DTIC ADA525141: Who's Responsible? Understanding Force Protection

5 Pages·0.68 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

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Understanding Force Protection
By T H O M A S W. M U R R E Y, J R.
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orce protection is a contentious issue. Yet force protection was not emphasized until
Since terrorism is a constant concern, after two attacks in Saudi Arabia. The first oc-
commanders agonize over their responsi- curred in November 1995 when a car bomb ex-
bilities and demand that their authority ploded in Riyadh at the Office of the Program
be precisely circumscribed. But although confu- Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard, that
sion persists, the legal basis of force protection killed five and injured another thirty-five. Then
has been greatly enhanced in recent years. Once in June 1996, terrorists mounted a devastating at-
understood, this structure can become an ally in tack in Dhahran at Khobar Towers housing com-
protecting U.S. military personnel. plex, detonating 20,000 pounds of explosives in a
Terrorist attacks have claimed the lives of fuel truck that took the lives of nineteen and
over 300 defense-affiliated personnel since 1977. wounded hundreds. As Secretary of Defense
William Perry later stated, “The Khobar Towers at-
tack should be seen as a watershed event pointing
the way to a radically new mindset and dramatic
changes in the way we protect our forces de-
Major Thomas W. Murrey, Jr., USAF, serves as assistant staff judge
ployed overseas from this growing threat.”1
advocate at Headquarters, U.S. European Command.
Summer 1999 / JFQ 105
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Who’s Responsible? Understanding Force Protection
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FORCE PROTECTION
Accountability 1995 listed sixty DOD civilian and military per-
The force protection role of the Secretary of sonnel who were the responsibility of the chief of
State is established in the Omnibus Diplomatic Se- mission. But when the embassy conducted a re-
curity Act of 1986 which calls for the develop- count, including everyone not under a CINC, this
ment and implementation of policies and pro- figure rose to 962 personnel. After Khobar Towers,
grams to provide for the security of operations of the need to address potential problems and re-
a diplomatic nature, to include all government place extant memorandums of understanding
personnel on official duty abroad. At first glance it (MOUs) between the Departments of State and
may appear that Congress has given responsibility Defense became obvious.
to the Department of State which it is ill prepared
Universal Memorandum
or equipped to handle. However, the law provides
for support by other agencies. Moreover, opera- In December 1997 the Secretaries of State
tional control for force protection may be dele- and Defense signed a new MOU that applied to
gated to the heads of the agencies concerned. “define the authority and responsibility for the
The Secretary of State cannot manage as- security of DOD elements and personnel in for-
signed security functions universally. The chief of eign areas not under the command of a geo-
mission in each country—usually the ambassa- graphic CINC.” By allowing operational force
dor—directs, coordinates, and supervises executive protection authority to pass between chiefs of
branch personnel.The Omnibus Act excludes per- mission and CINCs, the memorandum provided a
sonnel under area military commanders, namely, more logical allocation of duties. In some cases
combatant commanders in chief (CINCs), from se- chiefs of mission might have had force protection
curity oversight by the Secretary of State responsibility for DOD elements even though
The Secretary of Defense is also accountable CINCs might have been in the better position to
for initiating policies and assigning responsibilities provide it, or vice versa. The MOU was designed
for implementing force protection. These duties to rectify this problem and establish a principle
flow from the Secretary that responsibility should be assigned based on
CINCs answer for the successes through under secretaries, who can best provide force protection.
service secretaries, and Before any country is added to the covered
or failures of force protection
Chairman to CINCs. DOD country list in the MOU, the chief of mission and
programs overseas policy is that force protec- CINC negotiate a memorandum of agreement
tion falls to anyone in (MOA) outlining their respective responsibilities,
command,2but geographic CINCs are the only in- the position of temporary duty personnel, and
dividuals given the duty by statute. Although the the direction for the Emergency Action Commit-
Secretary is ultimately responsible, CINCs answer tee and guidance on coordination.
for the successes or failures of force protection pro- Once negotiated, a chief of mission will sub-
grams for military personnel overseas. mit the draft MOA to the Department of State for
CINCs, however, are not accountable for all approval. Both State and Defense then take action
military personnel stationed in or deployed to to place the country on the covered countries list
their areas of responsibility. The Secretary has di- in the Universal MOU, which includes provisions
rected that certain military personnel operating for deletions from the covered country list.
in AORs will not be assigned to CINCs and thus The MOU also addresses the resolution of dis-
are not under their command. These personnel putes. If chiefs of mission and CINCs are unable
are the responsibility of the Secretary of State un- to resolve an issue, they refer it to Washington. If
less this duty is delegated back to the Secretary of the issue remains unresolved, it is sent in turn to
Defense. Individuals serving with Marine security the Under Secretary of State for Management and
guard detachments, defense attaché offices, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. If it is
offices of defense cooperation are examples of not settled on that level, the issue goes to the Sec-
military personnel not under CINCs. retaries. MOUs may be terminated sixty days after
As a result, there are two categories of DOD either party gives notice of intention to withdraw
personnel protected overseas: those covered by from the agreement.
chiefs of mission and those under CINCs. As sim-
Command Relationships
ple as that solution seems, there have been dis-
putes between the Departments of State and De- When CINCs assume force protection re-
fense over certain organizations. In some sponsibilities under MOAs for DOD elements and
instances there has been no complete list of DOD personnel not previously in their chain, another
organizations within a given country.3 In Spain, problem arises: they become accountable for
the annual report of the American Embassy in forces with which they have no command rela-
tionship. A further issue is responsibility for per-
sonnel in temporary duty status or simply passing
106 JFQ / Summer 1999
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personnel temporarily assigned to an AOR, in-
cluding air crews. The memorandum also author-
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D ures (including temporary relocation) when, in
the judgment of the responsible CINC, such
measures must be accomplished without delay to
through a country. Scenarios include joint task ensure the safety of the DOD personnel....”
forces, naval personnel on port calls, aircrews With this solution, the CINCs now had the pro-
transiting through AORs, NATO personnel, peace- tection authority they previously lacked.
keepers, and DOD contractors. Problems occur NATO Personnel. Military personnel assigned
when CINCs take on responsibility under coun- to NATO enjoy no relationship with the Com-
try-specific MOAs for military personnel not nor- mander in Chief, U.S. European Command
mally under their command. They have no inher- (CINCEUR), unless they occupy NATO and U.S.
ent command authority over these personnel. billets concurrently.5 If the American half is in
The Joint Staff has adopted a solution used the CINCEUR chain of command, CINCEUR will
on the Arabian peninsula. In October 1996, the provide force protection through that billet. If the
Secretary of Defense delegated tactical control servicemember belongs solely to NATO, he is the
over non-CINC assigned forces to the Comman- obligation of the chief of mission. CINCEUR is re-
der in Chief, U.S. Central Command.4 Such con- sponsible for all personnel with whom he has a
trol enables CINCs to implement force protection
and exercise security responsibilities under the
MOU. Moreover, this authority applies to those
Summer 1999 / JFQ 107
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FORCE PROTECTION
command relationship, and the chief of mission for the safety of contract employees. There ap-
cares for the remaining military personnel in that pears to be an exception in situations when crises
country. In the case of NATO-assigned personnel, are declared by the National Command Authori-
this could allow a U.S. servicemember to be the ties or CINCs.6 Then the DOD components work
force protection responsibility of CINCEUR, while with contractors who provide essential services in
a peer across the hall falls under the chief of mis- order to develop and implement plans and proce-
sion. The Universal MOU, along with the coun- dures to ensure that their employees can perform.
try-specific MOAs, aimed to correct that. Unfortu- Although the instruction is vague, it can be inter-
nately, at the time this article was written, the preted as directing DOD components to provide
memorandum of agreement for Belgium, where force protection for contractors when either NCA
many NATO personnel are stationed, had not or CINCs declare a crisis. In routine cases, how-
been negotiated. However, the issue was ad- ever, DOD has no legal obligation to furnish secu-
dressed in the MOA for Turkey, which is in effect. rity for contractors unless specific language is in-
CINCEUR and the chief of mission for Turkey cluded in the contract.
agreed to assign force protection responsibility for
all NATO-assigned personnel in Turkey to As long as terrorism remains a threat, force
CINCEUR. When the memorandum for Belgium protection will be a vital feature of operations. It
is completed it is probable that, like the Turkish is essential that commanders understand the
agreement, most NATO personnel will be as- framework for allocating responsibilities. The first
signed to CINCEUR for protection purposes. and most important step in a force protection
Peace Observers. One group that occasionally program is determining who is responsible for
falls through the force protection net are U.S. every military unit located overseas. JFQ
military personnel serving as peace observers.
They are assigned to NOTES
one group that occasionally falls multinational U.N. or-
1William J. Perry, Report to the President: The Protec-
ganizations, often in re-
through the force protection tion of U.S. Forces DeployedAbroad(Washington: Govern-
mote locales far from ment Printing Office, September 15, 1996).
net are peace observers other DOD personnel. 2See DOD Instruction 2000.16, “DOD Combatting
The normal rules for Terrorism Program Standards” (September 15, 1996).
force protection apply to them: not being under This statement is taken to mean that commanders on
the command of a geographic CINC, they fall all levels are expected to take measures to protect troops
under the chief of mission. from problems ranging from terrorism to disease.
3For instance, the U.S. military has over 150 ele-
For example, an interesting issue arose over a
ments across the United Kingdom.
peacekeeping force in Morocco, which is in the
4The qualifier in this case is that responsibility must
U.S. European Command (EUCOM) AOR. Thirty
first be transferred from chief of mission to geographic
American military personnel are assigned to the
CINC under a country-specific MOA. CINCs are not ac-
U.N. Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara countable for transferred forces until a memorandum is
(MINURSO). This peacekeeping force operates in signed and placed on the covered country list.
a disputed area. Originally 26 countries con- 5CINCEUR is also dual hatted. He commands all
tributed over 1,700 military observers, 300 police- military personnel in theater and serves as Supreme Al-
men, and up to 1,000 civilian personnel to serve lied Commander, Europe, with responsibility for NATO
with this organization. As the sovereignty of the forces. However, that fact does not change force protec-
tion relationships for NATO-assigned personnel.
Western Sahara was in question, the local chief of
6See DOD Instruction 3020.37, “Continuation of Es-
mission did not normally exercise security func-
sential DOD Contractor Services During Crises” (Janu-
tions in the disputed region, which meant that
ary 26, 1996), which defines a crisis as “any emergency
he was not accountable for the thirty Americans.
so declared by the National Command Authorities or
However, an agreement was reached that directed the overseas combatant commander, whether or not
him to assume responsibility for all personnel as- U.S. Armed Forces are involved, minimally encompass-
signed to or on temporary duty to MINURSO. ing civil unrest or insurrection, civil war, civil disorder,
Contractor Personnel. Another complex issue terrorism, hostilities buildup, wartime conditions, disas-
involves contractors hired by the Department of ters, or international conflict presenting a serious threat
Defense. Contract employees often accompany to DOD interests.”
U.S. military forces on contingency operations to
provide services ranging from food preparation to
computer and engineer support. For instance, the
engineering firm of Brown and Root performed
work in both Somalia and Bosnia. Contractors
often eat, work, and live alongside military per-
sonnel. By law the chief of mission is responsible
108 JFQ / Summer 1999