Anarchy, State And Public Choice PDF
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Anarchy, State and Public Choice NEWTHINKING IN POLITICALECONOMY Series Editor: PeterJ. Boettke George Mason University, USA New Thinking in Political Economy aims to encourage scholarship in the intersection of the disciplines of politics, philosophy and economics. It has the ambitious purpose of reinvigorating political economy as a progressive force for understanding social and economic change. The series is an important forum for the publication of new work analysing the social world from a multidisciplinary perspective. With increased specialization (and professionalization) within universities, interdisciplinary work has become increasingly uncommon. Indeed, during the 20th century, the process of disciplinary specialization reduced the intersection between economics, philosophy and politics and impoverished our understanding of society. Modern economics in particular has become increasingly mathematical and largely ignores the role of institutions and the contribution of moral philosophy and politics. New Thinking in Political Economy will stimulate new work that combines technical knowledge provided by the ‘dismal science’and the wisdom gleaned from the serious study of the ‘worldly philosophy’. The series will reinvigorate our understanding of the social world by encouraging a multidisciplinary approach to the challenges confronting society in the new century. Recent titles in the series include: Explaining Constitutional Change APositive Economics Approach Stefan Voigt Ethics as Social Science The Moral Philosophy of Social Cooperation Leland B. Yeager Markets, Planning and Democracy Essays after the Collapse of Communism David L. Prychitko Governance and Economic Development AComparative Institutional Approach Joachim Ahrens Constitutions, Markets and Law Recent Experiences in Transition Economies Edited by Stefan Voigt and Hans-Jürgen Wagener Austrian Economics and the Political Economy of Freedom Richard M. Ebeling Anarchy, State and Public Choice Edited by Edward Stringham Anarchy, State and Public Choice Edited by Edward Stringham San Jose State University, USA NEWTHINKING IN POLITICALECONOMY Edward Elgar Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA ©Edward Stringham, 2005 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited Glensanda House Montpellier Parade Cheltenham Glos GL50 1UA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 136 West Street Suite 202 Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA Acatalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 1 84542 240 6 Typeset by Cambrian Typesetters, Camberley, Surrey Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall Contents List of figures vii List of contributors ix Acknowledgements x 1 Introduction 1 Edward Stringham 2 Individual welfare in anarchy 10 Winston Bush 3 Jungle or just Bush? Anarchy and the evolution of cooperation 24 Jason Osborne 4 The edge of the jungle 36 Gordon Tullock 5 Social interaction without the state 49 Christopher Coyne 6 Towards a theory of the evolution of government 60 J. Patrick Gunning 7 Do contracts require formal enforcement? 67 Peter T. Leeson 8 Before public choice 77 James M. Buchanan 9 Public choice and Leviathan 88 Benjamin Powell 10 Cases in anarchy 98 Thomas Hogarty 11 Defining anarchy as rock ’n’roll: rethinking Hogarty’s three cases 113 Virgil Storr 12 Private property anarchism: an American variant 123 Laurence Moss v vi Contents 13 Anarchism and the theory of power 153 Warren Samuels 14 Polycentrism and power: a reply to Warren Samuels 178 Scott Beaulier 15 Reflections after three decades 191 James M. Buchanan 16 Anarchy 194 Gordon Tullock 17 Tullock on anarchy 200 Jeffrey Rogers Hummel 18 Anarchism as a progressive research program in political economy 206 Peter J. Boettke Index 221 Figures 2.1 Income–effort curve 14 2.2 Reaction curves 15 3.1 Signal detection and the receiver operating characteristic curve 30 3.2 Prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix 31 3.3 Outcomes under different punishment regimes 33 6.1 Bribe function 62 6.2 Threat function 63 8.1 Law-abiding behavior and welfare 80 8.2 Payoff matrix for choices to observe law 82 9.1 Payoff matrix for choices to respect property rights 89 9.2 Payoff matrix for choices to obey social contract 91 vii Contributors Scott Beaulier, School of Business and Economics, Mercer University, Macon, GA, USA. Peter J. Boettke, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA. James M. Buchanan, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA. Winston Bush (1941–73), Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, VA, USA. Christopher Coyne, Department of Economics, Hampden-Sydney College, Hampden-Sydney, VA, USA. J. Patrick Gunning, College of Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan. Thomas Hogarty, Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, VA, USA. Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Department of Economics, San Jose State University, CA, USA. Peter T. Leeson, Department of Economics, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, USA. Laurence Moss, Department of Economics, Babson College, Wellesley, MA, USA. Jason Osborne, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA. Benjamin Powell, Department of Economics, San Jose State University, CA, USA. Warren Samuels, Department of Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA. Virgil Storr, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA. Edward Stringham, Department of Economics, San Jose State University, CA, USA. Gordon Tullock, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA. ix Acknowledgements I am thankful to the late Winston Bush, who persuaded public choice econo- mists to study anarchy three decades ago. Their initial work at the Center for the Study of Public Choice is the impetus for this volume. I was fortunate enough to take classes from James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock at George Mason University. On many occasions I heard how rewarding their collabora- tive project on anarchism had been, so I decided that the younger economists at George Mason University should take up the issue once more. Thanks go to these six contributors at George Mason University for doing such a great job. It has been a pleasure working with them, and I learned a lot. I also thank Buchanan, Tullock, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel and Peter Boettke for writing comments. At various dates in 2002 the articles were presented at George Mason University, the Association for Private Enterprise Education Conference, the Austrian Scholars Conference, and a symposium on the topic at the Mercatus Center, so thanks go to those who gave comments there, including Bryan Caplan and Tyler Cowen. I appreciate Jeffrey Tucker for advising me to move forward at the initial stage of this project, and I appreciate Alan Sturmer, Tara Gorvine, Caroline Cornish and those at Edward Elgar Publishing for their work at latter stages. I also thank Tullock for allowing us to reprint the original essays. Tullock is a great professor who never misses an opportunity to deride anarchism, but he has been very encouraging in his unique way. Most of all, I thank Peter Boettke for all his encouragement and support. All the young contributors to the volume wrote their dissertation under Peter Boettke, and we are grateful for that. Without Boettke, none of this would have been possible. This book is dedicated to him. x
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