DTIC ADA521391: F-16 UCAVs: A Bridge to the Future of Air Combat PDF
Preview DTIC ADA521391: F-16 UCAVs: A Bridge to the Future of Air Combat
F-16 UCAVs A Bridge to the Future of Air Combat? MAJ CHIP THOMPSON, USAF New World Vistas also “got too focused” on high-performance unmanned fighters. I think UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] are moving in the right direction–– that is, initially, we’ll use them for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and hopefully for longer dwell, greater survivability kinds of things. In the longer term, though, we’ll have to look at whether a “smart” UAV is really the way to de- liver weapons. ––Gen Ronald Fogleman PROMPTED BY ISRAELI UAV combat tary UAV programs occurred in 1996 when successes and the remarkable per the US Air Force started its first UAV opera formance of the Israeli-built Pioneer tional squadron near Las Vegas, Nevada, fly UAV flown by the US military in ing the medium-altitude Predator surveil- Desert Storm, the Department of Defense lance and reconnaissance platform. In 1999, (DOD) is now actively pursuing new US-built numerous Predator missions provided invalu UAV systems. Starting with subscale drones in able intelligence information to North At Vietnam, the DOD effort has focused prima lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) com rily on the surveillance and reconnaissance manders and targeteers in the air war against mission for UAVs. A major milestone for mili Serbia. 22 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2000 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2000 to 00-00-2000 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER F-16 UCAVs. A Bridge to the Future of Air Combat? 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Air and Space Power Journal,155 N. Twining Street,Maxwell REPORT NUMBER AFB,AL,36112-6026 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 15 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 F-16 UCAVS 23 Predator medium-altitude UAV The USAF is currently researching other stated that lethal UAVs would not fly for at combat mission ideas for UAVs, including least 25 years.1 suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) at In the meantime, US military and political a “battlelab” in Eglin AFB, Florida. However, leadership must continue to rely on cruise the DOD, in particular the USAF, has not pri missiles to deal with conflicts where the po oritized or funded any substantial research tential loss of American lives is unacceptable. into a bomb- or missile-carrying lethal UAV or Today, sea- and air-launched cruise missiles unmanned (or uninhabited) combat air vehi are the only offensive military instruments of cle (UCAV). The USAF Scientific Advisory power guaranteed not to produce US casual- Board’s New World Vistas report, the Defense ties or prisoners of war (POW). However, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) current US stockpile of cruise missiles has office, and the Air Force 2025 project have all ordnance limitations that prevent them from called for the rapid development of UCAVs. attacking important “hardened” military tar- Military planners, industry experts, and scien gets such as command and control (C2) tists all agree that current “off the shelf” tech bunkers, underground weapons storage facil nology is adequate to field an effective UCAV ities, or armored vehicles. Even though the platform. Yet, the USAF is reluctant to trust USAF and US Navy are now researching pen an unmanned remote-control aircraft with etrating warheads and in-flight reprogram the responsibility of dropping bombs or ming, these new air- and sea-launched cruise shooting missiles. Due to defense budget cuts missiles will still not reach the combat flexi and competition from the manned F-22 Rap- bility and capability of a modern multirole tor and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programs, fighter. Finally, the United States has only a the operational fielding of new-technology limited number of the one-million-dollar-plus UCAVs is decades away. In 1997, Gen Ronald expendable cruise missiles. This surprised Fogleman, USAF chief of staff, and Col Joe many in the spring of 1999 when the Penta Grasso, the Eglin UAV battlelab commander, gon placed an emergency order for more air- 24 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2000 UCAV option before exploring the F-16C UCAV proposal. The objectives of this article are to (1) provide some UCAV background to the reader with the advantages and concerns related to unmanned flight, (2) explain why the United States needs an interim UCAV mil itary option, and (3) recommend the dual- role F-16C UCAV. In summary, this article ad- dresses two important issues. First, the United States needs an interim UCAV option to over- come cruise missile limitations as soon as pos sible, and second, a dual-role F-16C UCAV can Northrop-Grumman’s future-concept UCAV quickly and effectively fulfill the requirements for this interim unmanned military option. launched cruise missiles only a few days into the air war in Kosovo. Because of current cruise missile target re UCAV Research strictions, limited numbers, and the high costs associated with a “one-shot” delivery Prompted by the USAF Scientific Advisory platform, US leaders need another un Board’s recommendations in New World Vis manned military option today that can de tas, DARPA research grants, and UCAV inter stroy most potential enemy targets and can be est in the Air Force 2025 project, several US reused for cost-effectiveness. UCAVs can pro- aerospace companies including Teledyne vide this additional unmanned military alter- Ryan, Boeing, Northrop, and Lockheed Mar- native to cruise missiles. Yet, as previously tin have started preliminary designs on ad stated, new advanced-technology UCAVs are vanced-technology UCAVs. Both Great decades from operational fielding. Can the Britain and Germany are also studying a USAF quickly provide a cost-effective UCAV UCAV replacement for their air-to-ground option to US leadership in the interim? Tornado. Interestingly, the development and The USAF can quickly provide a cost-effec research phase of the Joint Strike Fighter now tive unmanned military option by modifying has four versions: USAF, USN, US Marine some F-16C fighters into dual-role UCAVs. Corps, and a UCAV. Dr. Gene McCall, USAF The multirole F-16 is a combat-proven air-to- chief scientist, predicts that the last JSFs to air and air-to-ground fighter platform that roll off the factory line will be UCAVs.2 can perform all airpower missions with its ca Advancing technology, politics, and, most pability to carry almost all of the USAF bomb important, smaller military budgets may and missile inventory. Slightly modifying an eventually persuade the USAF to operate un F-16C for unmanned flight while maintaining manned lethal aircraft for most combat mis its manned flight capability gives the USAF sions in the future. Primarily because UCAV most of the advantages of UCAV operations “operators” conduct routine training in simu and reduces or eliminates many unmanned lators, DARPA and other aerospace compa flight concerns. A remotely piloted, dual-role nies have suggested that UCAVs will save 55 to F-16C UCAV can quickly provide a politically 80 percent in flight operations and support safe, cost-effective, and flexible unmanned costs compared to manned systems.3 Lower military option for US leadership. maintenance, training, and operation costs An important prerequisite for this F-16 are only some of the advantages of UCAVs UCAV idea is proving that the United States over traditional manned fighter aircraft. now needs an alternative to cruise missiles. Table 1 lists some UCAV advantages over Therefore, this article presents arguments on manned aircraft, and table 2 presents some why US leadership quickly needs an interim concerns for future UCAV operations. F-16 UCAVS 25 The USAF can overcome many UCAV con cerns with experience and development of safe procedures and doctrine. Some, espe cially the security and protection of the criti cal UCAV C2 links, may require new emerging technologies in communications such as data compression and data-burst transmissions. The USAF’s vision of the capabilities ex pected from future UCAVs is expressed in the following excerpt from the Air Force 2025 Strikestar executive summary: Tomahawk cruise missile In 2025, a stealthy UAV, we refer to as and recovery base could be struck, thus mini “Strikestar,” will be able to loiter over an area of mizing overseas basing needs.4 operations for 24 hours at a range of 3700 miles from launch base while carrying a payload of all-weather, precision weapons capable of vari ous effects. Holding a target area at continuous Reasons for an Interim UCAV risk from attack could result in the possibility of “air occupation.” Alternatively, by reducing loi As previously stated, it will take the USAF ter time, targets within 8500 miles of the launch decades to put advanced-technology UCAVs Table 1 Advantages of Future UCAVs over Manned Aircraft Vehicle Cheaper to build since pilot requirements such as cockpit controls and gauges, ejection Cost seat, oxygen, canopy, and pressurization are unnecessary. Saves about 10 percent on overall vehicle cost, including remote-control equipment. Some advantages negated by remote ground-station costs. Range and Longer flight times and ranges due to less drag and better engine placement without the Endurance canopy and cockpit. No human limits on flight-endurance time. Some UCAVs may fly fo r days over enemy territory. No Crew Risk No political risk from casualties or POWs. Can employ nonlethal weapons to put an enemy to sleep such as acoustic or brain-wave manipulation. Can operate in a nuclear, biological, or chemical environment with no risk to the pilot. Survivability Unmanned design without a canopy makes aircraft smaller and lowers radar cross section. Absence of humans permits high 10G-plus turns to avoid enemy missiles. Training Most training for UCAV operators is in simulators. No dependence on weather or mainte nance-ready aircraft. Periodic exercise participation such as Red Flags to test doctrine and manned-flight interface. Training and With only periodic flight training and little to no maintenance on the majority of“ stored” Support Costs UCAVs, there is a large reduction in peacetime training, fuel, and maintenance support costs. Personnel Fewer pilots and support personnel are needed. UCAV operators can fly numerous UCAV sorties sequentially or at the same time. With few training flights, fewer maintenance personnel and less equipment are required. 26 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2000 Table 2 Future UCAV Concerns Datalink 1. Loss of control due to enemy jamming or signal manipulation Communica 2. Long connectivity lapses due to distance, satellite location, or friendly mutual interference tions 3. Limited amount of frequency bandwidths to accommodate large numbers of secure links for multiple UCAV operations Air Refueling 1. Transoceanic deployment distances and communications 2. Risk to KC-135 or KC-10 high-value assets 3. Tanker joinup and multiaircraft air refueling Operator 1. Number of aircraft per operator or operators per aircraft Situational 2. Air traffic control (ATC) and enemy airspace deconfliction from other aircraft Awareness 3. Threat reactions for visual antiaircraft artillery, infrared surface-to-air missiles, or enemy aircraft Emergencies 1. Less capability to rapidly assess and correct aircraft problems 2. Unable to see damage, feel small vibrations, or smell smoke 3. UAV-capable alternate airfield recove ry due to fuel or weather into operational status. So why spend money advantages to UCAVs overcome some cruise- on an interim UCAV? Cruise missile advo missile limitations. cates argue that improvements to the sea- launched Tomahawk and the air-launched Political AGM-86 can handle high-risk missions for the UCAVs provide US political leadership another next 20 years. However, even the improved military-instrument-of-power option that will versions of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles not risk American lives. In smaller-scale con will still have some target limitations, and the flicts, the threat of losing a pilot and––even more expensive costs for hard-target penetra worse politically––the prospect of the enemy tion and reprogramming may restrict their holding a POW have motivated President Bill numbers. In addition to cruise missiles, Air Clinton to rely primarily on cruise missiles Force planners point out that new “standoff” for post–Desert Storm standoffs against Iraq launch-and-leave weapons such as the joint or for retribution against terrorism. The over- standoff weapon (JSOW) and the joint air-to- whelming national response to the Scott surface standoff missile (JASSM) can destroy O’Grady shootdown and the size and com targets without risking lives. Although these plexity of his rescue have reinforced the value expensive standoff weapons do put the air- of a single human life in military missions to crew farther from the target area at release, the president and Congress. For example, the they may still expose the aircrew to enemy Washington Post ran a front-page story for threats outside the immediate target area. three straight days after the O’Grady shoot- There are political, economic, and military down. Yet, two months later when two Preda reasons why the United States should imme tor UAVs were lost over Bosnia, the same diately take steps to reap the advantages of newspaper devoted only one small back-page UCAVs over manned aircraft. Although polit article.5 ical advantages are inherent to both UCAVs Trying to plan effective and efficient mili and cruise missiles, the economic and military tary missions with zero loss of life is the almost F-16 UCAVS 27 impossible task given to military planners With unmanned aircraft, another eco today. Not only will UCAVs give war planners nomic benefit is the reduced requirement for more options, the capabilities of UCAVs to combat search and rescue (CSAR) resources. strike all types of targets without loss of life Not only high operational costs but also high represent an important deterrent to US ene mies. A combination of UCAVs and cruise missiles will better enforce United Nations An interim UCAV can carry a variety of (UN) resolutions against tyrants such as Sad- ordnance to destroy most enemy targets, dam Hussein or Gen Ratko Mladic, the Bos and with “semiautonomous” flight, a nian Serb commander who remarked that human operator can identify the target “the Western countries have learned they can- area and consent to ordnance release. not recruit their own children to realize goals outside their homelands.”6 Economic temporary duty (TDY) rates affecting quality- of-life issues are continuous USAF concerns Reusability is one of the key advantages of in maintaining a CSAR alert force for the UN UCAVs over expendable cruise missiles. Tom and NATO missions in Iraq and Bosnia. ahawk cruise missiles today cost between 1.1 and 1.2 million dollars per shot, with over 250 Military launched in the first week of Desert Storm alone.7 In contrast, a five-million-dollar re- Long-range sea- and air-launched cruise mis conditioned “boneyard” F-16 converted into a siles will always remain an important capabil UCAV would become more cost-effective ity for the US military because of survivability than a cruise missile in fewer than eight and no requirements for forward basing. flights, adding a conservative three million However, cruise missiles currently have ord dollars for bombs, fuel, and one year of main nance limitations that restrict them to attack tenance support. It is important that a UCAV ing only fixed-position “soft” targets. Another is survivable for repeated missions, or it limitation due to the cruise missile’s full au quickly becomes a very expensive cruise mis tomation is the lack of man-in-the-loop target sile. Nonstealth UCAVs may need SEAD to identification and consent for release of survive a high-threat area with numerous sur weapons. On the other hand, an interim face-to-air missiles (SAM), or they may re- UCAV can carry a variety of ordnance to de quire air-escort protection through areas stroy most enemy targets, and with “semiau without air superiority. tonomous” flight, a human operator can By modifying existing or retired fighter or identify the target area and consent to ord bomber airframes into unmanned remotely nance release. In addition to increased target piloted aircraft, the USAF can have an in selection, other important military reasons to terim UCAV program that saves the expensive operate an interim UCAV include man-in-the- research and development costs associated loop target verification and an improved tran with a new aircraft. New technology is not sition to an unmanned Air Force. needed to modify an existing airframe into Target Selection. One advantage of a an interim UCAV––only inexpensive off-the- UCAV over today’s cruise missile is its ability shelf systems. The USAF will realize addi to deliver a variety of ordnance. Currently, tional cost savings at the end of the interim cruise missiles can carry only a thousand- pound explosive or about six hundred base- UCAV program since Tyndall AFB, Florida, ball-sized “grenades.” These ordnance loads can use the retired UCAVs for air-to-air mis restrict military planners today to a single sile testing and save the current conversion “soft” enemy target such as a radar dish or un expense of turning boneyard fighters into sheltered aircraft. In addition, even if some target drones. 28 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2000 UCAV the ability to destroy targets in any weather condition. Mobile Scud missile launchers, SA-6 SAM sites, or columns of tanks are not viable tar- gets for a cruise missile because its accuracy depends on the programming of correct tar- get coordinates before launch. However, an F- 16C UCAV could use its GPS, radar in the ground moving target (GMT) mode, and the forward looking infrared radar (FLIR) target ing pod to find moving vehicles on which to drop five-hundred-pound laser-guided bombs (LGB) or shoot Maverick missiles. In Desert Storm, a moving vehicle was the easiest to Iraqi bunker destroyed bya laser-guided bomb find and destroy since it was not buried in sand for protection or camouflaged to pre- vent identification. An unmanned F-16C car future cruise missiles are capable of in-flight rying GBU-12s can work with a joint surveil- target reprogramming, they will still have dif lance, target attack radar system (JSTARS) ficulty hitting moving targets such as armored aircraft for real-time target position updates vehicles. to quickly destroy up to six moving vehicles. Air Force Systems Command is aware of Man-in-the-Loop Target Verification. Even the soft-target limitation and is planning to with terrain updates and target photo match test AGM-86C cruise missiles with a thousand- ing, a cruise missile does not always find the pound penetrating warhead in hopes of pro correct target. Mechanical errors such as a viding this capability in two to three years.8 drifting inertial navigation system (INS), loss However, these advanced cruise missiles have of GPS signal, or human errors in entering new terminal seekers that have not yet been the wrong target coordinates always put some verified to be as accurate as current laser- or doubt in the launcher’s mind. Without real- TV-guided bombs. A successful attack on a time target validation just prior to bomb re- small hardened bunker or underground fa lease, many potential targets located near po cility usually requires a three-meter or less cir cular error probable (CEP) for “air vent ac litically unacceptable areas such as hospitals, curacy” and may require more bomb weight schools, or residential neighborhoods may re- for deeply buried targets. For many “hard main untouched. An interim UCAV, however, ened” targets, the Joint Munitions Effectiveness with man-in-the loop semiautonomous flight Manuals (JMEM) require near-simultaneous, control can identify the target area and con- multiple two-thousand-pound bombs for de sent to ordnance release. The ground remote- struction, much more than a cruise missile’s control operator receives real-time optical, in single penetrating thousand-pound warhead. frared, or radar-mapping pictures of the On the other hand, a UCAV-modified F-16C target area and sends back, if needed, target can fly the necessary altitudes, airspeeds, and position updates or corrections. When the dive angles to deliver the right ordnance to human operator verifies that the unmanned destroy most enemy target types––for exam aircraft is attacking the correct target, con- ple, the target-penetrating two-thousand- sent to release weapons is sent to the UCAV. pound, steel-encased, GBU-24I laser-guided Even manned systems with enemy target bomb. Reprogramming target coordinates in identification technology are not completely the air with the new joint direct attack muni reliable. For example, in Desert Storm an tion (JDAM) or Global Positioning System errant high-speed antiradiation missile (GPS)-guided JSOWs give a future interim (HARM) from an F-4G guided towards the F-16 UCAVS 29 tail of a B-52, and the US Navy fired on one of UCAV systems. For example, the Federal Avi its own aircraft. Until the US military is com ation Administration (FAA) has been avoid fortable that artificial-intelligence weapon sys ing control and deconfliction of UAVs and tems will not kill friendly troops, man-in-the- civilian air traffic for years. The operational loop control will allow unmanned systems in fielding of the Predator and its peacetime the interim more flexibility in combat mis training requirements in US airspace have sions. Unlike cruise missiles with one mission forced the FAA to begin seriously working un (strategic attack), UCAVs carrying a variety of manned-aircraft issues.9 ordnance with man-in-the-loop control can conceivably fly SEAD, battlefield air interdic F-16C UCAV tion (BAI), and offensive counterair (OCA) missions. Later, with more interim UCAV ex With years of experience turning moth- perience and acceptance, the USAF may balled fighters into full-scale target drones, allow missions to expand to close air support remote-control engineers can convert any of (CAS) and defensive counterair (DCA). the US military’s aircraft for unmanned One more consideration for a UCAV man- flight. So why is the F-16 the best candidate in-the-loop control system is its ability to de- for an interim UCAV? Because the F-16 is a fend itself if attacked. Although cruise mis multirole fighter, it performs all USAF mis siles rely on small size and radar cross section sions such as SEAD, DCA, OCA, killer scout, to survive to the target area, slow subsonic deep strike, interdiction, and CAS. No other speeds and better radar technology are be- current aircraft in the US military can ex coming cruise-missile survival concerns to the plore unmanned doctrine in so many areas of USAF. Since air defense exercises of the air combat. Not only are the F-16s compara North American Aerospace Defense Com tively inexpensive aircraft weapons systems to mand (NORAD) routinely practice F-16 and procure and operate, they are more numer F-15 air intercepts to destroy simulated ous than all other interim UCAV candidates enemy cruise missiles, the US military must combined, including the A-10, F-15E, F-117, believe that future radars can detect and send B-1, and B-52. This would help the F-16 com modern aircraft such as the Su-27 Flanker or munity better absorb an initial testing or op the Mirage 2000 to destroy defenseless sub- erational mission loss versus a more expen sonic US cruise missiles. An interim UCAV sive and less numerous high-value asset such fighter, however, can carry advanced medium- as an F-117 or F-15E. The small size and supe range, air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM) for pro rior maneuverability of the F-16 also increase tection and use man-in-the-loop control to its survivability over larger bombers such as help prevent fratricide. With enemy aircraft the B-1 or B-52. confirmation from the airborne warning and An interesting interim UCAV solution of control system (AWACS) or Rivet Joint air- fered by Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft craft, a future war may produce the first Systems (LMTAS) is to modify older F-16A ground-station remote-control-operator “aces.” jets baking in the Arizona sun at the Davis- Transition to the “Pilotless” Air Force. Monthan AFB boneyard into remotely pi Technological advances, funding, and politi loted UCAVs. However, this interim UCAV cal pressures may eventually force most com proposal must overcome critical hardware bat aircraft that fly over enemy territory to be problems with the F-16A and the high cost of pilotless by the mid-twenty-first century. An implementing a new weapons system into the interim UCAV program will help ease this USAF inventory. Designed in the early 1970s, transition by exposing pilots to the distinct F-16A models have no night or precision advantages of unmanned flight and, more im ordnance capability except for the AGM-65 portantly, by working out many of the “bugs” Maverick missile. To update its antiquated for implementation of advanced-technology avionics to current F-16C ordnance and main- 30 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL SPRING 2000 F-16As in storage at Davis-Monthan AFB,Tucson, Arizona tenance standards may require up to five mil- Design Modifications lion dollars per aircraft. In addition, the To give an F-16C a part-time UCAV capability USAF does not have the money or personnel requires two areas of modification: flight con resources during a pilot shortage to quickly trols and communications. Engineers need to bring an F-16A-model UCAV program to op incorporate an auto-throttle and auto-land erational status. capability into the flight controls similar to To avoid many of the problems and costs the design proposal for the Block 60 F-16. Ad associated with the LMTAS F-16A UCAV pro ditional communications equipment for the posal, another F-16 UCAV option is to modify F-16C is needed for remote-control opera currently flying Block 40 and 50 F-16Cs into tions and sensor feedback to the ground op “dual-role” manned and UCAV aircraft. A erator. Lockheed has already designed a com dual-role F-16 will retain all of its original munications satellite (SATCOM)-equipped manned fighter capability with the addition F-16 for international customers. One possi of less than three hundred pounds of remote- ble location for engineers to put additional control and communications equipment. If datalink hardware is in the vertical fin base called upon to perform its unmanned role, originally designed to hold the canceled the UCAV aircraft is immediately available with no additional maintenance. Initially, the USAF airborne self-protection jammer USAF should convert only four to six jets in (ASPJ) internal electronic warfare (EW) proj selected operational low-altitude navigation ect. Rough estimates from QF-4 conversion and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) experts put basic F-16 UCAV flight control system and SEAD F-16C squadrons into dual- and auto-landing recurring costs at three role UCAV aircraft. This will reduce initial hundred to four hundred thousand dollars.10 program costs and ease the transition to un Adding SATCOM and additional secure manned aircraft operations by training only a datalinks and antennas would add two hun few pilots and maintenance personnel in dred to three hundred thousand dollars of re dual-role operations and support. As un curring costs. manned flight operations and support be- If the UCAV mission required additional come more routine, additional squadron air- combat range, maintenance can remove the craft can convert to dual-role status and more seat and replace it with a twenty-three-hundred- pilots and maintenance personnel can cross- pound cockpit fuel tank in a matter of hours. train into the program. If future unmanned missions require F-16C
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