Table Of Content

The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis What To Do When Traditional Models Fail Carmen A. Medina Editors Note: This article is from decades ago would recog designed to stiniulale debate. nize most of what a typical Written and circulated within analyst does today, from read governinent circles in 2001, it is ing traffic to preparing finished presented herefor consider intelligence. Stability is often ation by a wideraudience. CIA comforting, but in the Dl(cid:146)s case officerSteven Wardjoins the change may be what is most debate with a coznzIeipoi~zt a,-ti needed. vIe onpage 29 ofthis issue. (cid:147) (cid:149) + + The Current Model Stability is often comforting, but in the The great challenge facing ana On the CIA(cid:146)s public internet case ofthe Directorate of lysts and managers in the website, the DI defines its mis Intelligence change Directorate of Intelligence (DI) sion as the provision of timely, may is providing real insight to smart accurate, and objective intelli be what is most needed. policymakers. Meeting this chal gence analysis on the full range lenge is hard, but intelligence of national security threats and officers have long believed that foreign policy issues facing the careful attention to the trade- United States. The website o~.it craft of intelligence analysis lines the different types of would lead to work that added analytic support that might he value to the information avail useful to a customer at any able to policymakers. During its given time. DI officers provide 50-plus years, the CIA. we analysis that helps officials believed, evolved a model that work through their policy agen needed only successful execu das by: addressing day(cid:151)to-day tion to produce quality intelli events; apprising consumers of gence analysis. When we fal developments and providing tered, we blamed the analysts related background informa (or the collectors), but not the tion; assessing the significance model. of developments and warning of near-term consequences~ and What if the failing, however, lies signaling potentially dangerous not with the analysts hut with situations in Lhe future. the model they are asked to fol low? Customer needs and A key aspect of this model is preferences are changing rap that it focuses first on develop idly, as is the environment in ments. In fact, the analysts(cid:146) which intelligence analysis work process is structured Carmen A. Medlna serves in the operates. Yet the Dl(cid:146)s approach around developments. They Office of Policy Support in the to analysis has hardly changed spend the first quarter or more Directorate of Intelligence. over the years. A DI analyst of their workday reading 23 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2002 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2002 to 00-00-2002 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER What To Do When Traditional Models Fail 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Central Intelligence Agency,Center for the Study of REPORT NUMBER Intelligence,Washington,DC,20505 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Studies in Intelligence, Volume 46, No. 3, 2002 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 6 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Future Analysis Analysts today have to dig deep to surpass the analytic abilities oftheft through the overnight traffic(cid:148) Analysts today have to add customers. to determine what is new They value in an era ofinforma report what is new to their col tion abundance. The leagues and superiors and then policymaker, an intelligence often to the policymaking corn consumer, has main(cid:146) more ways munitv. The new thing(cid:148) nmy of staying informed about be an event(cid:151)the death of a Assumption 3: The CIA and recent developments, intelli world leader or the precipitous specifically the Dl have unique gence-related or not The decline of an Asian currency. information about what is responses to a survey of cus Or it may be an item of intelli happening. tomers of the Senior Executive gence reporting on a situation Intelligence Bulletin (SEIB) con of interest(cid:151)from signals; imag Assumption 4: Dl analysts are ducted in late 2000 are illustra ery, human-source, open- particularly insightful about tive. When asked to identify the source, or other type of collec what these developments may unclassified information sources tion. This basic model has llleat1. they relied on, 85 percent of the guided the Dl(cid:146)s work for respondents picked all four of decades. the following sources: foreign When Models Fail newspapers and weekly period More recently, Dl managers icals; US newspapers and have realizer(cid:146) that the specific Models work only as long as weekly periodicals; their profes interests of customers must they suit the environment in sional networks; and official, have greater weight in deter(cid:151) which they operate. If reality informal communicalions, such mining what to do on any given changes. then it isa good bet as e(cid:151)mail. day. As a result, the model has that the model needs to evolve acquired an adcliuonal step(cid:151) as well. The Dl(cid:146)s tradecraft Policymakers today also read understanding customer feed model was developed during raw intelligence reports on a back to determine policymaker the 1960s and 1970s and opti regular basis. Twenty to thirty interests. This new step, how mized against the characteristics years ago, analysts in the DI ever, merely supplements the of that period. It was an era of had the fastest access to incom pivot around which the ana information scarcity(cid:151)truth ing intelligence information and lytic work turns(cid:151)identification about the world(cid:146)s many closed could count on seeing pai(cid:146)ticu of the new development. societies was a rare commod Iany criucaI cables before policymakers. Today, thanks to ity. Communicating across Critical, sometimes unstated, information technology, policy~ borders and with other govern assumptions underpin this makers often readl the raw traclecraft model. ments was hard(cid:151)governiiient tntffic at the same time as, if not leaders rarely talked to each before, analysts. In a 1998-1999 Assumption 1: Policymakers other on the phone and sum survey SEtB customers were need a service that tells them mits among world leaders were asked, What other sources of what is going on in the world unusual events. ideology was a daily intelligence rio you read?(cid:148) or in their particular area of key driver in international rela Almost one-half of the respon concern. tions(cid:151)it was always important dents voliinteered that they to kno\v how far left or right a often read raw traffic. Given Assumption 2: Policvmakers government would tack. These that (cid:145)raw ti(cid:146)a Ific(cid:148) was not need help in determining (cid:145)vliat traits rio not describe today(cid:146)s offered as a specific choice, the an event means environment. real percentage was almost 24 FutureAnalysis certainly higher than the write- of political activity in any num serve consumers who are not in responses indicated. ber of countries even though economic specialists or to iden the audience for this type of tify niche substantive areas Analysts today have to dig analysis is not as broad as it where the Agency can still pro deep to surpass the analytic once was. A recent study of vide unique support. Scientific abilities oftheir customers. articles in the SEIB, for exam and military analyses are bor Modern communication tech ple, revealed that 70 percent derline issues that defy easy nologies and evolving dealt mostly with analysis of solutions. A number of our diplomatic practices now allow political developments. In con senior customers, particularly in government leaders to commu trast, a much wider variety of civilian agencies, cannot serve nicate with each other freely issues was covered in memos and often. US officials even talk written directly in response to as their own experts on techni to opposition party leaders. This questions from senior custom cal topics. so there is more makes it much easier for policy- ers. Only about one-third of room for the intelligence ana makers to be their own those memos(cid:151)whose topics lyst to provide value-added. analysts(cid:151)to gain insights into presumably matched what was The issue for military analysis, the intentions of other govern most on the policymakers(cid:146) however, is which agency ments and decipher what minds(cid:151)covered political mat should be primarily responsi developments may mean. The ters, and many of those ble. This is now a crowded DI has probably always under discussed the behavior and atti field, occupied not only by the estimated the extent to which tudes of foreign leaders, a sub- DI and the Defense Intelli policymakers serve as their own category of political analysis gence Agency, but, increasingly analysts. Arguably, policymak that remains of high interest to more to the point, by the strong ers have never needed the DI to senior policymakers. intelligence centers at the uni tell them that riots undermine fied military commands. The DI governments or that currency The move toward non-tradi is still in the process of defin crises shake investor confi tional issues is already ing its comparative advantage in dence. Today, however, they no underway, evidenced by the military analysis. longer even need much help creation of specialized Centers deconflicting signals from other to deal with terrorism, weap governments. ons proliferation, and narcotics Analysis that Fits the New and crime. Nonetheless, too Environment Analysts today have to reach many of our flagship products beyondpolitical analysis, an still reflect a political analysis So, how does the DI, or any area in which it isparticu bias. We need to do a better job one, do intelligence analysis in larly hard toprovide value aligning our publishing strate of information abun an era topolicymakers. The ideolog gies with emerging realities. dance, wellconnected ical orientation of governments policymakers, and non:tradi~ is no longer the important issue Analysis in some other conven in international relations; it has tional areas can still provide tional issues? First, we need been replaced by a growing list value-added, but, like political new assumptions: of non-traditional issues that analysis, the challenge is greater tend to defy ideological defini than before. Economic analysis New Assumption 1: Most of tion. In the DI, however, faces daunting competition from the time, policymakers have a political analysis is still king. We the open-source world and good sense of what is going on want to follow the ins and outs those analysts need either to in their areas of concern. 25 Future Analysis Analysts must concentrate on ideas, not inteffigence. Neu(cid:146) Assumption 2: Policy- understanding emerging issues. makers frequently understand To rio this kind of work well, the direct consequences of the Dl will need keen critical events and their immediate thinkers open to unconven significance. practice of intelligence analysis tional ideas, perhaps even more change? than a will need regional New Assumption 3: The CIA(cid:151) experts. Customers are actually and particularly the DI(cid:151)often Analysts mustfocus on the pretty good at letting us know lacks unique inft)rmation about customer. For many analysts, what issues keep them up at developments, especially in the particularly those involved in night; we have to stop dismiss political and economic spheres political work, the focus would ing these questions as either too Raw intelligence is ubiquitous shift from tracking develop hard or not intelligence-related. ments in their particular and can get to policymakers before it reaches the analysts. accounts to addressing the spe To free analysts to do this work, cific, hard questions of we will need to dc(cid:151)emphasize New Assumption 4: Policy policymakers. An analyst, for products that largely describe makers need the greatest help example, would often start her what has just happened. This understanding non(cid:151)traditional day by reviewing feedback and will he hard because there are intelligence issues. There is still tasking from customers, instead customers (cid:145)s(cid:146)ho want such prod a market for political analysis of first reading the morning traf ucts, which are seen as and certainly for related leader fic. We need to use technology convenient, free goods. But if ship analysis, hut to be and a network of high(cid:151)caliber our relatively painless experi representatives at policy agen ence last year with the successful in traditional areas cies to create stronger Links elimination of the Economic the Dl must generate unique between analysts and Intelligence Weekly, a decades- insights into relatively well(cid:151) custon~ers. old publication that reviewed understood problems. economic developments, is any Analysts mustconcentrate on guide, policymaker demand for A Dl optimized against these ideas, not intelligence. such products is shallow at assumptions would understand Because the Dl has no monop best. current developments, but only oly over the dissemination oF as the necessary foundation for intelligence reporting, synthesiz Analysts must think beyond its real contribution to policy(cid:151) ing it for others is a poor finished intelligence. Analysts makers. Analysts would investment of its time and tal are schooled in the need to pro specialize in complex analysis ent. This particularly applies to ciucc validated, finished of the most difficult problems. political and economic analy intelligence(cid:151)(cid:148)finished(cid:148) mean They would focus on the poli(cid:151) sis; policymakers do in fact ing that it has been carefully cymakers(cid:146) hardest questions. often need help deciphering considered, officially reviewed, Their goals would include iden(cid:151) technical reports on such issues coordinated with colleagues, tifving new opportunities for as proliferation and informa(cid:151) and sent out under official policymaking and warning first (ion warfare. In many cover The main problem is that of cliscontinuities that could substantive fields, the Dl can such products often cannot spell danger. best serve the policymaker by keep pace with events or even tackling the hard questions and with information sources. What does this mean in practi trying to develop more reliable officers who deal frequently cal terms? Flow would the ways of identifying and with customers(cid:151)including 26 Future Analysis those who carry the Pies/dents Dc/li(cid:146) Brie/to the most senior The OldAnalysis 21si Century Analysis officials(cid:151)report that many products short of finished intel Cautious/Careful Aggressive/Bold/Courageous ligence often satisfy the needs Fact-based Intuitive of policyniakers. These include Concrete/Reality-based Metaphor-rich annotated raw intelligence, Linear/Trend-based Complex quick answers to specific ques Expert-based Humble, Inclusive, Diverse tions, infornial trip reports, and Hierarchical Collaborative memoranda of conversation. Precedent-hasecl Precedent-shattering Too many intelligence analysts \XTorst-case/Warning- Opportunistic/Optimistic and managers remain fixated on focused Image(cid:151)rich formal products even as policy- Text-based Customer-driven/Policy(cid:151) makers move further away from Detached/Neutral relevant them in their own work. As anyone who has done a recent tour at a US Embassy knows, Narcotics Center are not doing completely rewritten. The tran most of the real scoop on world real Dl work. They are produc sition might look something like events is now exchanged in ing little in the way of finished the box at the right. informal e(cid:151)nmils and telephone intelligence, and they are calls. Our adherence to the spending a lot of time doing The qualities of old analysis(cid:148) increasingly outdated concept individual tasks that meet very are familiar to any intelligence of finished intelligence is what specific customer needs. Instead professional. We pnde our makes the DI wary of such of being perceived as outside selves on carefully basing our informal intelligence practices the DI mainstream, the Centers judgments on fact, on our as electronic (cid:145)chat rooms(cid:146) and should be recognized as early expertise, on our ability to other collaborative venues.1 adapters of the new model. warn, and on our neutrality. Their focus on customer Sonic might argue that these are Analysts must look to the requirements. collaborative clearly the analytic qualities that Centers as models. If you sit work, and less formal products must persist under any sce long enough on a DI career ser speaks to the future. nario, regardless of whether we vice panel, you will still hear have addressed the needs of some managers say that certain our customers. analysts in the Counterterror Now for Something Completely ism Center or the Crime and Heretical Perhaps not. To really hell) sm;lrt policymakers, we may The need 10 escape the consiratots oi fin As policymakers continue to need to adopt new practices, ifisvheed\cianrtselalgiogebncyecwaaroslhDiughmlaiignhet.edamDolreofftihcaenr raise the standards for intelli new habits of thinking, and currently leading he Dirccioraies Global gence analysis. we may need to new ways of communicating ssFirisivleulIryneso1n9I9(cid:145)a6n.retnwfeorrmsleotxidpae.mpwalhefoo,rhiinanrsaelwlsriuigbtemtneienscseiaxontnnelaty(cid:151)o(cid:151) acshsaunmgpetimoonrseatnhdanwojurskt ohuabrits. our analysis. an in(cid:151)house elecironic discussion database, The fundamental characteristics To tell a policyniaker some swhoeulndotepdrotdhauicetheunffuitnuirseheidntemlileilgleintgeenocfef(cid:151)ailcler of intelligence- an~~l~~sis, care thing he does not already of it on line, interact (cid:147)c, tieralne. muIi di(cid:151) fully developed during the last know, we have to he prepared cdiinaacylaLsi10icoionrraunIs,riieabdnutciinooinnessrudmaiesacrdispal(cid:146)-ianailrayblfaebr2-iichoofurspse(cid:151)a mhaalyf oifn tfhaecttnweenetdiettohhceentury, t(cid:147)gootatkoeprriinstk(cid:146) swiinthounretwh,inking, to 27 Future Analysis (cid:147) Neutrality cannot be used to justify analytic celibacy and adventurous analytic lines disengagement from lacking in significant ideologi before anyone else. This is not cal conflict. Analytic detachment always our current style. Almost the customer. and neutrality are values bred everything an analyst learns of the Cold War, when foreign teaches her to he conservative: policy observers often do nor jump to conclusions, compensated for lack of infor consider all sources, coordinate mation with ideologically based your (cid:147)jews with colleagues At there are no handbooks on assertions. Intelligence best, an analyst will occasion how to identify new opportuni ally lean forward, when in fact ties for poiicyniakers. analysts correctly tried not to do she must strive to he several that(cid:151)they were reliably objective steps ahead of the policymaker The most controversial conten on a regular basis. tion may be that 21(cid:148) century analysts will need to become Being completely neutral and his difficult to generate new less independent and neu independent in the future, how ideas when you have to stay tral in favor ofgreater ever, may only gain us close to the facts. New ideas are tailoring to customer needs. irrelevance. We need, of often intuitive, based Some critics have already noted course, integrity in our anal on one or two stray bits of information that our customer focus in ysls(cid:151)we must he willing to s(cid:146)iy that coalesce into new insight. recent years is eroding our things that are uncomfortable Analysts in the 21~ century will detachment from policymak for the Pentagon or the State not only have to develop their ing. The usual answer is to Department and that are not intuition, they(cid:151)and their man assert that customer focus and compatible with the goals of agers(cid:151)will also have to trust it. neutrality are compatible; hut in policymakers. But we should truth they are not completely. not pretend that integrity and Analysts today spend consider The more we care, as we neutrality are the same thing or able time identifying patterns in should, that we have an impact that they are dependent on recent events and then project on the policymaking commu each other. Neutrality implies ing them onto the future. This is nity, the less neutral we be distance from the customer and trend analysis. Unfortunately, come, in the sense that we some near mystical ability to policymakers who are smart(cid:151) select our topics based on cus parse the truth completely free and most are(cid:151)can easily do tomer interests and we analyze from bias or prejudice. Integ this for themselves. The ana those aspects that are most rele rity, on the other hand, rests on lysts(cid:146) real value increasingly will vant to policymakers. Analysts professional standards and the lie in Identifying discontinul understandably are confused by willingness to provide the most ties that shatter precedents and this new direction. They were complete answer to a cus trends. taught, they say, to produce tomer(cid:146)s question, even if it is intelligence analysis that focuses not the answer he wants to Analysts are often good at iden on events and developments, hear. Neutrality cannot be used tifying what is not likely to not customers. It is not their job to justify analytic celibacy and work in a given situation; how to worry about whether or not disengagement from the cus ever, policymakers are usually it has impact. tomer. If forced to choose more interested in figuring out between analytic detachment what can work. While courses This is the most significant and and impact on policymaking, in the Intelligence Community difficult consequence of work the 21s1 century analyst must teach analysts how to warn, ing in an information-rich era choose the latter. 28