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Inside the Detention Camps A New Campaign in Iraq By Maso n Br ooKs and Dr eW MiLLer T he United States invaded Iraq Greer) in 2003 without a detailed plan m Willia for handling large numbers of Air Force ( (COIN) warfadreet.a Oinneee sc oinn sceoquunetnecrein osfu trhgiesn scity- U.S. uation was the debacle at Abu Ghraib prison that surfaced in 2004. Since then, the United States has struggled to regain the moral “high ground” and the trust of the Iraqi people. After the Abu Ghraib scandal, the U.S. military mainly concentrated on enforcing conventional “care and treatment” standards for the humane handling of detainees.1 Insur- gents, on the other hand, challenged coalition force (CF) authority in the camps and worked to recruit and train insurgents inside U.S. detention facilities. But in the past year, the handling of detainees has undergone a trans- formation. The new approach encourages detainees to embrace a more moderate view of Islam, reject violence, and support the gov- ernment of Iraq. While the jury remains out on the reorientation effort’s long-term effect (curbing recidivism or cramping insurgent recruitment, for example), it provides a useful case study of adaptation in war. Today, the detention situation in Iraq is improved over a year ago. A calmed situa- tion in the camps, coupled with a belief that faster release could yield political advantages, sparked a proposal to accelerate detainees’ release. Polls, interviews, and other sources showed that Iraqis (especially Sunnis) over- whelmingly see CF detention and detainee treatment as unfair. Former Iraqi Minister of Defense and Finance Ali Allawi noted, “Heavy-handed security measures . . . played a large part in crystallizing anti-Coalition Colonel Mason Brooks, USAF (Ret.), and Colonel Drew Miller, USAFR, are Staff Researchers in the Institute for Defense Analyses. They were assigned to Multi-National Force–Iraq, Strategy, Plans, and Guards check Iraqi detainee’s name off list upon release Assessment Directorate, in Baghdad’s International from custody Zone from September 2007 to May 2008. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 129 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2009 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Inside the Detention Camps A New Campaign in Iraq 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University ,Institute for National Strategic Studies REPORT NUMBER (INSS),Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 5 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 FORCE OF LAW | Inside the Detention Camps feelings in the Sunni areas.”2 Anger stem- detention of thousands of Iraqis captured Using local imams to teach and discuss ming from perceptions of unfair detention by by U.S. forces. He brought to the job a new moderate interpretations of Islam exposes “occupiers” provides support for insurgents approach—something he credits to his experi- detainees to nonviolent thinking. While and fertile ground for recruiting. Accelerated ence as a successful businessman and entre- voluntary, these sessions are well attended, release of detainees can reduce this alienation preneur. Stone stresses practical problemsolv- and many participants say that this is their effect and meet political demands to free ing and initiative, along with listening to first exposure to moderate religious views. Iraqis, but it also risks having them rejoin detainees to understand their motivations. He Job training and education classes target basic the insurgency and could jeopardize fragile speaks Arabic and routinely studies the Koran learning and labor skills to enhance employ- security gains. to enhance his grasp of Iraqi culture. ment possibilities—a leading cause of recidi- Pressed to inform General David General Stone began by separating vism. Detention facilities now offer classes on Petraeus of complicated decision aspects, the insurgent agitators from other detainees, sewing, masonry, and carpentry.3 Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) staff giving moderates in the camps the freedom to directed an assessment of the proposal’s risks choose a path other than violence. The result screening and resulting and benefits. This article describes the new convinced the general that at least a third of all isolation of extremists improve detainee policies, summarizes the effort to detainees could be influenced to reject insur- assess benefits and risks, highlights the reac- gency within the camps’ controlled detention camp security by giving tion to that assessment, and explains early setting. A new goal emerged: turning detainees moderates the freedom to (and expected) campaign impacts. into cooperative moderates. A multilayered avoid and reject extremist process aimed at attaining that goal is summa- views and activities New Detainee Policies rized in figure 1 and elaborated below. Major General Douglas Stone, USMCR, Separation of Moderates from Irrec- assumed command of Task Force 134 oncilables. TF–134 uses information from Exploiting Tribal Influences. Iraqi (TF–134) in 2007, with responsibility for the detainee entrance screening at a transition tribes form a societal hierarchy accommodat- barracks to identify moderates and extrem- ing the political, security, and social needs Figure 1. Summary of Key TF–134 ists. While resource-intensive, this screening of members. Tribes help shape individual Programs and resulting isolation of extremists improve behavior and are therefore essential to reinte- camp security by giving moderates the grating released detainees back into society.4 n Transition Barracks In: Initially assesses freedom to avoid and reject extremist views (TF–134-sponsored studies show stronger motivation for joining the insurgency, and activities. It also enables detainees to societal bonds afford even a single detained criminal history, religious status, volunteer for education programs, cooperate Iraqi the potential to influence over 100 other education/job skills n Religious Discussion Program: Voluntary, with guards, and transform their outlook and Iraqis.) To exploit this effect, the task force but used to determine extent of religion in behavior. works closely with Iraqi imams and others to detainees’ lives and to develop a moderate Opportunity for Religious, Academic, apply Iraqi cultural operating codes, such as view of Islam and Vocational Education. Programs address shame and honor and patronage,5 to develop n Dar al-Hikmah (Basic Education): Chance the lack of education and training in Iraq. programs that further objectives. to get a minimum 5th-grade education n Vocational Education: Job skills training ADM Mullen views Camp Bucca detention n Work Program: Compensated for voluntary center from observation tower work activities (for example, sewing center, mud brick facility, working parties) n Individual Assessments: Occurs before their Multi-National Force Review Committee hearing to consider mental health, religious ideology, education, work program performance, guard force input n Family Advocacy and Outreach: Includes family in the rehabilitation process and grants greater access based on progress n Lion’s Spirit: Continuing moderate religious education and training for those desiring to become an imam n Transition Barracks Out: May spend up to a week in this program that includes courses on civics, public health, and rtheein ftaemgrialytion into Iraqi society and with Neeley) Mc Source: MNF–I TF–300 Theater Internment Facility Chad J. Regional Center, brief, n.d. D ( O D 130 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu BROOKS and MILLER Family Advocacy. Capitalizing on the operational units, recommend release based TF–134 proposed increasing the number closest of Iraqi societal bonds, family advo- on whether a detainee poses a security risk. In of moderate CF detainees released in the cacy offers visitation as a privilege to detain- making these determinations, boards conduct interim, while still stressing a general policy of ees who follow facility rules. Closer family face-to-face interviews with detainees and no general mass releases and no release of any interaction for cooperative detainees provides review evidence from internment facility high-risk, irreconcilable detainee. greater moral support and involves families in guards, counselors, teachers, and evaluations, The proposal met strong opposition their transformation and reintegration efforts. along with that from arresting units and other from some commanders, who were convinced This program consists of frequent on-site vis- sources. MNFRC boards and other TF–134 Iraqis would feign moderation and resume itation—on average, about 300 families visit processes align with the local Islamic custom attacking CF troops as soon as they were detention facilities each day, and this number of conducting communal, nonjudicial hear- released. With deeply divided opinions and is steadily increasing.6 ings for accused persons to air grievances and pressed to inform the commanding general’s Pledge and Guarantor Program. publicly present evidence. decision, the MNF–I staff called for a formal Having detainees sign a pledge prior to release TF–134 saw detainees’ potential influence look to sort through all the issues. The impact is another new practice. Some with troubled over friends and tribal members outside the on political reconciliation and insurgent ranks backgrounds must also secure a guarantor, camps as a way to extend the positive effects of had to be assessed in only a few weeks. often a tribal leader, to assume responsibility its program to the Iraqi population. This think- for their post-release conduct. Iraqi judges for- ing produced a more aggressive policy, with Assessing Risks and Benefits mally administer this pledge, and violators of an expanded goal of “establish[ing] an alliance The assessment began by looking at how its provisions can be charged in Iraqi courts. with and empower[ing] moderate Iraqis to well the TF–134 approach to handling detain- Pledges are frequently part of TF–134 release effectively marginalize the violent extremists.”8 ees aligned with the overall joint campaign ceremonies, under its Lion’s Dawn program, This policy promotes political reconciliation plan for Iraq. COIN doctrine and literature in which Iraqi leaders recognize detainee by extending positive moderate influences to agree that it is essential to drive a “wedge” achievements and reinforce the significance of more Iraqis with the aim of reducing support between the hardened insurgent cadre and being given a new start.7 These actions, lever- for insurgents and bolstering the government those less committed or motivated to support aging Iraqis’ sense of honor and patronage, of Iraq. the insurgency.10 TF–134 seeks to do this are also aimed at curbing recidivism. In fall 2007, as Iraqi politicians renewed inside the camps. But the dramatic change Multilayered Release Policies. Multi- their call to grant amnesty to selected detain- in policy entails two other distinctive facets: National Force Review Committee (MNFRC) ees, TF–134 proposed even more sweeping leveraging detainees’ influence over Iraqis boards are the cornerstone of a paradigm shift expansions.9 If United Nations authority for outside the detention camps, and using the away from warehousing detainees and generic U.S. detention of Iraqis was not renewed at the expanded release policy as a wedge to influ- release policies to a multilayered risk assess- end of 2008, there could be a mass turnover ence political dynamics. While both support ment for each detainee. To achieve the goal of of tens of thousands of U.S.-held detainees— COIN tenets of reducing insurgent forces releasing only those detainees assessed as very potentially overwhelming Iraq’s prison and bolstering the government, implement- low risk, these boards, manned by military capacity and creating another problem for the ing them is a bold and complicated step into members from in-theater headquarters and Iraqi government. As a less risky alternative, uncharted territory. Adolphson) the key question is whether my (Jason inesituhregre fnrtosm g edte mtaoinree erse cwruhiots Ar S. were released or from other U. Iraqis who join because of resentment over the detainee alienation effect The key question is whether insurgents get more recruits either from detainees who were released or from other Iraqis who join because of resentment over the detainee alien- ation effect (see figure 2). A recent Joint Force Quarterly article on detaining Iraqis noted that “many examples of arrests and intern- ment [are creating] more insurgents than the arrests neutralize.”11 For Iraqi perspectives on Navy Judge Advocate General meets with Task Force 134 the likely impacts, the study used in-theater attorneys and paralegals at Camp Victory, Iraq Iraqi-American cultural advisors and native ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 131 FORCE OF LAW | Inside the Detention Camps Iraqis living in Baghdad who work for the a range of actions to take advantage of detainee 2007, declaring the authors’ assessment “very United States.12 The assessment used official releases, including their return to localities and useful” and matching his own impressions. MNF–I insurgent troop strength estimates, followup stories. A worst-case assumption was With the decision made, controversy over historical recidivism data, focus groups, and tested—reversing weightings for security and accelerated detainee release policy persists, nationwide polls, as well as special surveys, political criteria. The results still showed accel- with early results still inconclusive. The new working groups, and other subject matter erated release as the best option for achieving TF–134 view that detainees not only can expert inputs.13 This research helped establish joint campaign plan objectives. be moderated, but also can become a force a plausible range of release rates, recidivism These analyses pointed to an aggressive for spreading moderate beliefs across Iraqi rates, and detainee alienation effects. ICP and low recidivism as particularly impor- society, still faces opposition from some who Rough estimates based on analyzing a tant to achieving campaign goals. Lower believe it is best to keep detainees locked up number of cases with varying combinations recidivism seems dependent on training and as long as possible. Some commanders report of release, recidivism, and detainee alienation education programs in detention facilities opposition to detainee releases from locals effect rates show that detainee alienation has as well as effective reintegration of releasees who characterize detainees as criminals or the greater impact on insurgent force levels. In back into society, including securing a job or fear their return to the insurgency. While most cases examined, the number of released job training, an education, and so forth. New some of those concerns are no doubt legiti- detainees who return to the insurgency is less policies being implemented, which might free mate, they sometimes mask another problem. than the number of insurgents created due at least half of the 23,000 detainees currently It is not uncommon for someone to steal to detainee alienation, even where there are held, seem to be producing lower recidivism another’s home or property and provide bogus high numbers of released detainees. Thus, the rates. In the months since the program’s information to authorities, spurring a false benefits from lower detainee alienation offset implementation, recidivism rates are less than arrest and detention. Fear of revenge therefore the risks of released detainees rejoining the 1 percent, substantially below historical rates motivates some of the release program’s most insurgency—producing lower overall insur- of 6 to 9 percent.17 The rate of change sug- ardent opponents. gent force levels. In addition, lower recidivism gests recidivism will probably not return to increases the probability and scope of these previous higher levels, but more time (up to some commanders report positive impacts. These results are consistent 18 months) is needed to see if these rates will opposition to detainee with other COIN studies and are reinforced hold. Interestingly, these factors indicate that by new COIN doctrine.14 while TF–134 efforts are vital, ultimate results releases from locals who To consider broader political, security, may well depend on how other MNF–I subele- characterize detainees as and other impacts, the analysis team adapted a ments follow through on and synchronize the criminals or fear their return method that visually framed key decision cri- broader ICP and releasee reintegration imple- to the insurgency teria (see figure 3).15 This flexible, multicriteria mentation aspects. decision support approach allowed dynamic weighting of rating factors.16 Starting from a Senior Reaction Results The program is still experiencing pre–change-of-policy base case and incremen- General Petraeus approved the TF–134 growing pains, partly because no single entity tally adding more detainee engagement steps moderation and early release program with has end-to-end responsibility for implementa- and an aggressive information campaign plan the addition of a strong ICP to maximize tion or the result. As of August 2008, release (ICP) yielded positive results. The ICP included political reconciliation benefits in December rates were still lower than TF–134 initially Insurgent Recruitment and Growth Model proposed. ICP efforts to help spread the news Figure 2. Insurgent Recruitment and Growth Model of faster release and assist in transmitting moderate messages have only partially been Possible Detainee Practices Impacts on Anti-Iraqi Forces Recruitment Removed developed. Local reintegration efforts, critical Insurgents to curbing recidivism, are also fragmented. “DETAINEE ALIENATION EFFECT” Some early disparities are to be expected, Supporters and especially in a dynamic and uneven security Population Insurgents Sympathizers environment. Despite the challenges, progress Detainees is being made to set up effectively coordi- Figure 3. MNF–I Assessment Detainee Policies and Priorities Scorecard Defeating Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) 3 Political Reconciliation 5 Implementation Implementa- feasibility 1 tion costs 1 Free up Coalition Interrogation/ Iraqi Detainee GOI Support 3 Other SCIO Reduce # AIF 5 Force assets 3 Intelligence 1 turnover enlightenment 1 Potential 1 (does not impact Detaining Recapture Not provok- Fewer Other Willing- AIF Fair Fair include pos- 1 AIF 1 recidi- ing new AIF guards military ness to opposi- treat- treat- sible improved vism 1 (Detainee 1 assets 1 support tion 1 ment by ment by post-release Alienation GOI 1 GOI– GOI– intelligence) Effect) 2 Sunni 1 Shia 1 Key: GOI = Government of Iraq; SCIO = Strategic Communications Information Operations 132 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu BROOKS and MILLER U.S. Army nated, accelerated detainee evaluation and expert works by David Galula, James S. Corum, release processes. Brian Reed, John F. Hussey, and the 1968 RAND Important successes resulted from Vietnam Hamlet Evaluation System Study. War College 11 Kyle B. Teamey, “Arresting Insurgency,” Joint working with tribal chiefs outside the formal Force Quarterly 47 (4th Quarter, 2007), 117. government and employing Iraqis, many of 12 Efforts to incorporate Iraqi perspectives them former insurgents, as Concerned Local include closely interacting with Iraqi-Americans Citizens (also known as Sons of Iraq) to StRateGic LanDpoweR eSSay conteSt 2009 working in Iraq who collect information and provide security. That sort of boldness opened maintain a dialogue with a large network of Iraqis doors of opportunity. It is still too early to across the country and interacting with other Iraqis assess whether the TF–134 initiatives will living in Baghdad and working in the International The U.S. Army War College and U.S. Army War effectively complement the awakening to con- Zone for MNF–I open-source intelligence as media College Foundation are pleased to announce the vince more Iraqis to reject extremist views. By translators. annual Strategic Landpower Essay Contest. itself, the task force’s detention policy changes 13 Due to current instabilities in Iraq, coali- tion force (CF) recidivism is generally reported in will not turn the insurgency around, but they terms of a person, detained in a theater internment The topic of this year’s entries must relate to do represent a new patch in the larger quilt of counterinsurgency studies. JFQ facility as a threat to security, who is released and Perspectives on Stability Operations and Their again becomes an insurgent. The main way of mea- Role in U.S. Landpower. suring recidivism is when recaptured detainees’ NoteS identifying numbers are reactivated when they pass Anyone is eligible to enter and win except those through the magistrate’s cell at Camp Cropper. 1 As used here, the term care and treatment Detainee recidivists who are killed or those involved in judging. The U.S. Army War College refers to humane handling of detainees and detained by Iraqi Security Forces whose identity Foundation will award a prize of $3,000 to the conduct of detention personnel as established by is confirmed by biometric data from previous CF author of the best essay, a prize of $1,500 to the the Geneva Convention and promulgated by U.S. detention are also included in this measurement Government guidance documents. For example, second place winner, and $500 to the third place when the information is made available. Department of Defense Directive 2310.01E, Enclo- winner. 14 Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency sure 3, contains the verbatim text of Common (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of Article 3 to the Geneva Convention of 1949. Enclo- the Army, December 2006), table 1–1. For more information or a copy of the essay contest sure 4 contains other requirements of the law of war 15 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command rules, contact: essential to ensure humane care and treatment of draft pamphlet 525–FW–X, version 3.0, Com- all detainees. mander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, is 2 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Dr. Michael R. Matheny new doctrine (drawing systemic operational design Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven: and effects-based operations) that calls for better U.S. Army War College Yale University Press, 2007), 187. framing of the problem and conceptual approach 3 Ibid. Department of Military Strategy by senior commanders. 4 William S. McCallister, “COIN and Irregular 16 Campaign Assessment Methodology (CAM), Planning and Operations Warfare in a Tribal Society,” Applied Knowledge developed by the authors for MNF–I, rates how 122 Forbes avenue International pamphlet, 2007, 24, available at selected factors affect Iraqi views and support for <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/coinand- carlisle, pa 17013–5242, the government of Iraq by using campaign level iwinatribalsociety.pdf>; Elizabeth A. Nathan and objectives as criteria to weigh the desirability of tel: (717) 245–3459, DSn 242–3459 Kevin M. Woods, “Saddam and the Tribes: How actions based on how each promotes “tipping” email: [email protected] Captured Documents Explain Regime Adaptation Iraqis toward the government. Adapting it into a to Internal Challenges (1979–2003),” Iraqi Perspec- multicriteria decision support system (DSS) made it tive Project Series Phase II, Institute for Defense easier to reapply public opinion and “atmospherics” Analyses, Joint Advanced Warfighting Program data from CAM into the Iraqi detention DSS situa- Paper P–4263, August 2007, 37. tion. Both CAM and DSS use RAND’s DynaRank 5 McCallister, 14. multicriteria DSS. See Richard Hillestad and Paul 6 MNF–I TF–300 Theater Internment Facility K. Davis, Resource Allocation for the New Defense Regional Center, brief, n.d. Strategy: The DynaRank Decision Support System 7 MNF–I Battle Update Assessment briefing, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998). February 14, 2007, slide 28. 17 Yochi J. Dreazen, “U.S. Begins Freeing 8 TF–134 document describing moderation Thousands of Captives in Iraq: Detention Policies programs and mission. Have Been Source of Public Anger,” The Wall Street 9 Joshua Partlow and Amit R. Paley, “Maliki Journal, April 18, 2008, 3. Renews Call to Give Some Insurgents Amnesty,” The Washington Post, November 12, 2007, A16. 10 Besides other experts and sources specifi- cally cited (including U.S. Army Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency), this review included many U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Military Review Counterinsurgency Reader sources and other n dupress.ndu.edu iissssuuee 5522,, 11sstt qquuaarrtteerr 22000099 // JJFFQQ 113333

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