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Choosing war: presidential decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay incidents PDF

345 Pages·2016·27.57 MB·English
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CHOOSING WAR CHOOSING WAR Presidential Decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay Incidents Douglas Carl Peifer 1 1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2016 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data Names: Peifer, Douglas Carl, author. Title: Choosing war : presidential decisions in the Maine, Lusitania, and Panay incidents / Douglas Carl Peifer. Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016003097 | ISBN 9780190268688 (hardcover : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Presidents—United States—Decision making—Case studies. | War and emergency powers—United States—Case studies. | United States—Military policy—Decision making—Case studies. | McKinley, William, 1843–1901—Military leadership. | Wilson, Woodrow, 1856–1924—Military leadership. | Roosevelt, Franklin D. (Franklin Delano), 1882–1945—Military leadership. | Maine (Battleship) | Lusitania (Steamship) | Panay (Gunboat) Classification: LCC JK558.P45 2016 | DDC 355.02/720973—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016003097 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America To Lovers of history and international affairs J. Carl and Doris Peifer, world travelers. CONTENTS Acknowledgments  ix Introduction: Naval Incidents and the Decision for War 1 PART ONE: The Maine Incident The Incident 15 Context: The Cuban Insurrection, American Perceptions, and the Cleveland Administration’s Policy 23 The Immediate Reaction: The Public, the Press, Congress, and the Business Community 43 The President Decides, Congress Assents, and a New Era Is Born 53 Aftermath, Consequences and Reflections on the Maine Incident 61 PART TWO: The Lusitania Crisis The Incident 67 Context: American Neutrality, August 1914– May 1915 91 The Immediate Reaction 119 Wilson’s Response and Bryan’s Departure 127 Aftermath, Consequences, and Reflections on the Lusitania Crisis 135 viii • Contents PART THREE: The Panay Incident Background to the American Presence in China 149 The Incident 155 Context: Isolationism, Foreign Policy, and the Sino- Japanese War 167 The Immediate Reaction: The Public, the Press, and Congress 193 FDR’s Options and Response 201 Aftermath, Consequences, and Reflections on the Panay Incident 213 PART FOUR: Anticipating the Unexpected Categorizing Naval Incidents 235 Valuing the Particular 243 Notes  249 Bibliography  305 Index  325 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My thanks go out to the many individuals who read portions of the book, de- bated the intricacies of coercion theory and naval diplomacy with the author, and engaged in the disciplinary jousting that distinguishes historians from social scientists studying the same topics. Special thanks go to John Geis, Gerhard Weinberg, Elizabeth Peifer, Mark Duckenfield, John Schuessler, Kevin Holzimmer, Nikolas Gardner, Robert Hanyok, David Alvarez, Alexander Lassner, and the anonymous outside readers who offered valuable insights. I very much value their comments and criticism even if I did not always heed all suggestions. Any errors or interpretive differences should be laid at my doorstep. I have been greatly enriched by the experience of work- ing in a multidisciplinary, inter- service, and inter- agency setting where I could discuss and debate issues with fellow historians, international relations schol- ars, active- duty military officers from all the services, and international fellows from around the world. I am also deeply appreciative of the assistance rendered by Helen Lehman and Josephine Turner at the Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center; David Colamaria of the Naval History and Heritage Center, the staff at the Library of Congress and the National Archives, and colleagues David Alvarez and Robert Hanyok from H- Net. Special thanks are due to Nancy Toff at Oxford University Press for her thoughtful editorial sug- gestions, which undoubtedly made the book more readable, organized, and focused. My thanks go out to my family for their support and indulgence as I focused on presidential decision making, naval incidents, current affairs, and naval in- cidents past and present. As a fellow historian, mother to our four boys, and wife, Beth gave generously of her time and intellect as I subjected her to late- night discussions of the Maine, the Lusitania, the Panay, and the fruitful ten- sions between social scientists, historians, academics, practitioners, and policy- makers. Justin, James, Killian, and Fritz bring joy, energy, and a pride into my scholar’s life.

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