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Case 4:14-cv-04480-YGR Document 265 Filed 01/25/19 Page 1 of 26

1 MAYER BROWN LLP
ANDREW JOHN PINCUS (Pro Hac Vice)
2 [email protected]
1999 K Street, NW
3 Washington, DC 20006
Tel: [phone] / Fax: [phone]
4
MAYER BROWN LLP
5 LEE H. RUBIN (SBN 141331)
[email protected]
6 DONALD M. FALK (SBN 150256)
[email protected]
7 SAMANTHA C. BOOTH (SBN 298852)
[email protected]
8 Two Palo Alto Square, Suite 300
3000 El Camino Real
9 Palo Alto, CA 94306-2112
Tel: [phone] / Fax: [phone]
10
Attorneys for Plaintiff Twitter, Inc.
11
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
12
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
13
OAKLAND DIVISION
14
TWITTER, INC., Case No. 14-cv-4480-YGR
15
TWITTER’S OPPOSITION TO
16 Plaintiff, GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
17
v.
Date: February 15, 2019
18
Time: 9:30 a.m.
MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney
19 Courtroom 1, Fourth Floor
General of the United States, et al.,
Judge: Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers
20

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Defendants.
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1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY .................................................................................... 3
3
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................. 5
4
A. The Court Has Authority to Compel Production to Cleared Counsel of
5 Material the Government Has Deemed Classified ................................................. 5
1. The Court’s Authority to Compel Disclosure of Classified
6
Information to Counsel Whom the Executive Has Found Suitable
7 to Review Such Information Stems from the Court’s Inherent
Authority and Separation of Powers .......................................................... 5
8
2. The Government Has Offered No Contrary Authority ............................ 10
9
3. Even the Stillman Framework Favored by the Government
Recognizes the Authority of Courts to Grant, and the Potential
10
Utility of Granting, Cleared Counsel Access to Classified
11 Discovery ................................................................................................. 12
B. An Order Granting Twitter’s Request for Disclosure of the Classified
12
Declaration to Twitter’s Counsel Would Be an Appropriate Exercise of the
13 Court’s Broad Discretion to Make Discovery Rulings that Serve the
Interests of Justice ................................................................................................ 13
14
1. Interests of Justice, Access to Courts, and Due Process Favor
Granting Twitter’s Request for Access to the Classified
15
Declaration, Subject to Any Protective Measures the Court May
16 Deem Appropriate .................................................................................... 13
2. In the Alternative, Disclosure of the Steinbach Declaration Is
17
Appropriate Because It Is Not Properly Classified .................................. 16
18
C. Though the Government Should Have an Opportunity to Complete Its
State Secrets Review Process in an Expeditious Manner, Any Ultimate
19
Claim of State Secrets in this Case Would Be Wholly Inappropriate and a
20 Misuse of the Doctrine ......................................................................................... 19
21 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 20
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1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page(s)
3
Cases
4
Abourezk v. Reagan,
785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ..........................................................................................7, 15
5
Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury,
6
686 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2012) .....................................................................................2, 7, 13, 16
7
Al-Haramain Islamic Found. Inc., v. Obama,
8 705 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2012) .....................................................................................................8
9
Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno,
70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995) ...................................................................................................14
10
Campbell Indus. v. M/V Gemini,
11
619 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1980) .......................................................................................................6
12
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,
13 501 U.S. 32 (1991) .....................................................................................................................6
14 Dep’t of Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518 (1988) .......................................................................................................1, 10, 11
15
Doe v. Gonzales,
16
386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005) ..........................................................................................7
17
Dorfmont v. Brown,
18 913 F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1990) ...........................................................................................10, 11
19 Elec. Frontier Found. v. CIA,
2013 WL 5443048 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2013) ..................................................................17, 18
20
Ellsberg v. Mitchell,
21
709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ...................................................................................................15
22
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
23 542 U.S. 507 (2004) .................................................................................................................12
24 Horn v. Huddle,
647 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2009) ...............................................................................1, 8, 9, 13
25
Horn v. Huddle,
26
699 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 2010) .....................................................................................9, 10
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1 Joint Anti–Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1951) .................................................................................................................14
2
KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner,
3
710 F. Supp. 2d 637 (N.D. Ohio 2010) ......................................................................................8
4
King v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
830 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ...........................................................................................17, 18
5
6 Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).....................................................................................................9
7
Maricopa Audubon Soc. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
8
108 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................14
9
McGehee v. Casey,
718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983) .........................................................................................17, 18
10
11 Meshal v. Higgenbotham,
804 F.3d 417 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ...............................................................................................6, 9
12
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,
13 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) .............................................................................6, 19
14
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig.,
595 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ...........................................................................1, 8, 14
15
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig.,
16
700 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ...........................................................................7, 8, 10
17
In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig.,
18 No. MDL. 06-1791VRW (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2009), ECF No. 562 ......................................7, 8
19
In re Nat’l Sec. Letter,
930 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ...................................................................................14
20
Nixon v. Sirica,
21
487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ...................................................................................................9
22
Ray v. Turner,
23 587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ...............................................................................................18
24 Roule v. Petraeus,
No. C 10–04632 LB, 2012 WL 2367873 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2012) ........................................8
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Sablan v. Dep’t of Fin. of Commonwealth of N. Mariana Islands,
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856 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1988) ...................................................................................................6
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1 In re Sealed Case,
494 F.3d 139 (D.C. Cir. 2007) .............................................................................................9, 12
2
Stillman v. CIA,
3
319 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2003) .......................................................................................1, 12, 13
4
Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp.,
982 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1992) .....................................................................................................6
5
6 United States v. Meyer,
398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968) .......................................................................................................2
7
United States v. Reynolds,
8
345 U.S. 1 (1953) .....................................................................................................................19
9
United States v. W.R. Grace,
526 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 2008) .....................................................................................................6
10
11 Vaughn v. Rosen,
484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973) .................................................................................................14
12
Webster v. Doe,
13 486 U.S. 592 (1988) .............................................................................................................6, 11
14
Wiener v. F.B.I.,
943 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1991) ...................................................................................................14
15
Statutes
16
17 Classified Information Procedures Act
18 U.S.C. App. 3 § 4 ................................................................................................................10
18
Executive Order 13526,
19
75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009) ..................................................................6, 7, 11, 12, 16, 18
20
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 .............................................................................................................................6
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Freedom of Information Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552 ..............................................................................................................15, 17, 18
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1 INTRODUCTION
2 Running roughshod over fundamental separation-of-powers principles and the judiciary’s
3 role as a co-equal branch of government, the Government contends that the Court has no role to
4 play in determining whether private counsel may access classified information in litigation—
5 even after the Executive has made a general determination that the same counsel may be
6 entrusted with top secret classified information.
7 The authority to grant access to classified information to a counsel who has been found
8 eligible to hold the requisite security clearance falls comfortably within both the inherent and
9 congressionally conferred powers of Article III courts to control discovery in order to ensure a
10 just administration of the parties’ case. And contrary to the Government’s claim that an order of
11 disclosure in the absence of Executive Branch consent would be “unsupported by law,” the
12 courts that have considered this precise question have consistently rejected the Government’s
13 attempts to bar access to evidence in judicial proceedings based solely on an Executive
14 determination that opposing counsel has no “need-to-know” the classified information. See
15 Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55, 65 & n.18 (D.D.C. 2009); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency
16 Telecomms. Records Litig., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
17 Indeed, the Government’s position would present an unprecedented incursion by the
18 Executive Branch into the province reserved to the courts by Congress and the Constitution, and
19 raise fundamental concerns under the separation of powers. The Government’s authorities either
20 address wholly different questions (e.g., Egan and Dorfmont, which address a court’s ability to
21 review an Executive Branch decision about a person’s suitability for a security clearance) or, like
22 Stillman, actually support Twitter’s position that a court may compel production of classified
23 materials to cleared private counsel under certain circumstances. The Executive Branch has no
24 veto authority to prevent an Article III court from issuing a discovery order compelling the
25 disclosure of classified material to a private counsel with the requisite security clearance.
26 Simply put, “[t]he deference generally granted the Executive Branch in matters of classification
27 and national security must yield when the Executive attempts to exert control over the
28 courtroom.” Horn, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 65–66.
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1 The Court can and should exercise its broad discretion to control discovery as necessary
2 to achieve “justice between the parties” and grant to Twitter’s cleared counsel access to the core
3 facts underlying the Government’s impingement on its First Amendment rights. Principles of
4 due process, as well as interests in preserving the integrity of the judicial fact-finding process and
5 “achiev[ing] a just adjudication of the controversy between the parties,” require—to the
6 maximum extent practicable without creating a genuine risk of harm to national security—“full
7 exposure of the relevant facts.” United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 75 (9th Cir. 1968); Al
8 Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 983 (9th Cir. 2012).
9 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has held that disclosure of classified material to private counsel with
10 appropriate security clearance does “not implicate national security when viewing the classified
11 material because, by definition, he or she has the appropriate security clearance.” Al Haramain,
12 686 F.3d at 983.
13 Alternatively, the Classified Steinbach Declaration (“Classified Declaration”) may be
14 discoverable here because it is not properly classified. Though Twitter obviously cannot know
15 the Classified Declaration’s content, Dkt. No. 145, the Court’s description of that document as
16 containing only “generic” and “boilerplate” descriptions of the “mosaic theory,” Dkt. No. 172, at
17 18—a topic widely discussed in the public domain—suggests that the document does not meet
18 the criteria for classification set forth in Executive Order 13526. Twitter thus requests that the
19 Court exercise its authority to review the propriety of the Government’s decision to classify the
20 Classified Declaration. A finding that the Classified Declaration is improperly classified would
21 dispose of any need for Twitter’s counsel to possess a security clearance in order to view that
22 document, and thus avoid the need even to address the Government’s “need-to-know” objection.
23 Finally, the Government has indicated that, even if the Court rejects the Government’s
24 need-to-know objection, the Government may claim that the Classified Declaration is a state
25 secret and must therefore be altogether excluded from evidence. While, as noted above, the
26 Court’s description of the Classified Declaration suggests that it may not be properly classified at
27 all, much less constitute a state secret, this issue is not ripe until the Government formally asserts
28 such a privilege. Accordingly, Twitter does not address that potential invocation of privilege
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1 here, except to note that Twitter will vigorously contest any assertion of the state secrets
2 privilege. That being said, Twitter does not object to giving the Government an opportunity to
3 complete its state secrets review process—if it can do so quickly—before the Court makes any
4 final determination regarding Twitter’s right to access the Classified Declaration. And if the
5 Government does invoke the state secrets privilege, Twitter respectfully requests an opportunity
6 to respond to the Government’s privilege claim.
7 RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
8 The record before the Court reveals the Government’s current objection to Twitter’s
9 request for access to the Classified Declaration for what it is—a litigation tactic that is divorced
10 from any bona fide national security concern. In September 2016, Twitter filed a Motion for an
11 Order Directing Defendants to Initiate Expedited Security Clearance for Twitter’s lead counsel.
12 Dkt. No. 124. In that motion, Twitter explained that it was seeking security clearance because it
13 was highly foreseeable—given the subject-matter of this litigation—that in the future it might be
14 necessary for Twitter’s counsel to review classified material in order to effectively represent
15 Twitter in this litigation. Id. at 2–3. While that motion was pending, the Government moved for
16 summary judgment, Dkt. No. 145, and voluntarily lodged into evidence the Classified
17 Declaration by then-FBI Executive Assistant Director Michael Steinbach, see Notice of Lodging
18 of Classified Declaration, Dkt. No. 144. The Government argued that the Classified Declaration
19 (along with an unclassified submission) demonstrated that its 2014 denial of Twitter’s request to
20 publish aggregate data regarding its receipt of national security process did not violate Twitter’s
21 First Amendment rights.
22 On July 6, 2017, the Court denied the Government’s motion for summary judgment and
23 granted Twitter’s request that the Government be ordered to begin an expedited security
24 clearance process. Dkt. No. 172. In denying the Government’s subsequent motion for
25 reconsideration, the Court specifically confirmed that it had “reviewed EAD Steinbach’s
26 declarations, both the public and the in camera submission, and found them to be insufficient
27 and too generic to support the Government’s restrictions on publication of Twitter’s Draft
28 Transparency Report.” Dkt. No. 186, at 7.
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1 Consistent with the Court’s July 2017 Order, Twitter’s lead counsel, Lee H. Rubin,
2 completed a Questionnaire for National Security Positions, and the Government proceeded to
3 conduct a background investigation to determine Mr. Rubin’s eligibility for a security clearance.
4 Dkt. No. 250-1, at ¶ 2. On September 17, 2018, DOJ’s Litigation Security Group informed Mr.
5 Rubin via email that the Government’s assessment of his suitability to hold a security clearance
6 had been “favorably adjudicated.” Id. at ¶ 3. DOJ informed Mr. Rubin that the Government
7 nevertheless would not grant Mr. Rubin a security clearance unless “the government’s attorneys”
8 determined that Mr. Rubin has a “‘need-to-know’ the particular classified information in this
9 case.” Dkt. No. 250-1, at ¶ 3.
10 The Government has consistently taken the position that Twitter’s counsel has no “need-
11 to-know” any of the classified information in this case, regardless of its conceded relevance to
12 Twitter’s claims. See, e.g., Fourth Updated Joint Case Management Statement, Dkt. No. 244, at
13 9 (“[I]rrespective of [the] favorable determinations on Counsel’s background investigation,
14 [Twitter]’s counsel ha[s] no ‘need-to-know’ any of the classified information either sought in
15 discovery or previously submitted by the Government to this Court”); Dkt. No. 175-1, at ¶ 18
16 (“[E]ven if plaintiff’ counsel were to obtain a favorable suitability determination, I have
17 determined that they do not have a need for access to or a need-to-know the classified FBI
18 information at issue in this case. This includes the Government’s classified, in camera, ex parte
19 submission to the Court”).
20 While Mr. Rubin’s security clearance application was under consideration, the parties
21 proceeded through unclassified discovery, which took the better part of a year. By the
22 conclusion of unclassified discovery in November 2018, it became apparent that the Government
23 did not intend to produce anything of substance in response to Twitter’s requests for basic
24 discovery into the reasons for the Government’s classification of its draft Transparency Report.
25 Instead, the Government has claimed that all documents related to this issue—which lies at the
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1 heart of the First Amendment inquiry—are classified, privileged, or both.1
2 In light of the Government’s near-blanket refusal to produce any information—classified
3 or unclassified—regarding its reasons for classifying Twitter’s draft Transparency Report,
4 coupled with the Government’s continued assertion that the Classified Declaration conclusively
5 resolves Twitter’s as-applied challenge, e.g., Dkt. No. 256, at 10, Twitter notified the Court at
6 the November 26, 2018 case management conference of its intent to request access to the
7 Classified Declaration. 11.26.18 Tr. at 8–9, 16–17. Twitter filed a Notice of Request and
8 Request for Access to the Classified Declaration on December 5, 2018. Dkt. No. 250. On
9 December 17, 2018, the Government filed a 20-page brief informing the Court that it intended to
10 initiate the internal Department of Justice process for potential invocation of the state secrets
11 privilege and arguing that, irrespective of the outcome of DOJ’s state secrets deliberations,
12 Twitter’s counsel should not be given access to the Classified Declaration. Dkt. No. 256. On
13 January 2, 2019, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause Re: Disclosure of Declaration
14 Submitted In Camera. Dkt. No. 261. For the reasons set forth below, the Government’s
15 response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, Dkt. No. 264—which largely repeats arguments
16 the Government made before the Court issued its Order to Show Cause—provides no legally
17 cognizable basis for denying Twitter access to the Classified Declaration.
18 ARGUMENT
19 A. The Court Has Authority to Compel Production to Cleared Counsel of Material the
Government Has Deemed Classified.
20
1. The Court’s Authority to Compel Disclosure of Classified Information to
21 Counsel Whom the Executive Has Found Suitable to Review Such
Information Stems from the Court’s Inherent Authority and Separation of
22
Powers.
23
The Government’s position that the Executive Branch has exclusive authority to
24
determine if a private litigant may have access to classified material relevant to ongoing
25
litigation is fundamentally at odds with separation-of-powers principles and the Court’s inherent
26

1 Twitter’s motion challenging certain of the Government’s privilege designations, Dkt. No. 258,
27
is currently pending before the Court, but further proceedings on that motion have been stayed
28 during the government shut-down, Dkt. No. 262.
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