Table Of Content

Airpower and Political Culture COL CH ARLES M. WESTENHOFF, USAF A IRP OWER1 IS THE most respon sive and, in many ways, the most useful role democratic insti tu tions and value sys form of mili tary force yet de vel oped. tems play in the devel op ment and employ Inc reasi ngly, airpower demons trates ment of airpower. the capac ity to dominate warfare, yet varia West ern democ ra cies have evolved a dis tions in its effect iven ess show that air forces tinc tive and dominant secu rity insti tu tion, rarely achieve their mate rial poten tial. The the national air force. Authoritar ian regimes great success with which liberal democ ra cies have only occas iona lly imitated such arms have employed air forces as instru ments of and then could not trust them.2 The in ter re la power is most easily attrib uted to asymmet ri tion ship between democ racy and effect ive cal wealth, but this under stand ing misses the 39 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1997 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1997 to 00-00-1997 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Airpower and Political Culture 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Air and Space Power Journal,155 N. Twining St,Maxwell REPORT NUMBER AFB,AL,36112-6026 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 12 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 40 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1997 “Airpower is the most responsive and, in many ways, the most useful form of military force yet developed.” air power has both current and future signifi of their regimes. Even techni cally adept cance. authori tar ian states demon strate this ten Air power effect iven ess clearly depends on dency. The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany train ing, equipment, organiz at ion, and strat de voted consid er able resources (largely in egy, but com para tive stud ies of air power tend coll abor at ion) to develop airpower in the to focus on just techni cal and mater ial fac- 1930s. While they devel oped advanced air tors.3 So cial, po liti cal, and or gan iza tional fac arms for the time, these gov ern ments also im tors can also deter mine air pow er’s value as an paired these forces with doctrines that im in stru ment of power, either amplif yi ng or at proved their ad her ence to the ex clu sive party tenu at ing its mate rial poten tial. Scholarly in power but curbed their serv ice to the state.5 stud ies of the sensi tiv ity of military power to Re cent wars provide further and clearer evi po liti cal culture tend to focus on armies4—the dence of this trend. arms of conquest prized by authoritar ian Evi dence from recent wars indi cates that states—so there is much to learn in this field, the sensi tiv ity of air power to po liti cal cul ture far more than one brief arti cle can disclose. per sists. The 1991 Gulf War exhibi ted a stark Authorit ari an states have repeate dly found con trast between authoritar ian and demo air pow er’s util ity as an in stru ment of the state cratic air effec tive ness, but mate rial factors lim ited by their politi cal insti tu tions, often alone might have de ter mined the out come in gain ing only a small re turn for their air power this case. Regardl ess, the might and exqui site in vest ments. Some have even found their mili tary compe tence of the coali tion air op mili tary treas ure work ing against the in ter ests era tion overshad owed the effects of politi cal AIRPOWER AND POLITICAL CULTURE 41 cul ture on Iraqi air op era tions. A more ap pro tor in this de cline, but not the only one. (Iraq pria te case for illu mi nat ing how modern air- also suffered from withdrawal of aid. The So power oper ates in the hands of authoritar ian viet Union embar goed military shipments to lead ers is the Iran-Iraq War, the longest con vent ional war of this century.6 Social, political, and organizational factors can also determine Iran’s Islamic airpower’s value as an instrument Revolutionary Regime of power, either amplifying or attenuating its material potential. When Teheran’s Islamic revolu tion ary gov ern ment came to power, it quickly im posed politi cal controls over the exist ing mili tary elite. These controls particu larly af fected the Shah’s fa vored mili tary arm, the air Iraq soon af ter the war be gan, al though it qui force. Until 1979 the Impe rial Iranian Air etly resumed them in 1982.)9 The extreme Force, largely modeled after the US Air Force, hos til ity of the Khomeini regime to the most had been a major force in the Middle East. It in dus tri al ized states—the major arms suppli at ro phied quickly after it was reor gan ized as ers—iso lated Iran and signifi cantly compli the Islamic Iranian Air Force. Iran’s Western- cated its war ef fort. But sus pi cion and ten sion trained airmen chafed under increas ing re be tween Iran’s politi cal elite and its air force stric tions and be gan de fect ing. Re pres sion led proved the most corro sive influ ence on Ira to defect ion in a descend ing spiral; the most nian airpower. Tehe ran contin ued to impose emi nent defec tor was Iran’s president Bani- re stric tions on its available airpower as the Sadr in June of 1981 in the com pany of a colo Iran- Iraq War pro gressed. In the fi nal months nel of the Islamic Iranian Air Force. By 1982, of the war, Baghdad reported daily sorties in over 180 pi lots had de fected, many with their the hundreds, while Teheran’s war bullet ins air craft. They reported that they were forced re ported only a handful (and magni fied the to fly without Identification-Friend- or-F oe me dia signa ture of the few daily sorties by (IFF) equip ment, which re sulted in 55 Ira nian broadc asti ng the times they had been over air craft be ing lost to frat ri cide.7 Air craft main their targets).10 Finally, in the ulti mate dem on stra tion of its mistrust, Tehe ran founded a te nance was poor, but politi cal secu rity meas ri val air force within its Islamic paral lel ures took an even greater toll on Iranian air armed force, the funda men tal ist Revolu tion op era tions. A commit tee of three relig ious authori ties was appointed to oversee air op ary Guards (Pasda ran).11 erat ions. Aircrew members were searched before each mis sion, crews were given the mini- Iraq’s Baathist Regime mum fuel thought neces sary for the assigned mis sion, and aircrew members, instead of be The near-complete failure of the Iraqi air ing allowed to plan their missions, were is- force in 1991 has lured many commen ta tors sued flight plans just before takeoff.8 to conclude inac cu rately that this was an im The measures Tehe ran imposed on its air po tent force.12 In actu al ity, during the eight- forces contin ued to erode combat effec tive year course of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi air ness throughout the war. Iranian air efforts force devel oped into a regiona lly dominant peaked in the first few weeks of the war and threat.13 Still, despite invest ing in the mate ri dec lined steadily thereaft er. The isola tion of als of air strength, Baghdad harvested only Iran’s Islamic revolut iona ry regime and the part of the po ten tial gains avail able to it even dif fi cul ties it expe ri enced in obtain ing re- when fight ing Te he ran—largely for non ma te place ment parts and equipment was one fac rial reasons. 42 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1997 Mili ta rized states tend to design their avoid ance or a strateg ic oversight, but it ac armed forces not for war fight ing but for coup corded with each regi me’s priori ty on inter prev ent ion. The autonomous oper at ing char nal control. Saddam Hussein’s decla ra tion act eri st ics and concent rat ion of lethal power that he would disre gard Western analysts’ in her ent in air forces have been key to the criti cisms of his use of airpower corre out comes of coups in Guate mala (1954), sponded to his strateg ic overcon fi dence.20 Chile (1972), and the Philip pines (1989). Once the Iran-Iraq War began, Iraqi air Iraq’s Baathist regime had histori cal reasons com mand ers were punished for aircraft to fear the military—and the air force in par losses regard less of damage inflicted on the ticu lar. The Iraqi air force had been instru en emy. Optim ist ic reporti ng was rewarded men tal in several regime changes, includ ing and unfa vor able yet accur ate reporti ng pun- the 1936 coup and the 1958 repub li can revo ished.21 The regime acted against its own in lu tion. The Baath party launched its first coup ter ests when it attempted to gain better re in Februa ry 1963 by captur ing and execut ing sults by commit ting the Iraqi air force to the commander of the Iraqi air force.14 That bat tle piecemeal, which increased its losses gov ern ment, which brought Sad dam Hussein and reduced its accom plish ments.22 his first posi tion of power, lasted eight De spite these impo si tions on its employ months. In Novem ber 1963, the military re ment, the Iraqi air force, exposed for eight volted from the Baath party, se cur ing its coup years to the pitiless reali ties of combat, be- with an air force attack on the Baghdad head came one of the most techni cally expe ri quar ters of the Baath National Guard.15 The enced combat forces in the world in the Baath party returned to power in 1968 in yet 1980s. It steadily acquired new equipment, an other military coup led by Ahmad Hasan and its pi lots ac cu mu lated com bat prac tice in al- Bakr and se cured by a purge of the mili tary ad vanced techniques such as aerial refu el ing or ches trated by his chief of secur ity, Saddam and the use of precision-guided muni tions.23 Hussein. But with each advance in its capa bili ties, the Sad dam Hussein pushed President Bakr Iraqi air force posed a greater threat to the aside in 1979. Within a week of assum ing Baathist regime. power, he claimed to have dis cov ered a “con The assessm ent that “this is a war Iraq can spir acy” among the military and then exe not win and Iran can not lose” had become a cuted the accused before a month had cli ché by 1988, when Iraq launched a se ries of passed.16 Saddam Hussein purged all of the of fen sives and the course of the war changed armed services but devoted particul ar atten dra mati cally.24 Iraq success fully exploited tion to the Iraqi air force. Members hip in the three crucial differ en tials to stave off defeat Baath party became a prereq ui site for atten for seven years and eventu ally exhaust the dance at the Iraqi Air Force Acad emy. Sad dam Khomeini regime. First, Iraq possessed a net- Hussein fur ther tight ened his con trol by mov work of roads and railroads paral lel ing the ing the acad emy to his home town of Tikrit.17 bor der—what Jomini termed in te rior lines. When Iraq began its war against Iran in These lines of commu ni ca tion allowed Sad- Sept emb er 1980, it copied Israel’s 1967 strat dam Hussein to move re in force ments to limit egy—at tack ing all of the impor tant Ira nian air or reverse any Iranian attack.25 Second, Iraq bases on the first day—even though Iran had ex panded its air force and em ployed it to buy foll owed the lead of NATO states by con time while rein force ments moved when nec struct ing hardened aircraft shelters in the es sary.26 Third, and most impor tant, Iraq 1970s.18 Iran responded with a similar one- bene fited from gener ous loans and terms of pulse attack on Iraq’s air bases.19 Yet neither credit provided by Eastern as well as Western state persisted in its efforts to eliminate or sources. This allowed Iraq to invest in mod- even signific antly contain the opposi ng air ern mili tary tech nol ogy. Not sur pris ingly, the force after the opening days. Western ers tools of modern airpower were a top prior- might charac ter ize this omission as risk ity.27 However, Iraq’s repres sion of its air AIRPOWER AND POLITICAL CULTURE 43 force and its concent rat ion on ground de fen tion for dis loy alty and, by some ac counts, ac sive opera tions until 1988 had the effect of cu sa tions of disloy alty, was (and presumab ly curb ing the po ten tial of its abun dant mili tary re mains) death. A central aim of all of these hard ware. ef forts was to increase the secu rity of the re Al though Iraqi airpower may not have gime by politi ciz ing Iraq’s armed forces.32 been fully ex ploited to gain vic tory, it at least As the rest of the world was enter ing the pre vented de feat by play ing an in dis pen sa ble “in for ma tion age,” Iraq devel oped perva sive role in contain ing Iranian offens ives and pre- meas ures to control infor ma tion (which vent ing break outs from 1981 through 1988.28 even tu ally had debili tat ing effects on the Iraq’s air effort in this first Gulf War dwarfed Iraqi military in the 1991 Gulf War). Tele that of the coali tion in the 1991 Gulf War phones, radio receiv ers, copiers, comput ers, (400,000 sorties versus 110,000).29 By 1988, and typewrit ers had to be regis tered with the the Iraqi air force probably had more resident state. Cameras could be purchased, but pho comb at expe ri ence than all of the remaini ng tog ra phy was pro hib ited with out writ ten per air forces in the world combined. But Iraq’s mis sion from the inter ior minis try. Foreign Baathist elite carefully controlled this most pub li ca tions were prohib ited; Baghdad’s five po tent instru ment of exter nal power, unable news pa pers were all govern ment organs, as to assume it would remain loyal. In summa were its broadcast ing stations. Weather fore- tion, while the Iraqi air force was suffi ciently casts were state secrets; even current weather well em ployed to stave off de feat at the hands re ports were forbidd en to be published or of an impov er ished Iranian army, the penal- broad cast throughout the course of the Iran- ties im posed by the re stric tions it suf fered un Iraq War because of their possi ble value to der were made clear when it faced coalit ion Ira nian military planners.33 air forces in 1991. Iraqi offi cials echoed Iranian practices in the Iran-Iraq War by provid ing aircrews with their flight plans at the last minute and for- The Contest between Security bid ding mission debrief ings.34 The regime and Airpower also deemed it better to forgo the poten tial syn ergy available from coor di nat ing air and The particul ar philoso phies and goals of land opera tions rather than risk collabo ra authori tar ian states can be as differ ent as tion, so the Iraqi army and air force were pro North Korean juche and fascism, but states hib ited from co or di nat ing their ef forts.35 This that are systemic ally opposed to liberal de pro hi bi tion dangero usly slowed the collec moc racy often share many common fea tures. tive reac tion to Iran’s summer 1986 Karb ala Chief among these are concen tra tion of of fen sive, which penetrated so far into Iraq power in a sin gle “po liti cal party,” some form that it tempo rar ily closed the Baghdad- of national mobi li za tion, and secu rity mea Basrah highway.36 sures de signed to elimi nate op po si tion. In flu Iraqi airpower contrib uted anemi cally to enced largely by “fascism, Nazism and Stalin the battle field, but achieved eye-catching ism,” Iraqi Baathism illust rates the contem stra te gic successes against Iran. Long-range po rary “state of the art” other authoritar ian at tacks on pinpoint targets such as the Neka re gimes and fu ture suc ces sors can as pire to.30 power plant on the Caspian Sea coast, Larak Few if any states have erected inform at ion Is land in the Straits of Hormuz, the Bushehr con trol mechanisms to rival those installed nu clear plant, and satel lite commu ni ca tions fol low ing Iraq’s Baathist revolu tion of 1968. sta tions near Hama dan demon strated the in Un der Baath party leader ship, the military creas ing skill and techni cal sophist ic at ion of and the inter ior minist ry devel oped as many the Iraqi air force from 1986 on.37 Yet Iraqi air as eight separate but inter lock ing secur ity op era tions contin ued to follow the same im serv ices to moni tor the popu la tion as a whole prac ti cal pattern that plagued Iraq’s original and report on the others.31 The single sanc air effort of Septem ber 1980. Iraq certainly 44 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1997 had the military potent ial to gain the advan The secu rity measures imposed on the tages it ac crued by August 1988 at a faster rate. Iraqi and Ira nian air forces by their re spec tive The tempo of ef fort may have been slowed by gov ern ments attenu ated the poten tial of lim it ing the role of airmen in air planning; it these forces to a degree that would be viewed most certainly was affected by basing the as intol er able by the people and the military most effec tive aircraft far from the militar ily pro fes sion als sworn to protect the people in opt im um site—Iraq’s geographic and techni con tem po rary Western states. The luxury of cal cen ter of Bagh dad.38 While it im paired in con cord in public discourse enjoyed by ter nal air force commun ic at ions and techni authori tar ian regimes comes at an immense cal inter changes, the posit ioni ng of Iraq’s price in ac cu rate knowl edge and the feed back most potent com bat air craft at out ly ing bases nec es sary to tune govern ment opera tions. re duced the risks of their use against the re Poli ti cized armed forces, compelled to filter gime. Iraqi air forces also rarely flew in large and mis re port in for ma tion, lose ef fec tive ness for ma tions (and when large forma tions flew as in stru ments of the state. The re sults of ma to gether they were un armed) to elimi nate the nipu la tion continue in operat ion, gaining risk of a large force contrib ut ing to a coup. lay ers of effects. Natural errors may be statis This spilled over into the Gulf War of 1991, ti cally distrib uted and self-canceling in open elimin ati ng Iraq’s most worri some offen sive sys tems, but imposed biases block such self- op tion.39 All these factors confirm the ap regulation. All the armed forces of authori tar praisal offered by Anthony Cordes man that ian states are clearly affected as military in the Iraqi air force was “organ ized and de strum ents by inform at ion distor tion, restric ployed to prevent its use in a coup.”40 That is, tion of dialogue, and lack of access to it was fragmented and enmeshed in secur ity ob jec tive sources of feedback.41 These factors pro ce dures that limited its contri bu tions to im pede air forces disprop ort iona tely. the war effort. The losses that authoritar ian regimes sus tain by impos ing ex ces sive se cu rity meas ures on their armed forces are propor tional to the Airpower and Values mili tary possi bili ties they curtail. Air forces can attack opposi ng navies, air forces, or ar Elabo rate secu rity measures like those im mies with great im me di acy and ef fec tive ness. posed by Iran and Iraq have clear costs, yet They can also attack national war-sustaining these two ideologic ally opposed ruling elites means and may destroy or inca paci tate spe each deemed them neces sary to the regim e’s cific stra te gic func tions such as in ter nal com safety. Shifting military priori ties from war- mu ni ca tions or transport at ion. The array of fighting effect iven ess to inter nal stabil ity can airp owe r’s imme di ate possi bili ties magni fies have debilit ati ng effects. the oppor tu nity costs of misap pli ca tion and As these recent exam ples demon strate, ac cen tu ates the impor tance of air strategy. state value systems may bound modern mili In both Iran and Iraq, air strategies appear tary capa bili ties. Rigid command and direc to have been devised by ruling elites who for- tion tend to marginal ize air forces as instru bade or dismissed the advice of expe ri enced ments of war; each advance in capa bil ity that air men. It is impos si ble to say if Iran’s relig might compen sate for inef fi cient organi za ious authorities who oversaw air opera tions tion makes a repres sive state’s air force more had any un der stand ing of the po ten tial of air- threate ni ng to the regime it was intended to power, but the measures they imposed indi serve. The values and doctrines required to cate igno rance of, if not hostil ity to, the re- fully develop and harness the potent ial of sources at their dis posal. Fly ing mode rn air power clash with those val ues and then- irreplaceable aircraft without opera ti ng mechan isms of state control favored by un IFF equipment subjected Iranian airmen to popul ar or repres sive regimes, as the remain con tinu ous attack from both Iraqi and Ira der of this artic le explains. nian forces. Oper at ing aircraft supplied with AIRPOWER AND POLITICAL CULTURE 45 only a minimum of fuel—with no reserve for mu ni ca tions inadv ert ently sacrif ice exter nal the va ga ries of weather, ma neu ver ing, en emy mili tary secu rity. act ion, or disori en ta tion—guar an teed need - less losses of irre place able assets. Likewise, Bagh dad’s tenuous applic at ion of its air force “While Saddam Hussein could rely may have stretched out the Iran-Iraq War on like-thinking unsophisticates need lessly. And the awkward loca tions of from his home town of Tikrit to run Iraq’s air bases and Baghdad’s restric tions on his army, finding equally joint army–air force planning certainly cost doctrinaire individuals who could sol diers their lives and metered results. Pro also fly an airplane was a far more fess ional airmen in both nations must have difficult task.” un der stood many of these errors but lacked aven ues to commu ni cate even basic profes sional advice to those in authority. The under stand ing required to develop and effec tively employ military aviation is The airman’s appe tite for perti nent infor tech ni cal more than politi cal. However, pro ma tion is specific but vora cious in those par fes sional air men tend to be cos mo poli tan, ex- ticul ar areas of profes sional need; the air posed to Western educat ion, and accus tomed plan ner’s needs are syn op tic. Ac cu rate re port to thinking rigor ously—at least about matters ing is im por tant to any mili tary branch; to the aff ecti ng their survival. Iranian airmen were air man it is a pers onal prior ity.44 Inform at ion trained in the United States until 1979, while dis tri bu tion is a pre dict able source of ten sion Iraqi airmen traced their tradi tions to Brit be tween the power elites and the airmen of ain’s Royal Air Force and were trained in sev cen trist states. So cie ties ruled by tight con trol eral European loca tions in the 1980s.42 of infor ma tion cannot toler ate indi vid ual ac Authori tar ian or xenopho bic govern ments cess to infor ma tion, free media, or free may clas sify air men as a po ten tially threat en speech. This creates a natural tension with ing group. As Richard Hallion observed, the survival values and infor ma tion require “While Saddam Hussein could rely on like- ments of aviators. thinking un so phis ti cates from his home town All types of forces benefit from socie ties of Tikrit to run his army, find ing equally doc that permit free speech, free compet it ion, trin aire indi vidu als who could also fly an air- and free markets, but air forces exploit these plane was a far more dif fi cult task. (Hit ler and free doms in unique ways. Un like sol diers and Go er ing had the same prob lem with the Luft sail ors, aircrews possess the potent ial to at - waffe in the Second World War.)”43 tack any target within an immense radius Dis torted inform at ion can be a death sen each time they fly. This power is con cen trated tence on any sor tie. An ac cu rate and thor ough in indi vidu als and small crews. Army forces pref light briefing arms airmen to minimize ca pa ble of signifi cant action consist of hun risks, affords them the ability to adapt to un dreds or thousands of indi vidu als, none of fores een circum stances, and helps them to whom can radically depart from authorita work together when flying in forma tion. But tive norms. Similarly, naval vessels are to an air force as a body, debrief ings are even crewed by large numbers, and—while a “Red more impor tant. Debrief ings permit organi Oc to ber” mu tiny is theo reti cally pos si ble—no za tions to accu mu late knowledge, to cease ship (much less a fleet) is likely to be used to mak ing errors when they are first discerned, dis place a govern ment. Centrally controlled to ac quire vi cari ous knowl edge that can bene re gimes typically compen sate for this con fit the whole force, and to hone military ca pa cen tra tion of power in in di vid ual com bat ants bili ties. Debriefi ngs also begin the process of by select ing and advanci ng airmen based on feed back to national deci sion makers. Re their politi cal reli abil ity rather than their gimes that restrict construc tive inter nal com mili tary com pe tence, but this fur ther re duces 46 AIRPOWER JOURNAL WINTER 1997 the utility of the air forces they acquire. For as their source of power and their re spon si bil ex am ple, if the primary crite rion for en ter ing ity to safe guard. Stra te gi cally, gain ing con trol an air arm is red hair, those with the red dest of of the air has proven essen tial in every cam hair would be the top candi dates, and there paign of World War II and every inter state would be a cutoff at some degree of redness— war since. The method of gaining lasting re gard less of whether hair color in di cates skill advan tage in air operat ions—des troyi ng the or fitness to serve.45 Even with such select ion en emy air force, pref era bly on the prac tices, un popu lar or in se cure elites can not ground—seems from the evi dence of the 1991 af ford to trust that their airmen are free of in Gulf War to be increas ingly impor tant. This fect ion from Western ideas. les son has not been missed in Russia, which West ern air forces gain advan tages stem beg an its suppres sion of the Chechen rebel- ming from in for ma tion shar ing, the un bi ased lion by destroy ing the two hundred aircraft com pe ti tion of ideas, scien tific objec tiv ity in avail able to the rebels (who were led by the syst ems devel op ment and testing, and indi former bomber pilot Dzokhar Dudayev) in vid ual initia tive. These advan tages are likely the first day of opera tions. to re main un chal lenged by states that de pend Such a promisi ng strategy is unlikely to be for their secu rity on infor ma tion control and ig nored by re pres sive states, but the Iran- Iraq ma nipu la tion. The progres sive expect at ion War expe ri ence reveals some insti tu tional that knowledge ac cu mu lates to the benefit of impedi ments faced by authoritar ian regimes the many is similarly unlikely to benefit re in attempt ing to gain an air advan tage. In- pres sive regimes. But perhaps the most effec stead of attempt ing to gain air ascend ancy, tive value differe nt ial curbing hostile use of Iran and Iraq contin ued to attack politi cally air power is that Western forces are assumed sym bolic targets throughout their war. The to serve soci ety, not the ruling elite. sim plest expla na tion of this behav ior, proposed by a number of analysts, is that neither Baghd ad nor Tehe ran was willing to risk its Influences of Political Culture most flexible offen sive tool merely to shield its people.47 Instead, these centrist regimes on Airpower Doctrine strove to maintain control of the offens ive and Strategy po ten tial of airpower, meter ing air opera tions to prevent coup attempts and preserv Iran and Iraq used their air forces as terror ing it in case it might be needed to repress in weap ons and aped Adolf Hitler in apply ing ter nal foes. mis siles to the same job. The use of air forces One more po liti cal dif fer en tial stems from for ter ror was avail able from the first. It be gan the varied purposes states assign to their air with Ger man zep pe lin at tacks on Lon don and forces. Instead of de sign ing their air forces to other British cities early in World War I. Brit pro tect their people and disarm aggres sors, ain’s strat egy in re sponse was penned by Win authori tar ian regimes tend to see airpower as ston Churchill in a series of memoranda of an adjunct to their arm of conquest. In terms Sep tem ber 1914. In essence, he proposed of military art, Western states employ air gain ing ex clu sive con trol of the air. Af ter out forces as coequals to armies and navies in a lin ing an ar ray of mili tary meas ures to de fend “joint” scheme, while air forces designed to Brit ain from air attack, Churchill suggested a serve armies fit a “combined arms” scheme. way of making lasting gains: “After all, the Sev eral commen ta tors have noted how Iraq great defence against aerial menace is to at- fol lowed the combined arms model.48 In an- tack the ene my’s air craft as near as pos si ble to other intere sti ng parall el, in World War II Al their point of depar ture.”46 lied forces employ ing a joint opera tions Po liti cally, the priori ty of gaining control model gained air supe ri or ity and then com of the air accords with the value that demo plete ascen dancy over the Axis powers, who cratic govern ments assign to the popula tion gen er ally followed the combined arms AIRPOWER AND POLITICAL CULTURE 47 model. This was true in every thea ter save one posi ng aggres sive actors.53 One of the least —the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany both no ticed yet most impor tant changes in war- em ployed their forces under a combined fare wrought by airpower is its extraor di nary arms model on the eastern front of the Euro stream lini ng of multi na tional operat ions. In pean thea ter in World War II. It is no ac ci dent the 1991 Gulf War, air forces of a dozen na that this was by far the bloodiest front in the tions follow ing a common air tasking order war.49 op er ated seamlessly. The challenge that coa li tions have wrestled with since Wellingt on and Blücher, of con cen trat ing dif fer ent forces Airpower’s Utility in time and space, dissolves for air forces since they can concen trate in purpose with- As observ ers in many nations have noted out needing to unite in loca tion. The fluidi ty since the Gulf War, airpower is increas ingly of coali tion air opera tions adds to airpow er’s likely to estab lish the outcome of inter state use ful ness to democratic states.54 war.50 It is a more respon sive, potent, and Put simply, airpower concerts with Ameri flexi ble form of military power than any that can ideas. It supports collect ive response and pre ceded it. This charac teri za tion stems from in de pende nt strength. It substi tutes technol the speed, maneu ver abil ity, and range of air- ogy for hu man risk—and takes the ini tia tive.55 craft (giving them access to whatever an en The full potent ial of airpower can be real ized emy holds most dear, or, as a corol lary, eve ry by armed forces that system ati cally accept thing an enemy values). The conse quent and apply the Western values of free expres ca pa bil ity of air forces to attack any of an en sion, com pet ing ideas, and in di vid ual lib erty. emy state’s instru ments of national power No regime opposed to those values has met pro vides deci sion makers a valued array of West ern standards for exploit ing the poten choices.51 tial of airpower to date. Indeed, the insti tu Lib eral democ ra cies have taken extraor di tional disso nance between authoritar ian re nary measures to minimize casual ties in war gimes and effec tive doctrines for air yet retain military capa bil ity commen su rate em ploy ment indi cate that these impedi with their commit ments. Airpower has al ments are unlikely to vanish. Authoritari an lowed the United States in particul ar to not re gimes are un likely to choose more ef fec tive only re solve this di lemma but to ac quire a po air power at the cost of less control. tent ial “military edge over conven tional op po nents com pa ra ble to that ex er cised in 1898 by the soldiers of Lord Kitchener over the The Strategic Differential sword- wielding dervishes of the Sudan.” 52 Other democ ra cies share the same values if The priori ties and methods of totalit ari an not identic al wealth and techni cal achieve states clearly tend to curb air forces so they ments. As long as mem ory of the 1991 Gulf air ex clu sively serve the aims of ruling elites. In camp aign is widespread, citizens of demo sym met ri cal conflict, states that hoard air - cratic states will expect their govern ments in power to preserve its potent ial for terror are the event of war to use the full potent ial of likely to see that power wither, while air their air forces to minimize costs and risks. forces that are utilized to shield the citizenry Those citi zens might also judge the wis dom of are likely to gain advant age if they are rea their govern ments based on the soundness sona bly well equipped and led. States that do and foresight of their defense decis ions. not trust their air leaders are likely to employ Air forces provide democ ra cies with easily air forces to suit the desires of their power shared tools befitt ing their common values. elites, with little under stand ing of capa bili The evidence indi cates that democ ra cies ties, limita tions, or opport un it ies that expert rarely fight democ ra cies and, as the Gulf War ad vice would disclose. Conse quently, they demo ns trated, can find common cause in op fail to harness the combi na tion of respon-