Beyond the Anarchical Society

23 Pages·2002·0.14 MB·English

Beyond the Anarchical Society
Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics
Edward Keene
UniversityofOxford
         
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Contents
Preface pageix
Acknowledgements xiii
Introduction 1
1 Theorthodoxtheoryoforderinworldpolitics 12
2 TheGrotiantheoryofthelawofnations 40
3 Colonialism,imperialismandextra-European
internationalpolitics 60
4 Twopatternsoforderinmodernworldpolitics:
tolerationandcivilization 97
5 Orderincontemporaryworldpolitics,globalbutdivided 120
Conclusion 145
Bibliography 151
Index 162
vii
1 The orthodox theory of order
in world politics
Nowadays, order in modern world politics is usually described in terms
ofthenorms,rulesandinstitutionsoftheEuropeansocietyofstates.The
distinguishingcharacteristicofthisinternationalsocietyisthatitacknowl-
edgestheexistenceofdifferentpoliticalsystemsandculturesintheworld,
andattemptstofacilitatetheirpeacefulcoexistencewithoneanotherby
promoting toleration. It tries to achieve this goal through the norma-
tive principle of the reciprocal recognition of sovereignty: each state is
supposed to recognize the independent sovereignty of the others within
theirterritoriallydefinedspheresofdomesticjurisdiction.Thusnostate
isallowedtointerfereintheinternalaffairsofanother,andeachhasthe
spacetodevelopitsownwayoflifeasitchooses.Numerousimplications
for the structure of international order follow from this starting point.
Becauseeachstateisanindependentsovereign,thereisbydefinitionno
centralauthoritythatcanlaydownandenforceinternationallaw,main-
tainpeaceandsecurity,orcompelthemembersofinternationalsociety
toactinwaysthatarecontrarytotheirnationalinterests.Theinstitutions
ofthesocietyofstatesthereforehavetobeabletocopewithextremede-
centralization,evenanarchy.Forexample,theintegrityofthesystemand
theindependenceofitsindividualmembersareprimarilymaintainedby
the highly flexible and voluntaristic institution of the balance of power,
albeit sometimes with the addition of a special managing role for the
great powers. Another important example is the distinctive character of
moderninternationallaw:inlinewithpositivistdoctrines,andincontrast
withtheoriesofnaturallaw,theonlyfoundationforlegallybindingrules
ininternationalsocietyisthevolitionofstates,andthescopeofinterna-
tionallawisthereforerestrictedtorulestowhichstateshavegiventheir
consent.
At the risk of stating the obvious, the theory that order in modern
worldpoliticsisbuiltuponasocietyofstateslikethisrestsontwopropo-
sitions: that the modern international system is composed of states, in
otherwordsthatitisa‘states-system’;andthatintheirrelationswithone
another, states do indeed constitute something that can reasonably be
12
Theorthodoxtheoryoforder 13
describedasa‘society’.1Bothofthesepropositionshavealonghistoryin
politicalandlegalthought.Theideaofastates-systemoriginatedabout
200yearsago.Initscurrentform,asadescriptionofasystemofmutually
independent states who recognize each other’s territorial sovereignty, it
wasdevelopedbylateeighteenthandearlynineteenth-centuryconserva-
tivehistorianswhowantedtopresentapictureofEuropeanpublicorder
thatwouldlegitimizetheireffortstocontaintheFrenchRevolutionand
underminetheNapoleonicimperialsystem;theyworkedoutthenotion
of a states-system (Staatensystem) to achieve that end. The proposition
that international relations can be described as a society is even older.
Thisideawasfirstdevelopedinthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies,
by legal scholars who tried to describe the binding force of the law of
nations(iusgentium)intermsofasocietyofnations(societasgentium).As
onewouldexpect,theirunderstandingofsocietywasheavilycolouredby
theirjurisprudentialinterests:thecrucialevidencefortheexistenceofa
society,onthisview,istheexistenceofanauthoritativelegalorder,and
internationalsocietyissynonymouswithanorderofbindingnormsand
rulesthatappliestoallrulersandpeoples.
The theory of the modern society of states that scholars use today is
a combination of these two strands of thought: the political-historical
concept of a states-system and the legal concept of a societas gentium.
Butitisimportanttonoticethatcurrentscholarshiptypicallybeginswith
the idea of a states-system, and only then adds the proposition that an
internationalsocietyexists,suggestingthathavingestablishedasystem-
aticpatternofrelationswithoneanother,statesthengoontoconstitute
a society by making a collective commitment to observe certain shared
norms,obeygeneralrulesandparticipateincommoninstitutions.2Iron-
ically,thatisareversalofthechronologicalorderinwhichtheconcepts
actuallyemergedinpoliticalandlegalthought,wheretheideaofasocietas
gentiumprecededtheideaofastates-systembyoveronehundredyears.
It should immediately be obvious that this transposition might lead to
problems. In the first place, the contemporary theory of order in mod-
ern world politics relies on an account of the historical development of
European public order that is highly polemical, having been designed
byreactionariestosuittheirneedsinthestruggleagainstRevolutionary
FranceandtheNapoleonicEmpire.Secondly,itoffersaninterpretation
of sixteenth and seventeenth-century legal thought about international
societythatislargelycarriedoutintermsofapatternoforderandaset
of normative principles that were, for the most part, quite unknown to
1 OneoftheclearestexamplesofthisargumentisHedleyBull,TheAnarchicalSociety:A
StudyofOrderinWorldPolitics(London:Macmillan,1977),ch.1.
2 Ibid.,p.13.
14 Beyondtheanarchicalsociety
the theorists concerned; it refracts earlier theories through the prism of
later ones. The current conventional wisdom about the society of states
is therefore suspect both in its description of the pattern of order in the
moderninternationalsystemandinitstreatmentoftheconcernsofear-
lierlegaltheoriesofinternationalsociety.
Unfortunately,mostpeopletaketheorthodoxtheoryoforderinmod-
ernworldpoliticsatfacevalue.Fewhaveinvestigatedthesourcesforits
conceptofthestates-systemtoaskwhatmighthavebeenleftoutbythe
counter-revolutionaries who invented the idea; nor have many scholars
questioned the accuracy of the prevailing interpretation of the older le-
gal concept of international society. I will explore both of these issues
here,withtheintentionofdemonstratingthelimitationsoftheorthodox
theory. Like the conventional approach, I will begin with the concept
of a states-system, explaining exactly where this idea came from, and
what was left out of it, deliberately or otherwise; I will also look at how
theconcepthasbeendevelopedincontemporarytheoriesofthesociety
of states, where despite considerable additions the most serious origi-
nal flaws of the concept have not been corrected. Then I will look at
orthodox accounts of the concept of international society, charting the
confusionsanddistortionsthathavebeencreatedbytheefforttofitsix-
teenth and early seventeenth-century legal theories into the context of
eighteenthandnineteenth-centurypoliticaldebates.AsIindicatedinthe
introduction, throughout this chapter my focus will be on the ‘English
school’(ortheBritishcommitteeonthetheoryofinternationalpolitics),
and especially Hedley Bull, whose theory of the ‘anarchical society’ of
stateshasbeenhugelyinfluentialincontemporaryinternationalrelations
theory,andwhichIconsidertobeareasonableproxyfortheentirecon-
temporaryliteratureonmoderninternationalsociety.Nevertheless,itis
worthrepeatingthattheEnglishschoolshouldinnowaybethoughtofas
having originally developed this way of thinking about order in modern
worldpolitics:theorthodoxtheorythatIamdescribingherehasbeena
partofmainstreamscholarshipforoverahundredandfiftyyears,asthe
influence of the new counter-revolutionary history of the states-system
begantomakeitselffeltamongbothpoliticalandlegaltheorists.
Theoriginsoftheideaofastates-system
WhenthemembersoftheEnglishschoolbegantoconstructatheoryof
international relations, they agreed that their work ought to include an
historicalanalysisofthedistinctivecharacteristicsofmodernworldpol-
itics.Tobringthatelementintotheirresearchprogramme,theydecided
tofocusonthecomparativehistoryofstates-systems.Inmanyways,that
Theorthodoxtheoryoforder 15
was the obvious choice. One of the British committee’s leading mem-
bers, Herbert Butterfield, had great respect for the original authors of
the concept of a states-system – the ‘Go¨ttingen’ or ‘German historical
school’ – whom he saw, with good reason, as the founders of modern
historiography.3 Their thesis that the distinction between the medieval
andmodernworldscanbeunderstoodintermsofthedevelopmentofa
decentralizedsystemofmutuallyindependentsovereignstates,aStaaten-
system,hasexercisedapervasiveinfluenceonhistorical,sociologicaland
politicaltheoreticalscholarshipoverthelast200years,andcontinuesto
do so today; the English school are hardly alone in having fallen under
its spell.4 And, in any case, the members of the English school firmly
believedthatbystudyingtheEuropeanstates-systemtheycoulduncover
phenomena of general and lasting significance for contemporary world
politics,ifonlybecause,asBullobserved,Europe’slongperiodofglobal
dominance had attached a unique importance to that particular way of
organizinginternationalaffairs.5
Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the fact that the decision to
focus on states-systems had serious implications for the orientation and
unfolding of the English school’s research programme. In adopting this
idea as their organizing concept, the British committee were aware that
theywerecommittingthemselvestoaparticulartheoryofmodernhistory
thathadbeendevelopedinthelateeighteenthandearlynineteenthcen-
turiesbyscholarswhowere‘apologistsorprotagonists’fortheEuropean
states-systematatimewhenitwasfacingamortalthreatfromtheFrench
3 Herbert Butterfield, Man on his Past (Cambridge University Press, 1955). See also
Butterfield, The Origins of History (London: Eyre Methuen, 1981). The most famous
memberoftheGermanhistoricalschool,andthemostinfluentialintermsofthede-
velopmentofmodernhistoricalmethod,wasLeopoldvonRanke,butontheideaofa
states-systemthekeythinkerwasA.H.L.Heeren.SofarastheEnglishschool’shistorical
researchprogrammewasconcerned,theUr-text,sotospeak,wasHeeren,Manualofthe
HistoryofthePoliticalSystemofEuropeanditsColonies,fromitsFormationattheCloseof
theFifteenthCenturytoitsRe-EstablishmentupontheFallofNapoleon,translatedfromthe
5th German edn, 2 vols. (Oxford: D.A. Talboys, 1834) (the 1st edn was published in
1809).SeeBull,TheAnarchicalSociety,p.12;MartinWight,SystemsofStates(Leices-
terUniversityPress,1977),pp.20–1;AdamWatson,‘HedleyBull,StatesSystemsand
InternationalSocieties’,ReviewofInternationalStudies,13(1987),147–53;andWatson,
‘SystemsofStates’,ReviewofInternationalStudies,16(1990),99–109.
4 Foraninterestinghistoricalattackonthiswidespreadassumption,albeitonethatfol-
lows a rather different tack from my own, see Nicholas Henshall, The Myth of Abso-
lutism:ChangeandContinuityinEarlyModernEuropeanMonarchy(London:Longman,
1992).
5 HedleyBull,‘TheEmergenceofaUniversalInternationalSociety’,inBullandAdam
Watson(eds.),TheExpansionofInternationalSociety(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1984),
p.124;onitsrelevancetocontemporaryworldpolitics,seealsoWatson,TheEvolutionof
InternationalSociety(London:Routledge,1992),p.196.IoughttoaddthatIstrongly
disagreewithBullonthatpoint,aswillbecomeclearinduecourse.
16 Beyondtheanarchicalsociety
Revolution.6Theideaofastates-systemwasoriginallydevelopedaspart
oftheattempttojustifycertainnormativeprinciplesastheauthenticba-
sis for order in modern world politics; for all the merits of the concept
asawayofhighlightinggenuinelyimportantdimensionsofmodernand
contemporaryinternationalrelations,itsinitialpurposewastostigmatize
the French Revolution, and especially the Napoleonic imperial system,
as unlawful in terms of the ‘traditional’ principles of European public
law and order. Like all good propaganda, the historical concept of the
states-system contained a substantial kernel of truth, but presented in a
distorted way. It exaggerated the significance of some aspects of mod-
ernworldpolitics,whiledown-playingorevenignoringothersthatwere
not so helpful to the counter-revolutionary cause. Such distortions may
wellbeinherentinanyhistoricalnarrative,andthereactionarieswereno
lessscrupulousthantheiropponents,butIsubmitthatitisunacceptable
to take their history for granted as an objective description of order in
modernworldpolitics.
Although several scholars have complained about the problems that
flow from conceptualizing modern world history in terms of the idea
of a states-system,7 the reasons why the orthodox perspective is a dis-
tortedonearenotfullyappreciatedatpresentbecausefartoolittleatten-
tion has been paid to the sources that the counter-revolutionaries used
to construct their account of the modern states-system. It is therefore
impossible to understand what they were including and, just as impor-
tantly, what they were leaving out. The trouble here is that most schol-
arship on pre-revolutionary thought has concentrated overwhelmingly
on speculation about natural law and the law of nations as the root
of modern thinking about the European political system, usually trac-
ing a path from Hugo Grotius, through Samuel Pufendorf, to Emerich
de Vattel. Certainly, Pufendorf was one of the first to use the idea of
a states-system, although he meant something completely different by
that term from the way it is now understood. It must also be acknowl-
edged that Vattel’s description of the European political system looks
remarkably like the orthodox conception of international society in use
today:
Theconstantattentionofsovereignstoallthatgoeson,thecustomofresident
ministers,thecontinualnegotiationsthattakeplace,makeofmodernEuropea
sortofRepublic,whosemembers–eachindependent,butallboundtogetherby
acommoninterest–uniteforthemaintenanceoforderandthepreservationof
6 Bull,TheAnarchicalSociety,p.12.
7 For a recent discussion of this point, and in my view a very perceptive one, see the
introduction to James Muldoon, Empire and Order: The Concept of Empire, 800–1800
(London:Macmillan,2000).
Theorthodoxtheoryoforder 17
liberty.Thisiswhathasgivenrisetothewell-knownprincipleofthebalanceof
power.8
Thatdoessoundfamiliar,butforalltheapparentsimilarities,Vattelwas
not the main source for the idea of the states-system that the English
schoolputatthecentreoftheirhistoricalresearchprogramme.Tosup-
pose that he was is to overlook a crucial element of his conception of
theEuropeanpoliticalsystemanditslegalfoundation.Theearlymodern
legaltheoristsmentionedabovewereprimarilytryingtodiscern,through
rationalspeculation,principlesofnaturallawthatcouldbeusedasagen-
eralnormativeframeworkforthefamilyofnations.Bythemiddleofthe
eighteenth century, as illustrated par excellence by Vattel, this approach
was increasingly linked to the belief that revolutions were justifiable if a
rulerhadviolatedthefundamentalprinciplesofnaturallaw,andthatin-
terventionsinsupportofrevolutionsinotherstatesmightbejustifiedon
thesamegrounds.9 Ofcourse,thatwaspreciselytheconclusionthatthe
counter-revolutionaries wanted to avoid, and in consequence they were
waryofadoptingthenaturallawyers’conceptionoftheEuropeanpoliti-
calsystem.TheyoccasionallyacknowledgedGrotius’sreputation,butdid
notusehisoranyotherearliertheoriesofnaturallawtoanygreatextent.10
Nevertheless, with the French revolutionary armies in the ascendant
andwiththeprospectofNapoleonichegemonylooming,thereactionar-
iesweremoredesperatethaneverforanaccountofEuropeanpubliclaw
thatwouldjustifytheprinciplethatthelibertyofindividualstatesshould
berespected;theirproblemwasthattheyneededanargumentthatwould
supportthispointwithoutjeopardizingmonarchicaldynasticism.Theso-
lutionlayinaquitedistinct,andnowsomewhatneglected,literatureon
thelawofnationsthathadalsobeendevelopingsincethemid-seventeenth
century. In contrast with the more abstract, rationalist approach of the
natural lawyers and the philosophes, this literature was based on the em-
pirical analysis of treaties: a typical work would present a collection of
the texts of some important agreements, with a commentary on the ne-
gotiationprocessthathadledtothemandananalysisoftheimplications
of their provisions for the rights and duties of individual rulers.11 With
8 EmerichdeVattel,TheLawofNationsorthePrinciplesofNaturalLawAppliedtotheConduct
andtotheAffairsofSovereigns,trans.C.G.Fenwick(Washington:CarnegieInstitution,
1916),p.251.
9 Ibid., p. 340. As I will explain in more detail in chapter 2, Grotius had developed a
completely different way of justifying resistance, and arguably a rather more opaque
one,basedonthedivisibilityofthesovereignpowerratherthanappealtonaturallaw.
10 See,forexample,Heeren,HistoryofthePoliticalSystemofEurope,vol.I,p.173.
11 Forexample,FredericLeonard,RecueildesTraitezdePaix...depuispresdeTroiSiecles,
6vols.(Paris,1693);‘S.W.’,AGeneralCollectionofTreatys...from1648tothePresent,
4vols.(London,1710–32);Jean-YvesdeSaint-Prest,HistoiredesTraite´sdePaix...depuis
18 Beyondtheanarchicalsociety
onlyafewexceptions,thetreatiesinquestionhadbeenmadebydynastic
rulers,andusuallyinvolvedthetransferofspecificprerogativesfromone
family to another. They thus served the counter-revolutionary purpose
well in so far as they trapped France, like other states, in a restraining
weboftreatyobligations,whilereinforcingtheclaimthatEuropeanpub-
licorderasawholerestedontheprincipleofrespectforthelawfulrights
ofdynasticrulerscodifiedinthetreaties.12 Thisledeasilyenoughtothe
conclusionthattheEuropeansystemhadtraditionallybeena‘systemof
predominantmonarchies’,which,thereactionariesadded,hadperformed
avaluablefunctionbylimitingthepotentialfordisorderandconflictby
‘preventingthepeoplefromtakingamoreactivepartinpublicaffairs’.13
The republicanism of the French revolutionaries, their interventions on
behalf of revolutions elsewhere and their ‘sophistical’ notion of popular
sovereignty,couldbelabellednotmerelyassubversiveandunlawful,but
asdestructiveofthesensible‘cabinetpolicy’thathadbeenanindispens-
ableelementoforderintheEuropeansystemovertheprecedingcentury
andahalf.14
Althoughitreinforcedtherightsofdynasticmonarchs,themereanal-
ysis of treaties was not quite enough, however. Unfortunately for the
counter-revolutionaries,thehistoricalliteratureonprioragreementsbe-
tweenEuropeanrulersdidnotfullyendorsetheideathatthebasicprin-
ciple of the European legal order was the preservation of the mutual
independenceofthemembersofthestates-system.Onthecontrary,the
close reading of treaties often pointed towards patterns of overlapping
rights and privileges, more a system of mutual dependency than the re-
verse. An excellent example was the constitution of the Holy Roman
EmpireascodifiedbythePeaceofWestphalia,asubjectparticularlydear
to the heart of the historians at the University of Go¨ttingen (arguably,
laPaixdeVervins,2vols.(Amsterdam,1725);JeanDumont,CorpsUniverselDiploma-
tiqueduDroitdesGens...depuisleRegnedel’EmpereurCharlemagne,6vols.(Amsterdam,
1726);andG.F.deMartens,SummaryoftheLawofNations,FoundedontheTreatiesand
CustomsoftheModernNationsofEurope,trans.WilliamCobbett(Philadelphia,1795).
Martens, incidentally, was a professor at the University of Go¨ttingen, which perhaps
providesaninstitutionalconnectionexplainingtheimportanceofthislineofargument
tothecounter-revolutionaries,andespeciallyHeeren.Forsomebiographicaldetails,see
ArthurNussbaum,AConciseHistoryoftheLawofNations(NewYork:Macmillan,1947),
pp.163–77.
12 For an interesting early version of this line of argument, which almost anticipates
thelaterfusionoftreatyobligationswiththebalanceofpowermadebythecounter-
revolutionaries,seeJeanDumont,LesSoupirsdel’Europe,OrtheGroansofEuropeatthe
ProspectofthePresentPostureofAffairs,anonymoustranslator(1713),especiallypp.32,
75and84ff.Dumontwasoneofthemosthighlyrespectedinternationallegalhistorians
oftheeighteenthcentury.
13 Heeren,HistoryofthePoliticalSystemofEurope,vol.I,p.9.
14 Ibid.,vol.I,p.10andvol.II,p.162.