“Drunkenness Is No Excuse for Crime” - Alcohol, Murder and Medical Jurisprudence in Nineteenth ...

242 Pages·2014·1.3 MB·English

by  Michele Rotunda

© 2014

Michele Rotunda

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
“DRUNKENNESS IS NO EXCUSE FOR CRIME” – ALCOHOL,
MURDER, AND MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA

by

MICHELE ROTUNDA

A Dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School – New Brunswick

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Program in History

Written under the direction of

Susan R. Schrepfer

And approved by

___________________________________________
___________________________________________
___________________________________________
___________________________________________
New Brunswick, New Jersey
May 2014
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

“DRUNKENNESS IS NO EXCUSE FOR CRIME” – ALCOHOL, MURDER, AND
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA

BY MICHELE ROTUNDA

Dissertation Director:

Susan R. Schrepfer

Using a variety of court cases as evidence, this study focuses on several
competing, and often unresolved, models of responsibility for crimes related to
intoxication that emerged in nineteenth century America. Drunkenness truly was “no
excuse” for crime in the early years of the nineteenth century; however, changes in the
fields of medicine, the law, and society created the circumstances under which such a
defense became more viable, and certainly more prevalent, if only intermittently
successful, by mid-century. American courts began, in the 1820s, to accord an expanded
exculpatory value to intoxication due to several factors: 1. The medicalization of alcohol
use from delirium tremens to dipsomania to inebriety created categories of mental illness
from which to argue for limited or even absent responsibility under the law. 2. American
law, beginning in 1794, allowed for a greater recognition of the issue of intent in crimes,
in particular, creating statutory degrees of violent crimes that were dependent on
establishing appropriate mens rea. Evidence of intoxication could be used to disprove
intent and thus lower the charge to second degree. 3. The cautionary tale of a good man
ruined by the effects of alcohol was an important tool used by the early temperance
movement as it sought to curb the pernicious effects of drinking in a nation rife with
ii
alcohol. In much of the temperance literature, “demon rum” and the “rum-seller” often
joined the drunkard as accomplices in crime. Somewhat ironically, the demonization of
alcohol and those who sold it allowed for a narrative that mitigated the actions of the
drunkard himself. By the post-bellum period, a backlash, led by medical professionals
and buttressed by an influential temperance movement, materialized, but the groundwork
had been laid for considering what today is more likely to be called a defense of
“diminished capacity.”

iii
Acknowledgements

This project took a little longer than the traditional dissertation to complete, but I
can’t imagine my life if I had done it any other way. I have had the opportunity to work
with and to receive advice and support from so many brilliant scholars over the years, and
for that, I am enormously grateful to the History Department at Rutgers, in both New
Brunswick and Newark.
I am indebted to my students at Rutgers-Newark and, more recently, Union
County College, who provide me with deeper purpose and remind me every day why
history is the most interesting subject in the world – even if they don’t always agree.
I am grateful that my children, Scott and Kate, pulled me away from my research and
provided me with perspective – even if they added years onto my work.
I would also like to thank my husband, Keith Delaney, who made up for the
challenges of dealing with his unpredictable law enforcement schedule, by reading
through various drafts of the paper and acting as my unofficial legal consultant. When I
read the transcript of the James Graves trial that mentioned a diary used as evidence, my
fellow historians assured me that the “source” must still exist. My husband looked at me
as though I were insane, but he still called someone in the homicide division in Newark
to see if there was any chance they held onto evidence from the 1880s. I think they’re
still laughing.
My deep and abiding appreciation to my committee members Gerald Grob, Ann
Fabian and Sarah Tracy for their guidance and encouragement.
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My greatest debt is to my advisor and friend, Susan Schrepfer whose advice
always managed to be both brilliant and kind, and whose promise to remain my friend
even if I never finished my dissertation inspired me more than anything else.

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Table of Contents

Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………ii

Acknowledgements ...…………………………………………………………………..iv

Introduction ...…………………………………………………………………………...1

Chapter 1: “Not the intended result of drink” – Delirium Tremens as
a Defense ..……………………………………………………………………….13

Chapter 2: “Not capable of entertaining this specific intent” –
Intoxication as Mitigation …..…………………………………………………...49

Chapter 3: “A victim of intemperance” – The Drunkard’s Story .…………………….75

Chapter 4: “The broad resemblance between insanity and
drunkenness” – Moral Insanity .…………….…………………………………..111

Chapter 5: “They are simply drunk” – Backlash against Dipsomania ……………….152

Chapter 6: “Represented as framing an apology for sin and for crime” –
The Problem of Establishing a Disease Concept of Inebriety .......……..……....184

Epilogue …..…………………………………………………….…………………....211

Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………….217
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1

Introduction

On September 29, 1790, a Proclamation signed by Massachusetts Governor John
Hancock offered a reward of one hundred dollars for the apprehension of Samuel
Hadlock. The escaped prisoner had been convicted “of the horrid crime of Murdering
Eliah Littlefield Gott,” reportedly beating him to death when he was “too much inflamed
with strong drink.” Hadlock was captured a short time afterwards, and a date was set to
carry out the sentence of execution. On the scaffold, the condemned man insisted “that
he never had any malice afore-thought, or premeditated determination to kill any one,”
but as the newspaper had assured its readers, “the law considers intoxication as an
aggravation, rather than an excuse for murder.” Hadlock was executed on October 28.1
Had he committed his crime several decades later, Hadlock’s insistence that he had no
intent to murder might have formed his defense rather than his last words.
Whatever opinions they may have held on this particular case, American citizens
in the early republic knew that drunkenness provided no excuse for crime. As early as
1551, in the case of Reniger v. Forgossa, English common law proclaimed, “if a person
that is drunk kill another, this shall be felony, and he shall be hanged for it…” The
intoxicated state of the individual at the time of the crime was irrelevant inasmuch as it
“was occasioned by his own act and folly, and he might have avoided it, he shall not be
privileged thereby.” In other words, when the act of drinking is undertaken voluntarily,
the resulting state of intoxication is predictable, thus the offender bears full responsibility

1 “Trial for Murder,” The Massachusetts Magazine 2 (July 1790); 446; “Commonwealth of Massachusetts,”
Hampshire Chronicle (September 29, 1790); “Domestick Affairs,” Hampshire Chronicle, October 13,
1790; “Hadlock, the Inhuman Murderer Executed,” Hampshire Gazette, November 24, 1790.
2

for his actions.2 Writing on medical jurisprudence almost 300 years later, physician
Theodric Romeyn Beck validated this rule of law stating, “It is a well known and salutary
maxim in our laws, that crimes committed under the influence of intoxication, do not
excuse the perpetrator from punishment.” Yet he also noted that medical wisdom of the
time accepted habitual drunkenness as a cause of insanity. A staunch proponent of the
value of medical expertise in legal matters, Beck recognized the complexity of the issue
as he predicted that “The partition line between intoxication and insanity may hence
sometimes become a subject of discussion.”3 Here Beck is quite prescient if ultimately
understated.
Repeatedly from the pages of my research, figures from the past adamantly
declared that, “Drunkenness is no excuse for crime.” The seeming forthrightness of the
statement belies the reality of nineteenth century courtroom scenes in which heavy
drinking was often pled as a defense to a variety of heinous crimes, including murder.
Even as prosecuting attorneys attempted to convince juries that drunkenness was no
excuse according to the law, physicians and defense attorneys often relied on the very
same declaration with an important “but” that negated its relevance in the case of their
client. Arguments pointing out the lack of intent in an intoxicated defendant’s actions
were often supported by medical testimony for judges and juries to consider. The
defendant also may have attempted to shift some of the blame by proclaiming, “the

2 Case of Reniger v. Forgossa cited in Mitchell Keiter, “Just Say No Excuse: The Rise and Fall of the
Intoxication Defense,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 87 (1997): 484. Note that the law did
make a distinction between voluntary drunkenness and involuntary drunkenness – even as the former
condition was considered to be a rare event. For more on the early history of the insanity defense, see
Daniel N. Robinson, Wild Beasts and Idle Humours: The Insanity Defense from Antiquity to Present
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996).
3 Theodric Romeyn Beck, M.D., Elements of Medical Jurisprudence Vol. I, (Albany: Websters and
Skinners, 1823), 375.
3

Demon Rum” made him do it. The outcomes of these trials varied across time, place and
circumstance. Juries were sometimes swayed by the argument that alcohol consumption
did indeed affect the circumstances of crime. In other cases, juries who seemed to find
no exculpatory significance in an offender’s intoxicated state set their hands to petitions
calling for a reduced sentence after the close of what were often highly publicized trials.
More often than not, the “drunkard” was convicted; justice, and the cause of temperance,
seemingly served.
Using a variety of court cases as evidence, this study will focus on several
competing, and often unresolved, models of responsibility for crimes related to
intoxication that emerged in nineteenth century America. Like much of history, it is a
story that does not follow a straight path. Drunkenness truly was “no excuse” for crime
in the early years of the nineteenth century; however, changes in the fields of medicine,
the law, and society created the circumstances under which such a defense became more
viable, and certainly more prevalent, if only intermittently successful, by mid-century.
Generally it was a defense of last resort: to claim drunkenness as an excuse likely meant
there was little reasonable doubt as to the details of the crime. By the post-bellum period,
a backlash, led by medical professionals and buttressed by an influential temperance
movement, materialized, but the groundwork had been laid for considering what today is
more likely to be called a defense of “diminished capacity.” Broadly, this project
connects two fields of historical research that too often remain disparate – the history of
the insanity defense and a social and cultural history of alcohol consumption in the
United States. On the one hand, the story told here follows a similar trajectory to that of
the insanity defense which gained ground, linked to medical professionalization, in the