Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations

395 Pages·2005·1.29 MB·English

by  Peter D. Feaver

ARMED SERVANTS
Peter D. Feaver
Armed Servants
Agency, Oversight, and
Civil-Military Relations
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge,Massachusetts,andLondon,England 2003
Contents
Preface vii
1 Introduction 1
2 Huntington’sColdWarPuzzle 16
3 TheInformalAgencyTheory 54
4 AFormalAgencyModelofCivil-MilitaryRelations 96
5 AnAgencyTheorySolutiontotheColdWarPuzzle 118
6 ExplainingthePost–ColdWar“Crisis,”1990–2000 180
7 UsingAgencyTheorytoExploretheUseofForce
inthePost–ColdWarEra 234
8 Conclusion 283
Notes 307
References 337
Index 371
Preface
This project has spanned a significant portion of my academic career, and
throughoutitsmeanderingcourseIhaveaccumulatedaseriesofintellectual
debts that I can never repay. The project originated in my dissatisfaction
with the state of civil-military relations theory, which I had earlier used in
GuardingtheGuardians (Feaver, 1992) to explore civilian control of nuclear
weapons in the United States. In that book, as in this one, I realized I was
wrestling with some of the most basic questions of democracy, the same
onesthatsomefortyorsoyearsearlierhadengagedtheformidablemindof
one of my dissertation mentors, Samuel Huntington. I know I am no Sam
Huntington, but I was nevertheless motivated to see whether I could push
civil-militaryrelationstheoryinanewdirection,beyondsomeoftheprob-
lems that I thought one encountered in his landmark Soldier and the State.
Becausehehassufferedthisprojectwithonlyoccasionalflashesofexasper-
ation,andhastakenitinthespiritinwhichitisgiven—reformationasthe
highestformofflattery—Iowemyfirstanddeepestintellectualdebtonthis
projecttoSamuelHuntington.
Theprojectwasshapedatanearlystagebymyexperienceasdirectorfor
defense policy and arms control on the National Security Council staff in
1993and1994.IwastherecourtesyofaCouncilonForeignRelationsInter-
national Affairs Fellowship, and this experience gave me an unparalleled
windowintocivil-militaryrelationsbothinthetrenchesandatthehighest
levels.Alongtheway,Iwastutoredbysomeofthefinestmenandwomen
withwhomIhaveeverhadtheprivilegetowork.Isuspecttheywillshake
theirheadsindismayatsomeof“lessons”IthinkIlearned,butIamforever
in their debt. In this regard, I would especially like to thank: Steven
Andreason, Robert Bell, Hans Binnendijk, Joseph Bouchard, Kurt Camp-
bell,KeithHahn,BrentJames,StevenJones,thelateJosephKruzel,Daniel
viii Preface
Poneman, James Seaton, Joseph Sestak, George Tenet, and Anne
Wittkowsky. Of course, I am grateful to Anthony Lake, Sandy Berger, and
NancySoderbergfortherisktheytookinallowingapracticingacademicon
thestaff.
Iamlikewisegratefulfortheextraordinarywindowintocivil-militaryre-
lations that I have been provided as an officer in Navy Reserves. The re-
quirementofputtingonandtakingofftheuniformhasrituallyinscribedin
metheunderstandingthatcivil-militaryrelationsisnotjustafieldofschol-
arlyinquiry.Itinvolvesreallivehumanbeingswhoareworthyofmorere-
spectthanacademictheorycangivethem.Overtheyears,Ihavemethun-
dreds of men and women in uniform, and my respect for their service is
deepandprofound.
Theproject’sconceitwastoaddresscivil-militaryrelationswitharealism
that practitioners would recognize as authentic, while using an approach
that would also resonate with the most academic of political scientists. I
hopetobridgevariousepistemicdivides:civilianandmilitary,policymaker
and academic, American politics and national security. The insights of the
principal-agent framework seemed especially well suited to this ambition,
andIamverygratefultothescholarswhohelpedmeteaseoutausefulthe-
oryfromthissprawlingliterature:DeborahAvant,SteveBalla,RobertBates,
William Bianco, John Brehm, James Hamilton, Emerson Niou, Kenneth
Shepsle, and David Spence. I am also in the debt of Bruce Bueno de
Mesquita,JamesMorrow,CliftonMorgan,andtherestoftheHoover“boot
camp,” for tutoring me in the limits and utility of even very basic formal
methods.
Ihavestartedandcompletedmanyotherresearchprojectsintheinterim,
and every time I returned to this I found myself thinking about the prob-
lem in new ways. My collaborators and advisors on all those projects have
thusprofoundlyshapedmythinkingoncivil-militaryrelations,nonemore
so than my good friend and trenchant intellectual critic Richard Kohn. I
am proud to be a part of a renaissance of academics and practitioners who
takeseriouslythestudyofthepoliticsofnationalsecurity.Iwanttothankin
thisregard:AndrewBacevich,StephenBiddle,BernardBoene,JamesBurk,
Eliot Cohen, Chris Dandeker, Cori Dauber, Michael Desch, Thomas Don-
nelly, Benjamin Fordham, Christopher Gelpi, Hein Goemans, Ole Holsti,
GerhardKuemmel,ThomasLangston,LauraMiller,CharlesMoskos,Mack
Owens,AlbertPierce,ThomasRicks,PeterRoman,DavidRosenberg,Scott
Preface ix
Sagan, David Segal, Don Snider, Paul Stockton, Hew Strachan, David Tarr,
PascaleVenneson,MichaelVickers,andJayWilliams.
Ofcourse,thisprojectwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithouttheconsid-
erable financial investment of several institutions. I am especially grateful
forthegeneroussupportgivenbytheJohnD.andCatherineT.MacArthur
Foundation.Someoftheresearchherecameoutofaseparateprojectlook-
ing at the gap between the military and American society funded by the
Smith Richardson Foundation, and I thank that foundation heartily for its
support.IhavealsobenefitedfromthesupportoftheArtsandSciencesRe-
searchCouncilatDukeUniversity.Thebookmanuscriptwasfinallyfinished
whileIwasonsabbaticalasavisitingfellowatCorpusChristiCollegeanda
visitingscholarattheCentreofInternationalStudies,CambridgeUniversity.
Thisbookwouldnothavebeenfinishedwithouttheprodigiouseffortsof
a stable of thoroughbred research assistants: Erin Abrams, Anne Marie
Boyd, Ajin Choi, Shin-Hai Michael Chu, Lindsay Cohn, Damon Coletta,
Roger Cooper, Kirk Hawkins, Carrie Liken, Al Malbon, Edmund Malesky,
Mary Martin, Jennifer Martinez, Michael Noonan, Tammy Meyer, Anne
Richardson,ChristopherShulten,andChristineYoung.
Ihavehadtherareandattimesexcruciatingprivilegeofseeingmywork
inprogressdissected,critiqued,andultimatelyimprovedbyteamsofDuke
undergraduate and graduate students in several successive courses built
aroundtheproject.Itriedtoholdthosestudentstothehighestpossiblestan-
dards,andtheyrepaidthefavorinspadesbyshowingmemany(thoughnot
all)ofthemistakesandlapseswithwhichmyownworkisafflicted.Ithank
them all, and hope I have not committed yet another goof by omitting a
name: Lauren Aronson, Carol Atkinson, Robyn Barnett, Jen Bassler, Kate
Brennan,DevlinCasey,BillChen,PhillipDemske,AlyssaDragnich,Jennifer
Ezring,DavidFiler,RobertGallagher,AmyGravitt,JenGreenough,Christy
Hamilton,CarrieHayes,MatthewHoffman,AdamHudes,EugeneHsu,Tom
Jones, Richard Kells, Dan Kocab, Claire Kunstling, Kevin McGee, Alec
Miller, Ingrid Moeller, Ross Montante, Dennis Nuxoll, Matt Pittman, Matt
Sample, Jamie Satnick, Leah Scholer, Melanie Shirley, Victoria Snabon,
John Snyder, Daniel Thompson, Elizabeth Tolle, Kulbir Walha, Whitney
Walker,andJohnWyatt.
There are numerous people, too numerous to mention, who gave pene-
tratingfeedbackonportionsofthetext.Ithank,ofcourse,theanonymous
reviewersatHarvardUniversityPressaswellasmyencouragingeditor,Mi-
x Preface
chaelAronson,andhisstaff,especiallyBennoWeisbergandmyeagle-eyed
copyeditor,JulieHagen.Ialsothank:JohnAldrich,EvaBusza,KurtDassel,
John Duffield, Colin Elman, Joseph Grieco, Hal Klepak, Peter Lange, Jeff
Legro, Mariano Magalhaes, Jim Miller, David Priess, Brian Taylor, Harold
Trinkunas, Sharon Weiner, and the participants in the National Security
SeminaroftheOlinInstituteforStrategicStudies,theProgramonInterna-
tionalSecurityPolicyattheUniversityofChicago,andtheOhioStateUni-
versityDepartmentofPoliticalScience.
Portions of Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 build on an article originally pub-
lished in Armed Forces and Society, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Hun-
tington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” Armed Forces and
Society23,no.2(Winter1996):149–178.PortionsofChapter6alsobuildon
anarticleoriginallypublishedinArmedForcesandSociety,“CrisisasShirking:
An Agency Theory Explanation of the Souring of American Civil-Military
Relations,”ArmedForcesandSociety24,no.3(Spring1998):407–434.Copy-
rightforbotharticlesisheldbyTransactionPublishers.Materialfromthese
articles is used by permission of the publisher. Other portions of Chapter 1
wereoriginallypublishedasPeterD.Feaver,“Civil-MilitaryRelations,”An-
nual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 211–241, and the material is used
withthepermissionofthepublisher.OtherportionsofChapter6wereorigi-
nally published as Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Conflict and the Use of
Force,”inDonaldSniderandMirandaA.Carlton-Carew,eds.,U.S.Civil-Mil-
itaryRelations:InCrisisorTransition?(Washington,D.C.:CenterforStrategic
andInternationalStudies,1995),andthematerialisusedwiththepermis-
sionoftheCenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies.Stillotherportions
ofChapter6wereoriginallypublishedasPeterD.Feaver,“BookReviewof
CivilianControloftheMilitary:TheChangingSecurityEnvironment,byMichaelC.
Desch,”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview94,no.2(June2000):506–507;that
materialisusedwiththepermissionoftheAmericanPoliticalScienceAsso-
ciation.
Finally, I acknowledge my everlasting debt to the co-conspirators who
heldupthepersonalsidewhileIlaboredontheacademicsideoftheproject.
Iamblessedwiththebestcollectionoffriends,workdistractors,andprayer
partners a man could ever have, and they carried me over the hump: Ian
Baucom, Robert Beschel, Luke Condra, Josh Crossman, David Fott, Paul
Gronke,TimothyPrinz,WilliamWalker,ConnieWalker,DavidWelch,and
Paul Yanosy. None deserves more praise than my family, my sweet Karen,
Samuel, and Ellie; any interest they had in civil-military relations would
Preface xi
have been satisfied without a completed book, but they let it be a family
projectevenso.
I dedicate this book to my college mentor, Carey Joynt, who got me
startedontherewardingquestofintellectualdiscoverythatengagesmestill.
ARMED SERVANTS
1
CHAPTER
Introduction
The tragic events of 11 September 2001 and America’s re-
sponsetheretounderscoredthecentralityofmilitarypower,eveninamod-
ernliberaldemocracy.Thebrutalreturntosomethingofawarfootingafter
adecadeofcomparativepeaceremindedAmericansthatfreedomcomesata
price. At times liberty must be defended with its antithesis: coercion and
militaryforce.Iftheyhadeverforgotten,Americansrememberedjusthow
muchtheydependonthemenandwomenwhotraintousemilitaryforce
andwhopledgetheirlivesindefenseofthenation.Thesemenandwomen
are the nation’s armed servants, empowered but subordinate, capable of
wielding astonishing levels of coercive force, but expected to wield it only
within narrow confines dictated by others. They wear a uniform to mark
their special status, and since 11 September 2001, no one can ever doubt
their importance. This book, which was conceived and largely written be-
forethatdramaticturnofevents,isneverthelessabookforthefuture,be-
causeitaddressesaquestionthathasonlygrowninsignificanceasAmeri-
canshavebeguntowrestlewiththenewglobalsecurityenvironment.
How do civilians control the military? This most basic of political ques-
tions has two meanings. On the one hand, given that military institutions
enjoyanoverwhelmingadvantageincoercivepower,howisitthatcivilian
institutions are able to impose their will on their more powerful military
agents?Ontheotherhand,giventhatciviliansinmaturedemocraciesenjoy
generalsupremacyoverthemilitary,howdoesthecontrolrelationshipplay
outonaday-to-daylevel?Thisbookexploresthesecondaspectoftheques-
tion, developing a new theory of civil-military relations called agency the-
ory,whichisbasedontheprincipal-agentframeworkandwhichIusetoil-
luminate changes in U.S. civil-military relations during the Cold War and
post–ColdWareras.
1