng among many Air In actu al ity, although Luftwaffe strate­
Force profess iona ls as to the true nature of gists apprec ia ted the merits of aerial att acks
aeri al strategy. We have truncated the defini­ against centers of populat ion and produc­
tion of strateg ic airpower to such a degree tion, they tempered their zeal for strateg ic
that to many people it now equates to strate­ bombi ng with a sophist ic ated unders tand­
gic bombardm ent, whether that concept im­ ing of their country’s overall strateg ic situa­
plies the mass destruct ion of German and tion. This insight allowed them to develop a
Japan ese cities in World War II, or the more flexib le doctrine that enabled them to devise
rec ent surgic al att acks on Iraq during the ope rat ional plans with several differe nt and
Gulf War. In either case, limiti ng our defini­ comp lem ent ary aerial missions throughout
tion of strateg ic airpower to bombardm ent the first year of World War II. Although
miss ions prevents us from fully exploiti ng these missions did not necess ari ly corre­
the vast range of altern at ives available in aer­ spond to the prewar American concept of
ial combat. To take advant age of these op­ strat eg ic att ack, USAAC offic ers recogn ized
port un it ies, we must redef ine strateg ic that they did have a profoundly strateg ic ef­
airp ower in terms of what an air force con­ fect on the outcome of the fighting.
tribu tes to the overall war effort. The Luft­ When war broke out in Europe in 1939,
waffe and the US Army Air Corps (USAAC) the USAAC scrambled to collect as much in-
of early World War II each offer an examp le form at ion as possib le regardi ng the tactics
of an air force which accepted and apprec i­ and technolo gy of the bellige re nts. In par­
ated this broader context. ticul ar, the USAAC wanted to know what
Few airmen or histor ia ns have recogn ized miss ions had been assigned to the Luft­
the strateg ic nature of the Luftwaff e’s World waffe, how it carried out these missions, and
59
60 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1997
Doct rinal disputes over the proper employ ment of the Junkers Ju.87 (Stuka) divided the Luftwaf fe’s general staff dur­
ing 1938–39.
The manual began with an unequivoc al
how the Third Reich executed the command
statem ent: “Air power carries the war right
and control of its air forces. This scrutiny re­
into the heart of enemy country from the
sulted in a number of reports on the organi­
zat ion and doctrine of the Luftwaffe. mom ent war breaks out. It strikes at the very
Evalua ti ng these estim ates illum in ates the root of the enemy’s fighting power and of
nature of this doctrine during the opening the people’s will to resist.”3 Still, the manual
stages of the war and provides a clearer un­ did not call for the exclus ive use of strateg ic
ders tandi ng of the basis of American opin­ bomb ardm ent. Consist ent with the German
ions of it. milit ary’s tradit ional emphas is on adapt a­
One valuable piece of operat ional intell i­ tion, it stated that “the nature of the enemy,
gence possessed by the USAAC was Luft­ the time of year, the structure of his land,
waffe Manual 16, The Conduct of Aerial the charact er of his people as well as one’s
Warf are. Published in 1936, this regulat ion own military capab ilit ies”4 should dictate
prov ided American offic ers a synops is of the the use of airpower. Their country’s geo­
int erw ar Luftwaff e’s employm ent theories. graphic al posit ion in the heart of Europe
Alt hough some observe rs have interp reted was historic ally a paramount concern to
this manual as evidence of an “overwhelm­ Germ an strateg ic planners. Conseq uently,
ing emphas is on tactic al rather than strateg ic the Luftwaffe did not subscribe to the theory
bombi ng,”2 its authors obvio usly intended of strateg ic bombing that advoc ated the ex­
to highlight the flexibili ty of airpower. clus ive use of aerial bombardm ent against
HANDMAID OF THE ARMY 61
an enemy’s homeland.5 Such a strategy pared. Signific antly, the authors chose to
would doom Germany to defeat at the hands “us[e] the German termin olo gy” when list­
of an enemy land army long before the air ing these missions. In addit ion to planes fit­
off ens ive had any effect.6 ted for service as reconn aiss ance,
Nonet hel ess, the Luftwaffe continu ed to dive-b ombing, and pursuit, they noted that
supp ort strateg ic bombing operat ions, al­ the Luftwaffe possessed aircraft for both
though not to the exclus ion of other mis­ “med ium att ack (fast bombers)” and “heavy
sions. In 1937, for examp le, the Luftwaffe att ack (night bombers).”11
beg an work on a new two-engine bomber,
the Heinkel He.177, thinking that it would
have the requis ite operat ional radius to fill
The Luftwaffe emphas ized opera­
the gap in force structure created by the lack
of long-range bombardm ent aircraft in the tions indep ende nt of the army, in­
early 1940s.7 Doctrinal disputes over the cludi ng the destruct ion of the
proper employm ent of the Junkers Ju.87 ene my air force, interd ict ion of lines
(Stuka) divided the Luftwaff e’s general staff
of supply and commun ic at ions, and
duri ng 1938–39. Offic ers argued over
strat eg ic bombardm ent.
whether the air force should use the Stuka
against tactic al or strateg ic targets. Eventu­
ally they comprom ised, decidi ng that, de-
spite its limited range and bomb load, the The Air Corps needed the parent hetic al
dive-b omber could perform missions of ei­ clarif ic at ion due to the lack of dedicated at-
ther type.8 tack aircraft in its own invent ory. However,
As the Luftwaff e’s capab ilit ies grew, Third this dual categor iz at ion also reflects the in-
Reich offic ials found in it an extremely in­ here nt flexib ili ty of 1939 Luftwaffe air doc-
timid ati ng saber that they did not hesitate to trine. Recogn it ion of this pliabili ty emerged
ratt le in order to reinf orce their diplom acy. througho ut the remaind er of the report.
A carefully staged plan of strateg ic decept ion “The [German] Air Force is prepared and de-
crea ted in the minds of the world a vision of signed to provide army and navy coope ra­
the Luftwaffe as an omnipot ent force capa­ tion units” in the form of ground—attack
ble of striking anywhere in Europe.9 Cou­ airc raft, includi ng both the Junkers Ju.87
pled with the aggress ive nature of the Third Stuka and two-engine bombers—spec ific ally,
Reic h’s foreign policy during the 1930s, it the Junkers Ju.88 and the Dornier Do.17.12 In
caused conside ra ble concern among Ameri­ add it ion, the report noted that the Luftwaffe
can military offic ers. In an effort to evaluate emp has ized operat ions indep ende nt of the
the threat posed by German airpower, the army, includi ng the destruct ion of the en­
USAAC began a series of annual air reports emy air force, interd ict ion of lines of supply
cove ri ng all aspects of the Luftwaff e’s capa­ and comm un ic at ions, and strateg ic bombard­
bilit ies.10 ment. Specific targets included “all the en­
The 1939 air report was completed before emy establ ishm ents and equipment of
the German invas ion of Poland. Based pri­ imp ort ance to the conduct of war, espec ially
mari ly on compil at ions of air attac hé notes, airp lane fields and aircraft on the ground . .
this document accur ately described the Ger­ . military supply centers, road and railway
man air force’s doctrine. The section de- cons truct ions, centers of traffic and commu­
voted to operat ions began with an nic at ions . . . [and the] armam ent and air-
aff irmat ion of the Luftwaff e’s status: “The craft indust ry.”13
Germ an war doctrine is predicated on the Acc ordi ng to the report, the Luftwaffe an­
poss ess ion of an indep ende nt Air Force.” ticip ated using three methods of bombard­
The report then outlined the categor ies of air ment to achieve these object ives: high­
ope rat ions for which the Luftwaffe had pre- alt it ude horizont al, low-altitude horizont al,
62 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1997
and dive-bombing. The report however, did
waff e’s training manuals with regard to air-
reco gn ize that “the German viewpoint holds
support missions. In March 1937, for the
the low altit ude
genera lly more effect ive first time, single-seat, single-engine Heinkel
than the high altit ude horizont al bombing.
He.51s were used in a ground-support role.
Greater accur acy, at the expense of reduced
The success of this raid, which effect ively
bomb penetrat ion,
is claimed.” Luftwaffe paral yzed the ground troops it targeted,
doct rine
favored using dive-bombing caught Richthofen’s att ent ion. He soon de-
“against concent rated or small, import ant
vised a primitive system of air-ground
obj ect ives.” Addit iona lly, it recogn ized that
support reminisc ent of his background experi­
alt hough
the Germans conside red night ence in World War I. Despite initial skepti­
bomb ardm ent, they agreed with the Ameri­
cism on the part of the Luftwaffe High
can opinion that it had at best, a limited ef­
Comm and,15 Richthofen’s operat ions “proved
fect. “
[T]he night attack [is] being that bombers were extremely effect ive when
cons ide red [by the Luftwaffe] primari ly as a
used against enemy troop concent rat ions,
disr upti ng operat ion for complem ent ary use
strong-p oints, and lines of commun ic a­
with day attacks.”14
tion.”16 This exper ie nce led directly to the
The USA AC reali zed that the Spanish Civil creat ion of air divis ions within the Luftf lot­
War had “provided [the Luftwaffe] a practi­
ten. Although the air fleets remained at­
cal school of training of inest im ab le value.”
tached to a particul ar land-based area of
Ind eed,
Wolfram von Richthofen—com­ res pons ib ili ty, “these changes have been de-
mander of the Legion Condor, sent by the
signed to increase the mobili ty of the Air
Third Reich to Gen Francisco Franco’s aid—
Force and reduce its ties to fixed geog raphi-
quickly reali zed the inadeq uacy of the Luft­
cal or admini st rat ive commands.”17
Duri ng the ground-support phase of operat ions, the Luftwaffe concent rated on interd icti ng enemy supply and com­
mun ic at ions.
HANDMAID OF THE ARMY 63
Obs erv at ions in the report clearly cor­ ducted only at the army’s request and then
robor ate the thesis that USAAC offic ers rec­ for tactic al purposes.23 In fact, Luftwaffe doc-
ogn ized the validi ty of most of the trine proscribed the use of terror bombing,
Luftw aff e’s doctrinal concepts. For instance, and “very detailed instruct ions were pub­
a remarka ble degree of congrue nce existed lished by the Oberkomm ando der Wehrmacht
bet ween the Luftwaff e’s and the USAAC’s (OKW) that only these military targets
perc ept ions of night bombing. The report should be bombed.”24
also noted the fundam ent al nature of the By no means does this constraint towards
Luftw aff e’s indep ende nt status to its opera­ the bombing of civili an populat ions imply
tions. It identif ied only two German weak­ that the Luftwaffe espoused any less a com­
nesses: “relatively inadeq uate numbers of mitm ent to strateg ic operat ions. Although
trained personn el . . . and the questiona ble
adeq uacy of necess ary mater ial stocks for
wart ime support of the armed forces.”18 To
Americ an air offic ers, neither of these weak­ Alt hough German aircraft did un­
nesses indic ated anything amiss in the Luft­
dert ake missions in direct support of
waff e’s concept ion of aerial warfare.
ground troops, the bulk of their op­
Then, on 1 Septemb er 1939, Germany
launched its attack against Poland. The Luft­ erat ions was directed against the Pol­
waffe entered the fray with all of its dive- ish air force, vital indust ries, and
bombers, 70 percent of its bombers, and 50 lines of support and commun ic at ion.
perc ent of its fighters.19 Two geographic ally
based air fleets, Luftf lott en 1 and 4, partici­
pated in the offens ive. During the initial
stages of the attack, the Luftwaffe directed Germ an aircraft did undert ake missions in
most of its operat ions against Polish air- dir ect support of ground troops, the bulk of
fields. On 3 Septemb er, the emphas is shifted their operat ions was directed against the Pol­
to the aircraft and munit ions indust ries. ish air force, vital indust ries, and lines of
Only after these two missions had been supp ort and commun ic at ion. Indeed, only
comp leted did the Luftwaffe turn its atten­ poor weather condit ions had prevented the
tion to close air support of the Germ ans from “launching a massive, all-out
Wehrmacht.20 Albert Kesselr ing, then com­ att ack on the military install at ions and ar­
mander of Luftf lotte 1, later noted that doc­ mam ent factor ies of Wars aw to break Polish
trinal conside rat ions dictated this order of res ist ance at the start of the campaign.”25
ope rat ions: “Accordi ng to the operat ion Moreov er, the commande rs of the Luft­
princ ip le governi ng the Luftwaffe, the en­ flott en att ribu ted the campaign’s success to
emy air force and the aircraft factor ies in the the Luftwaff e’s indep ende nce. Ale xa nd er
imm ed ia te vicini ty of the airfields were to Loehr, Luftf lotte 4’s commander, stated that
be attacked.”21 “the Air Force was to opera te for the first
Duri ng the ground-support phase of opera­ time in world history as an indep ende nt
tions, the Luftwaffe concent rated on interd ict­ arm. Thereby it was to open up new aspects
ing enemy supply and commun ic at ions. of a strategy which in its princip les had re­
Other targets included masses of reserve mained unalt ered throughout the course of
troops and the retreati ng Polish forces. Few re- hist ory.”26 Field Marshal Kesselr ing sec­
ports exist which recount dir ect support of onded his comrade: “The Polish campaign
army operat ions or the use of the Luftwaffe as was the touchstone of the potent ia lit ies of
aeri al artill ery. On trial at Nuremb erg, Field the German Air Force.”27
Mars hal Kesselr ing insisted that operat ions The Luftwaff e’s operat ions against Poland
such as the bombing of Wars aw, although “se­ ref lected the successf ul use of an airpower
vere measures,” were “army action[s],”22 con­ doct rine emphas izi ng the indep ende nt na-
64 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1997
ture of air forces, the priori ty of gaining air view that the enemy High Command sent
sup er io ri ty, and attacks against strateg ic ob­ wave after wave of bombers to attack us. The
ject ives. Direct support of ground forces res ult came up only too well to their expec­
proc eeded only after, or in conjunct ion tat ions.”34
with, the successf ul accomp lishm ent of the The Luftwaff e’s increased number of
other missions. The unique charact eri st ics of direct-s upport missions, however, did not
their Polish enemies dictated the Germans’ pre-e mpt all indep ende nt operat ions. In
strate gy, and Luftwaffe doctrine flexed to ac­ mid- May, in a show of force inspired by
comm od ate it. The effect of this employ­ Herm an Göring, the Luftwaffe bombed the
ment scheme on the outcome of the downt own area of Rotterd am, the capital of
camp aign betrays its strateg ic nature. Ameri­ Holl and.35 This attack contribu ted signifi­
can observe rs recogn ized and apprec ia ted cantly to the surrend er of the Dutch after
the Luftwaff e’s strategy. The USAAC, and only five days of combat.36 At the Nurem­
Gen Henry H. Arnold in particul ar, were re- berg trials, Field Marshal Kesselr ing con-
ass ured that American “tactic al school theo­ ceded the strateg ic nature of the attack:
ries seemed to be genera lly in accord with “This one attack brought immed ia te peace
Germ an tactics.”28 to Holland.”37 Early in the aftern oon of 3
On 10 May 1940, this aerial strategy June, the Luftwaffe launched another largely
changed subtly with the launching of the of- strat eg ic att ack—Ope rat ion Paula. Lasting for
fens ive against France.29 Although the Luft­ two days, it was a series of aerial strikes
waff e’s immed ia te goal was the same as in against the aerodromes and aircraft factor ies
Pol and—the defeat of the enemy’s air on the outskirts of Paris. The Luftwaffe an­
forces—this time its aircraft would also be ticip ated that this attack might, like the one
used from the outset in direct support of on Rotterd am, produce a worthwhile de­
ground operat ions.30 Direct support of spond ency among France’s civili an popula-
ground forces remained a high priori ty tion.38 Overall, the Luftwaff e’s operat ions,
througho ut the western offens ive. On 11 whether in support of the army or carried
May, the enormous number of German out indep ende ntly, had the desired im­
bombe rs needed for attacks against columns pact—on 24 June, under the combined
of French ground troops prevented their em- weight of the German air and ground offen­
ploym ent in other missions.31 When the sives, French resolve collapsed.39
Luftw affe focused its attacks on ground Duri ng the course of the western offen­
units, it emphas ized concent rat ion at critical sive, American military att ac hés reported
points. For examp le, on 20 May, ground cons tantly to the War Departm ent in Wash­
comm ande rs called in the Luftwaffe for a ingt on, D.C., on what was transpiri ng. As
miss ion against enemy troops in order to en- early as 29 May 1940, the military att ac hé in
large the bridgehead over the Somme River.32 Paris, Capt John Sterling, dispatched his first
Later in the campaign, the German com­ maj or effort to synthes ize develo pm ents in
mander requested att acks against enemy rail the aerial battle. The report noted that many
and commun ic at ion lines between Rheims of the Luftwaff e’s missions had been in di­
and Paris.33 Despite the ground-support rect support of ground forces. “The German
chara ct er of these missions, they had a pro­ air offens ive over French territ ory has con­
foundly strateg ic effect. Marc Bloch, a sisted primari ly of operat ions in close sup-
French army offic er who became a partis an port of mechanized ground troops, use of
aft er the fall of France, recorded his impres­ aeri al bombardm ent against fortif ic at ions
sion followi ng an attack by the Luftwaff e’s prior to and during attack, [and] machine
dive-b ombers on 22 May: “the effect of gunn ing of enemy troops prior to and dur­
bombi ng on the nerves is far-reaching, and ing attack.”40 Nonethel ess, the attac hé
can break the potent ial of resist ance over a pointed out that “indep ende nt missions
large area. It was doubtless with that end in have daily attacked airdromes, [and] railway
HANDMAID OF THE ARMY 65
By 1939, the Luftwaffe was prepared and designed to provide army and navy coope rat ion units in the form of
ground- attack aircraft, includi ng two-engine bombers, such as this Junkers Ju.88.
yards and stations scattered over almost all
of improvi ng as soon as the present job [of
of France.”41 Regardi ng specific bombard­
def eati ng France] is finished.”44 American
ment techniques, the dispatch declined to
int ell ig ence offic ers unders tood that the
und ert ake a detailed analysis. “Tactics em­
Luftw affe had engaged signific ant elements
ployed by German bombers have varied con­
in ground-support operat ions and had in-
side rab ly; bombing has been conducted
creased its relia nce on dive-bombers. They
from all alti tudes, both horizont al and verti­
did not, however, believe that either of these
cal [dive-bombing].”42
phen ome na signaled either a reject ion of in-
Subs eq uent reports took a more critical dep ende nt strateg ic operat ions or the Luft­
stance with regard to bombardm ent. Al­ waff e’s subserv ie nce to the Wehrmacht.
though the attac hés continu ed to stress the Ind eed, USAAC analysts fully expected the
eff ect iven ess of missions supporti ng Ger­ Luftw affe to redoub le its efforts to perfect
man ground forces, indep ende nt operat ions bombi ng techniques in light of these set-
rec eived less praise. One report noted that backs.
“Germ any . . . concluded early in the war Nonet hel ess, the attac hés acknowle dged
that low altit ude dive bombing was most ef­ the import ance of effect ive coord in at ion be-
fect ive and comparat ively few high alti tude tween ground and air forces to Germany’s
att acks have been made.”43 A subseq uent succ ess.45 War Departm ent studies reveal a
disp atch proclaimed that “the Germans have furt her apprec iat ion of the Luftwaff e’s doc-
been very much surprised at their low effi­ trine, espec ially in regards to the coord in a­
ciency [in bombardm ent] and will find ways tion of operat ions with ground forces. The
66 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1997
Germ an success was attribu ted to unity of fe’s priorit ies remained air super io ri ty, inter­
comm and by an intell ig ence memorand um dict ion, and close air support.48
of 12 June 1940. “The efforts of the land, sea The Luftwaffe accomp lished its basic mis­
and air forces are subord in ated and directed sion of “eliminat[ing] effect ive hostile air
to the task at hand. For the nation as a whole power from the decis ive area . . . by attack­
these efforts are coord in ated by the German ing factor ies and airdromes, by air combat
High Command and the Supreme General and by antia irc raft fire.” Once this task was
Staff.” This, however, did not imply that the fini shed, it then directed the “main weight
Luftw affe was viewed as an extens ion of the of [the] attack . . . against object ives in the
army. The memorand um noted that only ob­ rear of the front line troops.” The main
serv at ion and reconn aiss ance aircraft were goals of this phase of operat ions were “to
ass igned to ground forces. “In general, paral yze Allied commun ic at ions” and inter­
pursuit aviation is not allott ed to army units. . dict lines of supply. In the final phase of air
. . There is no known instance of the assign­ ope rat ions—close air support—“Germ any had
ment of bombardm ent aviation to army rem arka ble teamwork between its air force
units.” Even in direct ground support, the units and its fast moving land units.” 49
Luftw affe insisted on centrali zed control to Americ an offic ers unders tood that this
maxim ize flexib ili ty. “Bombardm ent units “teamw ork” did not come at the expense of
are controlled by the supreme commander Luftw affe indep ende nce. “Except for obser­
of the particul ar operat ion, and . . . they vat ion the Germans employed their air force
may often be transferred from one opera­ as a Theatre of Operat ions weapon. . . . The
tion to another by the German High Com­ air force was employed in mass.” While not­
mand.”46 ing that “the German concept ion of air
A month later, on 2 July 1940, just one power is to retain a maximum of flexibili ty
week after the fall of France, a memoran­ of employm ent,” the report cautioned that
dum to General Arnold noted that despite “the Germans obtained timely close support
the high degree of coord in at ion between the of their armored units without att achi ng
Germ an armed forces, all three services were bomb ardm ent or pursuit to these ground
“free to develop their pecul iar powers and forces.”50
no one of the armed forces is subord in ated The War Departm ent’s intell ig ence re-
to the needs of another.” The Luftwaff e’s ef­ ports during and immed ia tely after the Bat­
fect iven ess stemmed not only from its tle of France clearly presented an accur ate
autonom ous status under OKW, but also ass essm ent of the Luftwaff e’s doctrine. A
from “mandat ory lateral coord in at ion.” The 1940 revis ion of Luftwaffe Manual 16 reite r­
rep ort quickly added that OKW enforced ated the doctrine develo ped during the in­
this mandat ory coord in at ion “through the terw ar years and employed since Septemb er
norm al chain of command of each of the 1939. The section of the manual devoted to
armed forces, rather than by attachi ng sub- ope rat ions began with a passage on the im­
ord in ate units of one of the armed forces to port ance of gaining air super io ri ty: “The en­
a subord in ate unit of another.”47 emy air force will be combated from the
The Luftwaff e’s doctrine also received at- beg inn ing of the war.” To accomp lish this,
tent ion from the War Departm ent. An intel­ the manual advised att acks against an ene­
lig ence section memorand um of 6 July 1940 my’s air force in the air, at the aerodromes,
obs erved that initially the majori ty of Luft­ and at the product ion and supply facilit ies.51
waffe units were assigned to the destruct ion The manual stressed flexibili ty when dis­
of the French air force. “When this object ive cussi ng ground-support operat ions: “De­
was accomp lished, and when the hostile rear pendi ng on the situation, the time, the type
area was suffic iently disrupted, then close of target, manner of operat ion, terrain, and
supp ort came into the picture.” Thus, even our own strength, the manner and extent of
the War Departm ent found that the Luftwaf­ coo pe rat ion with the army will be deter-