DTIC ADA525143: War, Politics, and RMA- The Legacy of Clausewitz

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

JFQEch 9/19/96 1:02 PM Page 76
War,
Soldiering.
Politics,
and RMA—
DOD
The Legacy of Clausewitz
By A N T U L I O J. E C H E VA R R I A I I
O
ver the last few years practi- older forms of war will continue to co-
tioners and students of war exist with newer ones, RMA, when
alike have debated the na- complete, will mean that future war
ture and impact of the revo- will differ fundamentally from wars of
lution in military affairs (RMA) on fu- the past. It will include more intelli-
ture war, especially with its emphasis gent warriors, knowledge-oriented
on speed, precision, and intelligence weaponry, a five-dimensional battle-
rather than the mass production and field (namely, breadth, depth, height,
target saturation so characteristic of in- space, and time—the ability and subse-
dustrial-age warfare. Moreover, analysts quent need to act within an enemy’s
have pondered the impact of RMA on decision cycle), global envelopment,
the structure and philosophy of the capabilities to attack simultaneously
Army of the 21stcentury, conflicts short and precisely on the tactical, opera-
of war, and information warfare. All of tional, and strategic levels, and an ex-
these observers agree that even though plicit “civilianization of war” in terms
of increased direct and indirect public
participation. In addition, RMA will
Major Antulio J. Echevarria II, USA, is operations officer of
likely challenge statecraft as diplomats
the 3/6 Cavalry Regiment and formerly taught history at the
adapt to the flow of real-time data, its
U.S. Military Academy.
76 JFQ / Winter 1995–96
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JFQEch 9/19/96 1:02 PM Page 77
Echevarria
effect on public opinion, and the un- the last century. Eberhard Kessel ar-
certain political capabilities and limits gued, for example, that for Clausewitz
of future war. Politik consisted of subjective and ob-
Given the extent of such change, jective elements. The former related to
does the thought of Carl von Clause- choices by political leaders about the
witz, developed one hundred and sev- type of war to wage and the specific
enty years ago, offer anything to aims to pursue. The latter involved
warfighters of the future? Indeed, some dominant ideas, emotions, and politi-
say that Clausewitz’s funeral rites are cal interrelationships unique to a given
overdue: “[Future] war will be fought time and place.5
not to pursue national interests, but to In fact, Clausewitz’s varied use of
kill enemy leaders, to convert oppo- Politik and the context in which he
nents....Thus the core of Clausewitz’s wrote indicate that he signified three
philosophy of war—that states wage things with the term. First, it meant pol-
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ttrhioorinnisakml t,ch ocaontu sntnautbecurle-lnaarray rwc woetaarprafofafnriecs,k, iatnrnagtn,i -satnneard-- oaannthd ee wrxwteeiasrkenn.a eSls esscetosa ntpiemdo ,osp iifott s iaemofdfnea ba,i ryns t—gr eepsosotoprleioutnilricgtcsite chaasssl, DU Library Special
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treaty, etc.—and as a Karl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz.
despite technological changes from RMA
process of internal inter-
his conception of war remains valid action between key
decisionmaking institu-
Political Forces
tions and the personali-
greater compartmentalization among ties of policymakers. Last, it meant an The final three books of On War—
political and military leaders render historically causative force, providing an on defense, attack, and war plans—
obsolete the Clausewitzian definition explanatory framework for examining contain the majority of Clausewitz’s
of war as an act of policy and his tri- war’s various manifestations over time. mature ideas pertaining to the influ-
partite concept of war.2 Moreover, the The first definition appears princi- ence of politics on war. They also dis-
relevance of On War3 appears suspect pally in the first chapter of On War close that his military thought was be-
for not addressing war as a cultural which discusses the nature of war. A coming increasingly historicist. He
phenomenon: it not only fails to ex- prefatorynoteindicatesthatClausewitz sought to interpret historical epochs on
plain why wars occur, it views war considered only this chapter to be in their own terms and understood that
from the perspective of the Western finalform.Butonemustresistthetemp- those who lived and fought in past
nation-state paradigm.4 However, such tation to read no further, for while it wars were governed by institutions, val-
arguments fundamentally misunder- mightappearthattheessenceofClause- ues, and beliefs unique to a specific
stood what Clausewitz meant by poli- witz’s message can be grasped in 15 time and place. In “The Scale of the
tics. In fact, despite technological pages rather than 600, this is not the Military Objective and of the Effort To
changes introduced by RMA—as well case. As one authority observes, strong Be Made,” Clausewitz broadens his
as those brought about by nuclear thoughcircumstantialevidencesuggests concept of Politikto encompass the first
weapons—his conception of war re- thatthenotewaswrittenwhenOnWar and second definitions mentioned
mains valid. wasclosertocompletionthangenerally above. He refers to policymaking, for
believed.6Thus, individuals seeking a example, as more than a mere act of in-
In Search of Politik “genuine understanding of Clausewitz telligence or product of pure reason: It
Clausewitz’s description of war as cannot escape the task of actually read- is “an art in the broadest meaning of
a “continuation of politics (Politik) by ing On War.”7 Indeed, one should read the term—the faculty of using judg-
other means” is well known but unfor- hisotherworksaswell.Forexample,his ment to detect the most important and
tunately is often interpreted to mean notes on history and politics and the decisive elements in the vast array of
that war is merely an act of state policy essay on “Agitation” (Umtriebe) reveal facts and situations.” This judgment, in
aimed at achieving political aims. Part thathisideaswerecontinuallyevolving. turn, was highly subjective, affected by
of this confusion stems from the ambi- The hefty tome On War constitutes “qualities of mind and character of the
guity of the term Politik, which means barely a third of them.8 Clausewitz is men making the decision—of the
both policy and politics. But Clause- oftenclearerwhenreadinGerman,but rulers, statesmen, and commanders,
witz also deserves some blame for ne- the prerequisites for understanding this whether these roles are united in a sin-
glecting to define in simple language great theorist are really patience and a gle individual or not.”States or soci-
how this multivalent term was to be willtoreflect. eties were not limited in form to
understood. German scholars and sol- monarchies (constitutional or abso-
diers alike have puzzled over that since lutist) and semi-rigid social hierarchies
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JFQ FORUM
characteristic of his day, but “deter- While the Tartar system of formu- and chameleon-like, composed of sub-
mined by their times and prevailing lating policy appears less sophisticated jective as well as objective natures. The
conditions.” A state, for instance, can than that of Frederick the Great or former consist of war’s means. Since
be a united, sovereign entity, a “person- Napoleon Bonaparte, it proved no less they vary over time and place, Clause-
ified intelligence acting according to decisive in developing strategies and witz dubbed them subjective. The lat-
simple and logical rules,” or merely “an directing military force in pursuit of ter, on the other hand, embrace ele-
agglomeration of loosely associated political objectives. As seen in this ex- ments of violence, uncertainty, chance,
forces.” Hence, the definition applies ample, Clausewitz’s use of Politik af- and friction; and while embodying
equally to feudal rulers, drug cartels, or fords both a transhistorical and tran- many varieties and intensities, they re-
terrorist groups. Even numerous Euro- scultural perspective on war, one that main a constant part of war despite
pean military institutions (for instance, at the same time respects historical time and place. Moreover, because war
armies and command structures) have and cultural uniqueness. Thus the ele- is not an autonomous activity but a so-
“differed in the various periods.” In ments that shape policy are both situa- cial and human event, it has two ten-
fact, in his later books Clausewitz uses tional and cultural, objective and sub- dencies, escalation and reciprocation.
the term military to mean all institu- Absent the moderating influence
tions, procedures, philosophies, and technological advances affect the of policy and debilitating force of
values of the military as a community. friction, these tendencies push
grammar of war, not its logic
Clausewitz employed several his- warfighting toward a violent ex-
torical examples to show how policy treme. Thus, for Clausewitz war
and political forces have shaped war jective (or rational, nonrational, and might change color like a chameleon,
from antiquity to the modern age. His irrational according to political-scien- but its essential nature remains con-
chapter “The Scale of the Objective” tific models).12 “The aims a belligerent stant—violent, unpredictable, and
includes vastly different yet pro- adopts, and the resources he employs, prone to escalation.
foundly similar wars of conquest and will be governed by the particular Technology, in fact, resides in all
plunder carried out by semi-nomadic characteristics of his own [geopolitical] elements of the trinity without altering
Tartars and those of expansion prose- position; but they will also conform to their inter-relationship. Military tech-
cuted by Napoleon’s armies. Selecting the spirit of the age and to its general nology, for example, might be defined
the Tartars as an example of politics di- character.” as any technology used by a nation’s
recting war is significant, for some forces for military purposes. While
Technology and the Trinity
would claim that their “tribal soci- items such as missiles fall in the mili-
eties” fall outside the Western nation- With a more complete understand- tary corner of the trinity, their compo-
state paradigm.9 Tartar tribes origi- ing of what Clausewitz meant by Politik, nent technologies (such as microchips)
nated in Central Asia along with other we can examine his tripartite concep- usually originate in the private sector.
Turkic peoples. In the 12th and 13th tion of war in some detail. This “remark- Indeed, technologies related to com-
centuries they were overtaken by Mon- able or paradoxical trinity,” as it has munications and transportation have
gols and mixed with them. They par- been called, is Clausewitz’s framework, broad application in all branches of
ticipated in Mongol invasions of east- or model, for understanding the change- the trinity, thereby defying pat labels.
ern Europe and the Middle East.10 They able and diverse nature of war. The The point is that the interdependency
eventually converted to Islam and forces that comprise it—blind emotion, of various components of the trinity
joined in Ottoman Jihads(holy wars of chance, and politics—function like will remain unchanged despite techno-
conversion) against the West. Tartar “three different codes of law, deeply logical advances. The evolving infor-
bands even raided Prussia in 1656–57, rooted in their subject and yet variable mation and communication technolo-
burning hundreds of villages, killing in their relationship to one another.” gies of RMA will simply expand the
23,000, and enslaving 34,000.11 They They, in turn, correspond to three repre- immediacy—by shortening response
thus fought for booty, to convert infi- sentative bodies—the character and dis- times and heightening sensitivity—for
dels, to kill enemy leaders, and for position of the populace, skill and each component in its interaction with
entertainment—all motives for future prowess of the military, and wisdom and the others.14
war as cited above. Yet, such motives, intelligence of the government. Information technology will cer-
as Clausewitz knew, were shaped by re- Despite revolutionary advances in tainly demand increases in the intelli-
sources available to the Tartars, their technology, this trinity remains rele- gence levels of military personnel and
geopolitical role as a composite of vant to future war. Technology does civilians alike, or at least oblige them to
Turkish and Mongol nations located in not require adding a fourth component process more information in less time.
Central Asia, their nomadic culture to the trinity, squaring the triangle, as But it will not change the fact that rul-
and traditions, and the religious influ- has been suggested.13 Technological ad- ing bodies—legitimate governments,
ence of Islam. These factors all fell vances will not alter the framework of revolutionary cells, terrorist gangs, or
under the rubric of political forces in war since they affect the grammar of drug cartels—will make decisions on
Clausewitz’s mind. war, not its logic. In other words, new
technologies change only war’s form,
not its nature. War is multidimensional
78 JFQ / Winter 1995–96
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Echevarria
when, where, how, and why to apply
force. Their decisions will be influenced
by political forces such as power rela-
tionships linked to alliances and treaties
(either perceived or real), the effective-
ness of key institutions involved in de-
cisionmaking, and general assumptions,
beliefs, and expectations held by deci-
sionmakers. Events surrounding the
Cuban Missile Crisis and October 1973
War reveal that even in the modern age
misperceptions continue to create
and/or exacerbate crises.15 Technology
will speed the transmission of informa-
tion (already approaching real time),
even provide it in new forms (such as
satellite imagery), and may, depending
on the scenario, reduce or expand the
time for making decisions. But decision-
makers will continue to receive a vast
quantity of information through sub-
jective filters; thus, their decisions will
rapenomldit aiPtichnaaar la tlfa dojrorugcxdeeilgscy.ma laley n,m tn awetwtiel lrt ebocefh jsnuhodalgopmgeyde nibnty-, UfmiSriisSns gCi laSep.Me– S2t .sGtaenodragred Navy (Johnny Wilson)
creases and decreases violence, chance, S.
U.
uncertainty, and friction in unforeseen
and uneven ways. New weapons sys-
tems enable both sides to observe and as some claim.18 His dictum that “war The destructive power of nuclear
strike simultaneously throughout the is the continuation of Politik by other weapons, prospect of runaway escala-
depth of a battlefield, thus eliminating means” is as valid in a nuclear conflict tion, and concept of superconductiv-
safe areas. The five-dimensional battle- as in conventional war. The evolution ity—the elimination of friction by re-
field means that operational comman- of nuclear strategy from massive retali- ducing the chain of events between the
ders must consider defeating either an decision to launch and the actual
attack or a counterattack from various launch of a strike—will reduce or
Clausewitz’s thought does not
directions at any time. A general “lack negate the influence of policymakers
of immunity” will prevail as units at all insist that warfare serves a on nuclear war should it occur.20Obvi-
echelons of command and control en- ously, until the technology is devel-
purely rational aim
dure greater risk.16 Precision-guided oped to harmlessly disarm nuclear
weapons and munitions do increase weapons in flight, the possibility of
the certainty of a hit or kill, but the ation in the 1950s to flexible response aborting or down-scaling nuclear war
weak link will be supplying reliable in the early 1960s, for instance, shows after a launch is minimal. But such re-
and timely target data.17 Enemies will how Politik affects war even in the nu- alities are merely products of the times
take measures and countermeasures clear age.19 Since 1945 policymakers and constitute what Clausewitz, in his
against this, and tactics will change as have duly responded to changing situ- historicist approach, would have con-
a result. Thus new technology alone ations, growing strike and counter- sidered the subjective elements of war
will not prove decisive in future war; it strike capabilities, and the will of the —means selected for its prosecution—
will require a harness of sorts—a flexi- populace by determining that, because that distinguish nuclear war from other
ble, comprehensive doctrine that inte- of attendant risks, nuclear war did not forms of conflict in the nuclear age. It
grates the tactical, operational, and suit national objectives; hence, other might be an exaggeration to claim that
strategic levels of war. The objective more conventional forms of war re- such means are the ultimate expression
nature of Clausewitz’s concept of war ceived more attention while nuclear of the remarkable trinity in terms of ab-
will remain relevant. weapons assumed a deterrent role. Pol- solute war, but not by much.
icy and politics have patently con- Again, Clausewitz’s mature thought
The Nuclear Factor spired to force the avoidance of nu- does not insist that warfare serves a
Even the development of nuclear clear war. purely rational political aim. In any
arms, the so-called absolute weapon, event, the definition of a rational politi-
has not meant the death of Clausewitz, cal aim is largely subjective. A terrorist
Winter 1995–96 / JFQ 79
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JFQ FORUM
group can launch suicide bombings that 4John Keegan, A History of Warfare 19The history of nuclear strategy did not
it considers completely rational. Indeed, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993). end there. Strategies of the early 1960s gave
the current world order advances the 5In its polemics with Hans Delbrück, rise to mutual assured destruction, mutual
possibility of a limited nuclear exchange the German great general staff argued that agreed assured destruction, Carter’s counter-
war was indeed subordinate to politics, but vailing strategy, Reagan’s strategic defense
between states or groups which have rel-
that political forces had changed since initiative, etc. Donald M. Snow, National Se-
atively small arsenals.21Far from restrict-
Clausewitz’s day. They saw politics as a so- curity: Enduring Problems in a Changing De-
ing the influence of Politik over war,
cial-Darwinistic struggle for national exis- fense Environment, 2ndedition (New York: St.
such a climate is likely to increase it,
tence that demanded war be waged to the Martin’s Press, 1991); Henry S. Rowen, “The
while admittedly reducing the time poli- utmost. Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Doctrine,” in
cymakers have to react to a strike. 6It also appears in Azar Gat, The Origins Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age, edited
Nuclear weaponry does not render of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to by Laurence Martin (Baltimore: The Johns
irrelevant the intelligence of the gov- Clausewitz(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 131–
ernment, skill of the military, and pp. 255–63. 56; and Fan Zhen Jiang, “Is War Obsolete? A
emotive force of the populace as some 7Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in Chinese Perspective,” in Essays on Strategy
English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain VI, edited by Thomas C. Gill (Washington:
believe. Rather, the advent of such
and America 1815–1945 (New York: Oxford National Defense University Press, 1989),
weapons and attendant strategies re-
University Press, 1994), p. 7. pp. 189–201.
veals that each component of the trin-
8These and other essays are found in 20Stephen J. Cimbala, Force and Diplo-
ity changes over time. Diplomacy is
Carl von Clausewitz, Historical and Political macy in the Future(New York: Praeger, 1992);
more aware that military action of any Writings, edited and translated by Peter and Richard N. Lebow, “Clausewitz and Cri-
sort might generate unintended conse- Paret and Daniel Moran, (Princeton: Prince- sis Stability,” Political Science Quarterly, vol.
quences and runaway escalation, and ton University Press, 1992). 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 81–110.
it has developed systemic checks and 9Keegan, A History of Warfare, pp. 11– 21Jerome Kahan, Nuclear Threats from
precautions to prevent that. The mili- 40; van Creveld, The Transformation of War, Small States (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S.
tary has gradually altered its warrior pp. 33–62. Army War College, Strategic Studies Insti-
10Douglas S. Benson, The Tartar War tute, 1994).
ethos to prize rather than eschew intel-
(Chicago: Maverick Publishing, 1981).
ligence and technical expertise. The
11F.L. Carsten, The Origins of Prussia(Ox-
public has also changed, becoming
ford: Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 208.
more educated and politicized, and
12See Bassford’s discussion in Clausewitz,
growing more sensitive to the fact that pp. 22–24, and “John Keegan and the
the future rests in the hands of a few Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz: A
chosen officials. Such developments do Polemic,” War in History, vol. 1, no. 3
not invalidate Clausewitz’s trinity but (1994), pp. 319–36.
speak instead to its lasting durability 13Michael Handel, “Clausewitz in the
and intrinsic dynamism. Age of Technology,” in Clausewitz and Mod-
ern Strategy, edited by Michael Handel
Of course, not all of Clausewitz’s
(Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 58–62.
military thinking remains relevant. His
14See also David Jablonsky, “U.S. Mili-
vision of war did not include the eco-
tary Doctrine and the Revolution in Mili-
nomic, air, sea, and space dimensions,
tary Affairs,” Parameters, vol. 24, no. 3 (Au-
forexample.Buthisconceptionofwar, tumn 1994), p. 34.
his remarkable trinity, and his grasp of 15Robert B. McCalla, Uncertain Percep-
therelationshipbetweenPolitikandwar tions: U.S. Cold War Crisis Decision Making
will endure as long as states, drug car- (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
tels, warrior clans, and terrorist groups 1992).
haveamindtowagewar. JFQ 16AvrahamRotem,“TheLandBattleofthe
1990s,” in Technology and Strategy: Future
Trends,editedbyShaiFeldman(Jerusalem:Jaf-
NOTES
feeCenterforStrategicStudies,1989),p.56.
1Steven Metz, “A Wake for Clausewitz: 17Shai Feldman, “Technology and Strat-
Toward a Philosophy of 21st Century War- egy: Concluding Remarks,” in Technology
fare,” Parameters, vol. 24, no. 4 (Winter and Strategy, p. 130.
1994–95), pp. 126–32, here p. 130. 18Sheppard, “Is Clausewitz Still Rele-
2John E. Sheppard, Jr., “On War: Is vant?” pp. 88–91; and Martin van Creveld,
Clausewitz Still Relevant?” Parameters, vol. Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict
20, no. 3 (September 1990), pp. 85–99; Mar- (New York: The Free Press, 1993), pp. 43–64.
tin van Creveld, The Transformation of War
(New York: The Free Press, 1991), pp. 33–62.
3Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited
and translated by Michael Howard and
Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1976).
80 JFQ / Winter 1995–96