DTIC ADA513743: The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower's Inability to Deny Insurgent Sanctuary

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MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES
THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR:
A SUPERPOWER'S INABILITY TO DENYINSURGENT SANCTUARY
SUBMITTED IN PARTIALFULFILLMENT
OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THEDEGREE OF
MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES
AUTHOR: MAJOR CHARLES E. DUDIK, USMC
AY 08-09
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The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower’s Inability to Deny Insurgent
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Sanctuary
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Title: The Soviet-AfghanWar: A Superpower's Inabilityto Deny Insurgent Sanctuary
Author: MajorCharles E. Dudik, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The SovietUnionfailed to deny sanctuaryto theMujahideen because it deployed an
inadequateforce to Afghanistan, butmoreimportantly, itprovedunable to counteract
international supportfor theinsurgency.
Discussion: TheSovietUnion invaded the DemocraticRepublic ofAfghanistan (DRA) in
December 1979 intending to stabilize the rapidly deterioratingpolitical-militarysituation in its
newestclientstate. Afghanistan's fledgling communistgovernmentlacked thelegitimacy or
strengthto suppress thegrowingMujahideen insurgency. Instead ofsimplyproviding security,
logistics, andcombat supportfor DRAforces fighting the Mujahideen as initiallyplanned, the
conventionallystructured, trained, and equipped Soviet40th Army assumed thelead againsta
determined guerrilla opponentin some ofthe mostrugged terrain onearth. TheMujahideen
quicklyrecognized theimprudence ofengagingthe Soviets conventionally, and embarkedupon
a guerrillacampaign thatleveragedbothinternal and transnational sanctuaryin orderto rest,
rearm, refit, train, receive medical attention, andrecruitand organizereinforcements. The
Soviets properlyidentified sanctuary as acriticalrequirementfor the Mujahideen to wage a
successfulresistance, butnevereffectively deprived theinsurgencyofthis requirement. Despite
tacticalinnovations andthe ad hoc developmentofcounterinsurgencydoctrine, the Soviets
lackedthe troop strength and compositionnecessaryto eliminateinternal Mujahideen sanctuary
inthemountains, orto interdicttransnational aidand sanctuary. Afghanistan's terrain was
simplytoo rugged and difficultfor the SovietUnion to rely on airinterdiction and its relatively
small counterinsurgency force to adequatelydeny physical sanctuaryorinfiltrationroutes within
thecountry. Sovietefforts to denyinternal sanctuarydrove the Mujahideen across the border
into Pakistan and, to a lesserdegree, Iran. Pakistannotonlyprovided secure sanctuaryfor the
Mujahideen, butactively supported the insurgencythroughout theconflict. Otherstates such as
the United States, China, Iran, Britain, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) funneled money and arms to the insurgents. Political and economic constraints
largelyprecludedthe SovietUnion from expandingthe warinto neighboring states to deny the
Mujahideentransnational sanctuary and external support. TheSovietexpansionofthe war
wouldhave underminedarms controlnegotiations with the United States, further isolated the
SovietUnioninthe international community, and significantlystrainedits fragile economy.
Conclusion: Unable to breakthewill oftheMujahideen, who werefighting ajihad against
"infidels," Sovietprospects for success inAfghanistan demanded the elimination ofinternal and
transnational sanctuary. The Soviets clearlycomplicatedMujahideen operations and
sustainmentefforts bydepopulating the countryside, improvingits counterinsurgencyforce, and
employing superiorfirepower and technologyto interdictinfiltrationroutes from Pakistan and
Iran. However, the SovietUnion nevereffectively denied sanctuaryto the Mujahideen because
itdeployed an inadequateforce to Afghanistan, anditprovedunable to counteractinternational
supportfor theinsurgency.
Table ofContents
Page
DISCLAIMER .i
PREFACE : .ii
INTRODUCTION 1
SANCTUARYDEFINED : 1
GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT , 2
DEMOGRAPHICS AND CULTURE 3
BACKGROUND ~ 3
POLITICALTURMOILINTHE 1970S 6
SOVIETCOMBAT OPERATIONS 8
INADEQUATEFORCETO DENY SANCTUARy ~ 11
COUNTERINGINTERNATIONAL SUPPORTFORTHEMUJAHIDEEN 16
CONCLUSIONS 19
NOTES 23
APPENDIX A: AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS 25
APPENDIX B: AFGHANISTAN 3-D RELIEF MAP ' 26
APPENDIX C: MAINETHNIC GROUPS OFAFGHANISTAN 27
BIBLIOGRAPHy 28
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1
PREFACE
Nearly eightyears sinceinitiatingcombatoperations inMghanistan,theUnitedStates
andour allies are witnessingfirst-hand the difficulty ofdenying sanctuaryto theTaliban andAI
Qaeda. Similarto the Mujahideenin the Soviet-AfghanWar, today's insurgents areleveraging
mountainous terrain andinternationalborders to survive againsta superpower's
counterinsurgency efforts. As the UnitedStatesprepares to shiftfocus from Iraq to Afghanistan,
it,behooves us to incorporate lessons learnedfrom the Soviet-Afghan Warin orderto adequately
shape ourforce and equipment, evolve counterinsurgencytactics and doctrine, and integrate the
elements ofnationalpowerto denyinsurgentsanctuary. I chose to studythe Sovietefforts to
deny theMujahideen sanctuarybecause Ibelieve sanctuarydenialis a criticalrequirementfor
oursuccess inthe currentfight againsttheTaliban andAI Qaeda.
I wouldliketo thankProfessorErin Simpsonfor herassistance with this paper.
11
"When PresidentZia...offeredPakistan as a secure base area, he condemnedthe Soviets to a
prolongedcounterinsurgency campaign thatthey were ill-preparedtofight. ,,1
-BrigadierMohammadYousef, 1992.
The SovietUnion did notanticipate a decade-long counterinsurgencyfight against the
Mujahideenwhenitinvaded theDemocratic Republic ofAfghanistan (DRA) in December 1979.
Determinedto stabilizetherapidly deterioratingpolitical-militarysituationin its newest client
state, the SovietUnion conducted a coup de main modeled aftersuccessfulinterventions in
Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia(1968). The Soviet leadership believed that".:.themere
presence ofSovietforces would serveto 'soberup' theMujahideen..."zand enable the DRA's
communistgovernmentto suppress theinsurgency. Failingto appreciate the will ofthe .
Mujahideentoresistforeign invaders, the Soviets miscalculatedthe nature ofthe warinto which
theyentered. Instead ofsimplyproviding security, logistics, andcombat supportfor DRAforces
fighting theMujahideen, the conventionallystructured, trained, andequipped40th Army
assumed the lead againsta determined guerrillaopponentin some ofthe mostrugged terrain on
earth. TheSoviets properlyidentified sanctuaryas acriticalrequirementfor theMujahideento
wagea successfulresistance, butnevereffectively deprived the insurgency ofthis requirement.
The SovietUnion failed to denysanctuaryto theMujahideenbecauseitdeployed aninadequate
force to Afghanistan, butmoreimportantly, itprovedunable to counteractinternational support
fortheinsurgency.
SanctuaryDefined
The·termsanctuarytraditionallyrefers to physical safehavens thatprovideinsurgents the
opportunityto rest, rearm, refit, train, receivemedical attention, orrecruitand organize
reinforcements.3 Insurgents may seeksanctuaryingeographically advantageous areas, such as
jungles ormountains, which exploitasymmetrical advantages againstconventional forces.
1
Similarly, insurgents mayfind adequate sanctuary andsustainmentsupportin villages or
population centers. Internal sanctuarypotentiallyexists in anyareawithin a state where the
counterinsurgentforce cannot, ordoes not, "extendcontrol orsignificantinfluence.,,4 While
internal sanctuaries usuallydemand areduced logisticsburden, theymaynotofferthe levelof
securityfound in sanctuaries established across internationalboundaries.
Insurgentsanctuaries in neighboring states have historicallybeenprotectedfrom
"counterinsurgentinterference.,,5 Thethreatofbroadening aconflict, combinedwiththe
potentialfor international condemnation orretaliation, deters counterinsurgentforces from
violatinginternational boundaries to attackinsurgent sanctuaries in neighboring states.
Insurgents mightfindincreased securityin sanctuaries thattranscendinternationalborders, but
the logisticalimpacts potentiallyoverwhelmthe capabilities oftheresistance. Sanctuary,
whetherinternal orinneighboring states, is a criticalrequirementfor most successful
insurgencies. Although sanctuarydenial does not necessarily guaranteeinsurgentfailure, it
undermines the strength oftheresistance.6 Consequently, "EffectiveCOIN operation$ work to
eliminate all sanctuaries.,,7
Geographical Context
In orderto studytherole ofsanctuaryinthe Soviet-MghanWar, onemustappreciate
Afghanistan's geographicalcontext. Roughly the sizeofTexas, Afghanistan sharesborders with
Iran to the southwest, Pakistanto the southand east, Chinato theextremenqrtheast, andthe
former Sovietstates ofTajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistanto the north (seeAppendix A:
Afghanistan's Neighbors). TheHindu KushMountains, withpeaks over24,000 feet, stretch
across muchofnorthern Mghanistan. The SuleimanRange, along Mghanistan's easternborder
withPakistan, is extremelyrugged andsupports minimalinfrastructure (see Appendix B:
2
Afghanistan 3-D ReliefMap). Withfew exceptions, the mountainregions ofAfghanistanare
prohibitivefor vehicular traffic, particularlymotorized and mechanizedmilitary vehicles.
Moreover, the steep grade ofthe mountains makes itdifficult to prosecutetargets withfixed
wing aviation and artillery. Theoperationalkey terrainis the "limitedroad networkthat
connects [Afghanistan's] cities in a giantring with sideroads to Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan."s
Demographics and Culture
Severalethnic groups compriseAfghanistan's populationwith the largestbeing the
Pashtun, followed bythe Tajiks, Uzbeks, andHazaras (seeAppendix C: MainEthnic Groups of
Afghanistan). ThePashtun tribeis splitbetweenAfghanistan and Pakistan bythe DurandLine
(discussedfurtherin the nextsection). Likewise, the Tajiks andUzbeks are divided by
internationalborders. Themajorlanguages are Pashto and Dari. Approximately 99 percentof
Afghans are Muslims (85 percentSunni).
Afghanpersonalloyaltyis generallyto thefamily, qwan, and tribe.9 Afghans have along
historyofuniting to resistforeign invasions andcentral authority. Describingthe impactofthe
Sovietinvasion on theMujahideeninsurgency, BrigadierMohammadYousefsaid, "Thearrival
ofthe infidels gave the resistance acause, transformed the guerillafighter into a crusader, a
Mujahideen, with all that thatimplies."l0 One suchimplicationwas thatthe rural population
supported, and provided sanctuaryfor, the Mujahideen.
Background
Fromthe 1830s to thebeginning ofthe 20thcentury, Afghanistanfunctionally served as a
bufferbetween British andRussian interests onthe Indian subcontinentin what was coined "The
3
GreatGame."n Britain invadedAfghanistanin 1838 duringthe FirstAnglo-AfghanWar, and
againin 1878 during the SecondAnglo-Afghan War, to install "astable, nonaligned orpro
British"regimein Kabul.,,12 TheBritishjustifiedthe invasions as beingnecessary to counteract
increasingRussian influencethroughout theregion, notjustAfghanistan. Regardless, Britain
withdrew from Afghanistan after toughfighting and onlypartial success in e.ach war. "TheGreat
Game" ended when Britainand Russiaenteredinto the Anglo-RussianTreaty of 1907. Russia
agreed thatAfghanistan was outsideits sphere ofinfluencein exchange for Britain's promisenot
to invade oroccupythe state. Afghanistan achievedfull independencefrom Britishinfluencein
1919.
One ofthe mostsignificantbyproducts of"The GreatGame" with respect to questions of
sanctuarywas the establishmentofthe DurandLinein 1893. Attemptingto consolidateits rule
overnorthwestIndia, Britainforced AfghanleaderAmirAbdurRahman Khan to accept this
"artificial"boundarythat todayseparates Pakistan andAfghanistan.13 TheDurandLine gave
Pakistan, which was then part ofBritishIndia, the strategic defensive advantage due to the
dominatingheights onthe east sideoftheboundary, butignoredthe tribal and ethnic
demographics ofthe region by splittingthePashtun tribein two. In a culture thatemphasizes
tribal structure and loyalty overa strong central governmentand internationalboundaries, the
Pashtunpaylittleattention to the DurandLineunless its observationbenefits them, such as
international sanctuary. TheDurandLineremains amajorsource oftension between Pakistan
andAfghanistan.
Between gainingits independencein 1919 and succumbing to communistrule in 1978,
Afghanistan "...balancedthe demands ofherimmediateneighbors and those ofexternal
powers...,,14 Seekingnormalizedrelations, Afghanistan and the SovietUnion signed the Soviet-
4