Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid

34 Pages·2015·0.35 MB·English

Be Afraid.
Be A Little Afraid:
The Threat of Terrorism from
Western Foreign Fighters in Syria
and Iraq

daniel byman

jeremy shapiro
Foreign Policy
at BROOKINGS
POLICY PAPER
Number 34, November 2014
Acknowledgements
This report is in large part the distillation and orga- expert and relatively gentle criticisms which both
nization of other people’s observations and wisdom. improved the paper and maintained our fragile egos
The authors relied heavily on interviews with experts (for the most part).
and government officials in Denmark, France, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United King- Finally, we would like to thank our Brookings col-
dom, and the United States to understand these leagues: Martin Indyk, for supporting the work
issues. These people were extraordinarily generous through the Director’s Strategic Initiative Fund; Ta-
with their time and with their insights. Most of mara Cofman Wittes and Fiona Hill for providing
them asked not to be identified, either for reasons stimulating and smiling places within Brookings
of modesty, professional survival, or simply because to work; Bruce Jones for shepherding us through
they are embarrassed to know us. This report is, we the review process and providing sage advice; and
hope, a small testimony to their enormous collective Rangano Makamure, Maggie Humenay, and Ben
wisdom and dedication to the safety and security of Cahen for their financial acumen. Special thanks go
their respective countries. to Stephanie Dahle for her expert editing and for
reminding us to thank everyone. Finally, our greatest
We would particularly like to thank Marc Hecker, debt is to Jennifer Williams. Her research assistance,
Shiraz Maher, Peter Neumann, Magnus Ranstorp, her formidable skills as an editor, and her astonish-
and Floris Vermeulen. We are also very grateful to ing patience were absolutely essential to the comple-
John Mueller and an anonymous reviewer for their tion of this paper.
Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its abso-
lute commitment to quality, independence, and impact. Activities supported
by its donors reflect this commitment, and the analysis and recommenda-
tions of the Institution’s scholars are not determined by any donation.
be afraid. be a little afraid: the threat of terrorism from western foreign fighters in syria and iraq
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Table of Contents
Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq ....1
The Standard Schematic Model of Foreign Fighter Radicalization.................................5
Syria/Iraq as the Worst-Case Scenario? .....................................................9
Mitigating Factors....................................................................16
Policy Recommendations ..............................................................23
Authors............................................................................30
be afraid. be a little afraid: the threat of terrorism from western foreign fighters in syria and iraq
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Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid:
The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters

in Syria and Iraq
O
n May 24, 2014, a man walked into the Jew- • Many die, blowing themselves up in suicide
ish Museum in Brussels and opened fire with a attacks or perishing quickly in firefights with
pistol and an AK-47, killing four people in just opposing forces.
seconds. This attack was more than just another inci-
• Many never return home, but continue fight-
dent of senseless gun violence. The alleged perpetra-
ing in the conflict zone or at the next battle
tor, Mehdi Nemmouche, was a French citizen who
for jihad.
had spent the last year fighting Syria. As such, this
attack appears to have been the very first instance of
• Many of those who go quickly become disil-
spillover of the Syrian civil war into the European
lusioned, and even many of those who return
Union. For many U.S. and European intelligence
often are not violent.
officials, it seemed a harbinger. They fear that a wave
of terrorism will sweep over Europe, driven by the • Others are arrested or disrupted by intelligence
civil war in Syria and the crisis in Iraq. services. Indeed, becoming a foreign fighter—
particularly with today’s heavy use of social me-
Despite these fears and the real danger that moti- dia—makes a terrorist far more likely to come
vates them, the Syrian and Iraqi foreign fighter to the attention of security services.
threat can easily be exaggerated. Fears about foreign
fighters were raised concerning many conflicts, espe- The danger posed by returning foreign fighters is
cially after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq; yet for the real, but American and European security services
most part, these conflicts did not produce a surge in have tools that they have successfully deployed in
terrorism in Europe or the United States. Indeed, in the past to mitigate the threat. These tools will have
the case of Iraq in particular, returning foreign fight- to be adapted to the new context in Syria and Iraq,
ers proved much less of a terrorist threat than orig- but they will remain useful and effective. Experience
inally predicted by security services. Previous cases thus far validates both perspectives on the nature of
and the information already emerging from Syria the threat. The Nemmouche attack demonstrates
suggest several mitigating effects that reduce—but the danger, but European security services have also
hardly eliminate—the potential terrorist threat from disrupted five plots with possible links to Syrian for-
foreign fighters who have gone to Syria. Mitigating eign fighters to date, in locales ranging from Kosovo
factors include: to the United Kingdom.1
1 For a list of violent plots in Europe involving Syria returnees, see Andrew Zammit, “List of alleged violent plots in Europe involving Syria returnees,”
The Murphy Raid (blog), June 29, 2014, http://andrewzammit.org/2014/06/29/list-of-alleged-violent-plots-in-europe-involving-syria-returnees/.
be afraid. be a little afraid: the threat of terrorism from western foreign fighters in syria and iraq
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Even the one successful attack in Brussels demon- the homes of Western Muslims every day. All sides
strates why Syria’s foreign fighters are less of a dan- increasingly consider the conflict sectarian, pitting
ger than is often supposed. Nemmouche was known Iraq and Syria’s Sunnis against the Iraqi and Syri-
to French counterterrorism officials who had placed an regimes and their Shi’a supporters in Syria, Iraq,
him under surveillance after his return from Syria, Iran, and elsewhere.
specifically because he had been in Syria. He escaped
greater notice probably because he acted alone, but Western security services fear that the foreign fight-
that also limited his impact. And while Nemmouche er threat in Syria and Iraq is different in important
appears to have picked up some weapons skills in ways than past foreign fighter problems. Young Eu-
Syria, he apparently had no idea how to operate as ropean and American Muslims will go off to fight in
an undercover terrorist in Europe. He failed to get Syria and Iraq as Sunni idealists but will return as an-
rid of the guns he used in the attack and boarded ti-Western terrorists.3 They see combat experience in
a bus on a well-known cannabis smuggling route, the region as a double threat. Many of those who go
leading to his capture. to war will come back as hardened veterans, steady
in the face of danger and skilled in the use of weap-
Many security officials do not find Nemmouche’s ons and explosives—ideal terrorist recruiting mate-
shortcomings very reassuring. Security officials are rial. While in the combat zone, they will form net-
paid to worry about threats and, despite the mitigat- works with other Western Muslims and establish ties
ing factors, foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria provide to jihadists around the world, making them prone
ample room for worry. to further radicalization and giving them access to
training, weapons, and other resources they might
Thousands of Sunni Muslims have gone to fight otherwise lack. Charles Farr, director general of the
alongside their fellow Sunnis against the Syrian and UK’s Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism,4
Iraqi regimes. (Thousands more Shi’a have gone to claims that “Syria is a very profound game-chang-
fight on the side of those governments.2 But it is er,” while the Netherlands’ national coordinator
the Sunni foreign fighters from Europe and Amer- for security and counterterrorism warns that “these
ica, with passports that enable them to go anywhere people are not only coming back with radical ideas;
in Europe or the United States without a visa, who they are also traumatised and fully prepared to use
worry Western officials.) The overwhelming major- violence.”5 This fear of violence is particularly acute
ity of foreign fighters who have gone abroad to join because many of those going to Syria and Iraq are
the fight in Syria and Iraq have come from the Arab social misfits and “marginalized… juvenile delin-
world. But Western Europe’s sixteen million and quents. It’s often people who were criminals before,”
America’s two million Muslims also feel the pull: the according to French officials.6
carnage in Syria, the refugee crisis, and the violence
between religious communities there have echoed American officials have similar fears. FBI director
throughout the West. Satellite television and social James Comey stated that “All of us with a mem-
media bring images of sorrow and slaughter into ory of the ’80s and ’90s saw the line drawn from
2 Daniel L. Byman, “Syria’s Other Foreign Fighters,” Lawfare (blog), January 12, 2014, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/01/the-foreign-policy-
essay-syrias-other-foreign-fighters/; for a broader overview of foreign fighters in history, see David Malet, “Foreign Fighters Playbook,” Foreign
Affairs, April 8, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141107/david-malet/foreign-fighters-playbook.
3 For a take on how these foreign fighters can negatively affect the insurgents they claim to aid, see Kristin M. Bakke, “Help Wanted? The Mixed
Record of Foreign Fighters in Domestic Insurgencies,” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Spring 2014), pp. 140-187.
4 Colum Lynch, “Europe’s New ‘Time Bomb’ is Ticking in Syria,” Foreign Policy, July 9, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/07/09/
european_fighters_jihadists_syria?page=0,1.
5 “Press Release: NCTV maintains threat level at substantial,” National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, Minister of Security and
Justice, July 1, 2013, http://english.nctb.nl/currenttopics/press_releases/2013/nctv-maintains-threat-level-at-substantial.aspx.
6 Lynch, “Europe’s New ‘Time Bomb.’”
be afraid. be a little afraid: the threat of terrorism from western foreign fighters in syria and iraq
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Afghanistan in the ’80s and ’90s to Sept. 11.” He attempts to understand the foreign fighter threat to
then warned: “We see Syria as that, but an order of the West, both the real dangers it presents and the
magnitude worse in a couple of respects. Far more mitigating factors. The foreign fighter threat—and
people going there. Far easier to travel to and back the mitigating factors—can be pictured as a process
from. So, there’s going to be a diaspora out of Syria from recruitment to fighting abroad to terrorism.
at some point and we are determined not to let lines But this process is not inexorable, and there are
be drawn from Syria today to a future 9/11.”7 Com- many possible exits and roadblocks on the route to
ey also explained that because the European Mus- terrorism. Indeed, the vast majority of individuals
lims are from countries whose citizens can travel to do not pass through the entire process. Most move
the United States without a visa, they are of greater off the road to terrorism, exiting at different stages in
concern, as they can more easily slip through U.S. the process. Each conflict has its own dynamics that
security.8 influence the likelihood that a given individual will
travel all the way through the process to terrorism.
Most importantly, the foreign fighter problem in
Iraq and Syria is simply bigger than past cases. Re- Using this framework, our policy recommendations
cent reports estimate that between 2,000 and 3,000 focus on trying to identify opportunities to encour-
foreign fighters from Western countries have trav- age potentially dangerous individuals to take more
eled to Syria and Iraq as of September 2014, includ- peaceful paths and to help determine which individ-
ing over 100 Americans; France, Britain, Belgium, uals deserve arrest, visa denial, preventive detention,
and Germany have the largest numbers of citizens in or other forms of disruption. Steps include increas-
the fight.9 However, these figures may underestimate ing community engagement efforts to dissuade po-
the flow of fighters: Syria has many entry points, and tential fighters from going to Syria or Iraq; working
Western security services recognize that they often more with Turkey to disrupt transit routes; improv-
do not know who has gone to fight. ing de-radicalization programs to “turn” returning
fighters into intelligence sources or make them less
As the wars continue, the flow is likely to increase. likely to engage in violence; and avoiding blanket
The problem may prove a long-term one, as the net- prosecution efforts. Most important, security ser-
works and skills formed in Syria and Iraq today are vices must be properly resourced and organized to
used in the coming years to fight against the next handle the potential danger. Taken together, these
grievance to emerge. One expert compared it to a measures will reduce the likelihood that any one
“ticking time bomb,”10 and Andrew Parker, director individual will either want to move or succeed in
general of MI-5 (Britain’s domestic intelligence ser- moving all the way down the path from concerned
vice) has affirmed that “A growing proportion of our observer to foreign fighter to terrorist.
casework now has some link to Syria.”11 This paper
7 Sari Horowitz and Adam Goldman, “FBI Director: Number of Americans Traveling to Fight in Syria Increasing,” Washington Post,
May 2, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-director-number-of-americans-traveling-to-fight-in-syria-
increasing/2014/05/02/6fa3d84e-d222-11e3-937f-d3026234b51c_story.html.
8 Horowitz and Goldman, “FBI Director.”
9 Dafna Rand and Anthony Vassalo, “Bringing the Fight Back Home: Western Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria,” Center for a New American
Security, August 2014, p. 1, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_ForeignFighters_policybrief.pdf; Richard Barrett,
“Foreign Fighters in Syria,” The Soufan Group, June 2014, p. 9, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-
in-Syria.pdf; Agence France Presse, “3,000 European jihadis now in Syria, Iraq: EU official,” The Daily Star, September 23, 2014, http://www.
dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Sep-23/271704-3000-european-jihadis-now-in-syria-iraq-eu-official.ashx?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_
medium=twitter#ixzz3EEtvjyOW.
10 Lynch, “Europe’s New ‘Time Bomb.’”
11 Guy Faulconbridge, “British spy chief warns Snowden data is a ‘gift’ for terrorists,” Reuters, October 8, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/10/08/us-usa-security-britain-idUSBRE99711A20131008?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_
medium=twitter&dlvrit=992637.
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This paper first lays out the standard schematic view why terrorism in Europe and the United States was
of how and why some foreign fighters become dan- less than expected from previous jihads such as Iraq,
gerous terrorists, drawing on the Afghanistan expe- again drawing implications and lessons specific to
rience in the 1980s to illustrate the arguments. The Syria, as well as examining factors unique to the Syr-
second section discusses why many seasoned observ- ian conflict itself. The fourth and final section iden-
ers believe the Syria conflict is likely to be partic- tifies policy implications and recommendations.
ularly dangerous. In the third section, we examine
be afraid. be a little afraid: the threat of terrorism from western foreign fighters in syria and iraq
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THE STANDARD SCHEMATIC recruitment networks. He begins the sometimes
long and arduous journey to the foreign field of bat-
MODEL OF FOREIGN FIGHTER
tle, through normal and specialized travel networks.
RADICALIZATION
In the process, he is put into contact with a fighting
group, often through friends who had preceded him
N
o single model exists to explain why foreign to the field of battle. They vet and assess him and
fighters turn into terrorists upon returning assign him to a task—to fight his enemies, to martyr
home, but looking at the arguments advanced himself, or just to dig latrines.
by experts and the experiences of past foreign fight-
ers, particularly those who went to Afghanistan in In the third step, the journey transforms as the re-
the 1980s to fight against the Soviets, we can discern cruits train and fight in the field of jihad. Thomas
a standard, schematic model.12 Hegghammer, director of terrorism research at the
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, points
The first step is for fighters from a foreign country out that “the majority of al-Qaida operatives began
to decide to join a conflict. At the start, the moti- their militant careers as war volunteers, and most
vation for the fight abroad is usually specific and lo- transnational jihadi groups today are by-products
cal—fighting against the invader or oppressor—rath- of foreign fighter mobilization.”16 Training camps
er than struggling against injustices at home. Overall, give recruits a sense of mission and focus, helping
security officials believe that the decision to go fight them develop an esprit de corps.17 While in the war
in a foreign conflict is usually less an act of religious zone, callow youths become seasoned combatants.
commitment than of young male rebellion and thirst Brutal combat hardens the fighters, making them
for adventure.13 One intelligence official notes that steady under pressure and giving them a deep sense
many recruits “just want to fight in Syria” but are of loyalty to their comrades-in-arms. They also gain
vague on why. “Only one percent know a theologian” immediate and practical skills. Clint Watts noted
or are informed on dogma in any way.14 Indeed, two that Iraq and Afghanistan were “training grounds”
British foreign fighters on their way to Syria found for foreign fighters where they learned urban war-
it necessary to purchase Islam for Dummies and The fare and how to use weapons, including advanced
Koran for Dummies for the trip, which at least shows technology.18 Hegghammer finds that the presence
an interest.15 As with all such adolescent rebellions, of a veteran from a foreign jihad both increases the
their parents and communities rarely encourage them chance that a terrorist plot will succeed and makes
to pursue their youthful enthusiasms. the overall lethality higher.19
In the second step, the foreign fighters travel to the Established insurgent and terrorist groups wel-
war zone. The aspiring jihadi makes contact with come—and exploit—foreign fighters. Some seek the
12 For an implicit overview of this model, see Clint Watts, “Countering Terrorism from the Second Foreign Fighter Glut,” Small Wars Journal (2009),
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/countering-terrorism-from-the-second-foreign-fighter-glut; another important works on the subject is Peter
Bergen and Alec Reynolds, “Blowback Revisited,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2005), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61190/peter-
bergen-and-alec-reynolds/blowback-revisited;
13 One reviewer of this paper stated that his data does bear out the notion that people in the radicalization stage are non-ideological. This is also the
prevalent view among security officials.
14 Interview with Danish official, May 2014.
15 Martin Robinson, “British Terrorists from Birmingham bought ‘Islam for Dummies’ book before traveling to Syria,” Daily Mail, July 8, 2014,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2684714/I-tell-I-m-going-jihad-Lol-I-ll-arrested-What-British-terrorist-Birmingham-told-childhood-
friend-travelled-Syria-join-rebel-fighters.html.
16 Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,” International Security Vol. 35, No. 3 (Winter
2010/11), pp. 53-94, p. 53, http://www.mitpressjournals.org.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00023.
17 Interview with Peter Neumann, June 17, 2014.
18 For an overview of this model, see Watts, “Second Foreign Fighters Glut.”
19 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?” American Political Science Review (February 2013), p. 11, http://hegghammer.com/_files/
Hegghammer_-_Should_I_stay_or_should_I_go.pdf.
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manpower and funds (and funding networks) that to encompass a broader set of goals. As one official
foreign fighters can bring. Western foreign fighters succinctly put it, “They come back fucked up.”
often have their passports taken away when they
join the group and, lacking family or cultural ties Networks form and strengthen as groups and in-
to others in the region, become highly dependent dividuals become connected to one another. Some
on the group they’ve joined. A few foreign fight- groups, like Al Qaeda, keep meticulous records, en-
ers may be medics, mechanics, or otherwise have abling them to track those who work with them and
valuable skills, though this is the exception, not the whom they train long after the conflict has ended.22
rule. Others welcome the foreigners for ideological As Britain’s MI-5 explains, “foreign fighters can gain
reasons. Still others recruit foreign fighters because combat experience, access to training and a network
they make good cannon fodder and suicide bomb- of overseas extremist contacts. The skills, contacts
ers. One study of Iraqi suicide bombing during the and status acquired overseas can make these individ-
height of the civil war found that there were more uals a much greater threat…”23
Europeans serving as suicide bombers than Iraqis.20
David Malet points out that groups often value for- Lone fighters go to the war zone but become part
eign fighters because these fighters do not have to of something bigger.24 This larger jihadist network
worry about retaliation against their families and are and the associated bonds can be invoked when ex-
therefore more willing to target civilians as part of a tremist groups seek to foment violence back in the
group’s efforts.21 West. Some returned fighters might also simply do
violence on their own without any central direction,
In the war zone, the fighting groups cross-fertilize, having been radicalized, or just psychologically dis-
with the ideas of all the different groups and individ- turbed, by the fighting in Syria or Iraq.
ual fighters influencing the others. In addition, those
who run the training camps and other members of In the fourth step, the fighters return to their home
established groups regularly proselytize to new re- countries in the West and keep the circle turning.
cruits. In Afghanistan in the 1980s, Egyptian groups Returned foreign fighters have gained in status—ob-
that saw Arab regimes as the primary enemy mixed tained a sort of “street cred”—that makes them able to
with those opposed to the Soviet invaders, leading to recruit and radicalize others.25 Sympathizers admired
the development of the broader ideology Al Qaeda returnees from Iraq and Afghanistan, giving them the
would eventually champion. Many foreign fighters prestige to convince others to enter the fray.26
who go to a war zone are young and ideologically
unformed, and the combatant groups see convert- In the final step, the returned fighters begin to plot
ing them to their worldview as part of their mission: terrorist attacks in their homeland. Slowly, they turn
training camps emphasize teaching “true” Islam and their attention away from the foreign struggle that
the duty of jihad as well as weapons training. So took them abroad and begin to focus on perceived
individuals may enter the war with no intention of injustices at home: insults against Islam from their
attacking at home, but their views change and come country’s politicians and opinion leaders, support
20 Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace
Press, 2007), pp. 251-4.
21 Malet, “Foreign Fighters Playbook.”
22 Jacob N. Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 96.
23 Security Service MI5, “Foreign Fighters,” (n.d., accessed June 1, 2014), https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/terrorism/international-
terrorism/international-terrorism-and-the-uk/foreign-fighters.html.
24 Interview with French government official, May 2014.
25 “The Threat to Denmark from Foreign Fighters in Syria,” Center for Terroranalyse (PET), December 4, 2014, p. 5, https://www.pet.dk/English/
CenterforTerrorAnalysisCTA/~/media/CTA/20131203SyrienUKLASSENGFINALpdf.ashx.
26 “The Threat to Denmark from Foreign Fighters in Syria,” Center for Terroranalyse (PET), December 4, 2014, p. 5, https://www.pet.dk/English/
CenterforTerrorAnalysisCTA/~/media/CTA/20131203SyrienUKLASSENGFINALpdf.ashx.
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for the forces oppressing Muslims abroad, or the Foreign fighters traveling to Somalia to participate
daily prejudices faced by Muslims in America and in the civil war there were also a major concern for
especially Europe. European officials. The head of MI-5, Jonathan Ev-
ans, said in September 2010 that “a significant num-
Not surprisingly, this standard model alarms U.S. ber of UK residents” were training in Al Shabaab
and European counterterrorism officials who fear camps in Somalia. He stated, “I am concerned that
that returning foreign fighters will produce a spate it’s only a matter of time before we see terrorism on
of terrorism. For example, one French intelligence our streets inspired by those who are today fight-
official warned about foreign fighters in Iraq in ing alongside al-Shabaab” and warned that “Somalia
2004: “There, they’re trained, they fight and acquire shows many of the characteristics that made Afghan-
a technique and the indoctrination sufficient to act istan so dangerous a seedbed for terrorism in the pe-
on when they return;”27 another declared in a confi- riod before the fall of the Taliban.”29
dential assessment that returned foreign fighters are
“a grave threat for the national territory of France.”28 For European Union member states, the problem
often appears worse, as the actions of one member
figure 1. standard schematic model of foreign fighter radicalization
DECIDE
Become
motivated to
fight
Plot a
Travel to
terrorist attack,
foreign country
PLOT recruit TRAVEL
to participate
others to the
in jihad
foreign jihad
Reenter home Gain skills and
country, avoid experience,
law connect to global
enforcement jihadi network,
and security adopt more
services extreme views
RETURN TRAIN & FIGHT
27 Craig Smith and Don Van Natta Jr., “Officials Fear Iraq’s Lure for Muslims in Europe,” The New York Times, October 23, 2004, http://www.
nytimes.com/2004/10/23/international/europe/23france.html?_r=0.
28 Elaine Sciolino, “Return of jihadists: Europe’s fears subside,” The New York Times, April 7, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/07/world/
europe/07iht-terror.4.11744190.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
29 Quoted in Richard Norton-Taylor, “MI5 chief warns of terror threat from Britons trained in Somalia,” The Guardian, September 16, 2010, http://
www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/sep/17/mi5-chief-somalia-terro-threat.
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