DTIC ADA483709: Army SOF in Afghanistan: Learning the Right Lessons

8 Pages·1.3 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

(cid:2)
PSYOP unit patrolling
Afghan village.
man)
Eric Lipp
Atlantic (
mera,
Army SOF Ca
mbat
Co
Fleet
in Afghanistan
Learning the Right Lessons
By F R A N K L. J O N E S
T
he role of Special Operations Forces basis for military transformation and an impor-
(SOF) in Afghanistan is currently being tant element in future strategic planning.
scrutinized for lessons on fighting the There are lessons to be learned—the chal-
global war on terrorism. Initial assess- lenge is identifying the right ones. Some might
ments suggest that coordination between land conclude that Afghanistan offered prescriptions
and air forces signals a revolution in military af- for combating terrorism or shaping conventional
fairs and perhaps a recipe for defeating terrorists. warfare. This idea stems from the success of spe-
Some contend that these lessons will become the cial reconnaissance, which aided precision air
strikes and direct action missions, but neglects
unconventional warfare. In other words, leaders
might seek to conventionalize future conflicts.
Unconventional warfare capabilities were essen-
Frank L. Jones is professor of defense policy at the U.S. Army War
tial in routing Taliban forces and al Qaeda and
College and previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
will be crucial in defeating enemies elsewhere.
for special operations policy and support.
16 JFQ / Winter 2002–03
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Army SOF in Afghanistan Learning the Right Lessons
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Jones
victory by retaining power. Nonetheless, uncon-
Hunting for weapons in
ventional warfare is an accurate term of art, a
Afghanistan.
form of conflict for which Special Operations
Forces are uniquely qualified and must maintain
a high level of readiness.
Within the Army, Special Forces claim un-
conventional warfare as their primary mission.
The international environment the Nation is
likely to face over the next ten to twenty years
will remain a gray area between political conflict
and total war. Under such conditions nonstate ac-
Roy) tors could threaten stability. This conclusion is
M. consistent with the findings of the intelligence
Todd community. Testifying before Congress, the direc-
Company ( t“oTrh eo f1 9th90es Dweefreen as et imInet eollfi gtreanncseit iAonge anncdy tsutramteodil:
Signal aasn dfa mstrilaiater gCieosl dg aWvaer wisasyu etso, pnreewce psetsc,u srtirtuyc tpuarreas-,
55th digms....I expect the next ten to fifteen years to
be at least as turbulent, if not more so.”1
Technological and information-age innova-
Unconventional Warfare
tions can be used to produce weapons of mass de-
It is prudent to reexamine unconventional struction and manipulate financial markets. Fur-
warfare as the Armed Forces begin to wrestle with ther, globalization may run counter to cultural
military transformation and wage a global war on norms and national impulses and result in en-
terrorism. While the term unconventional warfare mity. In addition, transnational actors like terror-
has found its way into various military lexicons ists can undermine sovereignty by operating
for decades, Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense across frontiers and establishing networks for sup-
Dictionary of Military and Associ- port. There is also a proliferation of dual-use and
understanding asymmetric ated Terms, defines it as: military technology. Other factors include disaf-
fected individuals and groups as well as global de-
warfare leads to the view ...military and paramilitary op-
mographic trends that can result in social stratifi-
erations, normally of long dura-
that time horizons are cation, which breeds resentment and hostility.
tion, predominantly conducted by
Unconventional warfare can succeed in this envi-
undergoing change indigenous or surrogate forces who
ronment because it can enable weaker parties to
are organized, trained, equipped,
take on stronger ones.
supported, and directed in varying
If one can perform tasks associated with un-
degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla
conventional warfare—the most demanding mis-
warfare and often direct offensive, low visibility,
sion conducted by Special Forces—other SOF mis-
covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indi-
sions (such as special reconnaissance and direct
rect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence
action) can be conducted successfully. According
gathering, and escape and evasion.
to this view, unconventional warfare as defined
Unconventional warfare is often regarded as
traditionally proves so demanding and compre-
synonymous with guerrilla warfare, thereby ob-
hensive that other missions are subsumed under
scuring its role in counterterrorism. This ignores
it. The skills required for unconventional war are
the fact that it seeks political ends which affect
applicable across the board, from military opera-
the stability of nations. Unconventional warfare
tions other than war to high intensity conflicts.
is a type of political and socioeconomic conflict
Special operations missions can be mounted in
with psychological elements. Moreover, although
situations where a small force is required because
they can be protracted, unconventional wars are
of the sensitivities to operational and strategic
cyclical in nature. Variations in intensity may not
missions in support of joint campaign plans dur-
equate to holding territory or imposing military
ing wartime.
government, which are associated with sustaining
forces on the ground for extended periods. Un- Strategic Context
derstanding asymmetric warfare leads to the view
National security strategy articulates Ameri-
that time horizons are undergoing change. Events
can policies as well as interests and objectives
in the last decade enabled protagonists to claim
around the globe. It also recognizes threats and
challenges. Two aspects of protecting interests
Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 17
(cid:2)
ARMY SOF IN AFGHANISTAN
system. They can act with speed and surprise.
They have unique abilities to work with surrogate
and indigenous forces, including foreign lan-
guages, regional expertise, and interpersonal
skills, particularly in teaching military tactics and
techniques.
Nonetheless, other means complement these
competencies and are valuable in conducting un-
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mera assistance and peace operations. Skills honed in
Ca these operations are transferable to unconven-
mbat tional warfare. Although structured primarily for
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Loading leaflet
necessary component in securing support from
dispenser.
the local populace in an unconventional warfare
and attaining objectives crystallized after 9/11, environment. They can restore basic services after
and both are related to unconventional warfare. a conflict like Afghanistan, where civil affairs
First, potential enemies fall into two major cate- units are surveying the needs of local people so
gories: nations with traditional forces and nontra- international organizations can provide aid. They
ditional or nonstate actors that resort to terrorism can also assist new governments and inexperi-
or asymmetrical warfare. Both sorts of threats are enced leaders in public administration, thus
less likely today to engage in force-on-force con- molding the post-conflict situation. Such efforts
frontations. Instead, they may resort to asymmet- are directed toward promoting conciliation with
ric or asynchronous strategies to inflict damage important levels of society to maintain stability.
on friendly forces and undermine national will, These skills are also required in the global
exploiting ethical constraints as well as the obses- war on terrorism. Unfortunately, preliminary les-
sion with declared endstates. sons gleaned from Afghanistan may narrow their
The second aspect is the interagency dimen- use to the application of technology in future
sion of conflict. The military has learned over the warfare or relegate SOF assets to roles that under-
last decade through peace oper- mine their unconventional warfare capability.
Afghanistan may relegate ations and humanitarian assis-
Future Operations
tance that it is no longer the
SOF assets to roles that
only instrument of national se- As previously noted, the future of uncon-
undermine their unconven- curity employed for these mis- ventional warfare was debated prior to 9/11. In
sions. It must deal with civilian view of the success of Special Operations Forces
tional warfare capability
agencies, foreign governments in Afghanistan and its influence on perceptions
and militaries, nongovernmen- of policymakers and unified commanders as a
tal and international organizations, and other ac- capability for combating terrorism, the demand
tors during and after a conflict. Afghanistan for such assets is growing dramatically. In turn-
called for extensive coordination between Special ing to this resource, strategic leaders must exam-
Forces and paramilitary assets from the Central ine the part it should play in troubled regions of
Intelligence Agency. Both considerations make the world.
Special Operations Forces not only the units of A number of considerations which bear on
choice for the future but demand an understand- the experience of Special Operations Forces in
ing of unconventional warfare as an essential Afghanistan have implications for missions and
component of national security strategy. force structure. Some leaders may assume that
special operators are only effective in combating
Instruments of Unconventional Warfare
terrorism when performing limited conventional
Special operators possess skills for unconven- support missions as part of combined arms teams.
tional warfare which are politico-military in na- This view has a long history in defense circles,
ture. They leave a small footprint and have the
adaptability to operate without a huge logistic
18 JFQ / Winter 2002–03
Jones
Afghanistan and Its Neighbors
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where synchronization is the accepted norm. Se- could also adulterate the quality of the force and
nior civilian officials and military officers hew to reorient it from unconventional warfare to a form
this rule out of fear that Special Operations Forces of elite infantry, which it is not.
may become either too independent or eclipse Third, aside from the belief that success in
conventional forces. Yet unconventional opera- Afghanistan is a model for other applications, de-
tions certainly complement conventional opera- cisionmakers may want to use SOF assets to com-
tions and must support joint planning when bat terrorism in ill-advised ways. They may seek
practicable. While the effects of SOF assets may to deploy them with other agencies, such as intel-
not be as precise as armored formations or as pre- ligence and law enforcement, to form joint inter-
dictable as deliberate attack, the benefits of em- agency task forces. Although SOF personnel can
ploying them in a limited capacity far outweigh work in an interagency environment, they would
the issue of control, because less flexibility seri- be reduced to staff responsibilities of marginal
ously erodes their capabilities. This approach has utility, given that such task forces would be fo-
often been disregarded in the past because of the cused on intelligence analysis, interrogating de-
need for unconventional capabilities. However, it tainees, and freezing assets. There are fewer than
is a lesson that senior leaders seem willing to 30,000 SOF personnel in the Army, many within
learn repeatedly. the Reserve components such as civil affairs and
Another consideration may be increasing the psychological operations units. Interagency as-
size or expanding the range of SOF assets. There signment is not a judicious use of scarce assets.
has been speculation in the media that airborne Another approach would be using SOF assets
units could be transferred to U.S. Special Opera- to train foreign armies in counterterrorism, which
tions Command. Such proposals ignore the facts
that make special operators successful. They
Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 19
(cid:2)
ARMY SOF IN AFGHANISTAN
is the only form of U.S. presence some countries
will tolerate. Though worthwhile, treating coun-
terterrorism as a one-dimensional mission, as
seems to be the situation in the Philippines, may
be a mistake. Terrorism is not an end in itself, but
rather a technique to create fear and destabilize
regimes. Groups such as al Qaeda seek to over-
throw governments and are insurgent. This sort
of threat is reactionary-traditionalist or spiritual
in nature. It tries to restore an arcane political
order, which is romanticized. Terrorism is a politi-
cal tool that is used because no other instrument
is available or the situation has not matured to
the point where guerrilla warfare is feasible.
Insurgency is fostered by popular resentment
of authority. This disaffection gives rise to resist-
ance or violence against existing regimes. There-
fore, foreign militaries must be trained not only in
civil disturbances and hostage rescue, but also
counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, and proce-
dures. For example, parts of the Philippines are be-
coming unstable and Muslim extremist groups are
expanding. Meeting this challenge will require
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tem. Insurgents survive because of weak control Robert
btiyo nnsa. tMioannaill aa urtehqouriirteise sb aenttder styomolpsa ttho ectoicu npotepru ilna-- Fast rope training in Company (
saunrdg menitlist,a rayn cda pWabaislhitiinesg—tocnan— acsaslilsitn wgh oenn nciovti lliiman- Afghanistan. Signal
ited to teaching hostage rescue techniques. 55th
On the Right Path
Underpinning special operations in SOF personnel are models of proper behavior
Afghanistan was the concept of engagement— among local populations and do not create
that is, enhancing national security through sys- enemy sympathizers. Such conduct also aids in
tematic and integrated collecting intelligence. In some nations, relation-
unconventional warfare must global leadership to influ- ships may include helping form local militias or
ence state or nonstate ac- civilian defense forces, thus strengthening com-
not be limited to hot wars or
tors. SOF personnel are ef- munities as well as respect for human rights. This
large-scale operations fective because of area fact was recognized by policymakers as an emerg-
expertise, which is honed ing post-Cold War role. If a crisis erupts while
over many years. They routinely deploy overseas special operators are deployed, they provide in-
and develop close relationships with foreign stant presence for unified commanders. In addi-
counterparts. For instance, Uzbekistani support tion, both psychological operations and civil af-
of operations in Afghanistan was facilitated by fairs on the strategic and tactical levels must be
the earlier visit of a Special Forces training team. emphasized since they clarify foreign policy ob-
SOF political-military efforts promoted long-term jectives through favorable impressions of U.S.
objectives. Such an approach must be sustained military activity in a region.
not only for the sake of counterterrorism, but to Unconventional warfare also puts demands
ensure that Special Operations Forces are capable on the operational skills of both civilian and mili-
of conducting unconventional warfare. tary organizations. DOD must augment SOF mis-
Moreover, SOF assets are global scouts. Some sions in those areas plagued by insurgency. Em-
of their critical work is performed prior to a cri- phasis must be placed on agricultural and
sis. Such efforts, often in the context of foreign economic efforts sponsored by the U.S. Agency
internal defense, are linked to proper conduct in for International Development—objectives con-
dealing with civilians where insurgency is likely.2 sistent with the global alliance, which is the
model for the 21st century. Such development is
crucial to U.S. strategic interests. Unconventional
20 JFQ / Winter 2002–03
Jones
Searching for hidden
arms cache.
well)
Gur
mpany (Fred
Co
Signal
55th
Civil Affairs personnel
with village elders.
merson)
Marshall E
mpany (
Co
Signal
55th
warfare must not be limited to hot wars or large- instruments of national power, including public
scale operations. A judicious admixture of train- diplomacy and psychological operations as well
ing and development may lead to a lasting vic- as civic action conducted. The lessons of the Viet-
tory without dramatic headlines. nam War are pertinent. Interagency relations
Next, the military must analyze irregular and must be enhanced to offset the lack of an inte-
revolutionary warfare, not only by revisiting past grated counterinsurgency strategy and national
conflicts but also in projecting future confronta- mechanism to coordinate it. This effort must
tions, which include political, economic, and so- focus on the Department of State (especially pub-
cial views as well as cultural and religious biases lic diplomacy); the intelligence community, be-
of potential enemies. The importance of area ex- cause human intelligence, counterintelligence,
pertise cannot be overestimated. Understanding and area expertise are critical (SOF personnel who
operational environments must form part of return from overseas are a trove of information);
training for SOF personnel, such as intelligence and the U.S. Agency for International Develop-
analysts and operatives. Equally significant are ment, which must act as a full partner in working
the strengths and weaknesses of allies and with local populations.
friends. Anecdotal evidence from Afghanistan Even superpowers can lose asymmetric wars.
suggests that SOF personnel must be proficient in The ideal response to such conflicts requires
several languages within their area of operations. preparing for engagements despite technological
DOD must consider innovations for use in advantages. Committing forces may cause public
various environments, such as urban warfare, and opinion to become a center of gravity, a vulnera-
the means to accomplish missions, from non- bility that insurgents exploit. In addition, when
lethal weaponry to sophisticated communication forces are committed, counterinsurgency mis-
equipment. There must also be an appraisal of sions must be entrusted to those especially
SOF capabilities for the future. trained and equipped for them. Winning hearts
A counterterrorism or counterinsurgency
strategy must integrate military and information
Winter 2002–03 / JFQ 21
(cid:2)
ARMY SOF IN AFGHANISTAN
Checking for munitions
outside Kabul.
Hunt)
Bethann
Squadron (
mera
Ca
mbat
Co
1st
Sandberg) adanxefidoe ammti inningd isitn iaisslu liyrng teienngvcryoa,kl aetndo fnaonarttciie-nTsg,a ltigobroao num nfuidgch hat neermds piashi rua nsaitdst eacrcaeknsts i bmwe ahptieuldet .o rTenhc rceuo lioatrtitdneigr-
Michael during the emergency in capacity resulted from employing SOF assets in
Atlantic ( sMuaclcaeysas—futl hceo umnotdereiln osuf ra- usunbctolnetvye nwtiiloln bael wcrairtfiacrael . iCn ofmutpurreeh eonpdeirnatgi otnhiss.
mera, gency campaign.3 While there are not many Afghanistans in the
Ca Finally, emphasiz- world, potential alliances abound. The rise of in-
mbat ing one mission over an- surgent and irredentist movements (sometimes
Fleet Co owtihtheor udt oferisc tnioont . cAolmloe- epqleuda twedit hw iathsy tmermroertirsitc i nthitrieaatitvse, sd eexmclaunsdivse aly )s,t rcaotue--
Preparing PSYOP
cating resources is diffi- gic vision for unconventional warfare. JFQ
leaflets.
cult, and upgrading unconventional warfare will
require personnel as well as resources that are not NOTES
included in the current budget. U.S. Special Oper-
1Thomas R. Wilson, “Global Threats and Chal-
ations Command must reexamine planning and
lenges,” statement before the Senate Armed Services
budgeting processes to determine if the uncon- Committee, March 19, 2002, http://www.dia.mil/
ventional warfare mission, in its broadest sense, is Public/Press/statement04.html.
amply supported. 2Anthony J. Joes, America and Guerilla Warfare
(Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 2000),
The successes of military operations in pp. 330–32.
Afghanistan are being jeopardized by misreading 3Michael Howard, “Mistake to Declare This a War,”
RUSI Journal, vol. 46, no. 6, (December 2001), p. 2.
them. Although Special Operations Forces are
credited with defeating Taliban and al Qaeda
22 JFQ / Winter 2002–03