Deforestation, Agrarian Reform and Oil Development in Ecuador, 1964-1994

14 Pages·2013·2 MB·English

Natural Resources, 2013, 4, 31-44 31
http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/nr.2013.41004 Published Online March 2013 (http://www.scirp.org/journal/nr)
Deforestation, Agrarian Reform and Oil Development in
*
Ecuador, 1964-1994
Robert Wasserstrom1, Douglas Southgate2

1Terra Group, Hershey, Pennsylvania, USA; 2Department of Agricultural, Environmental and Development Economics, Ohio State
University, Columbus, USA.
Email: [email protected]

Received October 13th, 2012; revised December 6th, 2012; accepted December 21st, 2012
ABSTRACT
Recent biodiversity research in the Western Amazon has emphasized the linkages among road construction, deforesta-
tion and loss of indigenous lands. Many observers have concluded that hydrocarbon production inevitably means de-
struction of forests and expropriation of native territory. Yet evidence from the eastern lowlands of Ecuador (known as
the Oriente) shows that oil can be developed without roads or harmful impacts. The Oriente also provides another con-
trasting case: in areas where no oil was discovered, the government often built roads to support its agricultural coloniza-
tion efforts. In these areas, a great deal of deforestation and indigenous displacement occurred. Such evidence suggests
that a different set of agrarian and environmental policies might permit oil activity without loss of rain forest or indige-
nous territory.

Keywords: Ecuador; Deforestation; Oil Development; Agrarian Reform; Colonization
1. Introduction Table 1. Deforestation in the Oriente, 1965-20001.
Recent biodiversity research in Western Amazonia has Deforestation
emphasized the linkages among road construction, de- Province Hectares (mm)
Hectares %
forestation of sensitive areas and loss of indigenous lands
[1-3]. Much of this research focuses on petroleum de- Sucumbíos 1.79 267,000 14.9
velopment in the eastern lowlands of Ecuador (known as Orellana 2.17 404,700 18.7
the Oriente), where “oil itself was located deep in pri-
Napo 1.25 421,300 33.8
mary forest and the extensive system of oil access roads…
Pastaza 2.91 222,800 7.7
facilitated colonization and subsequent deforestation by
small migrant farmers pursuing agriculture and cattle Morona Santiago 2.39 601,200 25.2
ranching” [4]. This formulation partly reflects the pio- Zamora Chinchipe 1.05 236,900 22.4
neering work of economist Sven Wunder, who reported
Total, Oriente 11.6 2,153,900 18.6
that “the direct deforestation impacts of the oil industry

from roads were negligible. The indirect impacts from oil
primary cause of harm.
roads to open up new areas for first timber extraction and
Yet for Ecuador, this account overlooks a major driv-
then colonisation were more important, causing a spon-
ing force of deforestation: the government’s agricultural
taneous influx of agricultural squatters, who… gradually
development and colonization policies. Settlement in the
‘ate’ their way into the forest [5].” Contemporary events
Ecuadorian Amazon remained a central focus of gov-
in Ecuador seem to bear him out. Between 1964 and
ernment policy throughout the late 19th and 20th Centu-
1994, nearly one-fifth of the country’s eastern forests
ries. Through shifting political currents and economic
disappeared (Table 1), while indigenous communities
fortunes, virtually every administration took steps to oc-
retained only a small fraction of their original lands. De-
cupy and subdue the rain forest. In 1875, the government
spite Wunder’s findings about colonization, however,
declared its Amazonian territories to be “vacant land”
most researchers continue to blame oil production as the
and open for colonization; they remained open until the
*The authors are deeply indebted to an anonymous reviewer, who sig- government formally ended colonization in 1994. In 1963,
nificantly improved our article. They would also like to thank Dr.
James Ellis for providing his satellite maps of the Ecuadorian rainforest. 1Adapted from Reference [6].
Copyright © 2013 SciRes. NR
32 Deforestation, Agrarian Reform and Oil Development in Ecuador, 1964-1994
authorities in Quito identified target areas for agricultural 1) The northern region, with extensive road construc-
settlement in the Oriente and designed a “master plan” tion, oil production and colonization.
for colonization. The following year, Ecuador’s new mili- 2) Pastaza Province, where oil development took place
tary rulers began a massive transfer of native lands to without roads or colonization.
migrant homesteaders, who were recruited from the high- 3) Morona Santiago Province, where roads were built
lands and Pacific Coast. to encourage settlement but oil was never found.
In contrast, oil production did not start until 1972, the 4) The remote eastern frontier without oil development,
same year a highway from Quito to Lago Agrio (the pro- roads or settlers.
duction center) was completed (Figure 1). Without ques- Comparing and contrasting such cases lead to broader
tion, settlers used this highway to enter the Oriente. But conclusions about development policy. Many investiga-
even where oil was absent, the government undertook tors now argue that oil and gas production are inherently
public works needed for colonization and demanded that destructive and cause deforestation, loss of indigenous
oil companies build roads and bridges—whether or not lands and other damage [7-12]. But our evidence shows
such infrastructure was needed for petroleum develop- that this need not be the case. Far more significant, we
ment. argue, was the Ecuadorian government’s early intention
In this paper, we will reevaluate the relative impact of to expand agricultural colonization into Amazonia. Oil
oil development and colonization policy on Ecuador’s exploration in the northern Oriente was used opportunis-
eastern rain forest. The Oriente offers a unique opportu- tically to build the infrastructure for settlement and for
nity to analyze development policy, because it can be crop and livestock production. This conclusion suggests
divided into four distinct zones that allow for detailed that a different set of policies might permit oil or mining
comparison: activity without loss of rain forest or native lands.

Figure 1. Ecuador and its eastern rainforest.
Copyright © 2013 SciRes. NR
Deforestation, Agrarian Reform and Oil Development in Ecuador, 1964-1994 33

2. Development Policy in Ecuador the 1970s and 1980s, the government offered subsidies
and tax holidays to large palm oil growers and cattle
When oil was discovered near Lago Agrio in April, 1967,
ranchers if they cleared new land in peripheral places like
the Ecuadorian government looked forward to investing
the Amazon basin [24].
heavily in national development [13]. Ecuador had one of
Other public subsidies directly accelerated the geo-
the poorest, most rural and fastest growing populations in
graphic expansion of agriculture into lowland forests.
the Western Hemisphere. Its gross national income (GNI)
During the 1970s, gasoline in Ecuador rarely cost more
per capita was little more than half the average for Latin
than $0.10/gallon, far lower than international prices.
America and the Caribbean as a whole; only Haitians had
Even during the 1980s, domestic prices rose to only
an average income that was significantly lower. Ecua-
$0.30/gallon [25]. Although low energy prices may have
dorians born in 1967 could expect to live 57 years, less
benefited everyone, they were especially advantageous
than the hemisphere’s average age of 59 years. Mean-
for farmers in remote settings like the Oriente. Mean-
while, at 3%, Ecuador’s annual population growth ex-
while, improvements in agricultural technology received
ceeded the rate for the region as a whole, which was
little support, which was reflected in low crop and live-
2.7% [14].
stock yields. By the late 1980s, rice yields in Ecuador
Thanks to oil money, GNI per capita in Ecuador grew
(2.3 metric tons per hectare) had sunk to less than half of
faster during the 1970s than in any other nation in the
yields in Colombia (4.7 tons) and Peru (4.8 tons)—de-
Western Hemisphere. By the end of the decade, oil ex-
spite the fact that farming conditions for rice are ideal in
ports brought in $1.035 billion and represented more than
the Guayas River basin [26]. Ecuador’s per-hectare pro-
half of all government revenues [15]. Nearly four-fifths
duction of grain and tubers was lower in 1998 than yields
of this revenue was used to expand public sector em-
in Colombia, Peru and Venezuela [27]3. Simultaneously,
ployment and increase salaries [16]. In turn, improve-
the rising demand for food led to a sharp expansion in
ment in living conditions for middle class families drove
agricultural land use. For two decades starting in the
up the demand for food, especially livestock products
mid-1970s, two-thirds of the increase in Ecuador’s crop
[17]. Increasing demand and accelerated currency appre-
and livestock output resulted from the spread of areas
ciation would most likely have resulted in a flood of im-
under cultivation; rising yields accounted for only one-
ported beef, pork and chicken. To prevent this, the gov-
third of that increase [29].
ernment imposed tariffs that protected domestic suppliers.
Ranchers and other livestock producers became major
3. Land Reform
beneficiaries of the growth in domestic markets, as were
suppliers of non-tradable services [18]. 3.1. The First Land Reform, 1964-1972
Government policies stimulated expansion of the live-
In 1964, Ecuador’s new military rulers decided to ad-
stock sector in other ways. Enriched by oil revenue, offi-
dress one of the country’s most serious economic and
cial agencies offered subsidized credit that favored spe-
political problems: agrarian reform. Since the country’s
cific economic sectors [19]. During the 1970s, for exam-
first agricultural census in 1954, many Ecuadorian offi-
ple, nearly every loan from the National Development
cials recognized that “agrarian reform was necessary if
Bank (BNF), a public credit agency, favored livestock
producers2. Moreover, cheap credit was directed over- industrialization was to be achieved” [30]. At the time,
0.4% of all proprietors occupied 45% of total farmland,
whelmingly toward larger operators: only 10% of the
while 90% of farms (owned by half of the country’s
country’s 700,000 farmers received BNF loans [22]. Es-
population) were too small to support a single family [31,
pecially in the highlands, large landowners used bor-
32]. Previous governments had made timorous efforts to
rowed money to mechanize and expand their operations.
address these problems. In 1957, President Camilo Ponce
As economist Carlos Larrea notes, mechanization often
Enríquez established the Instituto Nacional de Coloni-
reduced farm-related employment, which declined from
zación (INC, National Colonization Institute), which later
873,000 jobs in 1974 to 773,000 in 1982 [23]. Many laid-
became the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y
off workers moved to urban slums or returned to culti-
Colonización (IERAC, the Ecuadorian Institute for Agrar-
vating small highland plots. Others joined the ranks of
ian Reform and Resettlement). But support for land re-
agricultural colonists settling in the Oriente. At the same
distribution was always limited. Among other things,
time, national production of rice, potatoes and other basic
landowners objected to the abolition of indebted labor
food crops dropped by 30% [21]. And finally, through
(known as precarismo or huasipungo) on their estates
2In 1979, the World Bank found that 90% of these loans supported
cattle production [20]. Another government lender, the Banco Coopera- 3According to Pichón, “Yields of almost all crops in Ecuador are lower
tivo, supported only landowners who owned more than 100 hectares. than in neighboring Colombia and Peru, and in some cases are mark-
By 1984, 60% of all agricultural credit was channeled toward livestock edly lower…” He also writes that “in wheat, beans, and soybeans,
[21]. yields have actually declined since the early 1990s [28].”
Copyright © 2013 SciRes. NR
34 Deforestation, Agrarian Reform and Oil Development in Ecuador, 1964-1994
and opposed any limitation on farm size. As Redclift Esmeraldas. Then beginning in 1965, another region
writes, “Five years after the 1964 Law was introduced it opened to colonization: the Andean foothills of Morona
was calculated that, at the current rate at which land was Santiago province, east of Cuenca. With support from the
being handed over to former huisipungueros, it would be Inter-American Development Bank, regional authorities
one hundred and seventy years before all the precaristas in Cuenca built a road network that eventually extended
in Ecuador were in possession of land [33].” deep into “unoccupied” areas that lay within traditional
Although land reform largely failed in the highlands, Shuar and Achuar territory [20,38]. By 1973, IERAC had
government officials achieved greater success in reset- issued provisional title for 212,000 hectares to 4000
tling impoverished families on “vacant lands” along the beneficiaries [20].
northern coast and in the southern Amazon. In 1963,
3.2. The Second Land Reform, 1973-1979
military rulers asked the Junta Nacional de Planificación
y Coordinación Económica (National Planning Board, In 1966, Ecuador’s military authorities relinquished power
known as JNPC) to prepare an inventory of potential to a civilian administration that governed until 1972,
“colonization” areas, along with a master plan for settling when the armed forces again took control (until 1979).
them (Figure 2) [34]. By this time, highland hacendados had sold off signifi-
But without roads, most of the Amazon remained out cant holdings, but they still owned a third of the coun-
of reach4. Until the mid-1960s, only one under-populated try’s total (and best) agricultural land. In contrast, 70% of
part of Ecuador could be reached by highway: the coastal rural households tried to survive on less than 8% of all
rain forest between Santo Domingo de los Colorados and farmland. For the most part, food production stagnated.

Figure 2. Designated colonization zones, 1963.

4Bromley provides an early discussion of this issue [ 35]. In a few instances, large haciendas spread along the most accessible headwaters of major
rivers: the Napo, Pastaza and Curaray. According to Uquillas, however, early settlers focused primarily on land speculation or logging [36]. Brownet
al. point out that early migrations closely followed commodity cycles: “With respect to the Oriente, increases in world demand for rubber, gold, qui-
nine and petroleum motivated successive waves of settlement, and decreases in demand dampened or reversed those waves, leading to a boom and
bust economy [37].”
Copyright © 2013 SciRes. NR
Deforestation, Agrarian Reform and Oil Development in Ecuador, 1964-1994 35

Soon after taking power, military rulers created a new build other infrastructure-including highways, bridges
state oil company, the Corporación Estatal Petrolero Ec- and the Lago Agrio airport-worth $55.5 million (includ-
uatoriana (CEPE, later renamed Petroecuador) and joined ing $20 million of penetration roads unrelated to oil de-
OPEC. They rewrote the National Hydrocarbons Law to velopment) [41]. For the first time, Ecuadorian officials
underscore governmental ownership of the country’s pe- could now envision fulfilling their aspiration of coloniz-
troleum reserves, along with its exclusive right to explore ing the northern Amazon (Figure 3).
and develop them. New contracts were signed with Tex- Like its predecessor, the military government that
pet (the Texaco-Gulf Consortium that discovered oil in came to power in 1972 viewed land reform as an essen-
1967), thereby making CEPE an equity partner. Hence- tial precondition for economic progress. But reform ad-
forth, foreign companies were also “required to pay sur- vocates quickly ran into opposition from landowners and
face and entry rights, royalties, tax contributions for edu- more conservative military officers. As in 1964, pro-
cation, transportation fees for pipeline usage, and com- posed ceilings on landholdings became the stumbling
pensatory public works in the region contracted [39].” block. As a compromise, the 1973 Agrarian Reform Law
The emphasis on public works is significant. Since the set no limits on farm size, as long as these holdings ful-
1920s, when it adopted its second Ley del Oriente, the filled a legitimate “social function”: efficient agricultural
Ecuadorian government had looked to oil companies for production [42].
“dual purpose” infrastructure [40]. In 1947, for example, But what was to be done with the 1.85 million high-
Shell built a road from Ambato (in the central highlands) land peasants who had received nothing at all under land
to Puyo, opening part of the central Amazon to settle- reform? Most of these families lived on less than one
ment. It also built an airport at Shell-Mera and a network hectare and survived as seasonal migrants on coastal plan-
of local penetration roads. As oil exploration proceeded, tations or in the cities. “By 1973,” Redclift notes, “it was
these roads were extended and eventually connected to abundantly clear that no redistributive land reform was
the highway from Morona Santiago, farther to the south. likely, at least in the short term, and that the main efforts
In September, 1971, at the government’s direction, Tex- of the military would be expended in efforts to ‘modern-
pet completed a highway from Quito to Lago Agrio ize’ agricultural production on the latifundia [43].” As a
(paved in 1972). By contract, Texpet was also required to result, Zevallos adds, “colonization became an alternative

Figure 3. Highway construction in the Oriente, 1947-1994.
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36 Deforestation, Agrarian Reform and Oil Development in Ecuador, 1964-1994

to agrarian reform [44].” In 1972, as the Quito-Lago 4. Colonization and Resettlement:
Agrio road was nearing completion, the government de- Four Cases
clared that oil development would enable the northeast to
become a target “area for migration and expansion.” It Were deforestation and the loss of native land an un-
offered 50-hectare parcels of land in the Oriente and re- avoidable outcome of petroleum development, as many
quired settlers to clear half of their holdings within five scholars have argued, or were these problems largely a
years to show “effective use.” Colonization, not land consequence of misguided economic policies5? Beginning
reform, became the dominant force in reshaping Ecua- in 1964, migrants from the highlands and Pacific Coast
dor’s countryside (Figure 4). poured into the eastern forests and claimed “vacant”

Figure 4. Land reform and colonization, 1964-1978.
5In our analysis of deforestation, we have used satel lite imagery from 2000 because this is the first year that it was available after the frontier was
closed. Data were adapted from Reference [6] and from the Centro de Levantamientos Integrados de Recursos Naturales por Sensores Remotos
(CLIRSEN), available online at http://www.clirsen.gob.ec/clirsen/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1. We are grateful to Dr. James Ellis for
sharing his analysis with us.
Copyright © 2013 SciRes. NR
Deforestation, Agrarian Reform and Oil Development in Ecuador, 1964-1994 37

land under the country’s new colonization laws (Table 2). extensive lands. Ultimately, however, the government
Analysis of satellite imagery and historical data allow us approved only modest grants to native communities [36].
to compare how such events unfolded in four cases. By 1990, the Siona-Secoya had obtained title to just over
40,000 hectares; almost 680,000 hectares of Huaorani
4.1. The Northern Oriente (Oil Development, land were legally protected from invasion; eventually,
Roads and Colonization) the Cofán received 34,000 hectares (subsequently in-
creased to 69,000 hectares). For the Cofán and Siona-
Until 1972, a few migrants entered this area—mostly
Secoya, such grants ensured their bare survival, but ex-
settlers pushing north along the Puyo-Tena road. After
cluded most of their original territories (totaling nearly 3
the highway from Quito to Lago Agrio was completed,
million hectares).
however, colonos poured in from all parts of Ecuador,
Homesteading was not successful for everyone. Many
especially drought-stricken Loja Province in the southern
farmers failed, because they missed their annual land
Andes. Colonization brought significant consequences
payments, lacked credit, lost cattle, or couldn’t grow
for the region’s indigenous population. Virtually all of
enough food. IERAC procedures were complicated and
the “vacant” land identified by government officials in
often required fees, bribes and expensive trips to Quito or
their 1963 settlement plan was located within traditional
Lago Agrio. Land could not be sold legally without per-
territories used by the Cofán, Siona-Secoya and Huaorani
manent title. If hardship struck, many colonos abandoned
people. According to Uquillas, “The fact that large por-
remote farms for a fraction of their potential market
tions of land are considered ‘fallow’ or have no owner
value, allowing larger landowners to expand their hold-
other than the state (frequently ignoring prior rights of
possession of indigenous inhabitants) has incited the un- ings. Ultimately, wrote Hiraoka and Yamamoto, this
restrained taking of lands by immigrants to the petroleum process would defeat the purpose of agricultural settle-
zone. In areas of highway construction (or projected con- ment: “social and economic roles envisaged for the Ori-
struction), colonists take possession of the land and ente—provision of better financial opportunities and the
commence deforestation [48].” poor and relief of demographic pressures from the An-
Only the first homesteaders who lived along new roads dean core regions—will not be realizable [50].” To make
enjoyed relatively easy access to outside markets. They matters worse, government officials also allocated far lar-
planted crops such as coffee, maize or plantains on home- ger parcels in the northern Oriente to commercial agri-
steads that measured 200 - 250 meters wide by 2 km culture. By 1978, they had already given grants of 10,000
deep. Later arrivals settled farther from roads, with little hectares and 60,000 hectares to corporate operators for
prospect of raising anything but cattle. By 1978, accord- oil palm and livestock production. Subsequently, 9,500
ing to Hiraoka and Yamamoto, “colonists were clearing hectares of traditional Siona-Secoya hunting territory were
parcels… eight or ten kilometers distant from the trunk awarded to Palmeras del Ecuador for an African oil palm
routes [49].” Many of these colonists knew that their plantation. A few years later semi-clandestine logging
farms were commercially unviable, but were speculating spread into the Cuyabeno Wildlife Reserve along roads
that access roads would be built later. built by the state oil company, Petroecuador (Figure 5)
In September, 1980, government officials convened an [51,52].
inter-ministerial committee to resolve the conflict between
colonos and native communities. Representing traditional 4.2. Pastaza Province (Oil Development without
“developmentalist” agencies, most committee members Roads)
argued that 50 hectares per family were generous for
Pastaza Province shares a long border with Peru, guarded
semi-nomadic native farmers and that larger land grants
by remote army garrisons. Until 1947, its capital, Puyo,
would be wasted. Independent experts conducted field
housed a small Catholic mission and neighboring village.
studies among the Cofán, Siona-Secoya and Huaorani,
Completion of roads to Macas and Ambato transformed
and tried to explain why native economies required more
the settlement into a commercial and administrative cen-

Table 2. Population of the Oriente, 1962-19926. ter. By 1966, it was surrounded by large ranches and
sugar plantations, as landowners took advantage of the
Year Population 1964 Agrarian Law to annex lowland Quichua territory
1962 25,582 [53,54].
1974 55,142 Traditionally, lowland Quichua people were divided
into two groups: Quijos (Napo Runa) and Canelos (Puyo
1982 115,110
Runa). By the mid-19th Century, many Runa—at least
1992 371,110
those who lived closest to Puyo and Tena—had become
6Adapted from References [46,47]. indebted peons on lowland haciendas (also called fundos
Copyright © 2013 SciRes. NR
38 Deforestation, Agrarian Reform and Oil Development in Ecuador, 1964-1994

Figure 5. Land use in Sucumbíos, Orellana and Napo Provinces, 2000.

in Ecuador). During the mid-20th Century, they often completed work on production facilities and a secondary
found opportunities to work elsewhere or find temporary pipeline connecting Villano with SOTE, Ecuador’s main
employment with petroleum companies. Wages in the oil pipeline system. To minimize environmental impacts,
fields were far superior to peonage on lowland fundos. At ARCO built its facilities using an “off-shore” strategy
first, local men worked for Shell, which explored for oil that required no roads. During construction, all equip-
in the Oriente between 1937 and 1950. Later, they signed ment, supplies and workers were transported by helicop-
on with Texaco or other companies. Although a few ter. A small “flow line” was laid above ground to avoid
families moved to Lago Agrio, an important Texaco base, damaging tree roots and leave the forest canopy intact.
more often the men took temporary jobs there (the nor- Oil was stored at a central processing facility outside the
mal labor contract lasted 90 days), while their wives and jungle, rather than in large tanks at Villano [58]. Where
children remained behind on the chacra (farm). the flow line emerged from undisturbed forest, it was
This situation changed in the late 1950s and early deliberately routed across an impassible escarpment to
1960s, as colonos invaded Runa territory along the Puyo- block easy entrance for potential settlers.
Tena road. In response, the Runa there abandoned their Opposition to the off-shore model came from two
traditional subsistence economy and subdivided commu- quarters: local communities and Petroecuador. Commu-
nal lands into individual parcels, which they cleared for nity members lobbied intensively for an access road al-
pasture [55]. As cattle ranches, their lands could be titled lowing them to market their cattle and other products in
and protected. They understood the 1964 Agrarian Re- Puyo. When ARCO refused, they held three company
form Law and the laws that followed—many of them had employees hostage for ten days in 1998 until provincial
moved from Tena to escape colonization—and they took leaders negotiated their release. Petroecuador also wanted
preemptive action. Farther south, around Puyo, Quichua a road: in its view, road construction remained a key to
communities also adopted livestock production in order economic development in the region and part of its public
to hold onto their land [56]. responsibilities. After lengthy discussions, ARCO agreed to
In 1988, ARCO signed a contract with Petroecuador to build secondary roads elsewhere along the Puyo-Baeza
explore Shell’s old fields in Pastaza. A few years later, it Highway in areas where deforestation had already oc-
discovered significant reserves in Villano, a cluster of curred. So far, it seems, the offshore model has worked:
several small villages located in undistributed rain forest in 2001, satellite imagery showed that only 1.6% of the
about 100 km east of Puyo [57]. In 1998, the company Villano area had been deforested (Figure 6).
Copyright © 2013 SciRes. NR
Deforestation, Agrarian Reform and Oil Development in Ecuador, 1964-1994 39

Figure 6. Land use in Pastaza Province, 2000.

4.3. Morona Santiago (Roads and Colonization write Rudel and Horowitz [62], “their demands for land
without Oil) began to disturb the Shuar. The colonists converted as
much forest to pasture as possible; only the steepest
In 1893, Salesian missionaries from Italy arrived in Mo-
slopes remained forested… In contrast the Shuar prac-
rona Santiago to “civilize and indoctrinate” Shuar and
ticed shifting cultivation which left the basic structure of
Achuar communities (collectively known as “Jívaro”)
the forest intact.” By the 1950s, Salesian missionaries
numbering as many as 10,000 inhabitants [59]. Until the
became alarmed at the growing influx of settlers and oc-
mid-1960s, these groups lived in extended households
cupation of native territories. Early efforts to obtain land
headed by closely related men. Large distances separated
titles for Shuar families went awry when native “land-
family groups. Periodically, Jívaro war parties raided
owners” sold their parcels to outsiders. The Salesians
other Shuar and Achuar settlements. During these raids,
then hit upon the idea of forming centros (centers) under
several families might come together in one large house
the 1937 Rural Communes Law: “The Shuar in an area
until the danger had passed [60]. Between 1940 and 1960,
would form a centro, an organization of villagers, and it
according to Taylor, such raids became so frequent that
would receive title to a large tract of land around the vil-
one out of every two Achuar men was killed in warfare
lage. Each household in the village would receive a tract
[61]. Survivors described those years as a time when “we
of land in the centro. Household heads could sell their
were ending.” land to other members of the centro, and they could pass
Around 1900, one small group of 400 mestizo immi- it on to their sons and daughters, so individuals consid-
grants settled in the Upano Valley, located within Shuar ered themselves to be the ‘owners’ of their tract of land.
territory along the Andean foothills. Unable to transport They could not sell their land to outsiders [62].”
their crops to the highlands, they lived in near total isola- In 1964, Shuar leaders formed the Federación de Cen-
tion. Other settlers began to arrive in the 1930s, when tros Shuar (FICSH, the Federation of Shuar Communi-
Salesian missionaries built a trail through the mountains ties), which began an aggressive campaign to defend
to their mission in Méndez, located in the lowlands 100 Shuar territory. Settlers reacted forcefully. In 1977, they
km east of Cuenca. persuaded the military government to create a “national
Conflict quickly arose between colonists and Shuar reserve” for colonists east of the Cordillera de Cutucú.
communities in the Upano region. “As the colonists be- Between 1976 and 1988, IERAC slowed its processing of
came more numerous during the 1930s and 1940s,” Shuar and Achuar land claims, thus giving migrants time
Copyright © 2013 SciRes. NR
40 Deforestation, Agrarian Reform and Oil Development in Ecuador, 1964-1994
to occupy new land. Still, 83% of eastern Morona Santi- not brought significant change. In the late 19th and early
ago remained in native hands. By the late 1980s, the set- 20th Centuries, Ecuadorian and Peruvian landowners cre-
tlement frontier stabilized, because no new roads were ated a string of haciendas down the Napo River as far as
built farther east. Nonetheless, migrants and Indians alike Iquitos. Many of the Quichua-speaking communities that
cut down the forest. Virtually all colonos aspired to raise subsequently received land there under the 1973 Agrar-
cattle. And like the Runa in Pastaza Province, Shuar (and ian Reform Law included the descendents of laborers on
eventually Achuar) communities adopted similar strate- these haciendas.
gies. Beginning in the early 1960s, Salesian missionaries The economic decline of Iquitos and the 1941 border
persuaded indigenous leaders that cattle production was war with Peru put an end to settlement along the lower
their best defense against encroachment and lent live- Napo. Periodically, Petroecuador has tried to interest for-
stock to native communities. eign oil companies in developing heavy oil reserves near
“In the early 1970s,” Rudel and Horowtiz write, “the Nuevo Rocafuerte, but so far with little success. Simi-
federation, using funds donated by European develop-
larly, eastern Pastaza and Morona Santiago Provinces
ment agencies, began making loans to Shuar centros for
remain too isolated for settlement. In 1984, Petroecuador
the development of their cattle herds [62].” Within a few
explored for oil along the Peruvian border, but aban-
years, traditional communities—and relatively intact
doned these efforts shortly thereafter [63]. Ominously,
forests—remained only in eastern Morona Santiago, far
Petroecuador has also drilled several exploration wells in
from existing roads (Figure 7). The 1973 Agrarian Re-
the Cuyabeno Wildlife Reserve and has begun to build
form Law cemented this pattern in place.
production facilities in a protected forest adjacent to the
Reserve. For now, however, these areas appear to be safe
4.4. The Remote Frontier (No Roads, Oil or
from large-scale deforestation, since most rivers flow
Colonization)
eastward from the Andean foothills into the Amazonian
Beyond these frontiers, Ecuador’s eastern rain forest has interior, making it difficult to market illegally harvest
remained largely undisturbed. Sporadic settlement has timber (Figure 8).

Figure 7. Land use in Morona Santiago Province, 2000.
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