DTIC ADA426667: Closing the Barn Door: Installation Force Protection (Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 2002)

6 Pages·0.39 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

Checking identification
at Shaw Air Force Base,
September 11,2001.
Davis)
Greg L.
Closing the Barn Door Squadron (
munications
m
Co
20th
Installation Force Protection
By J O H N L. C I R A F I C I
T
he United States is at war with an in- groups have tasted a series of victories. Since 1983
sidious and determined enemy, but not they have included bombings in Beirut, Naples,
everyone is prepared for the fight. This Ramstein, Rhein Main, Berlin, Riyadh, and
enemy will avoid conventional battle Dhahran as well as a simultaneous attack on two
at all costs, wears no uniform, and is unlikely to American embassies in East Africa, the USSColein-
negotiate terms at a table. The personal commit- cident, and the events of September 11, 2001.
ment is total, and the only outcome can be vic- These successes reveal the challenge.
tory or death. The enemy is terrorism, although
its perpetrators would rather be seen as selfless Through Enemy Eyes
warriors fighting a just war with their motivations To appreciate the terrorist’s perspective, one
firmly anchored in ideology and faith. Terrorist must step into his mind and view these attacks as
he does—as significant engagements between his
movement and the world’s most formidable
Colonel John L. Cirafici, USAF, is currently servng with the Defense power, the United States. Each victory is a vindi-
Threat Reduction Agency, Department of Defense, and has taught cation of the struggle and is achieved against
history at theAir Force Academy. incredible odds. In this asymmetrical war, attacks
Spring 2002 / JFQ 89
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■
FORCE PROTECTION
deputy director of operations (combating terror-
ism) within the Operations Directorate (J-3), Joint
Staff. Standards were established and a process
was implemented to regularly assess installation
programs. The deputy director for combating ter-
rorism (J-34) is responsible for evaluating dangers
and seeking countermeasures. To improve protec-
Bivera) tdiuveit pforarc tinicfeosr mata itniostna ltloat iaonnds , fJr-o3m4 atchtes faise lad caonnd-
Atlantic (Johnny ddtheiseps uetemtryri ondraiirtseetc stt hobrre ossutt rgpihvre atsce tctiohc ensseo iltzooeg ittchhaeel eicnnuihsttiaoantmicveeemr .f erTonhmtes
Group, aton din isst aalnla taiodnvo AcTa/tFe Pf oprr apcrtoicceesd. uTrhael iCmopler oCvoemmmenitss-
mera sion, formed in the wake of the USS Cole attack,
Ca
mbat issued its report in January 2001. In response, J-
Co 34 is further expanding the antiterrorism mission
Fleet to include policies and practices for deterring, dis-
Marines fortifying rupting, and mitigating attack on forces in tran-
positions,Kandahar. sit. Joint Staff integrated vulnerability assessment
(JSIVA) teams, established in 1997, are the tip of
are not random but are part of a strategy to bend the spear.
an enemy’s will and force submission. Each suc-
cess validates the cause and demonstrates enemy Comprehensive Assessment
impotence. Key measures of success are the num-
JSIVA teams are integral to the Defense
ber of casualties and the breadth of media cover-
Threat Reduction Agency’s combat support direc-
age. Succinctly, in the terrorist’s war anyone can
torate and are located in Alexandria, Virginia. As
be the target, and the immediate goal is to kill as
the field agents for the Chairman’s AT/FP pro-
many as possible.
gram, they assess the protective posture of instal-
The Department of Defense is committed to
lations and supporting facilities worldwide and
protecting its people and facilities by denying ter-
provide comprehensive feedback, training, and
rorists exploitable vulnerabilities. The intent of
recommendations through the assessment
the antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) pro-
process and mobile training teams. The teams are
gram is to reduce the likelihood of attack and to
complemented by a front office, which provides
mitigate the effects if one should occur through
easily accessible expertise to installation com-
assessment and substantive feedback to installa-
manders and their staffs and technical assistance
tion commanders.
to the Joint Staff.
In response to the Khobar Towers incident in
The agency fields six JSIVA teams from the
June 1996, when 19 U.S. military were killed and
antiterrorism assessment division of its combat
502 wounded, and the subsequent Downing Re-
support directorate. They collectively assess a
port on the attack, changes
hundred installations a year throughout the serv-
standards were established were enacted within DOD to ices, defense agencies, and combatant commands.
protect personnel and mission-
and a process was imple- DOD Instruction 2000.16 states that CINCs, serv-
essential infrastructure. The re-
ices, and agencies shall ensure that lower-level
mented to regularly assess port concluded that both na-
antiterrorism programs receive higher headquar-
tional security and U.S. forces
installation programs ters vulnerability assessments every three years. A
were increasingly vulnerable to
JSIVA evaluation fulfills the requirement. Teams
transnational terrorism and ad-
try to appraise installations yearly in moderate or
dressed adequacy of policy, clarity of responsibil-
high threat environments such as the Balkans
ity, effectiveness of intelligence, and sufficiency
and the Middle East.
of budget. It also dealt with host nation provision
The services and CINCs nominate facilities
of security, advanced technology, medical care,
for assessment annually. J-34 then schedules a
training, and personnel preparedness.
week for each. A team will normally go on the
The Secretary of Defense designated the
road for two weeks and conduct two appraisals.
Chairman as the point of focus for force protec-
The chief will deliver an out-briefing to the instal-
tion and tasked him to develop aprogram for the
lation commander and staff and generate a com-
services, combatant commands, and defense
prehensive report on the findings within 45 days.
agencies. The Chairman turned the task over to a
90 JFQ / Spring 2002
Cirafici
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Strengthening force Squadron (
pKraontdeachtiaorn amirepaosrtu.res, Prior to a visit, the installation plan munications
m
is examined for compliance with DOD Co
Instruction 2000.16, “DOD Antiterrorism 5th
Standards.” Previous Joint Staff and AT/FP
assessments conducted by service or CINC teams Team chiefs contribute not just leadership
are reviewed for findings and remedial actions but expertise. Current chiefs bring military po-
taken. The team contacts the installation antiter- lice, engineering, and special operations experi-
rorism officer to begin ground- ence to the table. They interface with an installa-
team chiefs bring military work. The intent of a visit is to tion’s senior leadership from arrival till the
provide the commander a com- out-briefing. The chief delivers an overview of
police, engineering, and
prehensive assessment of his an- how a fully functional antiterrorism program
special operations titerrorism program, recommend should look at both an initial meeting with the
improvements, and pass on any commander and during a standard in-briefing
experience to the table
of the installation’s practices with his staff and the installation antiterrorism
which might be helpful else- committee. He describes what the functional
where. Each team, manned by six experts in the area representatives will be assessing and with
antiterrorism process, is led by an Army, Air whom they must interface.
Force, or Navy 0-6. Teams encompass five func-
Experienced Professionals
tional areas: terrorist options, security operations,
structural engineering, infrastructure engineering, Terrorist options assessment specialists (TOs)
and operations readiness. Additionally, a member are typically experienced Army Special Forces or
of J-34 often accompanies the basic team. A De- Navy SEAL noncommissed officers. Their primary
fense Intelligence Agency analyst augments the duties include review of the facility terrorism
team for overseas assessments. The group is fur-
ther joined by a service or CINC representative.
Spring 2002 / JFQ 91
■
FORCE PROTECTION
USS Colebeing moved
for repairs.
m)
Draha
S.
Pat
Navy (
S.
U.
threat assessment process, use of the intelligence Force civil engineers. Working with TOs in an at-
cycle, and mechanism for timely flow of data both tack scenario, they develop estimates of likely
up and down the intelligence conduit. They pre- damage from a given explosive device used
pare for a specific assessment by first collecting against specific structures. The estimate considers
data from the various services’ counterintelligence air blast, fragmentation, debris, and shock pro-
and counterterrorism organizations, the Federal duced by a detonation. Major factors are the
Bureau of Investigation if applicable, the Defense method of construction and materials used, espe-
Intelligence Agency for overseas sites, and local cially the glass, and the stand-off distance separat-
law enforcement authorities. TOs examine exist- ing a structure from a potential vehicle trans-
ing intelligence threat assessments to establish the ported bomb. The type and size of a weapon used
potential for targeting by known groups active in to illustrate the threat is determined by the JSIVA
the area. They act as the terrorist on the team, team based on the installation’s exploitable vul-
looking at an installation through hostile eyes, nerabilities, including access control, antiterror-
and employ a realistic modus operandi based on ism measures in place, physical structures being
known terrorist groups and identifiable threats. targeted, and antiterrorism awareness of person-
They build a plan of attack around the vulnerabili- nel. SEs also assess entry control points and
ties they and their team identify. perimeter fencing. They propose actions that will
JSIVA security operations specialists (SOs) are mitigate the casualty-producing effects of a bomb,
highly experienced active and retired service- minimize damage, and increase deterrence.
members who are drawn from Air Force security Infrastructure engineers (IEs) are typically
forces and Army military police. Each team has trained civil engineers with a public works back-
two, and they assess physical security, review in- ground. IEs focus on critical nodes, including the
stallation antiterrorism planning, evaluate access electrical supply and distribution system, water
control and perimeter deterrence, measure train- supply and distribution, telecommunications, and
ing and antiterrorism awareness, and evaluate fiber optics infrastructure. They assess fire protec-
personal and executive protection. They further tion and suppression systems and fuel storage and
determine if a plan is adequate (if it contains all delivery facilities and examines heating, ventilat-
key components) and executable (sufficiently re- ing, and air conditioning to determine vulnerabil-
sourced, detailed, distributed, and exercised). SOs ity to airborne contaminants. Further, they assess
review whether procedures in place provide for a the availability and operational adequacy of per-
seamless AT/FP defense in depth. manent collective/protective sheltering.
Structural engineers (SEs) are professionals
with DOD experience in military construction.
Several current engineers have additional back-
ground as Army engineers, Navy SEABEEs, and Air
92 JFQ / Spring 2002
Cirafici
Operations readiness specialists (ORs) review roads, open perimeters, uncontrolled gates, and
an installation’s contingency planning, emer- extensive reservations without security.
gency notification procedures and systems in Repeated observations of inadequate physi-
place, mass casualty plans, emergency operations cal security have led to a reluctant reversal away
center capabilities and procedures, and terrorist from openness. The services have moved to
incident response measures. They focus on inci- mandatory vehicle registration for DOD person-
dent response and consequence management. nel, retirees, and family members and a require-
They assess first responders and their prepared- ment that visitors produce positive identification
ness, equipment, intra- and intercommunications, and have legitimate business. Facilities are enter-
and planning. ORs examine installation emer- ing into memoranda of understanding with local
gency operations and response measures, espe- law enforcement and governments to perma-
cially medical and fire capabilities and hazardous nently reroute traffic or close traversing roads
materials as well as procedures for ordnance dis- during higher force protection conditions. Gates
posal incidents. ORs review first responder per- are being reduced to what a facility can control,
sonal protective equipment for applicability, ade- and perimeter fencing, barriers, lighting, and
quacy, currency, and user training. other deterring improvements are being installed.
The comprehensiveness of JSIVAs and the analy-
A Reluctant Reversal
sis of findings have been major factors in improv-
The JSIVA team assessment is driven by the ing the security climate.
antiterrorism standards DOD established and Many shortcomings can be solved procedu-
codified in Instruction 2000.16 in response to rally. One is the fundamental deficiency of instal-
the Downing Report. These 31 points are re- lation antiterrorism plans. A common problem is
quired to implement department policy and are lack of detail. Measures that require implementa-
fundamental to a solid antiterrorism program. tion under time compression are often too vague
They are echoed by each department component or not resourced. For example, a measure that re-
in its instructions, orders, and regulations and quires execution of the barrier plan should in-
provide clear expectations for an installation. clude placement diagrams, identification of re-
They describe the elements of a viable program, sources and their location, means to move
speaking to the AT plan and all its subsets, and barriers in place or fill them with water, and
to security, training, awareness, incident re- points of contact for access to support equipment
sponse, and consequence management. Weapons and personnel. A commander should ask himself
if—should an incident occur late Sunday night—
operations readiness specialists review first respon- the security sergeant or the duty officer can
quickly execute the directed measures without
der personal protective equipment for applicability,
having to resolve issues.
adequacy, currency, and user training
In the current climate, JSIVA-noted vulnera-
bilities have been given priority attention. The
of mass destruction vulnerabilities and threats overall antiterrorist posture of installations has
are addressed. Every observation made in an as- improved thanks to increased awareness, com-
sessment report must reference one or more of mand emphasis, the assessment process, compre-
the DOD standards. hensive trends analysis, and cross talk with both
The teams have completed four hundred as- service and CINC antiterrorism/force protection
sessments since their inception. Many installa- divisions; yet many areas need enhancement. A
tions are undergoing a second. J-34 has taken ob- key catalyst has been face-to-face interaction be-
servations from all assessments to establish trends tween JSIVA teams and installation commanders
and determine where emphasis is needed. A sam- with their AT/FP teams. The bottom line is that
pling of common findings shows where ex- DOD personnel must have reasonable confidence
ploitable vulnerabilities are often identified. JSIVA that they and their families are being afforded
assessors frequently encounter a fundamental in- protection from terrorist attack while they focus
adequacy in installation access control. The prob- on their warfighting mission. It is the goal of
lem commonly arises from a dichotomy between JSIVA teams to make that possible. JFQ
a post’s traditional openness to the public and a
need for commanders to know who is within
their perimeters. Many posts and bases host mu-
seums, historical areas, open houses, air shows,
and displays to promote public interest. Com-
pounding the problem are traversing public
Spring 2002 / JFQ 93