Assurance: An Austinian view of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims PDF
Preview Assurance: An Austinian view of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims
Assurance This page intentionally left blank Assurance An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims Krista Lawlor 1 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,ox26dp, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries #KristaLawlor2013 Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted FirstEditionpublishedin2013 Impression:1 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData Dataavailable ISBN978–0–19–965789–6 PrintedinGreatBritainby MPGBooksGroup,BodminandKing’sLynn LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. To my son, Ian This page intentionally left blank Contents Introduction 1 1 Thespeechactofassurance 9 2 Austiniansemantics 54 3 Austiniansemanticsandlinguisticdata 80 4 Paradox,probability,andinductiveknowledge 117 5 Idiosyncrasy,disagreement,andthereasonablepersonstandard 151 6 Assuranceandradicalskepticism 189 Bibliography 219 Index 227 This page intentionally left blank Introduction We are asking ourselves: what do we do with a statement ‘I know...’?...And that is how one must decide whether some- thingisknowledgeornot. Wittgenstein(1969,}230) Thereareagreatmanydevicesthatcanbeusedformakingclear... whatactitisweareperformingwhenwesaysomething—toneof voice,cadence,gesture—andaboveallwecanrelyuponthenature of the circumstances, the context in which the utterance used... Still,in spite of allthese devices thereis anunfortunate amount of ambiguity...IfIsaysomethinglike‘Ishallbethere’,itmaynotbe certain whether it is a promise, or an expression of intention or perhapsevenaforecastofmyfuturebehavior...anditmaymatter agooddeal...preciselywhichofthesethingsitis.Andthatiswhy the explicit performative verb is evolved—to make clear exactly whichitis,howfaritcommitsmeandinwhatwayandsoforth. Austin(1979a) Wittgenstein and Austin both advise us to start our study of knowledge with knowledge claims, beginning with what one does when one says ‘Iknow...’.Whatisitthatonedoeswithsuchstatements? Thesimpleansweris—oneclaimstoknowsomething.1Butclaimingto know is more than making a report about one’s epistemic position. In claimingtoknow,oneoffersone’sassurancetoothers.Whenoneclaims to know that one’s phone is working again after the outage or that the 1 Onecanofcoursesaymanythingswith‘Iknow’,notalloftheminvolvingaclaimto know.Forinstance,onecangiveencouragementtoalistener,orindicateboredom(‘Iknow, Iknow...’).I’llbefocusingoncasesinwhichoneuses‘Iknow’togiveanexplicitassurance, and‘Heknows’tocommunicateinformationaboutwhohasassurance-givingpower.
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