Church Dogmatics, Vol. 2.2, Sections 36-39: The Doctrine of God, Study Edition 12

268 Pages·2009·59.07 MB·English

by  Karl Barth

KARL BARTH
CHURCH DOGMATICS
VOLUME II
THE DOCTRINE
OF GOD
THE COMMAND OF GOD
EDITED BY
G. W. BROMILEY
T. F.TORRANCE
.~
t&t clark
Translated byG.W.Bromiley,]. C.Campbell, lain Wilson,]. Strathearn McNab, T.H. L.Parker,
W.B.Johnston, Harold Knight,]. L.M.Haire, R.A.Stewart
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Authorised translation ofKarl Barth, DieKirchlicheDogmatik II
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CONTENTS
S 36. ETHICSASATASKOFTHEDOCTRINEOFGOD
1. The Command of God and the Ethical Problem
2. The Way of Theological Ethics 33
S 37. THECOMMANDASTHECLAIMOFGOD
1. The Basis of the Divine Claim 42
2. The Content of the Divine Claim 55
3. The Form of the Divine Claim 72
S 38. THECOMMANDASTHEDECISIONOFGOD
1. The Sovereignty of the Divine Decision 119
2. The Definiteness of the Divine Decision 149
3. The Goodness of the Divine Decision 195
S 39. THECOMMANDASTHEJUDGMENTOFGOD
1. The Presupposition of the Divine Judgment. 219
2. The Execution of the Divine Judgment 227
3. The Purpose of the Divine Judgment 247
v

[509]
ETHICS AS A TASK OF THE DOCTRINE OF GOD
Asthe doctrine of God's command, ethics interprets the Lawasthe form of
the Gospel, Le., asthe sanctification which comes to man through the electing
God. Because Jesus Christ isthe holy God and sanctified man in One, ithas its
basis in the knowledge of Jesus Christ. Because the God who claims man for
Himself makes Himself originally responsible for him, it forms part of the
doctrine of God. Its f':llction isto bear primary witness to the grace of God in
so far as this isthe saving engagement and commitment of man.
1. THE COMMAND OF GOD AND THE ETHICAL PROBLEM
In the true Christian concept of the covenant of God with man the doctrine
of the divine election of grace is the first element, and the doctrine of the
divine command isthe second. It isonly in this concept of the covenant that
the concept ofGod can itselffind completion. For God isnot known and isnot
knowable except in Jesus Christ. He does not exist in His divine being and
perfections withoutJesus Christ, in whom He isboth very God and very man.
He does not exist, therefore, without the covenant with man which wasmade
and executed in this name. God isnot known completely-and therefore not
at all-if He is not known as the Maker and Lord of this covenant between
Himself and man. The Christian doctrine of God cannot have "only" God for
its content, but since itsobject is this God it must also have man, to the extent
that in Jesus Christ man is made a partner in the covenant decreed and
founded by God. We dare not encroach on the freedom of God by asserting
that this relationship of His with man isessential, indispensable, and inalien-
able. But wecannot avoid the free decision of His love in which God has actu-
ally put Himself into this relationship, turning towards man in all the
compassion ofHis being, actually associating Himselfwith man in allthe faith-
fulness of His being. Wecannot try to go behind that. Of course man in him-
self and as such has no place in the doctrine of God. ButJesus Christ has a [510]
place. God's compassion and faithfulness towards man have a place. A God
without Jesus Christ, without this compassion and faithfulness towards man,
would be another God, astrange God. Bythe Christian standard He would not
be God at all.The God of Christian knowledge, the only true and real God, is
assurely the Lord ofthe covenant between Himself and man asHe is"the God
and Father of our LordJesus Christ."
S 36. Ethics as a Task of theDoctrine of God
The first element in the concept ofthis covenant isthe doctrine ofthe elec-
tion of grace, of predestination. God elects Himself to be gracious toward
man, to be his Lord and Helper, and in so doing He elects man to be the
witness toHisglory.This election, decreed from alleternity injesus Christ and
executed in Him in time, isthe mystery ofthe willofGod. Preceding allother
resolutions and actions ofGod, itisHisbasic mystery,which He reveals in His
Word, and which maybe known and grasped in faith in HisWord. To saydiv-
ine election, to saypredestination, isto name in one word the whole content
of the Gospel, itssum. For that reason the doctrine of election belongs to the
doctrine of God. For how can we really speak about God, without speaking
directly, ifonly summarily, about the Gospel?
But the concept ofthe covenant isnot exhausted bythe doctrine ofelection.
The partner in this covenant is man. What does it mean-looked at from
God's side-for man t? be apartner in the covenant, to be placed in this rela-
tionship to God?Already, at the conclusion of the doctrine of election, itwas
necessary for us to ask:What isthe purpose of the electing God for the man
whom He has elected? And the answer wefound wasthat in allcircumstances
God willsto rule over man. He willsto take him into His service, to commis-
sion him for a share in His ownwork. He willsto make him awitness ofjesus
Christ and therefore awitness ofHis ownglory. But obviouslywemust now go
on to askwhat itisthat God wantsfrom man. What does He expect, what does
He demand of him? The divine election is, in the last resort, the determin-
ation ofman-his determination to this service, this commis~ion, this offic~of
witness. It isman who isdetermined in this way.Therefore-whatever else he
maybe-he iscertainly not amere thing, a neuter, but aperson. And asa per-
son he is a partner in the covenant which God has made and established
between Himself and him. If this isthe case, then obviously another problem
opens up from the doctrine ofelection. Tobe sure, it can onlybe legitimately
put in the light of this doctrine. But it has an independent content as com-
pared with the doctrine of election, and therefore it must have a special
answer.Aselection isultimately the determination ofman, the question arises
asto the human self-determination which corresponds to this determination.
The question? For the moment wecannot saymore than this, and in sayingit,
wedo not make itinto an answer-least ofallan answer which would limit or
[511J perhaps even destroy the truth that the election and determination ofman are
byGod's grace alone. The good news that inJesus Christ God has decided in
favour of man, and given him this determination in His omnipotent wisdom,
must not be reversed even by a single iota. It is obvious, however, that this
determination confronts man with the question asto his attitude to it. How is
he going to exist under this determination? Asthe one who isdetermined in
thisway,what sort ofaman willhe be and what willhe do? Itwould not be his
determination if he were not asked these questions, if to the divine decision
there did not correspond a human one in which the partner in the covenant
has to givehis answer towhat issaid to him bythe fact that God has concluded
2
1. The Command of God and theEthical Problem
it.That God willsto rule over him clearly means that He wants his obedience,
and the question of obedience is therefore put to him. That God has deter-
mined him for service clearly means that He claims him for Himself, and he is
therefore asked whether he willsatisfythis claim. When God becomes his Part-
ner, as the Lord of the covenant who determines its meaning, content and
fulfilment, He necessarily becomes theJudge ofman, the Lawofhis existence.
Man isjudged as he is measured against God. And as he measures himself
against God he necessarily judges himself. Unless he accepts this question-
however it isto be answered-he obviously cannot be elect. He cannot be in
this covenant with God. God cannot draw him to Himself without involving
him in responsibility. It maybe noted that when wecome to this second ques-
tion we do not leave the circle of our consideration of the being and essence
and activityofGod. It iswithin this circle, within the ~octrine of God, that the
question arises. Itisin and with man's determination byGod asthis takes place
in predestination that the question arises of man's self-determination, his
responsibility and decision, his obedience and action. To answer this question
cannot, then, impose any limitation upon the knowledge of the absolute
authority of God's grace. There can be no question, therefore, of having to
speak of anything other than the Gospel. What wehave to establish isthat the
being and essence and activity of God as the Lord of the covenant between
Himself and man include a relationship to the being and essence and activity
of man. It isas He makes Himself responsible for man that God makes man,
too, responsible. Ruling grace iscommanding grace. The Gospel itself has the
form and fashion of the Law.The one Word of God isboth Gospel and Law.It
isnot Lawby itself and independent of the Gospel. But it is also not Gospel
without Law.In its content, it isGospel; in itsform and fashion, it isLaw.It is
firstGospel and then Law.Itisthe Gospel which contains and encloses the Law
as the ark of the covenant the tables of Sinai. But it is both Gospel and Law.
The one Word ofGod which isthe revelation and work ofHisgrace isalsoLaw.
That is, it is a prior decision concerning man's self-determination. It is the
claiming of his freedom. It regulates and judges the use that is made of this
freedom. As the one Word of God, which is the revelation and work of His [512]
grace, disposes ofman, itisalso the impulse directing him to afuture that isin
keeping with this "disposing." Asthe one Word of God which isthe revelation
and work ofHisgrace reaches us,itsaim isthat our being and action should be
conformed to His. "Be ye (literally, ye shall be) therefore perfect (literally,
directed to your objective), even as (i.e., corresponding to it in creaturely-
human fashion as) your Father which isin heaven isperfect (directed to His
objective)" (Mt. 548). The truth of the evangelical indicative means that the
full stop with which it concludes becomes an exclamation mark. It becomes
itself an imperative. The concept of the covenant between God and man con-
cluded inJesus Christ isnot exhausted in the doctrine ofthe divine election of
grace. The election itself and assuch demands that itbe understood asGod's
command directed to man; as the sanctification or claiming which comes to
3
~36. Ethics as a Task of theDoctrine of God
elected man from the electing God in the fact that when God turns toHim and
givesHimself to him He becomes his Commander.
Election injesus Christmeans separation for the purpose ofsubjection tothe lordship of
HimwhogaveHimselfforus"thatwewhichliveshould not henceforth liveunto ourselves,
but unto him which died for us, and rose again" (2 Cor. 515). It ismade sure (j3€(3ata),
confirmed and proved bythe fact that thissubjection takesplace, that the elect accept this
subjection. Itsaimisthisconfirmation and proof-"salvation through sanctification ofthe
Spirit" (2 Thess. 213). Wemayrefer (although notwithout reservation) toThomas Aquinas:
Deus adjuvatur per nos, inquantum exequimur suam ordinationem, secundum illudEN1 (1Cor.39):
Dei enim adjutores sumus. Neque hoc estpropter defectum divinae virtutis: sed quia utitur causis
mediis, ut ordinis pulchritudo servetur in rebus, et ut etiam creaturis dignitatem causalitatis
communicetEN2 (S. theol. 1, quo23, art. 8,ad. 2). Ifthiscanbe understood in accordance with
Mt.548, wemayrightlyput itinthisway.The summons ofthe divinepredecision, the sanctifi-
cation which comeson man from alleternity and therefore once and for allin the election
ofjesus Christ,isthat inallitshuman questionableness andfrailtythelifeofthe electshould
become itsimage and repetition and attestation and acknowledgment. In thissense Calvin
again and again urged: Electionis scopus est vitae sanctimoniaEN3 (Instit. III, 23, 12). Quae in
electisfutura eratsanctitas, abelectione habuit exordium EN4 (ib., 22, 3).Election isthe sun,sancti-
fication itsshining-who istoseparate the two?(Congreg. sur l'electet., 1551, C.R. 8, 107). Ce
sont choses conjointes et inseparables, que Dieu nous ait eleu et que maintenant il nous appelle Ii la
sainctete ... il nefaut point separer cequ'il a conjoint etuni ... ilfaut, que l'election soil comme une
racine, quiJette debonsfruitsEN5. (Sermon onEph. 14-6,C.R. 51, 270 f.).
This makes itplain that ethics belongs not only to dogmatics in general but
to the doctrine of God. This issomething which ought to have been apparent
for some time. For who can possibly see what is meant by the knowledge of
God, His divine being, His divine perfections, the election of His grace, with-
out an awareness at every point ofthe demand which isput to man bythe fact
that this God ishis God, the God ofman? How can God be understood asthe
Lord if that does not involve the problem of human obedience? But what is
[513J implicit must now be made explicit. What isself-evident must now be brought
out specifically.The doctrine ofGod must be expressly defined and developed
and interpreted asthat which italsoisateverypoint, that isto say,ethics.Other-
wise, human carelessness and forgetfulness may only too easily skim over the
fact that itactually isthis, and that allthat wehave sofar said asthe doctrine of
God has also this further sense-the sense of basically ethical reflection and
explanation.
ENI God is aided through us, inasmuch as we carry out his will according to the verse (1
Cor 3.9)
EN2 'For we are God's fellow workers'. This isnot because of some lack of power in God, but
because he uses causal means in order that the beauty ofhis order be kept in things, and in
order that he might share the dignity ofcausation evenwithhiscreatures
EN3 The goal ofelection isvirtuousness oflife
EN4 That which isfuture holiness among the elect had itsbeginning in election
EN5 These are things which are conjoined and inseparable: that God has elected us and that he
nowcallsustoholiness ... What he hasjoined together and united, let them not beput asun-
der ... Itmust rather be the casethat election isasaroot, which growsgood fruit
4
1. The Command of God and theEthical Problem
If we adopt here the term ethics to describe the special task of dogmatics
which the Law as the form of the Gospel has imposed on us, we do it in the
freedom-which is so very necessary and is alwaysenjoyed in dogmatics-to
take such terms as are to hand, not allowing ourselves to be bound and fet-
tered bythe meaning which they mayhave acquired from their use elsewhere,
but using them in the sense which, when they are applied to the object with
which weare concerned, they must derive from this object itself. No term has
as such an absolutely universal and therefore binding sense. This is equally
true of "ethics." At any rate the dogmatics of the Christian Church cannot
make use ofany terms (not even those ofmathematics!) without examination,
without reserving the right to give them a sense of itsown, and to apply them
in its own way.And this is also true of the term "ethics." But-granted this
reservation-there isno reason not to make use of the term in dogmatics. A
relatively general conception of ethics which we might take as our point of
departure YViLVaa'TLKWsEN6 isasfollows. The ethical question isthe question
as to the basis and possibility of the fact that in the multitude and multiplicity
of human actions there are certain modes of action, i.e., certain constants,
certain laws,rules, usages or continuities. It isthe question asto the rightness
of these constants, the fitness of these laws.It is the question as to the value
which givesanyaction the claim to be the true expression ofamode ofaction,
the fulfilment ofalaw-the right to be repeated and in virtue ofitsnormative
character to serve asan example for the actions ofothers. What isthe true and
genuine continuity in all the so-called continuities ofhuman action? What isit
that really givesforce to allthese recognised laws?What isthe good in and over
every so-called good ofhuman action? This is-roughly-the ethical question,
and-roughly again-the answering of it iswhat isgenerally called "ethics."
"Ethics" comes from 1j(}os (orig. dwelling, stable), is synonymous with "morals" (from
To
mos), and means the doctrine ofcustom or habit. ~(}LKOV TTJS ef>LAocroef>tas EN7 (Diogenes
Laertius) isthe part ofphilosophy which dealswith the principles ofthe moral. Tocorres-
pond to the true meaning a general definition would have to be asfollows.Ethics isthe
scienceorknowledge ordoctrine ofthe modes ofhuman behaviour, ofthe constants orlaws
of human behaviour. But obviouslythis definition which derives from the meaning isnot
enough. There are allsorts ofquestions about modes ofhuman behaviour, about the law
and rule and continuity ofhuman action, which do not sofar,or anylonger, haveanything
to do with the ethical question in itself. "Will-psychology"investigates the constants of [514]
human behaviour within the sphere ofnatural law.The science ofmoral statistics,the study
ofcustoms and inawidercompass the morphology ofcultures allaskabout the constants of
human behaviour which havefreelyarisen and which perist in history.The science ofposi-
tivelawinvestigatesthe continuity ofhuman behaviour whichisguaranteed and sanctioned
by national communities. The philosophy of history investigates the constant of human
behaviour in the common temporal change and development ofhuman aimsand achieve-
ments. Butwhere the taskofethics hasbeen undertaken, ithasalwaysbeen understood asa
differentone from the taskofthese sciences.
ENfi for discussion
EN7The Ethic ofPhilosophy
5
~36. Ethics as a Task oftheDoctrine of God
Moralityinthesenseoftheethicalquestion issomething other than thecongruence ofan
action with a demonstrable natural lawof human volition and action. Even if the moral
action issubject tosuch alawofnature, thisdependence and agreement does not make it
moral action. Surprisingly enough, even the naiveidentification ofthe moral lawwithnat-
urallaw,asvariouslyrepresented byJ.J. Rousseau,L.Feuerbach, M.Stirner,Friedrich Nietz-
scheand E.Haeckel,wasnot carried out intheform ofmere descriptions, but alwaysinthe
form of definite imperative claims upon human volition and action. With Rousseau and
Nietzsche it actuallyhas something of the character of a passionate proclamation. If the
moral lawisno more than natural law,allitneeds istobe stated asthat-the more object-
ivelythe better. There isno need to preach it.When natural lawispreached, the alleged
identification ofmoral lawand natural lawisrevealed asamere predication, and thefunda-
mental difference between the twoisdisclosed. Therefore, whatever be the position with
regard tothepossiblecongruence ofthemoral actionwithanatural event,wecannot evade
the question ofaspecificmoral lawasdistinguished from natural law.
Again,moralityinthesenseofthe ethicalproblem isnot merelytheconformity ofhuman
behaviour with amore or lesswidespread and prevalent usage, custom, culture or civilisa-
tion.Here, too,acongruence maywelloccur,and moral philosophers likeH.Hreffding and
Friedrich Paulsen havebeen able to approximate verycloselyto an "identification" ofthe
ethicalwiththese concepts. Butsofarno one hasseriouslyattempted tomerge moral philo-
sophycompletelyinthescienceofcustom.Indeed, itcouldneverbeseriouslycontested that
immoral customson the one sideand moral breaches ofcustom on the other sidearepossi-
bilitieswithwhich ethics has inevitablyto reckon. But this means that evenfor the lawof
human behaviour asthisisascertained bythehistorico-morphological method, thequestion
ofaspecificethical lawremains.
And moralityinthe senseofthe ethical question isnot atallthe sameasthe congruence
ofhuman behaviour withthe existinglawsofthe state.Itisfarmore than legality.Statelaw
withitsobviousgenerality mayofcourse, asJeremy Bentham maintained, beunderstood as
the mostpregnant expression ofthe constant ofhuman behaviour whichethicshastoinves-
tigate.And, conversely,moralitymaybeunderstood, asin the teaching ofH.Cohen, asthe
immanent powerofalllegality.There canbelittledoubt that inone form oranother many
positivistand idealisticmoral philosophers havehad dreams orvisionsofamutual approxi-
mation ofmorality and lawand their meeting in infinity.But it has never yetoccurred to
anyone seriouslyto assert a simple equation of ethics and politics, ofethics andjurispru-
dence. The ethical question isstillaspecificone evenalongside that ofthe lawofthejust
state.Itisonlyafter the former that the latter question, and that ofthe connexion between
the two,canbeput.
Finally,in the sense of the ethical question aparticular human action isnot moraljust
because itagreeswithwhat isperhaps ademonstrable lawofgeneral development or ofa
specifichistorical development. There maywellbe aphilosophy ofhistory,and therefore a
lawofhistoricaldevelopment, e.g.,thatwhichwasproclaimed byKarlMarxinapplication of
[515] Hegelian theory, or that which wasmore recently proclaimed in words and actsbyNeo-
German Nationalism. But obviouslythe establishment of these lawsisone thing, and the
activeaffirmation which issostormilydemanded another. History maystand under thisor
that law;but ifthis isthe case,whyare weassured bythose who maintain these lawsthat
history must be made bymen with much toil and sacrifice,with many conflicts and tribu-
lations. Whyis this claim raised? A different lawof human volition and action obviously
intervenes, and itisonlyifthis other lawissure and validthat the same can be saidofthe
so-calledlawofhistory,and the demand that thislawshould be obeyed can haveauthority
and force. The question ofthevalidityofthisother law,the ethical question, isstillopen-
6