Armor, July-August 1984 Edition

56 Pages·2007·3.91 MB·English

United States Army Armor School
Commandant
MG FREDERIC J. BROWN
Assistant Commandant
BG GORDON R. SULLIVAN
Deputy Assistant Commandant
COL MICHAEL H. CRUMLEY
Chief of Staff
COL FRED W. GREENE, 111
Command Sergeant Major
CSM JOHN M. STEPHENS
NSTRUCTIONALD EPARTMENTS
Maintenance
COL DONALD S. ZUTTER
Command and Staff
COL JAMES M. LYLE
Weapons
COL DAVID V. HARBACH
Committee Group
COL BOBBY J. CARTER
NCO Academy/
Drill Sergeant School
SGM DONALD H. DEVINE
DIRECTORATES
Evaluation and Standardization
COL JOHN THOMPSON
Training and Doctrine
COL DUDLEY M. ANDRES
Combat Developments
COL ROBERT W. DeMONT
UNITS
Center/School Brigade
COL WILLIAM M. BOICE
1 st Armor Training Brigade
COL ROBERT L. PHILLIPS
“To disseminate knowledge of the military arts and sciences,
4th Training Brigade
with special attention to mobility in ground warfare, to promote
COL WILLIAM M. MATZ, JR.
professional improvement of the Armor Community, and to
preserve and foster the spirit, the traditions, and the solidarity of 194th Armored Brigade
Armor in the Army of the United States.” COL PAUL E. FUNK
M M O R T h e Ma gazine of Mobile Warfare
Editor-in-C hief
FEATURES
LTC CHARLES R. STEINER, JR.
Managing Editor 12 Resupplying Armor the FASTARM Way
JON T. CLEMENS by Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) David C. Holliday
-
Assistant Editor
16 Camouflage Air Superiority Indicator?
ROBERT E. ROGGE
by Paul J. Hoven and Joseph R. Burniece
Administrative Assistant
VIVIAN THOMPSON 21 1984 Armor Conference Report
Contributing Artists 21 Commander’s Report
MARK KAYROUZ
by Major General Frederic J. Brown
GREG HARPER
22 A Look at Our World
Contributing Photographer
by Secretary of the Army John 0. Marsh
SFC DALE BUTLER
26 The Manpower Situation
ARMORmagazine (ISSN 0004-2420) is
published bimonthly by the U.S. Army by General Maxwell R. Thurman
Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road,
Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
Fort Knox. Kentucky 401 21. Unless
otherwise stated, material does not
28 Reducing Training Costs
represent policy, thinking, or endorse-
ment by any agency of the US. Army. An Armor Conference White Paper
Use of appropriated funds for printing of -
this publication was approved by the 31 Combat Service Support At War
Department of the Army 6 January 1984.
ARMORis not a copyrighted publication An Armor Conference White Paper
but may contain some articles which
have been copyrighted by individual 35 General Officers in Attendance
authors. Material which is not under co-
pyright may be reprinted if credit is given
36 CRUSADER: Slow Step to Victory
to ARMORand the author.
Permission to reprint copyrighted mater- by Master Sergeant (Ret.) Robert E. Rogge
ial must be obtained from the author.
SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Individual
subscriptions to ARMORare available
through the US. Armor Association, Post
Office Box 607, Fort Knox.
Kentucky 401 21. Telephone (502) 942- DEPARTMENTS
8624.
Domestic: $15 .00 one year, $26.00 two
years, $37.00 three years. Foreign: 2 Letters 44 Professional Thoughts
$22.00 one year, $35.00 two years. Sin-
5 Commander’s Hatch 49 Recognition Quiz Answers
gle copies, $2.00.
7 Driver’s Seat 50 Regimental Review
CORRESPONDENCE: Address all cor-
9 Master Gunner’s Corner 52 Books
respondence to US. Army Armor Center,
ATTN: ATSB-DOTD-MAG, Fort Knox, 11 Recognition Quiz 53 Steel on Target
Kentucky, 401 21. (Telephone:
AUTOVON 464-2249/2610 or commer-
cial (502) 624-22491261 0.)
SECOND class postage paid at Fort
Knox. Kentucky and additional mailing
office.
ARMORmay be forwarded to military COVER
personnel whose change of address is
caused by official orders (except at APO A It hough battle-dress uniforms and camouf lage-pai nt ed
addresses) without payment of addition- vehicles are still relatively new to the U.S. Army, camouflage paint
al Dostaae. The subscriber must notify
schemes go back to the 1920s. In the article that begins on page
the postmaster.
USPS 467-970 16, authors Paul J. Hoven and Joseph R. Burniece argue that
camouflage has long been a silent indicator of an air-defense
July-August 1984 VOl XCV situation.
Maps Needed for Scouts in the summer of 1939, was only partially Thoughts on “Thinking”
formed and equipped. From the partial
cadres of this unit and the troops of the
Dear Sir,
I would like to commend SFC Skiles for Armored Force Training Center (CWPB). Dear Sir,
his outstanding article, “The Scout Pla- the Warsaw defense command formed I enjoyed Lieutenant Davis’s article
toon Revisited”, that appeared in Pro two 7TP companies, one under Captain “Toward An Old Way of Thinking” in the
Thoughts in the January-February 1984 Stanislaw Grabczewski with 18 7TP March-April issue of ARMOR Magazine.
issue of ARMOR Magazine. He was right tanks, the second under Captain Feliks His grasp of the problem in balancing the
on target. Michalowski. with 11 7Tf tanks. Both demands of firepower and maneuver in
However, let me add just one item to companies saw extensive fighting in the order to effectively deal with an oppo-
the sergeant’s list of needed scout pla- defense of Warsaw. The other battalion nent is most evident. If possible, I would
toon equipment-and this item is so ba- mentioned in Mr. Ogorkiewicz’s letter, like to add to his argument.
sic that one wonders why it isn’t consi- the 21st Light Tank Battalion, was not While agreeing that maneuver and fire-
dBeerleiedv. eI aitm o rr enfeotr,r imnga tnoy mofa posu.r Ysecso, umt applas-! caosm thbaeti rr eFardeyn acth t hRe- 3o5u tbtarenakks ohf athde o wnalyr fpaocweetsr aorf eo nnoe t esfefoprat ra-te c eonmtibtiaets -bu It fteweol
toons do not have maps because of real arrived in Poland in July 1939. They were compelled to emphasize the lieutenant’s
or imagined shortages. If necessary, do mobilized in the first week of the war, but charge that firepower is the handmaiden
without maps elsewhere, but give them to the battalion never saw combat and was of maneuver. I feel certain he would
the scouts! They must have maps! finally withdrawn into Romania at the end agree that simply adding weapons to do-
Also, on the subject of issuing reports, of the war rather than surrender the uble or triple the measured firepower of a
the armored cavalry Beale Wheel (GTA tanks to the Germans. Interestingly company, battalion or division is quite
17-3-7 of 30 April 1973) should be enough, these Renaults later served with meaningless unless there is a practical
updated to reflect the excellent FM 17- the Romanian Army against the Soviet method for employing that increased
98 and worn like ID tags by every scout. Army on the Eastern Front, and in 1945 firepower. The Soviets today appear,
This plastic reports card, when used in against the Germans when the Roman- through their ongoing debates on tactics,
conjunction with the map and FM 17-98, ians switched sides. to recognize this problem more accurate-
is all that is needed for success in being In regard to Captain Betson’s excellent ly than we after having recently
the eyes of the battalion - with, of article on U.S. armor in the Oran landing, increased, with numbers of new wea-
course, good leadership! perhaps I can shed some light on the pons, the relative firepower index of their
mystery of the French tanks that were units through the -la st decade. Once hav-
BO BARBOUR encountered during the operations in ing the weapons any weapon - it is
Captain, Infantry North Africa. Recent French accounts of then a matter of how to most effectively
4th Battalion, 16th Infantry the fighting, notably Colonel E. Ramspa- employ that weapon.
cher’s book, “Chars et Blindes francais,” It is at this point that the lieutenant and
published in 1979, indicate that French I part ways. In following the Ressetta Riv-
armor and cavalry units in the Oran area er engagement, it seemed to this writer
Polish Cavalry Charges On at the time consisted of a number of sec- that the Soviet intention - through hit
tions of antiquated, WW I-vintage Re- and run tactics - was to wear down the
Dear Sir, nault FT-17 light tanks that came from a opponent. An attrition engagement was
Many thanks for running my letter on number of disbanded tank battalions. dictated by the limited effectiveness of
the Polish cavalry matters in the March- These were mostly parcelled out to vari- some of the on-hand equipment (tanks)
April 1984 issue of ARMOR Magazine. A ous infantry units, or assigned to guard and the training of the troops (the Soviets
couple of old cavalry vets helped me out duty at the airfields in the area. Besides are rather timid about the prowess of
on the article and were a bit upset about these, there were a number of compan- their tankers in that period when dis-
the taczanka and rittmeister matters. ies of 1920-vintage Renault D1 medium cussing actions with the German tank
Printing the letter got me off the hook! tanks attached to Colonel Touzet de Vigi- troops). They successfully accom-
I don’t entirely agree with Richard er’s “brigade mechanique” south of plished their attrition since the line at
Ogorkiewicz’s letter concerning the arti- Oran. numbering about 45 tanks. Several that point in Russia did not effectively
cle. I did not mean to suggest that my years ago, I tried to sort out this mystery move further to the east for the rest of the
article was the sole English language myself by consulting the after-action re- war. The Germans certainly might have
account of the Polish cavalry in 1939. ports of the 1st Armored Regiment, but wished to move the line further back, but
Besides Ogorkiewicz’s articles, readers these accounts were equally ambiguous as the flank guard to the operation to-
might also be interested in the section of about the types of French tanks encoun- ward the Caucasus, their goal was sim-
Janusz Piekalkiewicz’s book “The Caval- tered. However, while looking through ply to tie down Soviet forces. In short,
ry in WW 2” which covers a number of the Signal Corps and U.S. Navy photo re- attrition. What this example does not
Polish cavalry battles in 1939. While it is cords of the Oran landing, I found numer- indicate, however, is what might be pre-
true that a number of cavalry regiments ous photos of disabled FT-17s and none sumed to be the case to be supported;
carried their lances with them during the of the Renault D1. I strongly suspect that i.e, that troops may fight to the death in
mobilization of 1939, it was against earli- the tanks encountered on 9 November spite of losses and certain defeat.
er instructions and policy decisions. Old 1942 were these old Renault FT-17s. The It is true that some units may take
-
traditions die hard. confusion as to their type probably heavy losses and still remain a viable
-
I perhaps would have been more pre- stems from the lack of information in U.S. though diminished fighting force. Oth-
cise to have said that the Polish Army Army tank identification manuals of the er units, just as large and well-equipped,
fielded the equivalent of three light bat- period, which did not list the French may dissolve instantly under the least
talions with the 7Tf tank in 1939. Two of types in any kind of comprehensivefash- pressure. The difference is in what the
these battalions, the 1st and 2d Light ion. individual fighting man, among his com-
Tank Battalions, were fully formed and rades and tempered by experience, be-
mobilized on 1 September. The 3d Light STEVEN ZALOGA lieves to be the case. Thus in the above
Tank Battalion, being formed in Warsaw Greenwich, CT discussed actions, the see-saw engage-
2 ARMOR july-august 1984
ment would permit the Individual troops specific weakness in order to implement But the U.S. military has had its share
of both sides to believe that they were corrections to overcome then-current of less-than-high-minded moments. Our
winning. Further, given the apparently deficiencies. wars with Mexico and Spain were expan-
common consent attrition mindset of As Patterns of Conflict and FM 100-5 sionist conflicts, unmotivated by appeals
both senior commanders, as long as no both highlight, it is now time to learn how to any sort of higher morality. The myriad
I
unforeseen action occurs, all was going to “spot the weakness.” My compliments Indian wars of the 19th Century were
“according to plan” on both sides. At no to the lieutenant for his spotting ability. essentially a naked competition over
time would we perceive that the forces of land and resources fought against a mili-
either side were pushed past their limit of JOSEPH R. BURNIECE tarily weaker culture. And more recently
endurance to fight a “hopeless” battle. In Washington, D.C. we have the Vietnam conflict, an incident
coming back to a common agreement A number of readers have queried the that stands on equally shaky moral
with the lieutenant, this writer also ARMOR staff about where they could find ground.
arrived at the understanding from Colo- Colonel John Boyd‘s Patterns of Conflict, All nations, governments, and institu-
nel Boyd’s forceful study, Patterns of in which the Observation-Orientation- tions have their peculiar faults. Ours is to
Conflict, that disorientation leads to de- Decision-Action cycle (The “OODA insist on viewing ourselves as somehow
feat. However, to this student, the salient Loop”) is explained. According to Lieu- morally superior, both in the context of
feature of that study and one which may tenant Davis, author of the article, the ti- other contemporary nations, as well as
have been overlooked in the face of so tle refers to a briefing. Although Boyd’s that of history itself. There is nothing
much supporting evidence, is that the work is now being widely quoted in arf- wrong with seeing ourselves as special.
-
aim of warfare battle, tactics, and icles and publications by others, Boyd’s For the United States is, in some objec-
-
strategy is to overwhelm the mind of presentation is not available in written tive sense, a grand and noble experi-
the enemy commander. form. ment. For all its flaws, American democ-
All of this is not to say that the lieuten- racy has brought an unprecented
ant is incorrect. In a sense, fighting at the -Ed. amount of freedom to a vastly greater
level of company and battalion will rarely number of people than any previous pol-
lead to an opportunity to thoroughly itical system. But seeing ourselves as
numb the mind of the opposing battalion 63d Armor Motto Claimed as better, not merely different, is a state of
commander to such an extent that all of TD’s Own mind that leads to the sort of smug, “my
his troops, with weapons in hand, walk country right or wrong” thinking that
away. And more, veteran fighter pilot that Dear Sir, blinds us to where our true allegiance
Colonel Boyd is, one would expect that You highlighted the 63d Armor on the should lie: not to the institutions or politi-
after all of the maneuver necessary to back cover of your March-April 1984 ical entities themselves, but to the prin-
get the enemy plane in the sights, a fire- issue of ARMOR Magazine and gave as ciples that they embody.
power point must come when the trigger its motto: Seek, Strike, Destroy. Nowhere Institutions are not moral or immoral.
is pulled to “hose’em.” But there is sig- did you explain the derivation of that The people who create- a nd control them
nificant value to be gained by continually motto. I submit that it came from the Tank and work for them are or are not. Thus,
disconcerting the enemy troops, per Destroyers of WW il. the US. military cannot be more or less
Boyd. Constantly catching your oppo- As a former member of the 628th Tank moral than the sum of the moralities of
nent‘s platoon, company, battalion, or Destroyer Battalion I can attest to seeing those who make it up. And to therefore
arm-y at the time and place least expect- those words on walls, shoulder patches, claim for it a moral superiority is to argue
ed standing when a retreat “should” anywhere one looked. that the people who make it upare some-
be in progress, attacking when there are The Tank Destroyer Association re- how made of better moral stuff than
“insufficient forces” to do so, even deny- cently erected and dedicated a monu- those of other nations. I think this is erro-
ing the enemy a warm meal - all count to ment to the TDs at Fort Hood, Texas, and neous. We have been fortunate enough
wear down the morale of the enemy those words are emblazoned around the to have had leaders with the wisdom to
troops. And it is the morale of the troops crest of a tiger eating a tank. create and sustain a political system that
which weighs most heavily on the shoul- puts controls on those aspects of human
ders of the commander. If the troops are ROBERT W. HERMAN nature which are not conducive to the
dejected, how can the commander count Lieutenant Colonel, Armor (Ret.) maintenance of human freedoms.
on them to attack? Will they stand on Auburn, CA To see the morality of the U.S. military
defense? How long will they remain a as a unique historic characteristic is to
cohesive force? claim for ourselves a place in history
As Colonel Boyd’s study serves to only posterity can bestow. The United
underline, we must keep in mind that the States is a great nation and probably
More on Morality
path of success is not necessarily the represents the best-tasting compromise
shortest or most rehearsed. The best of political power and individual freedom
battalion tactical maneuver in a situation Dear Sir, one can create from the present socio-
may not be “round-the-flank’’ but “right- I feel compelled to reply to 2d Lieuten- political soup. But we are not the cul-
up-the middle.” It is indeed a matter of ant Weber’s letter on the morality of U.S. mination of human progress, the “last,
“mindset.” It is the training to seek out armed forces which appeared in the best hope of mankind”. We are just
-
the weak spot in the enemy defense March-April 1984 issue of ARMOR another rung albeit an important one
whether it be lack of firepower, severely Magazine. - on the ladder to the better world of the
reduced density, the determined “do-or- His letter was both thoughtful and future.
die” attitude to hold a specific point/po- important, for the moral application of Thinking about moral conduct is
sition, and the overriding concern not to force is an extremely relevant issue for a important; claiming moral superiority is
expend lives under any circumstances. nation which considers itself in some not. Morality or immorality are not func-
Each such weak spot has an effective respects above the swell of cynical pow- tions of abstract principle, but the judge-
“strength” which we can employ to really er politics. . .Yet while I believe 2LT Web- ment of day-to-day conduct. No matter
“force multiply” our combat capability. er raises an important issue, I also feel how moral one’s intentions may be
The new version of FM 100-5 is a first he is fundamentally wrong in his conten- (‘‘keeping the world safe for democracy”
step in implementing this new “thinking/ tion that the U.S. military is a moral one. for instance), true morality must be re-
seeking” approach to past US. Army There is no disputing the fact that the flected in the methods by which one’s
doctrine. No doubt, as in all cases past, US. military forces were initially consti- goals are attained.
this manual will be superceded by new tuted to support and defend the prin- Rather than taking for granted that we
versions. Such is the value of a current ciples eventually codified in the Con- are moral from the start, a premise that
training document in recognizing a stitution. often seems to relieve us of the burden of
july-august 1984 3
constantly reexamining our conduct, we We arrived in the maneuver area and “Russian Version” Useful
should decide for ourselves - as indivi- on Friday of the first week of April Gener-
duals as well as a nation - just what al Chaffee sent for me. He handed me an
exactly it is that we think is moral, and assembled map of the maneuver area
then proceed each day to put those prin- and told me to bring it back by Monday Dear Sir,
ciples into practice, aware that as men noon, and indicate on it all bridges, CUI- I was very disappointed with Dr.
we are capable of and likely to fall far verts and other things that would prevent Thack’s review of “The Russian Version
short of our stated goals. We should re- movement of his brigade over the roads of the Second World War” in the March-
member that just as we struggle with the in the area. He pointed out how serious it April 1984 issue of ARMOR Magazine.
problem of encouraging the good and would be if one of his columns ran into a Dr. Thack is right - that if one is looking
taming the evil within ourselves, so do all roadblock on the narrow roads. for information on the Russian Cam-
men, even our stated enemies. The histo- On my way back to my troop, I gave paign, this is not a book to consult. That,
ry of the U.S. armed forces bears out this thought to how to carry out my orders; however, is not the purpose of the book.
same dichotomy. It is a condition unre- and I also reflected on General McNair’s The book‘s objective is to show how the
stricted to a certain type of political sys- advice to interpret orders in such a way military and political actions involving
tem or military force, but common to as to best help your commander to carry World War II are presented to the Soviet
mankind. out his mission. I then stopped at the 1s t high school student. The book is a tran-
Cavalry Regiment and talked to Colonel slation of various Soviet high school his-
NEIL R. KINGSLEY Henry Baird. I requested that he assign tory texts.
1L T, MI to me three tanks with crews and rations Yes, the book is also propagandistic,
Fort Knox, KY and gasoline for three days. He sent but so are American high school history
them to my troop at once. books. The reason for the publication of
I assembled my two lieutenants, divid- this book was to make available an
Carrying Out Orders ed the troop into three parts of 30 men English translation of Soviet high school
each; and further equipped them with history so that an English-speaking per-
(Ed. Note: The following letter to Major bridge and culvert materials as well as a son might have an insight into how the
supply of rations and gasoline. I then Soviet people (are taught) to view World
General Brown from General Bruce C.
Clarke, USA (Ret.) and his ”bit of history” assigned one-third of the maneuver area War II. From the Soviet perspective of
are printed here for fhe edification of all to each of my platoon leaders while It ook having suffered 10 million battlefield
armor leaders. The letter follows, then the remaining third. I gave each a tank casualties and another 10 million civilian
the main subject matter.) and a gasoline truck. casualties, the North African, Italian, and
I instructed my platoon leaders to be Western Europe campaigns of the West-
Dear Rick: back by noon Monday, after driving their ern Allies are insignificant. The only
I used this bit of history at AWC, Naval tank over all the roads in their areas and battlefield of significance for the Soviet
War College, C/S College of USMC and fixing any bridges and culverts needed to citizen is the Eastern Front, for here the
at Benning, Belvoir and Knox. It was the support a tank column. battle to save Mother Russia was fought.
most important thing I learned at CLSC. This was done in all three parts of the Of major interest are the appendices,
It carried me through a dozen commands maneuver area. I took the map. with no which present first the Western version
in two wars and in peace in between. It marks on it, to General Chaffee. He said and then the Soviet version of three dif-
brought me seven promotions. that I could not have understood what he ferent incidents, the 1939 Stalin-Hitler
I’d like to see every armor commander wanted me to do. I told him what I had pact, the 1940-41 Soviet-Finnish war,
with Gen. McNair’s concept. It is particu- done and that his tanks could use any and the 1944 Warsaw uprising. It is inter-
larly applicable to mission-type orders road in the area unless the “enemy” pre- esting to see how the substance of the
and armor operations.. . . vented it. story in each case is the same, but mo-
He broke down and shed a few tears. tives, objectives, and responses of the
He said, “Clarke, we are going to win!” participants are presented so differently.
BRUCE CLARKE
This he did, and on 1 July 1940, General It is no wonder that with such diverse
George Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, understanding of history and the lessons
created “The Armored Force,” with Gen- to be learned from it. the US and the So-
In 1939-40 I was a student at the Com- eral Chaffee as its Chief, and activated viets have such great difficulty in negoti-
mand 8 General Staff School. Our com- the 1s t and 2d Armored Divisions. ating any type of agreement.
mandant was Brigadier General Leslie J. I became acting Armored Force Engi- To dismiss the Soviet historical ver-
McNair. I felt that the best parts of the neer, C.O., 16th Armored Engineer Bat- sion of World War I1 as mere propaganda
course were the times that General talion of the 1s t Armored Division and its is a disservice to the Armor Association
McNair talked to us from the stage on the Division Engineer. Soon, senior engineer membership. The book presents not only
basic factors of command. officers were sent in to take my jobs; but the average Soviet citizen’s understand-
One of these gems of wisdom was: not until I had served on the board ap- ing of “the Great Patriotic War“ but also
“When you get an order you must inter- pointed by General Chaffee to come up how the Soviet citizen - from the Polit-
pret it. Do so by doing your best to help with the first TOLE of an armored divi- buro member on down - views the sig-
your commander to carry out his mis- sion. In his guidance to us he directed nificance of World War 11. It is fashiona-
sion.” that the armored division be: ble for Westerners to dismiss Soviet his-
When I graduated on 1 February 1940 I A balanced team of combat arms and torical and political writing as progagan-
was assigned to the 7th Mechanized Bri- services. . .of equal importance and da and to assert that the Soviet leader-
gade at Fort Knox, to organize the 4th equal prestige. ship doesn’t mean or believe what it
“
Engineer Troop (Mechanized) and to be This concept made the Armored Force says. Anyone who holds this view lacks a
Brigadier General Adna R. Chaffee’s Bri- great! It is regrettable that General Chaf- fundamental understanding of Soviet
gade Engineer. Soon, I received two fee did not live long enough to see his culture and philosophy.
engineer lieutenants and 91 soldiers for Armored Force perform in battle. If he Those interested in the Soviet histori-
my troop. had, I believe he would have been very cal view of the causes and consequenc-
In April, the 7th Mechanized Brigade proud of what he had accomplished for es of World War I1 will find this book well
and the 1st Infantry Tank Brigade from our army. worth reading.
Fort Benning were ordered to Louisiana
to maneuver against each other; to de- BRUCE C. CLARKE CHARLES H. BOGART
termine whether an armored force General, USA (Ret.) Department of Military Affairs
should be established. MacLean, VA Frankfort, KY
4 ARMOR july-august 1984
I
MG Frederic J. Brown
Commanding General
U.S. Army Armor Center
I
Training for the AirLand Battle -
”*’
The Armor Force is preparing itself to fight with new certain circumstances it may be better to use fewer tanks for
equipment which has capabilities literally without precedent, peacetime training, yet maximize their use by much more
particularly in terms of mobility and operations in limited intensive use of devices. This concept was further explored
visibility. To get the most out of this equipment, we must during the Armor Functional Area Assessment (FAA) con-
reexamine our tactics and methods of training soldiers. ducted in the spring for the Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
This reexamination began with the FM 17-12 series Some of the potential cost benefits of device-based training
gunnery manuals. Two fundamental questions had to be were determined for peacetime, and the wartime need to use
answered: devices to train crews transitioning to different type tanks
(1) What engagements should be practiced? was introduced.
(2) What standards should apply to each engagement? Our current combined arms training is not business as
The first question was answered by analyzing the target usual. Our training should be, must be, rooted in offensive
arrays that an individual tank, tank with wingman, or pla- AirLand Battle doctrine from our national command au-
toon could expect in the defense or offense. From this ana- thority down to each soldier on the forward line. We must
lysis, the USAARMC determined that two classes of engage- make sure each level of command has a shared understand-
ment exercises should be practiced. The first is the “classi- ing of the concept of the operation and a willingness and zeal
cal” gunnery table engagement: targets appearing to the front to accomplish the mission.
of firing vehicles in engagements that can be practiced with The tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine are being integrated
-
live ammunition exercises developing precision in “steel into institutional instruction and training support materials.
on target.” The second type is the engagement that occurs in With FM 100-5,O perations, as background, the USAARMS
the other 300” of the battlefield: variable targets to the side has fielded coordinating drafts of doctrinal manuals for the
and behind the firing vehicles, precipitating typical battle- tank platoon (FM 17-15), the company team (FM 17-16),
field engagements that can be practiced only with laser and the battalion task force (FM 17-17). The FM 71-series
equipment simulation in tacticalproficiencye xercises. manuals are being rewritten in conjunction with the USAIC:
The second question - what standards should apply? - the draft FM 17-16 will be incorporated in the coordinating
was answered by developing a methodology that considered of draft of FM 71-13; similarly, FM 17-17 wil become FM
the Threat vehicles’ ability to engage us while we engage 71-25.
them. This forces us to time standards based on “hit All of these manuals are based on the J-series TOE and
exchange ratios” that account for the time to fire, single- incorporated employment of the new equipment being
shot probability of hit, and the projectile time of flight of issued to the close combat (heavy) force. This doesn’t limit
Threat vehicles firing on our tanks during a target engage- the use of the new FM series to MI/M2/M3 forces, since we
ment exercise. The answers to these questions are incorpor- must also begin to employ AirLand Battle Doctrine in units
ated in the new FM 17-12 series of tank combat tables. Scor- with older equipment to increase the combat effectiveness of
ing tables for gunnery proficiency exercises include a new the entire Armor Force.
-
scoring methodology. There is also a tactical proficiency The key to ensuring this goal will be met is training we
engagement section in each manual to address the 360” must train as we will fight. Our peacetime training tasks must
battlefield. equal our wartime mission. We must attain and sustain high
Reexamination continued during the Army Tank Program standards in peacetime so that we ensure ultimate success in
Analysis (ATPA) Study. The study concluded that we need combat.
to review new, more effective and resource-conserving At the USAARMC, three key elements are built into the
methods to train on armored vehicles. For example, under courses for officers and NCOs: know the equipment, know
ARMOR july-august 1984 5
the tactics, and know how to train to standards with the worldwide, and record a TC’s decision-making process as
ARTEP Mission Training Plan (AMTP). The AMTP des- well as his manipulation of the tank’s fire control system.
cribes a preferred method for conducting selected unit mis- The U-COFT and other realistic training devices will enable
sions called the situational training exercise (STX) that trains potential TCs to be evaluated objectively on identical
the major missions a unit must be able to conduct in combat. engagements, anywhere in the Armor Force.
The platoon AMTP begins to build combined arms ele- T,he MI/M.?/M3 will force us to conduct more frequent
ments such as artillery and engineer support into tank pla- training than we have been accustomed to with the older
toon training events. Tank platoon training then leads into generation of equipment. Their new capabilities mean there
the company team level AMTP where infantry, ADA, ord- are more ways to use the equipment and more elements on
nance, recovery, and resupply assets must be actively man- which training must be conducted. If we continue “business
aged. This then builds into the battalion task force AMTP as usual,” the rising operation and support (O&S) costs
where all combat, combat support, and combat service sup- associated with our old training methods will either reduce
port assets must be managed and employed to preserve the training of the current force or serve to constrain the size of
offensive nature of ground combat and to be able to exploit the Armor Force in order to live within our budgetary con-
openings deep into the enemy’s rear. straints. Neither is acceptable. Therefore, we are forced to
explore ways to increase training without spending more
The AMTP STXs are designed to train critical tasks and to
money. The increased use of simulation devices for training,
impart the knowledge needed to operate successfully on the
the use of heavy equipment transporters (HETs) to move
combined arms battlefield, without tying up a unit’s equip-
tanks to and from motor pools and training areas, and a less
ment or personnel. In many instances, the leaders should be
tank-intensive training program appear to offer the best
the primary recipients of training. The soldiers are practicing
opportunities for achieving more training for the same re-
repetitive drills. For example, during the AMTP tasks, tank
sources. We are seeking actively other innovative yet practi-
crews can be practicing gunnery or tactical exercises either in
cal, effective solutions.
conjunction with the AMTP STX, or apart from it. Ideally,
during STX training, a well-trained OPFOR would also par- The USAARMC has developed a notional descriptive bat-
ticipate, and engagement simulation equipment could be talion yearly training program showing the types of events
used to identify “casualties.” Results of good or bad deci- and the repeats of each type of event, with approximate
sions and actions would be more readily apparent. Each re- readiness objectives, that we think units should execute.
peat of an STX should be accompanied by a detailed after- This comprehensive training program can be executed with-
action review, and no further STXs attempted until the unit in the current organizational structure and available re-
can do each STX correctly. In other words, train basic exer- sources of our units.
-
cises again, again and again until they have been mastered Note that when we tie training to readiness and specify
to a standard of excellence. numbers of repeats, we have forged a two-edged sword. By
When multiple STXs are performed together, an entire justifying the resources needed in terms of readiness, we can
field training exercise (FTX) has been defined. Once a unit has establish a justifiable requirement to provide to the unit
successfully mastered the AMTP exercises, it can select any commander sufficient Class 111, V and IX funds to accom-
of the additional missions in the ARTEP for a full-scale field plish these training events the required number of times.
training exercise in which everyone participates. The prima- Given the resources, the unit must manage them wisely,
ry training devices for AMTP field training have been the execute the training in accordance with the factors of METT-
tactical engagement simulation devices of MILES. T applied by that unit’s chain of command and thereby
Incorporated into the AMTPs are alternative means of achieve increased readiness.
training leaders; for example, the coordination exercises: the Some would argue for a less ambitious program with a
fire coordination exercise (FCX), the logistical coordination reduced number of event repeats. That must be a decision at
exercise (LCX), and the movement coordination exercise the chain of command considering mission readiness re-
(MCX). quirements. USAARMS is describing a way to train to mis-
The final element supporting unit training is the company sion proficiency on the new (and old) equipment. This train-
team combined arms live-fire exercise (CALFEX) to be defined ing program is the basis for all officer and NCO training in
this summer as FC 7 1-4. CALFEX provides an exercise for the School. The specific training program at the unit must
-
the unit commander to orchestrate the dynamics of battle remain the decision of the chain of command responsible for
maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. This exer- mission readiness.
cise forces all the communication/coordination links for all In summary, the challenge to the Army is to organize,
weapon systems to function simultaneously, and requires equip, and train the force to win the AirLand Battle. The
the chain of command to demonstrate the ability to place USAARMC shares in that effort by supporting Armor units
direct and indirect “steel on target” under battle conditions. and by training Armor leaders and soldiers who will carry out
This is a vital complement to the tank combat tables - a the shared concept of the operation with success and excel-
necessary annual proficiency exercise, particularly for for- lence: success gained through tough, rigorous, training in
ward-deployed units. the institution; success gained through constant, well
Two areas remain for further work: thought out, well-executed combined arms unit training;
(1) The future certification of tank commanders of all and by excellence of leadership and soldiers to do difficult
-
grades and, things under great stress to win the AirLand Battle.
(2) The efficiency with which we train the Armor Force. A
The contribution of the Armor Force on the modern
battlefield depends upon the competency of tank command-
ers. We must have the most highly qualified personnel we
can find at these positions. We need men who know the
tactics, know the equipment, and know how to lead during
combat. We are developing a tank commander certification
process. The unit conduct-of-fire trainer (U-COFT) can pre-
sent a large number of different engagements, replicable
6 ARMOR july-august 1984
CSM John M. Stephens
Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Armor Center
A Message for the NCO
“We have done tremendously well in training our own
through the Noncommissioned Officer Education System
and the Noncommissioned Officer Development Program.
In this issue, I’m turning my column over to the very appropri-
However, I firmly believe that we must work even harder in
ate remarks of the Sergeant Major of the Army, Glen E. Morrell.
order to produce quality soldiers.
During their recent visit to Fort Knox, Sergeant Major and Mrs.
“Noncommissioned officers make noncommissioned offi-
Morrell were the guests of the commanding general at the Fort
cers. We are the keepers of the keys which unlock the door
Knox Noncommissioned Officer S Birthday Ball, attended by
to professionalism and technical competence.
approximately 900 noncommissioned officers and their guests.
“The training and development of excellence in the Non-
The ball, established by Sergeant Major John W. Gillis in 1982,
commissioned Officer Corps begins with the identification
has become an annual tradition.
and selection of the right soldiers to be trained, and then by
ensuring that the training and ultimate use of those noncom-
missioned officers are maximized. This is the very founda-
tion of our leadership development program. We do have
“It is indeed a pleasure for me to be here this evening. some problems. I am concerned about how we train soldiers.
From the very beginning of my Army career, some 29 years “All too often, we select those soldiers for NCO training
ago, I have been constantly taught to soldier, to lead, to who are available and who are most easily released from
-
teach to dedicate myself to those principles which con- units for weeks at a time. We should be sending the “Soldier
tinue to make our great nation the “land of the free and the of the Month” type soldier, those on the promotion list, or
home of the brave.” those slotted in leadership positions on the unit manning
“As history will show, the most impressive thing about report. I firmly believe we are not being selective enough on
any army is the individual soldier. Even with the most which NCOs we send to school.
sophisticated equipment, the most modern technology, the “From my travels thus far, I find today’s soldiers are well-
most expensive and advanced fighting vehicles, an army educated, motivated, and eager to learn. They are the base
cannot fight, sustain, and win a war without quality soldiers. from which we drive our army. Their training is of the
“And of utmost importance is the positive leadership utmost importance. Their ability to sustain themselves and
which begins with the noncommissioned officer. We have their fellow soldiers during periods of high stress is built
indeed produced a corps of NCOs in the U.S. Army unsur- upon rock-hard confidence in themselves and their leader-
-
passed in ability and ready to go. ship chain, beginning with fire team leaders or the noncom-
“When I assumed my position as Sergeant Major of the missioned officers of their sections. These young NCOs are
Army in July of last year, I reflected upon my experiences in the ones who call the shots. It is on their knowledge, initia-
-
Europe, in the U.S. Army Recruiting Command and most tive, and courage that our success in battle rests.
-
recently U.S. Army Forces Command. That reflection “Whatever we do in the Army today, we must first ensure
clearly indicated to me the requirement for excellence in that our army is prepared for war should our deterrence fail.
leadership and technical ability. We must be more flexible and deployable, more powerful,
ARMOR july-august 1984 7
better resourced, better balanced between light and heavy to understand our heritage as soldiers in order that we may
forces, better trained, and better led. be better protectors of our nation’s sacred trust.
“Let me take a minute to talk about the mission and “As I see it, every soldier must possess professional com-
responsibilities of noncommissioned officers. As General petence through knowledge of his military occupational spe-
Wickham indicated in his remarks during our annual AUSA cialty, basic common soldiers’ tasks, the history of the NCO
Sergeants Major Luncheon in Washington this past October, Corps, and why we serve.
our mission, and that of the NCO Corps worldwide - is to “I would like to see every soldier possess integrity - in
be concerned with the quality of our force and how well it is order to build trust and confidence in ourselves, our leader-
led and taught. He was speaking in particular of its human ship, and the American public. I would like to see every
-
dimension, our soldiers. They are the prime factor in how soldier possess strength in our physical abilities to per-
flexible, how deployable, how powerful, and how well the form our mission; in our determination to excel as a total
equipment is used. force. Every soldier must portray an image that is immacu-
“How well are we accomplishing our mission? From my late and impeccable in every way to the American public, our
observations thus far, I can tell you that the attitudes and allies, and our potential adversaries.
morale of our young soldiers are superb. They are quite “More importantly, every single leader must possess
capable, concerned, and feel that what they are doing is intestinal fortitude. It takes guts for a leader to use inherent
important. That is convincing evidence of a positive reflec- authority and responsibility in training, maintaining, leading
tion on the quality of the NCO corps and our dedication to and caring for soldiers and their equipment.
producing good soldiers and units. “Our leadership must recommend the promotion of good
soldiers, weed out the poor performers, train the right sol-
“When I speak to the NCOs in the field, or anywhere, I diers and teach them the right things. They must comply
tell them they must train, maintain, and care. Our young with HQDA policies; they must lead by example, and they
soldiers are so good today that if our leadership doesn’t must promote discipline and good order. Those are by no
challenge them and fulfill their expectations, we are going to means all of my concerns and observations, but they are
lose the good people we lead. some of the most important.
There is some fine-tuning which requires our attention. We “We are indeed doing some great things in the Army
“
all need to stress the importance of professional excellence. today. Our Chief of Staff has pledged to us the best possible
In all we do, we must project competence and professional- leadership, fiscal policy, and representation to Congressional
ism. It is the perception that our soldiers, our nation, and and civilian authorities. We, in turn, must pledge to him our
our potential adversaries must have of us. It is the reason for total support and confidence.
our wearing the uniform and our mission as soldiers. “The Army is what it is today because of its excellent
“We must demonstrate to the nation and the public that soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers who serve
we are an army of knowledge, wisdom, technical compe- with pride, dedication, and a sense of national spirit.
tence, and values. Noncommissioned officers cannot ignore “The Secretary of the Army and our Chief of Staff have
-
the historical importance of their profession the society proclaimed this year as the “Year of the Army Family:” a
from which it comes, and why it is worth preserving. We owe family of components, of units, and of people. Their support
our nation, our children and grandchildren the debt of and concern show how important a role the family plays in
ensuring that each of our soldiers knows what it is they are our overall success. We reenlist a soldier, but we retain a
protecting and guarding, and why. For not to do so, we family. We all need support. Children must morally support
certainly run the risk of the guardians not knowing or valu- their parents; family members must support the service
ing what they guard; and we run an even greater risk of member; the soldier must support the leadership in the
losing the values and the freedoms we so highly cherish and Army.
preserve. “When we successfully meet the challengers of our lead-
“The noncommissioned officer who does not read about ership, we not only assure professionalism, but we help
and impart his knowledge of military history is shortchang- create an army of soldiers and units comitted to excellence.
ing our soldiers and our army. We need to focus some of our ‘For those who have fought for it, freedom has a taste
“
training into the basic question of why we serve. We all need the protected will never know’.’’
“The Centennial of Armor”
Shown at right is the 30 x 48-inch oil painting commis-
sioned by the U.S. Armor Association to commemorate the
Associations’s uDcomina 100th anniversary. The “Centen-
nial of Armor” was created by Mark Irwin. an illustrator at
the Training and Audiovisual Support Center, Fort Knox, KY.
The full-color oil depicts the evolution of today’s armor
force from the horse cavalry days of 1885,w hen the Associ-
ation was established as the U.S. Cavalry Association,
through World Wars I and II, Korea and Vietnam to the pre-
sent day AH-64 attack helicopter, and the M7 Abrams main
battle tank and the M2 Bradleyfighting vehicle. The painting
graphically portrays the direct connection between the old
fighting arm and the new combined arms team that is the
spirit of armor. The Armor Association will complete a cen-
tury of services to cavalry and armor on 9 November 1985.A
24 x 36-inch full color collector quality reproduction of the
painting is now available from the Association. Flyers have
been mailed to all members announcing the sale of the
prints.
8 ARMOR july-august 1984