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I * . ARCHIVE COPY NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE THE SUBMARINE FORCE: UTILITY IN THE FUTURE NMS? CORE COURSE ESSAY ROBERT THOMAS/CLASS OF 1997 MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS SEMINARD CAPT S DOYLE/DR W JOSHUA CAPTAIN MILETICH Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1997 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1997 to 00-00-1997 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER The Submarine Force: Utility in the Future NMS? 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National War College,300 5th Avenue,Fort Lesley J. REPORT NUMBER McNair,Washington,DC,20319-6000 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT see report 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. 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THIS PAGE 14 unclassified unclassified unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 i. . “‘It IS always thus, Impelled by a state of mendw hxh IS destmed not to last, that we make p” our u-revocabled ecuxons ” Marcel Proust (187 l-l 922), French novelist “There zsn ot a fiercer hell than thef azhue In a great object. ” John Keats (1795-182 l), Enghsh poet Introduction Impelled by a state of mind that has lasted the past seveny ears, the Department of Defense has been strugghng wrth the concept of a comprehensrvem ilitary strategy for an uncertam future In tms quest, force structure debate has often supplanted strategrc consrderatronm the decrsronm akmg process Our “great object” 1st o craft a strate,y that can drovet he decisronm akmg process,b ut our lack of mnovatrvet hmkmg may mdeedb e the “fiercer hell” to whrch Keats referred The Base Force, the Bottom Up Review, and the current Quadrenma.Dl efenseR evrew (QDR) are all attempts to arnve at a force level prescnptron without understandmgt he strategrc disease In these attempts, force structure IS usually reduced m a honzontal fashron,t hus “the dinosaur that we know as the Armed Forces hopes to escapee xtmctron or radical alteration by becornmg a mrm dinosaur “l One of the elementso f this force structure is the natron’sr obust nuclear submarinef orce, both m its attack and balhstrc mrssrlev ariety As the momentum for a balancedb udget grows, should an expensivee lement of nnhtary power hke the nuclear submarmeb e reexammedm the hght of a post Cold War Natronal Mrhtary Strategy? From a strategrcp omt of view, IS another honzontal slice warranted or perhapsa vertrcal cut7 Thrs analysrsw ill focus on the future submarmef orce structure m the context of the National Mrhtary Strategy of the 21s t century and attempt to assessth e relevancy of such a force 1 Szafransh, F&hard Wzen Yuves Colhde Future Conjhct (Jolt Force Quarterly, Spnng 1995), 78 The Current State of Affairs The family tree of the nuclear submarmef orce 1sl oosing limbs faster than any other part of the Navy Only the Russransa re sheddingf orce structure faster, though adnuttedly using some shortcuts Turned away from a goal of 100 attack submarmes( SSNs) m the late 1983s,t he submarmef orce will be composed of 53 attack boats and 18 balhstrc missile submarmesb y the turn of the century According to the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Russiann uclear submarmef orce, our only near term peer competrtor m thrs field of endeavor,w rll look about the same “The U S Kavy has also decommissronedf our classeso f nuclear submannes Kmety nuclear submarmesw rll be decommissronedm 1Cy ears They cost $1 brlhon a piece That number represents6 5 percent of the nuclear submarmef orce of thrs natron, decommrssronedb ecauset hey are not as relevant m tins new world I speak as a nuclear submarinerm yself, who reahzesw hen we remove a whole classt hrs way, we get the efficiencies of a vertxal cut “2 Force level studies conducted by the submarmef orce type commanders (TYCOMs) show that current operatronal comnutments requrre a mrmmum force of about 68 attack submannes Wrth decommrssromngso ver the past three years reachmg a rate of 12 to 15 submarmesp er year, the TYCOM requirement wrll be unansweredb y the end of 1997 The Navy now finds itself on the horns of a dilemma, attempt to hold the lme on force level or cut force structure and reduce operational commrtments In fact, the National leadershrp1 sa ttemptmg to have rt both ways by cuttmg force structure wl-nle mamtarmng or increasmgm rssion requirements Tins “do more with less” construct wrll be asymptotrcally approachmgb reakdown by the year 2Cc)O The future National Mrhtary Strategy (&MS) must actually begm to dnve the force levels soon or the nulitary will * Owens, W~lhm The Four Revolutions m lddrtavy Thmkxng (ROA Nauond Secunty Report,1 995)3, 2 2 . F return to its hollow version of the 1970s Thrs leads to the operative question What are the trends m the future of the KMS and how does the submannef orce contnbute? Trends in the Future NMS Admtral William Owens provided an excellent forecast of the future NMS dunng hrs tenure as the Vice Chanman of the Joint Chrefs of Staff Few were really hstenmg however, and remnants of Cold War thmkmg still stand as monuments to Pentagon bureaucratic mertra His vision for the 2 1s t Century strategic envrronment hmges on four “revolutrons m military thinkmg” First we must understand that the only certainty m the post Cold War world is uncertamty Secondly, the nnhtary budget has taken a 45% cut - and at best wrll contmue to be reduced at a slower rate Thrrd, the “Jomtness”p ron-nsed by the Goldwater-Nichols DefenseR eorganizatronA ct 1sn ow becoming a reality after ten years of pursuit And finally, the revolutron m technology leading to dommant battlefield awarenessw ill radrcally changet he way we fight Thrs was a valiant first attempt to frame the context for the future NMS, however, rt did not go far enough For all of hrs foresight, Admiral Owens could not build a bench of decrsronm akmg support willmg to nsk a strategic pause m order to revolutromze the future force Other strategic thmkers like Carl Builder, Mmhael Vrckers, and Rrchard Szafranskr have also contnbuted important elementst o the debate The Szaf?anskrv rsron includes a new charactenzatrono f the threat envrronment “The threat IS gone We now face only dangers “3 In this view, the need for large conventronal combat forces seemst o be less relevant, though he postulates that “Naval forces may well become the centerpieceo f the rmlitary ‘I4 Michael Vrckers also seest he Navy, and m partrcular a Navy of the submergedv anety, as a ma.Jorfo rce element m the future “The capital shrp of the fleet m 2020 nught be an arsenals lup, a nnssrlef inng submersiblea rmed with cruise and conventronal balhstrc 3 Sz&a.nsk~&,c hard When !%ves Collide Future Conf~cr (Joint Force Quarterly, Spnng 1995), 78 4 Szafranskr,R xhard When WavesC ollide Future Conjllct (JomnFt orce Quarterly, Spnng 1995), 78 3 miss&s Attack submarinesw ill hkely remam essentialt o achrevmgu nderseac ontrol, wluch mrght be all that could be expecteda gamst a large adversaryw rth a robust arm-navy capability and a strategrc nuclear deterrent ‘Is Andy Krepmevrch echoed tms sentiment m his 1996 study on mture naval alternatives,c allmg for the conversrono f Trident submarmesm to “stealth battleshrps” Carl Builder notes that there are new roles for the Armed Forces that “are drsturbmg to many m the rrnhtary ‘I6 The submarmef orce leader&p is attempting to embracet hose “new roles” m the hope that the Szaf?a.nskarn d Vrckers view takes root whrle only certain aspectso f the Owens perspectiveg et counted Tms effort has been characterizedb y other brancheso f the Naval Servrcea s an attempt by the submannef orce to hold onto as much force structure as possible Routmely sincet he end of the Cold War one can find pictures of U S submarmesp osted on stateroom walls on board a earner with the caption reading “W11w1 ork for food” The arrogance of the “srlent service” as the trp of the Cold War spearh as been replaced by submarmersw rth a wrllmgness to talk and an opennesst o do most any battle group task In the April 1997 issue of the Naval Instate Proceedmgs, Lieutenant Commander Gary Watson recogmzedt he submannef orce’s past tendenciesm his article, Runnrng Too Went and Too Deep, which 1sa call to reopen the submarme technology debate and embracen ew nnssrons The Submarine Force Vision In late 1996, the submarinef orce pubhsheda vrsron statement,S ubmarznesm the Future Security Envzronment There were two themes that dommated the effort First, “the charactenstrcso f modem nuclear submarines,s tealth, agrhty, endurancea nd precrsron firepower, provide our nation with flexrble, multr-rrnssronw arslnps ‘I7 Secondly, the submarmef orce 1sp oised to “reach its full potentral”8, by responding to many mrssron 5 Vlckers, Michael !‘/arfare m 2020 A Pruner (Wash DC. CSEA, 1996), 10 6 Budder, Carl Rethmkrng Natlonal Secunty and the Role of the IAlrtary (RAIbD, 1995). 22 7 OPNAV St.&T SubmarmesI n the Future Securrty Envrronment l:CNO, N87, 1996j , 1 * OPKAV Staff Submarrnesz n the Future SecurztyE nvwonment (CNO, N87, 1996), 1 4 F‘ areast hat are either non-tradmonal or have not been emphasrzeds mce World War II Antrsubmanne Warfare (ASW) IS stallc onsideredt he dommant domam of the submarmer but power proJectrona nd Special Operations Forces (SOF) support are also prominent m thrs vision Forward presencea nd crisesr esponseh ave replaced bastron busting as mainstayso f the submarmef orce missron Thrs new vrsion also adrmts that the “Silent Service” concept is dead “The glue that holds all of these mrssronc apabilmest ogether 1sc ornmumcatrons Our submarmesa re no longer the “Silent Service” when rt comes to commumcatronsc onnectivity and must a&eve full inter-operability with the Joint Task Force Future submarmesw 11b1 e equipped with automated systemsw hich can transnnt and receive on all frequency spectrumsw rth data rates hrgh enough to achieve full motion video, exchangeq uality Imagery products, lmk wrth fiendly forces, plan SOF nnssrons,a nd update TOMAHAWK nnssrons“ 9 P The submarinef orce leadership has decided that becoming a full time battle group player 1st he key to force structure survival The questronr emams is thrs adjustment in submarinef orce missronp normes relevant m the 21st Century’7 Relevancy in the Zlsf Century When assessmgth e relevancy of the submarmef orce m the decadesa headI t IS prudent to treat the two types of nuclear submannes,b alhstrc nnssrlea nd attack, as separate elementsm the force structure equation Strategic nuclear deterrenceI S stall advertisedb y STRATCOM as a relevant nnssronm the 21st Century Accordmg to today’s nuclear strategists, the nuclear tnad of land based Inter-contmental ballistrc m&es (ICBMs), mannedb ombers and submarmel aunched balhstrc mrssrles( SLBMs) 1sc onsidered a viable form of strategic deterrencem the future g OPNAV Staff Submarmesm the Future Securdy Envrronment (CNO, X87, 1996), 4 5 Flexlblhty, redundancy, and the safety of the tnad are all cited as Important elementsm hedging against a titure competitor m the realm of weapons of mass des-ructlon (WMD) The nation’s nuclear strategy rests on three prmclples, reduce, deter, and defend In an environment of dnnm&ng resourcesa nd strategic arms reductions, the Trident su3marme must compete myth land basedb alhstlc rmssllest o fill the deter portion of the rmsslon The lowest operating cost option clearly favors the land basedI CBM Survlvablhty and flexblhty clearly favor the submarine The simple answer would be keep a little of both, but our titure constramts may not allow this option An argument can be made that the tnad 1sn ot only costly but obsolete With s-rateglc arms reductions m t-le next decade likely to result m an inventory of 2000-3000 strategic nuclear \+arheads,c ost becomesa major point of leverage For the submannef orce any reduction m the number of Trident submarmes( SSBSs) may brmg the equation to the breakmg point Cnh-<el and based rmsslles,a reduction m the number of warheads and SLBMs may lead to fewer boats makmg the investment m separateh ome ports hard to Justify Currently, Kmgs Bay and Bangor support eight submarinese ach Hou far down the force level ladder can we travel before It makes no senset o keep these baseso pen The operating costs of each submarme as well as the cost of D-5 SLBM production also must be factored mto the force level equation The RUSSEUhXa ve already concluded this debate and decided on the submarme as the key part of their titure strategic force By the year 2003, the Russian submarine force ~111a ccount for 55% of then-s trategic warhead inventory Admiral Yerofeyev, Commander of the Northern Fleet, has emphasizedt hs decision by statmg that the purpose of the general naval forces 1st o “Support the combat enduranceo f the SSBX” 10 The U S strategic leadershipw ould do well to tilly engagem the debate about the future relevancy of each component of the triad It appearst hat the Russiansh ave it right and that we should continue to move m the dlrectlon of the 1996 Nuclear Posture Review lo Officeo f Sa\ al IntelligenceI f orldwrde Submarme Challenges (ONI 1997) 12 6 p” that relegatest he strategic nuclear bomber force to non-alert status, reducest he number of land basedI CBMs, and mamtamst he preponderanceo f our nuclear arsenalo n board balhstrc rmssile submarmes The attack submarmef orce also must be examined for relevancy m the 2 1s t Century Not only the questron of how many attack submarmesn eedst o be debated,b ut also the types of technology for the future should be open to question “We must pursue new technology to stay aheado f our competmon Designs for n-nssron-spectics ubmarines,l ike a guided rmsslle SSN (SSGN) or submarine arsenal shrp, should be investigated and produced m small numbers to test and evaluate Every effort should be made to pursue the latest developments technology has to offer Ko serious alternative should be drsmrssedm, cludmg the non-nuclear one, until It has been proved to have no utrhty for the submanne force “11 Some of these issuesh ave been debatedt horoughly m the past ten years Clearly the non-nuclear powered submarinei s not an option unless we as a nation Intend to defend our coastlme as opposed to pursue forward presence But the other technology Issues mcluding commercral off-the-shelf (COTS) weapons and sensort echnolo,~ need to be debated It 1sn nportant durmg thts debatet o take advantageo f the strategic pauset hat IS avarlablea nd not be pressedm to productron of costly one of a kmd boats XJnhke an-planesd, esign and technology mrstakesm the productron of a submarmec an be so costly that recovery becomesp roblematic The relevancy of the attack submarmef orce m the next two decadess hould be determmed based on roles and mrssionsb ut will contmue to be a finctron of the submarine mdustnal base Submannesw ill contmue to be produced ni lower numbers and wnh higher technology quotrents Becausea submarine cannot be m more than one place at a l1 Watson, Gary Runrung Too Ment and Too Deep (L-SX Proceedmgs,A pnl 1997), 31 time, the trade off between technolo,y and force level has a fimte lnmt That lnmt wrll be reacheda t the turn of the century Frfty attack submarmesw rll not be able to keep up with requn-ementsa nd thus may lose relevancy by substrtutrono r mrssrone hmmatron Coupled with the premmm being pard in the shrpburldingb udget to mamtam two nuclear submanne shipyards,t he cost and lack of numbers m attack submarmesm ay systematicallym ake the SSN less relevant in the eyes of deasron makers after the year 2000 The nuclear submannersc ould lose cntrcal mass early m the next century Thrs lack of self-sustammgc apabrhtyw rll mean that the SSN wrll lose the capital shrp status that rt has enjoyed for the past forty years and have to become a ache player in the future The Future as a Niche Player Wrth a force level of 45-50 SSNs, the question of employment gains new srgmficance The SSK must be used m the correct mche to just@ the cost of mamtammg thrs lunrted force A few assumptionsw rth respect to the rest of the Navy are approprrate First, the Navy will lose at least two Carner Battle Groups (CVBGs) to the budget cutter’s ax 11t1h e next decade Thrs will cut down the total number of SSNs assocratedw ith battle group support to twenty Secondly, the surface combatantsw ill contmue to field robust rmssrle capabrhty Along wrth the Arsenal Shrp, thrs stnke and Theater Mrssrle Defense (TMD) capabihty wrll preclude the non-battlegroup SSN from havmg to fill a role as a tactical rmssrles hooter Thrrd, the number of ASW assetso utside the submannef orce wrll contmue to decline The overwhelming share of the ASW mrssronw rll fall on the shoulderso f the submarmef orce One IS tempted to ask, what ASW mrssron? The answer IS clear when the number of countnes operating submarinesI S evaluated Forty countnes currently operate submarmes,m ostly of the diesel-electnc vanety Two potential peer competrtors have sigmficant nuclear submarine capabrlrty,t he Russransa nd the Chmese Qualitatively, none wrll match the U S force, however, the employment of submarmesb y many countnes falls into the category of placmg silent mobile mme field equivalentsa t seam areasw here we would hke to operate surface combatants Thrs antr-