DTIC ADA338619: Congress and SDIO, 1983-1989.

314 Pages·14.9 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

CONGRESS AND SDIO, 1983-1989
Contract #F49642-88-C5157
Deliverable 0001AL
(Final Report)
Principal Author/Analyst
Dr. Steven L. Rearden
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Accession Number: 6187
Publication Date: Jan 31, 1992
Title: Congress and SDIO, 1983-1989
Personal Author: Rearden, S.L. Report Number: Deliverable 0001 AL
Abstract: This study, concentrating on the period of Reagan's presidency, examines the role of Congress in
the development and evolution of the Strategic Defense Initiative, including relations between Congress
and the SDIO, which exercised primary responsibility for the program within the Department of Defense.
The argument presented here is that Congress played a larger role in shaping SDI than is generally
appreciated.
Descriptors, Keywords: SDIO Congress Rearden Reagan Star Wars ABM Treaty US Soviet Union
Pages: 300
Cataloged Date: May 21, 1997
Contract Number: #F49642-88-C5157
Copyrighted or Not: N
Document Type: HC
Number of Copies In Library: 000001
Record ID: 44471
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Introduction AL-1
Chapter I Congress and Ballistic Missile Defense: AI-5
The Historic Setting (1945-1972)
The Origins of Ballistic Missile Defense AL-5
The Post-Sputnik Reaction AL-8
The McNamara Era and the Decision to Deploy ABM AL-14
The ABM Debate AL-23
Congress and the ABM Treaty AL-27
Chapter II Launching SDI (1972-1983) AL-31
Progress in Ballistic Missile Defense AL-32
The Soviet BMD Program AL-33
The U.S. Missile Defense Program AL-34
High Frontier AL-37
The Reagan Administration and Missile Defense AL-40
Wallop for the Defense AL-43
March 23, 1983, and Its Immediate Aftermath AL-46
The Scowcroft Commission Report AL-53
Authorization and Appropriations: FY 1984 AL-54
The People Protection Act AL-60
Chapter III A Cautious Beginning (1984) AL-65
The Administration's Program AL-65
The FY 1985 Authorization: Committee Actions AL-74
Senate Debate: The Percy Amendment AL-85
Appropriations AL-88
Other Congressional Actions AL-93
SDI and the 1984 Elections AL-98
V1
AL-i Table of Contents
Chapter IV Progress and Controversy (1985) AL-100
The Ninety-ninth Congress AL-100
Background of the 1985 Budget Debate AL-102
Senate Deliberations on the FY 1986 AL-113
Authorization Bill
The Authorization Bill in the House AL-123
Conference Compromise AL-130
Appropriations AL-131
The ABM Treaty Interpretation Dispute AL-138
Chapter V SDI Under Attack (1986) AL-145
The President's FY 1987 Budget AL-146
and Its Prospects
SDI and Arms Control AL-156
The Revolt in the Senate AL-161
Further Setbacks in the House AL-166
The Reykjavik Pre-Summit AL-171
SDI and the 1986 Elections AL-175
Chapter VI Legislative Stalemate (1987) AL-177
Changes in Congress AL-178
The Emerging Controversy over Phased Deployment AL-180
The ABM Treaty Interpretation Dispute Revived AL-191
House Debate on the FY 1988 Budget AL-199
Impasse in the Senate AL-205
The Budget Summit Agreement and AL-2H
Its Implications
AL-ii Table of Contents
Chapter VII Marking Time (1988-1989) AL-215
Personnel and Program Changes AL-217
SDI and Arms Control AL-228
The Debate in the Home AL-232
Senate Deliberations and Reagan's Veto AL-238
Appropriations AL-244
Final Action on the Budget and AL-246
the Restructuring of SDI
SDI and the 1988 Election AL-251
Conclusion AL-256
Appendices
Appendix 1 Text of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
between the United States and the Soviet Union AL-268
Appendix 2 Excerpts from President Reagan's Speech of
March 23, 1983 AL-288
Appendix 3 Comparison of SDI Budget Requests and
Appropriations in Key Technologies,
FYs 1985-1989 AL-291
Appendix 4 Profiles of Pro- and Anti-SDI Lobbying and
Interest Groups AL-292
Note on Sources and Select Bibliography AL-296
AL-iii Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
During the course of writing this study I incurred a number of debts and
obligations. For taking the time to read an earlier version of this report and to offer their helpful
comments on improvements at a seminar held on October 30,1991,1 need to thank Dr. Cargill Hall,
Office of Air Force History; Dr. Jacob Neufeld, Chief of the Air Staff History Office; Professor
Stephen J. Cimbala, Penn State University; Dr. Brian J. Nichelson, Exxon Production Research
Company; and Dr. Adam L. Gruen, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Also extremely
useful were the comments and suggestions offered by members of SDIO's Office of External
Affairs, especially Tom Johnson. Dr. Thomas A. Fabyanic of EAST, Inc., provided not only
necessary administrative assistance for this project but also many useful insights that helped me
better understand the political process. Finally, I wish to offer a special note of thanks to Dr.
Donald R. Baucom, the SDIO Historian, whose friendship, advice, and support proved invaluable.
AL-iv Tabfe of Cenfents
INTRODUCTION
(U) Shortly after taking up his duties in March 1989 as President George Bush's Secretary of
Defense, Dick Cheney reaffirmed his support of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the research
and development (R&D) program launched six years earlier by President Ronald Reagan to counter
the threat posed by Soviet offensive ballistic missiles. But while he pledged to continue to promote
SDI, Cheney also said he believed that the program had been "oversold" to the American public.
Indeed, Cheney thought that Reagan's stated aim of rendering nuclear weapons "impotent and
obsolete" any time in the foreseeable future was such "an extremely remote possibility" that he saw
no choice but to pursue less lofty objectives, at less cost and less effort. Under the new
administration, he indicated, SDI would no longer be the high priority item it had been during
Reagan's presidency.1
(U) This shift of emphasis was the result of a variety of factors, not the least of which was
the growing opposition to and skepticism over SDI in Congress. That Congress should have taken
such a critical position was something of a departure from its usual custom, since normally Congress
grants military R&D programs considerable leeway in the interests of national security. SDI,
however, posed a unique set of problems, and thus received different treatment. Not only was it one
of the most expensive and technically complex military R&D programs of all time, but also it cut
a highly visible political profile. The goal of SDI, in Reagan's view, was a virtually impenetrable
peace shield based mainly in outer space, utilizing the most advanced technologies such as lasers,
particle beams, and kinetic energy weapons, many of which were little more than drawing board
concepts. Once in place, the purpose of such a system would be nothing less than to free mankind
of the threat of nuclear holocaust, an admirable objective, to be sure, but not one that all in Congress
saw as being attainable solely or even in part through SDI. With sentiment and opinion thus
polarized almost from the very outset, SDI was a natural candidate for close congressional oversight.
1 Washington Post. March 29, 1989.
AL-1 Introduction
(U) The congressional debate over SDI was wide-ranging and free-wheeling, covering a
myriad of issues—not only the formidable technical problems the program faced, but also its possible
impact on such issues as arms control, the growing Federal budget deficit, the East-West strategic
balance, relations with U.S. allies, and perhaps most important of all, the future of the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. In other words, SDI
posed numerous questions of feasibility, not just from a scientific and technical standpoint, but also
in terms of overcoming equally formidable political, fiscal, and strategic hurdles. After nearly five
years of hearings, floor debate, and other deliberations addressing these issues—from March 1983
when Reagan first proposed SDI, to January 1989 when he left office—only one thing was clean the
political controversy over SDI, or "star wars," as its enemies and critics derided it, was just as fresh
and vigorous as ever.2
(U) This study, concentrating on the period of Reagan's presidency, examines the role of
Congress in the development and evolution of the Strategic Defense Initiative, including relations
between Congress and the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), which exercised primary
responsibility for the program within the Department of Defense. The argument presented here is
that Congress played a larger role in shaping SDI that is generally appreciated, following a general
pattern of steadily growing congressional involvement in defense and national security affairs since
World War II;3 and that the debate over SDI in Congress became a major focal point of competing
liberal and conservative values, a persistent conflict throughout the Reagan years. The distinction
drawn in this study between liberals and conservatives refers both to the policies and programs they
endorsed, and to the mindset that their preferences reflected. For Congressional liberals, this meant
a government-oriented approach to problem-solving, increased emphasis on meeting domestic needs,
particularly for the underprivileged, and relatively less expenditure of energy and resources on
2 The term "star wars" came from a highly popular 1977 science fiction motion picture of the
same title, and was used derisively by critics to try to convey what they deemed the absurdity
of Reagan's program.
3 On the background of growing congressional involvement, see Steven L. Rearden, "Congress
and National Defense, 1945-1950," in Richard H. Kohn, The United States Military under
the Constitution of the United States. 1789-1989 (New York: New York University Press,
1991), 271-289.
AL-2 Introduction
foreign and defense policy. Conservatives, on the other hand, followed a different persuasion that
down-played the role of government in virtually all but foreign and domestic affairs. Accordingly,
they sought a more laisser faire approach to the economy that would reward individual initiative, a
more active foreign policy to counter communist expansion, and a stronger defense posture in the
■ face of what they viewed as an ever increasing threat posed by the Soviet Union.
(U) Most senators and representatives, following congressional custom, never openly
acknowledged that purely political considerations, including political ideology, were the deciding
factors in how they voted on SDL But a sizable number—opponents on the left, supporters on the
right—seized on SDI as a means of advancing their own particular political agendas. For those on
the left (i.e., liberal Democrats for the most part) SDI was an unnecessary diversion of resources
which would be better spent either on strengthening conventional military capabilities or, preferably,
on improving domestic programs. Afro-American members of Congress, representing predominantly
depressed inner-city areas that were heavily dependent on Federal subsidies, were especially critical
of SDI. They considered it not only an immediate drain on essential public welfare programs but
also the first step toward a massive, long-term claim on resources by the military that would leave
their constituents worse off than ever in the future.
(U) Conservative Republicans, on the other hand, regarded SDI as probably the most
important national security issue of the decade and potentially Reagan's greatest legacy—ridding the
Free World of the threat of nuclear destruction. Given these high stakes and expectations, and the
political opportunities they presented, it was hardly surprising that congressional conservatives and
Uiu; iuaowers piaceo lurtlienng SDI at or near the top of their list of priorities. As time went on,
SDI became practically as much a symbol of conservative Republican politics as Ronald Reagan
himself. Yet it was this same enthusiasm for SDI that gradually helped to weaken the program's
appeal and general support on Capitol Hill. So eager were many conservatives to see deployment of
SDI, even if only on a limited scale, that they created an atmosphere in which the administration had
no real choice other than to take arguable positions on issues—the interpretation of the ABM Treaty
in particular—that diminished support for SDI among congressional moderates and opened the way
for the program's opponents to impose crippling constraints.
AL-3 Introduction
(U) In fact, the ideological division in Congress over ballistic missile defense was by no
means new to the Reagan years; its roots extended back to the splits between liberals and
conservatives over the Vietnam War and the ABM debate of the late 1960s and early 1970s. But it
was during Reagan's presidency, with the appearance of SDI, that the divisiveness reached its peak.
Not only was SDI one of the most complicated technical issues ever to come before Congress; it was
also one of the most politically explosive as well. Though Reagan undoubtedly never imagined the
full range of consequences, political and otherwise, that flowed from his decision to launch SDI, he
embarked upon the program confident that ultimately it would reshape military strategy and produce
a less threatening, more stable international environment. From Capitol Hill, however, Reagan's
vision of the future was neither quite so clear nor confidently accepted.
AL-4 fetzoductioE