Arkansas Code, Volume 16, 2013 Supplement

2013·19.5 MB·English

by  State of Arkansas

Arkansas Code
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1987
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SUPPLEMENT
2013
VOLUME
16
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ARKANSAS CODE REVISION COMMISSION
Senator David Johnson, Chair
Senator David Burnett
Representative John Vines
Representative Darrin Williams
Honorable Bettina E. Brownstein
Honorable Don Schnipper
Honorable David R. Matthews
Honorable Stacy Leeds, Dean, University ofArkansas at
Fayetteville, School ofLaw
Honorable Michael H. Schwartz, Dean, University ofArkansas at
Little Rock, School ofLaw
Honorable Warren T. Readnour, SeniorAssistant Attorney General
Honorable Matthew Miller, Assistant Director for Legal Services of
the Bureau ofLegislative Research
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TITLE 16
PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, AND COURTS
(CHAPTERS 1-17 IN VOLUME 14A; CHAPTERS 18-54 IN
VOLUME 14B; CHAPTERS 55-89 IN VOLUME 15)
SUBTITLE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE GENERALLY
6.
CHAPTER.
JUDGMENTAND SENTENCE GENERALLY.
90.
91. APPEALAND POST-CONVICTION.
92. COSTS, FEES, FINES, ETC.
93. PROBATIONAND PAROLE.
94. EXTRADITION.
96. PROCEEDINGS IN INFERIOR COURTS.
98. TREATMENT FOR DRUGABUSE.
99. PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE FUNDING FOR RECIDIVISM AND CRIME
REDUCTION.
SUBTITLE PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGSAND REMEDIES
7.
CHAPTER.
105. ABATEMENT OF NUISANCES.
108. ARBITRATIONAND AWARD.
ATTACHMENTAND GARNISHMENT.
110.
114. MALPRACTICE ACTIONS.
116. PRODUCTS LIABILITY.
118. MISCELLANEOUS ACTIONS.
120. IMMUNITY FROM TORT LIABILITY.
122. CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSONS CAUGHT SHOPLIFTING.
123. CIVIL RIGHTS.
125. IMMUNITY FORYEAR 2000 COMPUTER ERRORS. [REPEALED.]
127. STALKER LIABILITYACT.
128. CIVIL LIABILITY FORACTS OF TERROR.
SUBTITLE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE GENERALLY
6.
CHAPTER
90
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE GENERALLY
subchapter.
1. General Provisions.
3. Restitution to Victims. —
4. Execution of Sentence Confinement.
7. Crime Victims Reparations.
8. Sentencing Guidelines.
9. Expungementand Sealing of Criminal Records.
12. Encouragement of Treatmentand Rehabilitation of Drug Users.
13. Earned Discharge and Completion of Sentence.
14. Comprehensive Criminal Record SealingAct of 2013 [Effective January 1, 2014]
1
16-90-103 PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, AND COURTS 2
—
Subchapter 1 General Provisions
SECTION. SECTION.
16-90-111. Correction orreduction ofsen- 16-90-122. Post-convictionrelease ofnon-
tence. violent offenders.
16-90-120. Felony with firearm. 16-90-123. Sealing certain convictions.
16-90-103. Sentences without notice void.
CASE NOTES
Invalid Notice. judge failed to notify either party before
Judge's attempt to reduce a one-year amending his original order. Linder v.
sentencefollowinga contemptorderto six Weaver, 364 Ark. 319, 219 S.W.3d 151
months was null and void where the trial (2005).
16-90-105. Verdict of guilty.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. Annual
Survey ofCase Law: Criminal Law, 29 U.
Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 849.
CASE NOTES
In General. plea.Ainsworthv. State, 367Ark. 353, 240
This section does not require the void- S.W.3d 105 (2006).
ing of a judgment entered more than 30 Cited: Loarv. State, 368Ark. 171, 243
days after a court's acceptance ofa guilty S.W.3d 923 (2006).
16-90-107. Fixing of punishment generally.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR. Validity, Construction, andAppli- tion of Sex Offense for Purposes of
cation of State Statute Including "Sexu- Sentencing or Classification ofDefendant
ally Motivated Offenses" Within Defini- as Sex Offender. 30A.L.R.6th 373.
CASE NOTES
Analysis iner testified to signs of extensive and
ongoing sexual abuse; based on this evi-
Discretion ofCourt. dence, thejury's verdict did not appear to
Fixing by Court. be the result ofpassion or prejudice. Mc-
Modification ofSentence. Donaldv. State, 364Ark. 491, 221 S.W.3d
Motion to Reduce. 349 (2006).
Discretion ofCourt. Fixing by Court.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion Useoftheword"may"in§ 5-4-702 does
in denying defendant's motion to reduce notmean that ajuryhas the discretion as
his life sentence for the rape ofhis minor to whether to impose an enhanced sen-
daughter as numerous witnesses testified tence where a crime ofdomestic violence
to the alleged abuse ofthe victim, includ- was committed in the presence ofa child;
ing the victim herself, and a nurse exam- rather, it means the state had the option
3 JUDGMENTAND SENTENCE GENERALLY 16-90-111
ofseeking the enhancement. Thus, where becausehefailedtoprovethathereceived
no sentence was imposed by the jury, a the ineffective assistance of counsel. In
trial court did not err by imposing one part, the inmate's argument that the ju-
under this section. Sullivan v. State, 366 ry's verdict imposing the maximum sen-
Ark. 183, 234 S.W.3d 285 (2006). tences torunconsecutivelywas aresultof
Modification ofSentence. passion and prejudice is not persuasive;
Trial court did not abuse its discretion considering the court's ability to sua
in denying defendant's post-trial request spontereducethe sentence, thetrialcourt
for a sentence reduction pursuant to sub- didnotclearlyerrinfindingthatamotion
section (e) of this section because defen- to reduce the sentence under subsection
dant's 20-year sentence for second degree (e) ofthis sectionwouldhavebeendenied.
sexual assault, in violation of§ 5-14-125, Hoyle v. State, 2011 Ark. 321, 388 S.W.3d
fell within the statutory range. Brown v. 901 (2011).
State, 2010 Ark. 420, 378 S.W.3d 66 Cited: Barritt v. State, 372 Ark. 395,
(2010). 277 S.W.3d 211 (2008); Vance v. State,
Motion to Reduce. 2011 Ark. 243, 383 S.W.3d 325 (2011).
Denial ofappellant's, an inmate's, peti-
tion for postconviction relief was proper
16-90-111. Correction or reduction of sentence.
(a) Any circuit court, upon receipt ofpetition by the aggrieved party
for relief and after the notice of the relief has been served on the
prosecuting attorney, may correct an illegal sentence at any time and
may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time
provided in this section for the reduction of sentence.
(b)(1) The court may reduce a sentence within ninety (90) days after
the sentence is imposed or within sixty (60) days after receipt by the
court ofa mandate issued upon affirmance ofthejudgment or dismissal
ofthe appeal.
(2) The court may also reduce a sentence upon revocation of proba-
tion as provided by law.
History.Acts 1983, No. 431, § 1;A.S.A. this sectionbecause the defendantwas on
1947, § 43-2314; Acts 1987, No. 550, § 1; probation and therefore by definition not
1999, No. 578, § 1. in custody.
Publisher's Notes. This section is be- By per curiam order dated December
ing set out in its entirety as it was previ- 19, 1994, the Supreme Court provided:
ously set out as "[Superseded]". "This court frequently acts on motions
This section was declared superseded filed in the course of appeals of orders
by ARCrP 37.2(c) in Harris v. State, 318 denyingpost-conviction reliefpursuant to
Ark. 599, 887 S.W.2d514(1994). However, Arkansas Criminal Procedure Rule 37,
in Reeves v. State, 339Ark. 304, 5 S.W.3d Ark. CodeAnn. § 16-90-111 (Supp. 1991),
41 (1999), the Arkansas Supreme Court statutes which govern the issuance of
citedBlack's LawDictionary 1220(7thed. writs ofhabeas corpus and mandamus as
1999) and held that when dealing with a wellaslegalremedies suchaserrorcoram
motion to modify a condition contained in nobis proceedings and others. As there is
ajudgment ofprobation under subsection no provision in the prevailing rules of
(b) of this section rather than a petition procedureforamotionforreconsideration
under ARCrP 37 for postconviction relief to be filed after this court has denied a
following imprisonment, a trial court had motion which stems from a post-convic-
the authority to modify an illegal condi- tionmatter, suchmotionswillnolongerbe
tion of probation under subsection (a) of filed."
16-90-120 PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, AND COURTS 4
CASE NOTES
Analysis counsel, defendant'smotionforasentence
reduction under this section should have
Appeal. been considered by the trial court as a
Appeal Dismissed. petition for postconviction relief under
Considered as a Petition for Postconvic- Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1(a). Gonder v. State,
2011 Ark. 248, 382 S.W.3d 674 (2011).
tion Relief.
Inmate's appeal of the denial of the
Untimely Petition.
inmate's petition to correct an illegal sen-
Appeal. tence, pursuant to this section, was dis-
Defendant's appeal ofthe denial of de- missedbecause(1)Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(b)
fendant'spetitionto correctanillegal sen- said all postconviction reliefgrounds cog-
tence was dismissed because defendant nizable underArk. R. Crim. P. 37.1 hadto
could not prevail, as, (1) to the extent be raised in a Rule 37.1 petition filed
defendant's claims were cognizable under within 90 days of the date ofjudgment
Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, defendant's request whenadefendantpledguilty, eventhough
for reliefwas properly treated as a peti- this section let a trial court correct an
tion under Rule 37.1 and was subject to illegalsentenceatanytime, asthe statute
the time limitations contained in Ark. R. was superseded to the extent the statute
Crim. P. 37.2(c), which defendant did not conflicted with the Rule's time limits, (2)
satisfy afterhavingpled guilty, and, (2) to the petition was filed over six years after
the extent defendant's claims were not judgment was entered, (3) the time limits
cognizableunderArk. R. Crim. P. 37.1,the in Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2 were jurisdic-
claims alleged no error required to sup- tional, denying a trial courtjurisdiction if
port a claim of an illegal sentence, as the time limits were not met, and, on
defendant did not show defendant's sen- appeal, a reviewing court, and (4) the
tences were outside the statutory range, inmate's sentence was within the pre-
and defendant's petition was not timely scribed statutory ranges in §§ 5-4-
f2i0l1ed3 Aurnkd.er18t9h,is—sSec.tWi.o3nd. —Dav(i20s13v)..State, 5St0a1t(eb,)(220)1(A3)Arakn.d9,5—-4-S4.0W1(.b3)d(l—)., 2R0e1d3uAsrkv..
LEXIS 15 (Jan. 17, 2013).
Appeal Dismissed.
Untimely Petition.
Defendant's appeal ofthe denial ofde-
fendant's motion to correct an illegal sen- Where appellant entered a guilty plea
tencewas dismissed because the sentence tomultiplefelonyoffensesandreceivedan
defendantcontestedhadbeenvacatedand aggregate sentence of 720 months' in
remanded to the trial court, which resen- prison, the trial court did not errby deny-
tenced defendant, rendering the appea—l ing his motion to correct an illegal sen-
moot. G—laze v. State, 2013 Ark. 141, t9e0n-cdeaybetciamueselihmietdriedquniortefdilbeyitswuibtdhiviinstihoen
S.W.3d (2013).
(b)(1)oft—his section.—Purifoyv. State, 2013
Considered as a Petition forPostcon- Ark. 26, S.W.3d (2013).
viction Relief. Cited: State v. Wilmoth, 369Ark. 346,
Where defendantrequestedreliefbased 255 S.W.3d419 (2007); Robertsonv. State,
on a claim of ineffective assistance of 2010Ark. 300, 367 S.W.3d 538 (2010).
16-90-120. Felony with firearm.
(a) Any person convicted ofany offense that is classified by the laws
ofthis state as a felony who employed any firearm ofany character as
a means ofcommitting or escaping from the felony, in the discretion of
the sentencing court, may be subjected to an additional period of
confinement in the state penitentiary for a period not to exceed fifteen
(15) years.
(b) The period of confinement, if any, imposed under this section
shall be in addition to any fine or penalty provided by law as punish-
5 JUDGMENTAND SENTENCE GENERALLY 16-90-120
ment for the felony itself. Any additional prison sentence imposed
under the provisions ofthis section, ifany, shall run consecutively and
not concurrently with any period ofconfinement imposed for conviction
ofthe felony itself.
(c) A separate appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from the
imposition ofthe sentence, ifany, provided for by this section, and any
appeal shall be in the manner prescribed for appellate review of
conviction of criminal offenses in general. However, the sole and only
question to be decided upon the separate appeal shall be whether the
evidence warrants a finding that the defendant actually employed a
firearm in the commission of, or escape from commission of, the felony
for which he or she stands convicted.
(d) Any reversal ofa defendant's conviction for the commission ofthe
felony shall automatically reverse the prison sentence which may be
imposed under this section.
(e)(1) For an offense committed on or after July 2, 2007, notwith-
standing any law allowing the award of meritorious good time or any
other law to the contrary, except as provided in subdivision (e)(l)(B)(ii)
ofthis section, any person who is sentenced under subsection (a) ofthis
section is not eligible for parole or community correction transfer until
the person serves:
(A) Seventy percent (70%) of the term of imprisonment to which
the person is sentenced under subsection (a) of this section if the
underlying felony was any ofthe following:
(i) Murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102;
(ii) Kidnapping that is a Class Y felony, § 5-11-102;
(hi) Aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103;
(iv) Rape, § 5-14-103; or
(v) Causing a catastrophe, § 5-38-202(a);
(vi) Trafficking methamphetamine, § 5-64-440(b)(l);
(vii) Manufacturing methamphetamine, § 5-64-423(a) or the for-
mer § 5-64-401; or
(viii) Possession ofdrug paraphernalia with the purpose to manu-
facture methamphetamine, the former § 5-64-403(c)(5).
(B)(i) Except as provided in subdivision (e)(l)(B)(ii) ofthis section,
seventy percent (70%) of the term of imprisonment to which the
person is sentenced under subsection (a) of this section if the
underlying felony was any ofthe following:
(a) Manufacturing methamphetamine, § 5-64-423(a) or the for-
mer § 5-64-401; or
(b) Possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to manufac-
ture methamphetamine, the former § 5-64-403(c)(5); or
(c) Trafficking methamphetamine, § 5-64-440(b)(l).
(ii) The person is eligible for parole or community correction
transfer ifthe person serves at least fifty percent (50%) ofthe term of
imprisonment to which the person is sentenced under subsection (a)
ofthis section for the offenses listed in subdivision (e)(l)(B)(i) ofthis
section with credit for the award of meritorious good time under
16-90-120 PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, AND COURTS 6
§ 12-29-201 unless the person is sentenced to a term oflife impris-
onment. The time served by any person under this subdivision
(e)(l)(B)(ii) shall not be reduced to less than fifty percent (50%) ofthe
person's original sentence under subsection (a) ofthis section; or
(C) Either one-third (Vs) or one-half (V2) of the term of imprison-
ment to which the person is sentenced under subsection (a) of this
section with credit for meritorious good time and depending on the
seriousness determination made by the Arkansas Sentencing Com-
mission if the underlying felony was any felony not listed in subdi-
vision (e)(1)(A) or (B) ofthis section.
(2) The sentencing court may waive subdivision (e)(1) ofthis section
if all ofthe following circumstances exist:
(A) The defendantwas ajuvenile when the offensewas committed;
(B) The defendant was merely an accomplice to the offense; and
(C) The offense was committed on or after July 31, 2007.
(f) Aperson who commits the offense ofpossession ofdrug parapher-
nalia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, § 5-64-443,
after July 27, 2011, shall not be subject to the provisions ofthis section.
History. Acts 1969, No. 78, §§ 1-3; ers accountable, and contain correction
—1973,No. 61, § 1;A.S.A. 1947, §§ 43-2336 costs."
43-2338; Acts 2007, No. 1047, § 5; Amendments. The 2011 amendment
2011, No. 570, § 76. inserted (e)(l)(A)(vi) through (viii); re-
A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2011, No. 570, wrote (e)(l)(B)(i)(a); substituted "the for-
§ 1, provided: "The intent ofthis act is to mer § 5-64-403(c)(5); or" for "§ 5-64-
implement comprehensive measures de- 403(c)(5)" in (eXIXBXiXfc); inserted
signed to reduce recidivism, hold offend- (eXIXBXiXc); and added (f).
CASE NOTES
Analysis did not subject defendant to double jeop-
ardy as the conviction under this section
In General. was used to enhance defendant's sen-
Additional Confinement. tence. Davis v. State, 93 Ark. App. 443,
Appeal. 220 S.W.3d 248 (2005).
Construction With Other Laws. In a case involving terroristic acts un-
Firearm Enhancement Statute Not Re- der § 5-13-310(a)(l) where three shots
pealed by Implication. were fired into an automobile, because
Indictment. eachterroristic actwas a separateoffense
Instructions. that could have been committed with or
Sentencing. without a firearm, each crime was subject
In General. to a firearm enhancement under this sec-
Plain language ofthe firearm-enhance- tion. McKeeverv. State, 367Ark. 374, 240
ment statute shows that the legislature S.W.2d 583 (2006).
intended for it to apply to any offense, in Appeal.
additiontoanyfineorpenaltyprovidedby
In amurdercase, the trial court didnot
lMacwKeaesveprunvi.shSmteatnet, f3or67thAerkf.elo3n7y4,its2el4f0. iernrfoirnmaatliloonwionng tthhee mstoartneintog aomfetnridalthteo
S.W.3d 583 (2006).
include a felony-firearm enhancement.
Additional Confinement. Because the charge defendant was tried
Defendant's convictions for aggravated forwas contained in the original informa-
assault in violation of § 5-13-204(a) and tion, the reviewingcourtfailedto seehow
use ofa firearm in commission ofa felony defendant was unfairly surprised or oth-
,
7 JUDGMENTAND SENTENCE GENERALLY 16-90-120
erwise prejudiced by the amended infor- on-the-record explanation with their tes-
mation. Plessyv. State, 2012Ark.App. 74, timony that they initially decided not to
388 S.W.3d 509 (2012). amend the information in the interest of
judicial economy to avoid a continuance.
Construction With Other Laws. After the first trial ended in a hungjury,
This section, the firearm enhancement the threat ofdelaywas no longer a facto—r.
statute, was not repealed by implication William—s v. State, 2013 Ark. App—. 179,
when the Arkansas Criminal Code be- —S.W.3d (2013),reviewdenied, S.W.3d
came effective in 1976; former § 5-4-505 , 2013 Ark. LEXIS 211 (Ark. Apr. 11,
could be read in harmony with this sec- 2013).
tion, and the general assembly's amend-
mentto this sectionwas inconsistentwith Instructions.
the conclusion it had been repealed by Circuitcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretion
implication. Sesleyv. State, 2011Ark. 104, in denyingdefendant's second-degree bat-
380 S.W.3d 390 (2011). tery instruction because the offense
chargedwasfirst-degreebatterypursuant
Firearm Enhancement Statute Not to § 5-13-201(a)(3), and the jury was not
Repealed by Implication. required to find that defendant employed
Fifteen years' imprisonment pursuant a firearm in order to convict him ofthat
to a firearm enhancement was proper be- offense, norwasthejuryrequiredto apply
cause this section was not repealed by the firearm enhancement if it convicted
implication when the Arkansas Criminal defendant offirst-degree battery; the fire-
Code became effective; statutes were not arm enhancement was not an element of
in irreconcilable conflict, and the general the first-degree-battery offense but was
assemblyhadvalidated this section's con- anadditionalsentence authorizedbystat-
tinued existence by amending it. Neely v. ute if defendant was convicted of first-
State, 2010 Ark. 452, 370—S.W.3d 8—20 degree battery, and the jury determined
(2010), rehearing denied, S.W.3d thatdefendantemployed afirearm during
2011 Ark. LEXIS 377 (Ark. Jan. 6, 2011). commission of that offense as prohibited
Where defendant was found guilty of by this section. Reed v. State, 2011 Ark.
aggravated robbery and theft ofproperty, App. 352, 383 S.W.3d 881 (2011).
his sentencewas enhancedbysevenyears
Sentencing.
pursuant to this section for employing a
After defendant was convicted ofthree
firearm in the commission ofa felony; the
appellate court rejected the argument counts ofcommitting a terroristic act, the
that the firearm enhancement was re- trialcourtdidnoterrinimposingmultiple
pkeaanlseadsoCnrJiaminnuaalryC1o,de197t6o,okwheeffnectt.heTAhre- fciormemairtmteednhatnhcreeemenstepsabreacteausceridmeifneanldaonft-
firearm enhancement did not violate the fenses, and each offense was committed
plain language of § 5-4-104(a), because with a firearm. McKeever v. State, 367
§sec5t-i4o-n10c4a(na)beanrdeasdubhsaercmtoinoinsou(sa)l-y(bt)oomfethains ArkD.ef3e7n4d,an2t4'0sSc.oWn.v3idct5i8o3n (f2o0r06m).urder in
the second degree, with a firearm en-
that subsections (a)-(b) are only a sen-
hancement, was proper because defen-
tence enhancement, while the Arkansas
Criminal Code provides the minimum dantactedknowinglytocausethevictim's
death under circumstances manifesting
sentences to be imposed for each specific
oS1f7.f9We,.n3s_ed.—SW.iWl2.l03i1da3—mAsr(vk2..0S1Lt3aE)t,XerI,eS2v0i2e11w31dA(eArnrkik.e.dAA,ppp—r.. meaxnatdnreiltmiefwe.aisnTdhipefrfeeirssesunumceeesdtiontvhtoahlteveavdalpcuereredsioobfnilhiiutn--y
, tended the natural and probable conse-
11, 2013).
quences ofhis or her acts; defendant shot
Indictment. herhusbandinthewristwith ahandgun,
Presumption of prosecutorial vindic- he bled to death as a result ofthe wound,
tiveness didnot arisewhenthe Statefiled andadditionalevidenceindicatedthatthe
an amendedinformation addingafirearm fatal wound was defensive in nature.
enhancement under this section after de- Johnson v. State, 2010Ark. App. 1—53, 375
fendant'sfirsttrialforaggravatedrobbery —S.W.—3d 12 (2010—), review denied, Ark.
and theft ended in a mistrial, because the , S.W.3d , 2010 Ark. LEXIS 257
deputy prosecutors provided an objective, (May 6, 2010).
16-90-121 PRACTICE, PROCEDURE, AND COURTS 8
Defendant's sentence enhancement record that relief was not warranted on
pursuant to subsection (a) ofthis section, theinmate'sclaimsconcerningillegalsen-
whichalloweddiscretionaryenhancement tencing as there was no evidence that
for using a firearm as a means ofcommit- counsel agreed to allow the court to sen-
ting a felony, was proper because defen- tence on a gun enhancement cha—rge. Dav-
dant's accompliceliabilityfortheunderly- —enport v. State, 2011 Ark. 105, S.W.3d
ingoffense ofmurder, thatwas committed (2011).
by use ofa firearm, was sufficient for the Where defendant was convicted ofmul-
statutoryenhancementto app—ly. Mhoon—v. tiple offenses and sentenced to 240
State, 2010 Ark. App. 183, S.W.3d months for committing a terroristic act
(2010). and 192 months for domestic battery, the
Summary denial ofan inmate's Ark. R. enhancement of his sentence on both
Crim. P. 37.1 postconvictionreliefpetition charges by 144 months pursuant to this
was reversed because the order did not sectiondidnotresultinhissentencebeing
provide the requisite findings and conclu- enhancedtwiceforusingadeadlyweapon
sions, and the record did not clearly sup- because the use of a firearm was not an
port affirmation; because no hearing was element the prosecution had to prove to
held, the trial court had an obligation to obtainhis conv—ictions. Ki—ngv. State, 2012
provide written findings that showed that Ark. App. 94, S.W.3d (2012).
theinmatewasentitledtonorelief. Itwas Cited: Polivkav. State, 2010Ark. 152,
not conclusive from the petition or the 362 S.W.3d 918 (2010).
16-90-121. Second or subsequent felony with firearm.
CASE NOTES
Good Time Credits. inmate's sentence), the inmate's 30-year
Because § 12-29-201, changing how sentence for first-degree murderwas sub-
meritorious good-time credit was applied, ject to reductionbymeritorious good-time
did not impliedly repeal the language in credit at the conclusion of the first 10
this section (the deadly-weapon enhance- yearsofth—esentence.—Hobbsv. Baird, 2011
ment statute applicable at the time ofan Ark. 261, S.W.3d (2011).
16-90-122. Post-conviction release of nonviolent offenders.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any circuit
judge may authorize the temporary release of an offender in the
sheriffs custody who has:
(1) Been found guilty of or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a
nonviolent felony offense in circuit court; and
(2) Been sentenced to a term ofimprisonment and committed to the
Department ofCorrection or the Department ofCommunity Correction
and is awaiting transfer to the Department of Correction or the
Department of Community Correction.
(b) A circuit judge shall not authorize the temporary release of an
offender under subsection (a) of this section if the offender has been
found guilty of or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a:
Y
(1) Class felony offense listed in § 16-93-618; or
(2) Felony sex offense listed in the definition of "sex offense" in
§ 12-12-903.
(c)(1) The circuit judge may authorize the release under the terms
and conditions that he or she determines are necessary to protect the
public and to ensure the offender's return to custody upon notice that