Apollo 12 SA-507 Saturn V Flight Manual - NASA's History Office

244 Pages·2015·17.68 MB·English

SATURN V
FLIGHT
MANUAL
SA 5O7
THIS PUBLICATION REPLACES MSFC-MAN-607 DATED 16 AUGUST 1969 FOR VEHICLE SA-607; HOWEVER
MEFC-MAN.607 DATED I5 AUGUST 19611REMAINS THE BASE LINE MAN_:,_,_ FOR SA.61M ANO SA-rd)9.
15 AUGUST1969
CHAN6ED50CTOItln t969
"1
I:"_1D! ...................................
°
15 AU6UST1969
CHAHSED 50CTOItEI 1969
___J
r.
_ r
Reproduction for Hn-gowrmwnt uoe of t_ inl_m_ti4m of lilust_iege mmtsl_d in
this publication Is not permitted without s_ifi¢ _qn_nI! of the Jsoui_ service.
line in the outer margtns oY the page.
TOT_J.NUMBEROF PAGESIN THIS PUBLICATION IS 246, CONSISTINGOF THE FOLLOMING:
lie
Imue
*1]tie ........................... SOCt 1969
6-2 ............................... Oripal
*A .............................. $Oct 1969
• 6-3 .............................. $Oct 1969
i.................
64 Itum6-10 ....................... Orqinal
*',,00 ,,, O_J_d °6-11 tlml 6-12 .................... $Oct 1967
*ill. .S Oct 1969
6-13thin 6-16 ...................... Ol_q_.l
• 6-17............................. $Oct 1969
I-1 thru 1-3 ........................
*i-4 ............................. $Oct 1969 6-18 tluu 6-33 ...................... O_inal
I-S 6-34 Blank ......................... "_i_inal
• I-6 ".'.''.°°.''.'''.''....................... .......... ° ,.°..,, 5OOc_i_t 1969 7-1 tent 7-21 ....................... O_l_nal
• 7-22 ............................ 5Oct 1q69
1-7 thru 1-9 ........................ Original
7-23 .............................. Orisinat
* !-i0 Blank ......................... Original
• 7-24thru 7-25 .................... 5Oct 1969
*2-1 thru220 ..................... 5Oct 1969
• 3-1 ............................. $Oct 1969 7-26 thru 7-30 ...................... O_inal
8-1 tima8-20 ....................... OriginaJ
3-2 thru3-10 ....................... Original • 8-21 tlma8-23 .................... 5OCt 1969
*3-11 thru3-22 .................... 5Oct 1969
8-24 tluru8-26 ...................... Ori_nal
*3-23 Added ...................... 5Oct 1969
9-i thin 9-13 ....................... Ori_nal
• 3-24 Blank Added ................. 5Oct 1969 • 9-14_ 9-16 .................... 5OCt 1969
4-1 thru4-3 ........................ Oristnal 9-17
*4-4 ............................. 5Oct 1969 .......... Ori_nal 0
4-5 thru4-23 ....................... Original • 10-1thru 10-7.................... 5OCt 1969
4-24 Bia_l,.......................... Original • 1041Bhmk ....................... 5Oct 1969
5-1thru5-28 ....................... Original • A-! thru&-4 ...................... 5Oct 1969
• 5-29 ............................. 5Oct 1969 • B-i thai B-3 ..................... 5Oct 1969
• 5-30 Blank ....................... 5Oct 1969 • B-4 Blank ........................ •Oct 1969
• Index ! thn_ Index 7 ............... 5Oct 1969
*6-1 ............................. 5Oct 1969
• Index 8Blank .................... 5Oct 1969
* The asterisk indicates pages changed, added, or deleted by the current change.
B-I
NASA
Chanired 5October 1969
tmr
TABLEOFCONTENTS
--cTuoH i Page
General Del_flptteo ........................... I-1
SECTION II
Performance ................................ 2-1
SECTION III
Emergeacy Detectiqm end Precedms ................ 3-1
SECTION IV
S-IC Stoge
" • e • • • • • • e e e e e e e e ................. 4-1
SECTION V
S-II Stage .................................. 5-1
SECTION Vl
S-IVB Stage ................................. 6-1
SECTION VII
Instrument Unit
.............................. 7-1
SECTION VIII
Ground Support Interface ......................... 8-1
SECTION IX
Mission Control Monitoring ....................... 9-1
SECTION X
Mission Yorioblos end Constraints ...... • ---....... .10-1
APPENDIX A
Abbreviations and Acronyms A-I
°" " "°ee o'.ee..ee .eu..o
APPENDIX II
Btbliogr_y ................................ B-I
INDEX
Alphobeticol
.............................. Index I
(
i/ii
O
&ATUItN V FLIOHT MAIWtAL
|
IIA.607
FOREWORD
This manual was prepared to provide the astronaut with a sk_le mwce reference as to the
characteristics and functions of the SA-$07 bunch vehicle and AS-S07 flight mission. Data on the
SA-$08 and SA-509 launch vehicles and missions is included, however the 15 Aulpm 1969
manual serves as the baseline manual for these two vehicles. A change to the 15 August 1969
manual, incorporating the latest released data, w/ll be reJeued for etch vehicle, SA-$08 and
SA-509, approximately 30 days prior to their respective leunch dates.
The manual provides general miss/on and performance d|ita, emergency detection system
information, a description of each stage and the IU, lind 8 general discussion of ground support
facilities, equipment, and mimuon control. A bibliography identifies edait_,t_al references ff a
!i more comprehensive study is de.red.
Major hardware associated differences between the Saturn V launch vehicles SA-506 through
(
SA-$09 are annotated in the manual. They are identified by reference numbers in the
adjacent to the new information. These reference numbers refer to footnotes which are located at
the end of each section.
This manuat is for information only and is not a control document. If a conflict shoukl be
discovered between the manual and acontrol document, the control document will rule.
Recommended changes or corrections to this manual should be forwarded, in writing, to the
Saturn V Systems Engineering Management Office (PM-SAT-E) MSFC, Attention: Mr. H. P.
Lloyd; or the Crew Safety and Procedures Branch (CF-24), MSC. Attention: Mr. D. K. Warren.
REVISION NOTE
Manual MSFC-MAN-507, dated 15 August 1_69, was based on the G mimion. The information in
this manual describes the vehicle configuration and mission characteristics asdefined for the H-I
nlission and was prepared from information available approximately thirty days prior to 5
October 1969,
Each page changed to make this revision is identified by a change note at the bottom of the page.
Changes of technical significance are identified on these pages by a black bar in the marBin
opposite the change. Nontechnical changes such asrecompt_ition of pages to accommodate new
information, minor rewrite to clarify meaning and correction of typographical errors ave not
identified by change bars.
Changed 5 October 1969
IIIi1_
1
i
ETmI I
liimal
II __
TAll.| OF_
VEHICLE DESIGN GROUND RULES
SATURN FSYS'I'£M DESCRIPTION .............. I-I
LA vcHv mcL ossc irno .......
Nae s,4ver,v,No NSTRUMelVr,,I. KI I I
Safety criteria are identified by Air Force Eastern Test Range
PERCEPTIBLE PRELA UNCH EVENTS ............ 1-9
(AI_:_['R) SafeW Manual 1274 and AFETR Regnlatior. 127-9.
SATURN V IIYITEM DEI_RIPTION
Crew safety coe._leratlom requil_d the development of an
EmerlKSIcy Detection System (EDS) with equipment located
The Saturn V system in its broadest scope includes
throughout (he I_unch vehicle to detect emergency
conceptual development, design, manufacture, conditions as they develop. If an emergency condition is
transportation, assembly, test, and launch. The primary detected, this system will either initiate an automatic abort
mimlon of the Saturn V launch vehicle, three-stage-to.m_pe sequeace, o5"display critical data to the flight crew for tl_ir
boost hunch of an Apollo Spacecraft, establbhed the basic anab_ andreection.
concept. This minion !:eludes a suborbital start of the third
stage (S-IVB) engine for final boost into earth orbit and
Each powelreclstage is defined with dual redundant range
subsequent reignition to provide sufficient velocity for escape safety equipment which will effect engtne cutoff and
miuiom including the lunar missions.
propeSant dispersion in ,the event of a launch abort after
liftoff. Engine cutoff results from closing valves and
LAUNCH VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT terminating the flow of fuel and oxidizer. Propellant is
disperaed by detonating linear-shaped charges, .thereby
The Saturn launch vehicles are the product of a long longitudinally opening the propellant tanks.
evolutionary process stemming from initial studim in 1957 of
SuqwS_ration
the Redstone and Jupiter missiles. Eady conceptual studies
included outer proven missiles such as Thor and Titan, and
conddered payloads ranging from earth orbiting satellites to The separation of the launch vehkle stages in flight required
manned spacecraft such as Dynasoar, Mercury, Gemini. and desfljn studies Involving consideration of many parameters.
eventually Apollo. such as time of separation, vehicle position, vehicle attitude.
'singieor dual plane separation, and the type. qnantity.and
location of ordnance.
The Saturn V launch vehicle evolved from the earlier Saturn
vehicles as a result of the decision in 1961to proceed with the
Apollo manned hmar mission. As the Apollo mission The launch vehicle stages separate in flight by explosively
definition became clear, conceptual design studies were severing a circumferential separation joint and firing
made, considering such parameters as structural dynamics, retrococket motors to decelerate the spent stage. Stage
stalPng dynamics, and propvlsiun dynamicL separation is initiated when stage thrust decay_ to a vah0e
equal to or less than 10%of rated thrust. A short crest mode
is used to allow sep_r_.._on of the spent stage, and to effect
Design trade-offs were made in certain areas to optimize the
ullage settling of the _cces_,e stage prior to engine ignitio|,.
launch vehicle design, based on minion requirements. The
beat combination of design parameters for liquid propellant
A delayed dual plane separation is employed between the
vehicles resulted in low accelerations and low dynamic loads.
S-IC and S-II stages, while a *ingle plane separation is
Reliability, performance and weight were among primary adequate between the S-I! and S-IVB stages.
factors considered in optimizing the design.
OmbilicMs
Structural daslgn carefully considered the weight factor.
Structural rigidity requirements were dictated largely by two In the design and placement of vehicle plates, conskleration
general considerations: flight control dynamics and was given to such things as size. locations, methods of
propellant slceh problems. Gross dimensions (diameter & attachment, release, and retraction.
length) were dictated generally by propellant tankage size.
i
The number of umbilicals is minimited hy the ¢ombining of
As propulsion req.irements were identified, wstem electrical connecttws and pneumatic and propellant ¢o.pli.g_
characteristics emerged: thrmt levels, burning times. into common umbilical carrie_. I.ocation of the tlmhili¢:|ls
propellant types and quantities. From these data, enline depended upon the location of the vehicle plates, which were
requiremente and characteristics were identified, and the limited somewhat by the propellant tanking, plumbing, and
dealjn and development of the total launch vehicle wiring runs inside the vehicle structure. Um'.)ilical di_onnec!
continued, centered around the propulsion systems. and retraction systems are redundant for reasons of reliability
and mfety.
Some of the principal design ground rules developed during
Electrical Systems
the conceptual phase, which were applied inthe final design,
are discmsed in the following Peralraphs.
An electrical load analysis of the launleh vehicl_ pr_,vi,le,,I the
I-I
in
GENERAL DESCRIPTION
incorporation of design features which will enable the flight Long distance water transportation for the Saturn V stages is
crew to detect and react effectively to abnormal by converted Navy barges and landing ship dock type ocean
circumstances. This permits the flight crew to abort safely if vessels. Tie-down systems provide restraint during transit.
Ocean vessels are capable of ballasting to mate with barges
the condition is dangerous or to continue the normal mission
in an alternate mode if crew safety is not involved but and dock facilities for roll-on/roll-off loading. Docks are
located at MSFC, KSC, Michoud, MTF, and Seal Beach,
equipment is not operating properly.
California (near Los Angeles).
Failure Effects and Criticality Analyses
Air transportation is effected by use of a modified Boeing
The modes of failure for every critical component of each B-377 (Super Guppy) aircraft. This system provides quick
reaction time for suitable cargo requiring transcontinental
system are identified. The effect of each failure mode on the
operation of the system is analyzed, and those parts shipments. For ease in loading and unloading the aircraft,
contributing most to unreliability are identified. These compatible ground support lift trailers are utilized.
analyses have resulted in the identification of mission
A Saturn transportation summary is presented in figure 1-2.
compromising, single-point failures, and have aided in the
determination of redundancy requirements and/or design
LAUNCH VEHICLE DESCRIPTION
changes.
GENERALARRANGEMENT
Design Reviews
The Saturn V/Apollo general configuration is illustrated in
A systematic design review of every part, component,
subsystem, and system has been performed using figure 1-3. Also included are tables of engine data, gross
comprehensive check lists, failure effects analysis, criticality vehicl%dimensions and weights, ullage and retrorocket data,
ratings, and reliability predictions. These techniques have and stage contractors.
enabled the designer to review the design approach for
INTERSTAGE DATA FLOW
problems not uncovered in previous analyses. In the R & QA
area, the prelimina_ design review (PDR) and critical design
In order for the Saturn V launch vehicle and Apollo
review (CDR) required by the Apollo Program Directive No.
6 represents specialized application of this discipline. spacecraft to accomplish their objectives, a continuous flow
of data is necessary throughout the vehicle. Data flow is in
both directions: from spacecraft to stages, and from stages to
VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT FLOW
the spacecraft. The IU serves as a central data processor, and
nearly all data flows through the IU.
Principal milestones in the hardware and mission phases of
the Apollo program are shown in figure lq.
Specific data has been categorized and tabulated to reflect, in
figure 1-4, the type of data generated, its source and its flow.
Certification and Review Schedules
Each stage interface also includes a confidence loop, wired in
series through interstage electrical connectors, which assures
Certificates of Flight Worthiness (COFW) function as a
the Launch Vehicle Digital Computer (LVDC) in the IU that
certification and review instrument. A COFW is generated for
these connectors are mated satisfactorily.
each major piece of flight hardware. The certificate originates
at the manufacturing facility, and is shipped with the
RANGE SAFETY AND INSTRUMENTATION
hardware wherever it goes to provide a time phased historical
record of the item's test results, modifications, failures, and
GENERAL
repairs.
In view of the hazards inherent in missile/space vehicle
The MSFC flight readiness review (MSFC-FRR), the
countdown demonstration test (CDDT) and the manned programs, certain stringent safety requirements have been
established for the Air Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR).
spaceflight-flight readiness review (MSF-FRR) provide
assessments of launch vehicle, spacecraft and launch facility Figure 1-5 illustrates the launch azimuth limits and destruct
azimuth limits for the Atlantic Missile Range (AMR).
readiness. During the final reviews, the decision is made as to
when deployment of the world wide mission support forces
Prime responsibility and authority for overall range safety is
should begin.
vested in the Commander, AFETR, Patrick AFB, Florida.
However, under a joint agreement between DOD and NASA,
TRANSPORTATION
ground safety within the confines of the Kennedy Space
Center will be managed by NASA.
The Saturn stage transportation system provides reliable and
economical transportation for stages and special payloads
To minimize the inherent hazards of the Saturn/Apollo
between manufacturing areas, test areas and KSC. The
program, a number of safety plans have been developed and
various modes of transportation encompass land, water, and
implemented in accordance with AFETR regulations.
air routes.
These plans cover all phases of the Saturn/Apollo program
Each stage in the Saturn V system requires a specially
from design, through launch of the vehicle, into orbit.
designed transporter for accomplishing short distance land
moves at manufacturing, test, and launch facilities. These
To enhance the development and implementation of the
transporters have been designed to be compatible with
manufacturing areas, dock facility roll-on/roll-o ff range safety program, two general safety categories have been
established: ground safety and flight safety.
requirements, and to satisfy stage protection requirements.
1-3
• ._.-. • .''
, . . .." • . ,
Such acto s as rehabdlty, weig..h..t. hmltatlons, and weight
equipment. However, at approximately T-50
distributions dictated the requirements to minimize electrical seconds, power is transferred to the launch vehicle
wiring, yet distribute the electrical loads and power sources
batteries, and final vehicle systems monitoring is
throughout the launch vehicle. Each stage of the vehicle has accomplished.
its own independent electrical system. No electrical power is
transferred between stages; only control signals are routed 2. While in the launch area, environmental control
between stages.
within the launch vehicle is provided by
environmental control systems in the mobile
Primary flight power is supplied by wet cell batteries in each
launcher (ML) and on the pad. The IU also utilizes
stage. The sizes, types, and characteristics are discussed in
an equipment cooling system, in which heat is
subsequent sections of this manual. Where alternating removed by circulation of a methanol-water coolant.
current, or direct current with a higher voltage than the During preflight, heat is removed from the coolant
batteries is required, inverters and/or converters convert the by a Ground Support Equipment (GSE) cooling
battery power to the voltages and frequencies needed. system located on the ML. During flight, heat is
removed from the coolant by a water sublimator
All stages of the launch vehicle are electrically bonded system.
together to provide aunipotential structure, and to minimize
current transfer problems in the common side of the power 3. While in transit between assembly area and launch
systems. area, or while in the launch area for launch
preparations, the assembled launch vehicle must
MANUFACTURE AND LAUNCH CONCEPTS withstand the natural environment. The launch
vehicle is designed to withstand 99.9% winds during
The development of the vehicle concept required concurrent the strongest wind month, while either free standing
efforts in the areas of design, manufacture, transportation, or under transport, with the damper system
assembly, checkout, and launch. attached. In the event of a nearby explosion of a
facility or launch vehicle, the Saturn V will also
The size and complexity of the vehicle resulted in the withstand a peak overpressure of 0.4 psi.
decision to have detail design and manufacture of each of the
three stages, the Instrument Unit (1U), and the engines 4. To more smoothly control engine ignition, thrust
accomplished by separate contractors under the direction of buildup and liftoff of the vehicle, restraining arms
MSFC.
provide support and holddown at four points around
\ . the base of the S-IC stage. A gradual controlled
This design/manufacturing approach required the release is accomplished during the first six inches of
development of production plans and controls, and vertical motion.
transportation and handling systems capable of handling the
massive sections. RELIABILITY AND QUALITY ASSURANCE
The assembly, checkout, and launch of the vehicle required The Apollo Program Office, MA, has the overall
the development of an extensive industrial complex at KSC. responsibility for development and implementation of the
Some of the basic ground rules which resulted in the KSC Apollo reliability and quality assurance (R & QA) program.
complex described in Section VIII are: NASA Centers are responsible for identifying and establishing
R & QA requirements and for implementing an R & QA
l. The vehicle will be assembled and checked out 2n a program to the extent necessary to assure the satisfactory
protected environment before being moved to the performance of the hardware for which they are responsible.
launch site. The Apollo R & QA program is defined by the Apollo
Program Development Plan, M-D MA 500 and Apollo R &
2. A final checkout will be performed at the launch site QA Program Plan, NHB 5300-1A.
prior to launch.
Crew safety and mission success are the main elements
3. Once the assembly is complete, the vehicle will be around which the R & QA program is built. The primary
transported in the erect position without criterion governing the design of the Apollo system is that of
disconnecting the umbilicals. achieving mission success without unacceptable risk of life or
permanent physical disablement of the crew.
4. Automatic checkout equipment will be required.
It is Apollo program policy to use all currently applicable
5. The control center and checkout equipment will be methods to ensure the reliability and quality of
located away from the launch area. Apollo/Saturn systems. Some of these methods are discussed
in subsequent paragraphs.
LAUNCH .REQUI REMENTS
Analysis of Mission Profiles
Some of the launch requirements which have developed from
the application of these ground rules are: The mission profile is analyzed to deternfine the type and
scope of demands made on equipment and flight crew during
1. Several days prior to the actual launch time, the each phase of the mission. This has resulted in the
l-2
f
mmutl, lum_
i/
Q
,at.."
Fi_u_ I-i
1.4
ChRn|ed 5 October 1969
L I.,,,
"1
m__r
azmut_t mat'mnmw
0
+i
Figure 1-2
GROUND SAFETY
5. Special Preca_tionary Procedures, This i_kage
The ground safety program includes a ground safety plan covers pmsible umafe conditions and includes
which calls for the development of safety packages. The fightning safeguards, use of complex test equipment.
major catesories covered by these packages are: and radiological te_i_.
I. Vehicle Destruct System. This package includes a Also included under ground safety arc provisions for launch
system description, circuit descriptions. _hern_tics. area surveillance during launch: activities. Surveillance
ordnance system description, specifications, RF methods include helicoptef_, search radars, and rangesecurity
system description, installation, and checkout Personnel. Automatk- plotting boards keep the range safety
procedures. officer (RSO) informed of any intn_n into the launch
danger zones by boats or aircraft.
2.
Ordnance Devices. This package includes descriptive
information on chemical composition and To further assist the RSO in monitoring launch _lety. a
characteristics, mechanical anti electrical considerable amount of ground instrumentation i_ u._d A
specifications and drawings, and electrical hridgewtre vertical-wire sky _reen provides a visual rel_'ren,:e tl_.tt
data. during the initial pha_ of the laun,:h t(_ m_mlt(_r vehh.'Ic
attitude anti positk)n. Television systems phot(_raphmlz lilt'
Propellants. This package includes descriptive data launch vehicle from dlfferen! angle_ _l_t_ pro)vide, _.i_u,_'
on chemical con)position, (luantilies of each lype. reft.rence. Pulsed ;ind ('W traL'km_ r;Id_ir_ [intl rc:tl Imlc
locations in the vehicle, handling pnx'edures, and lelemetry dal;i pr(widc all t'h'ctrtml¢. _ky _,.'rt.e,= _h_ h
hazards. di_ltl:l(y)_natlt()n)alli_ch_liilhl_g);li(I:sl.nt_|'Is;ttlti5ltC'l'lllt'.,l
l]igllIlr;ljeClorpy;Ir'llllelcr_.
4.
Iligh Pressure Sy._lenl_ "l'hi,_package Inch,lt.s lype_
of gase._, vehicle _tl()ragt, hh:;lli()n% I'tre_tlre_. _llltl Inlh_.t0VCltllli:tIllk.I;itt_cvht'h,_Idtc,_iJlt.l,l,t,__I_I_I.H_.,I
ha/artl_.
lilt" I(_() rlltl_l Cttlnflt;lllt| th",tltlCl 1_+ li+t',llt*+ *_r th+" l.llt_'t